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Abstract 
There has long been a connection between the concept of utopia as a perfect 
society and the desire for perfect humans to live in this society. A form of 
selective breeding takes place in many fictional utopias from Plato’s Republic 
onwards, but it is only with the naming and promotion of eugenics by Francis 
Galton in the late nineteenth century that eugenics becomes a consistent and 
important component of utopian fiction. In my introduction I argue that behind 
the desire for eugenic fitness within utopias resides a sense that human nature 
needs improving. Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859) prompted fears of 
degeneration, and eugenics was seen as a means of restoring purpose and 
control. Chapter Two examines the impact of Darwin’s ideas on the late 
nineteenth-century utopia through contrasting the evolutionary fears of Samuel 
Butler’s Erewhon (1872) with Edward Bellamy’s more positive view of the 
potential of evolution in Looking Backward (1888). Chapter Three uses 
examples from three late-nineteenth-century feminist utopias to highlight the 
aspirations within these societies to use science to transform women’s social 
position and transcend the biological determinism of their reproductive role. 
Chapter Four focuses on the social theory and utopian fiction of Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman to illustrate how eugenics becomes part of her vision of 
progress for women and the human race as a whole. Chapter Five turns to 
dystopian fiction from H.G. Wells, Aldous Huxley, Yevgeny Zamyatin, Charlotte 
Haldane and Katherine Burdekin to examine how eugenic ideas retained an 
element of idealism even in the context of the dystopias of the first half of the 
twentieth century. Chapter Six looks at the fate of eugenics in utopian fiction 
after the Second World War and argues that the resurgence of utopianism in 
the form of the ecological utopia continue to rely on eugenics, population control 
and manipulation of human behaviour to succeed. My conclusion argues that 
eugenics is a utopian idea with enduring appeal despite the disastrous effects of 
its practical implementation, and that utopian and dystopian fiction offer an 
important lens through which to understand the hopes and fears represented by 
the different versions of eugenics and the current debates over genetic 
enhancements and transhumanism.  
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1. Introduction 
Historically there has always been a tension between the idea of the 
perfect society and the reality of human behaviour. Eutopia, the good society, is 
also outopia, nowhere land, a recognition that the perfect society cannot exist in 
our present world. However, by the nineteenth century, social reformers, 
inspired by revolutionary ideals and the scientific advances of the day, believed 
that utopia could be created in the real world. Real utopians communities such 
as New Lanark or Brook Farm testify to this. But so also do the works of utopian 
fiction of this era, which whilst retaining fantastical and satirical trappings, focus 
largely on social reform. Scientists too thought utopia might be achievable. 
Eugenics, the movement for improving the genetic quality of human populations 
through directed breeding, offered the hope of creating better people to make 
utopian ideas a reality. Francis Galton, who coined the term “eugenics” in 1883, 
suggested that watching for opportunities to intervene in the process of 
evolution could ensure that “the Utopias in the dreamland of philanthropists may 
become practical possibilities” (“Presidential” 12). Alongside the drive to make 
utopian dreams a reality, late-nineteenth-century writers of utopian fiction were 
confronted with the implications of Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859) and 
Descent of Man (1871) which changed the popular perception of humans from 
divinely created beings to malleable, ever-evolving descendants of animals. The 
concept of evolution troubled the imagination of writers such as Edward Bulwer-
Lytton, Samuel Butler and H. G. Wells, calling into question the inevitability of 
progress. Evolution by natural selection appeared random and purposeless, 
leading to fears of degeneration, a discourse popularised in Ray Lankester’s 
Degeneration: A Chapter in Darwinism (1880) and Max Nordau’s Degeneration 
(1892). Worse still, the citizens of utopia might not even be human, but the 
super-evolved descendants of humanity, to whom humans would merely be 
equivalent to primitive animals. 
All these elements led to an interest in controlling evolution and 
harnessing its powers for utopian ends, through replacing natural selection with 
artificial selection. It was felt that if farmers could improve their stock by 
breeding from their best animals, then humans could potentially do the same by 
encouraging the best people to breed. The idea was not new. Plato suggested it 
in The Republic, and the nineteenth-century Oneida Community attempted to 
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put it into practice under the earlier name of stirpiculture. What was new about 
Galton’s eugenics was that it put the breeding of humans on an apparently 
scientific basis, backed up by a whole statistical machinery of tables and 
formulae from the Eugenics Laboratory (founded in 1907) and the academic 
credibility of a Chair of Eugenics at University College London, from 1911 
onwards. Eugenics was also taken up by social reformers who lobbied for 
eugenic policies to encourage the fit to breed more and the weak and feeble-
minded to breed less. Writers of utopian fiction experimented with these ideas in 
their work, hoping to force evolution into an upward trajectory which would back 
up their social imaginings. Eugenics also appealed to the imagination of female 
writers of utopian fiction, offering women an important role in the evolution of 
the human race as wives and mothers, and also through their political 
aspirations to create a more moral society which would promote the mental and 
physical health of future generations.  
In my thesis, I explore the connection between the concept of utopia as a 
perfect society and eugenics, with its negative connotations and horrific 
consequences when applied in the real world. I argue that utopian ideas helped 
form eugenics and that eugenic ideas circulating within utopian and dystopian 
fiction from the late nineteenth century onwards supported the idea that 
eugenics would improve society. I see utopian fiction as a valuable parallel 
record to the scientific and social texts on eugenics. As a genre, it sits part-way 
between polemic and imaginative fiction, offering a site for testing the 
indeterminacies and ambitions of eugenics and helping to understand its origins 
and eventual popularity. My project will focus on readings of the politics, beliefs 
and ideologies surrounding reproduction and the perfectibility of human nature 
in utopian and dystopian fictions involving scientific improvements to humans or 
society. I will consider the role of science in the formulation of utopian texts, as 
well as the ambition of utopian texts to influence the direction of science and 
society, at a time when the boundaries between scientists and writers were 
more fluid than they are today. 
 
1.1 Eugenics and Utopian Fiction 
Historical and literary studies of eugenics have undergone a resurgence 
in the twenty-first century. The silence about eugenics in the aftermath of World 
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War Two and the eagerness of those involved in sterilisation programmes to 
disassociate themselves from the Nazi campaigns led to secrecy and a 
reluctance to admit to wrong-doing. It is only in recent years that society has 
begun to face up to the former popularity of eugenic ideas, not just in Germany 
but all round the world, as well as their persistence in various guises after the 
Second World War. Breakthroughs in genetic science and work on codifying the 
human genome have also led to fears of eugenics being reintroduced in a new 
form and fuelled interest in understanding the history and ideology of eugenics. 
Daniel J. Kevles’s seminal work on the history of eugenics In the Name of 
Eugenics (1985) was motivated by recognition “that the subject [of eugenics] 
casts a shadow over all contemporary discourse concerning human genetic 
manipulation” (xiii). Other historical studies focussing on specific aspects of 
eugenics have followed, including Richard A. Soloway’s Demography and 
Degeneration (1990), which shows how important questions of population and 
birth control are to eugenics, and Marius Turda’s Modernism and Eugenics 
(2010) which offers an international perspective on eugenics in the build-up to 
the Second World War. There are also important recent publications on post-
war eugenics, including Stefan Kühl’s For the Betterment of the Race (English 
edition 2013) and Sterilized by the State (2013) by Randall Hansen and 
Desmond King, which dispute the myth that eugenics disappeared after the 
Second World War. The 2010 publication of The Oxford Handbook of the 
History of Eugenics, edited by Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine, shows the 
diversity of work being conducted in the study of the history of eugenics 
throughout Europe, America, India and Latin America. In 2008, there was also a 
special issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C dedicated 
to “Eugenics, sex and the state” in which Lesley Hall, in her introductory 
remarks, made the important point that “we should be talking about ‘eugenicses’ 
rather than a coherent and stable ‘eugenics’” (177). She argued that “the simple 
use of the term as if it were monolithic and unproblematic tends to occlude vast 
differences of meaning accorded to it by different cultures, by different 
individuals and different movements” (177). The resulting selection of papers 
showed that dealing with the history of eugenics needs to go beyond what 
Richard Overy describes in the Afterword as the twin obsessions with “the 
experience of the Third Reich” and “American and Swedish sterilisation policy” 
(270). Overy argues that these papers also recognise the many reasons why 
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people engaged with eugenics, including “Utopian aspirations for the ideal 
modern community” (272). My project situates itself in this area of research into 
the multiple meanings of eugenics and the recognition that as well as being 
coercive, reductionist and scientistic, at times and for some people, eugenics 
also appeared to be utopian.  
The study of eugenics through the lens of literature is as important for 
understanding the popular appeal of eugenics as historical studies. Angelique 
Richardson combined historical and literary perspectives in Love and Eugenics 
(2003), which used research on New Woman writers to show the importance of 
the relationship between early feminism and eugenics. My project, although not 
exclusively about eugenics and feminism, also interrogates the eugenic dreams 
of women, though through the more overt fantasies of social improvement by 
writers of feminist utopian fiction. The essay that first sparked my interest in 
eugenics and the paradoxical appeal of eugenics to otherwise progressive 
writers was David Bradshaw’s “Eugenics: ‘they should certainly be killed’” 
(2003) with its shocking roll-call of modernist writers in agreement with 
eugenics. Many of these writers are discussed in more depth in Donald J. 
Childs’s Modernism and Eugenics: Woolf, Eliot, Yeats and the Culture of 
Degeneration (2001), a work which shows the impact of eugenics in British 
modernist circles. More recently, Clare Hanson demonstrated in Eugenics, 
Literature, and Culture in Post-War Britain (2013) that literary interest in 
eugenics did not disappear after the Second World War. She combines 
readings of post-war literature with a critique of eugenic elements of British 
culture, in particular the Welfare State, which she argues was set up by 
eugenicists with a eugenic agenda and eugenic preconceptions. 
Hanson’s work also illustrates the potential for discomfort when writing 
about eugenics, as the subject remains sensitive, and any association with 
eugenics has the potential to destroy sacred myths, and taint or contaminate 
the people or institutions concerned. This is certainly the case with utopian 
fiction. Much scholarship on eugenics in individual works of utopian fiction 
considers eugenics as an aberration or mistake, or else evidence of the writer 
holding intellectually abhorrent views in general. This is particularly true in the 
case of H.G. Wells, Aldous Huxley and Charlotte Perkins Gilman, as Chapters 
Three, Four and Five will illustrate. Even more general studies of eugenics in 
utopian fiction, such as Patrick Parrinder’s “Eugenics and Utopia: Sexual 
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selection from Galton to Morris” (1997) involve a certain amount of questioning 
of reputations. My approach is to read the eugenics of utopian fiction writers 
within their historical context in a way that accepts the contradictions of the day 
without accusations, while at the same time not condoning racism, class 
prejudice, anti-disability rhetoric or other discriminatory attitudes. My intention in 
arguing that eugenics played a significant role in utopian thinking from the late 
nineteenth century onwards is not to support the argument that all utopian ideas 
are dangerous, but to look at how utopianism can give expression to popular 
wishes, work as a thought-experiment or explore the gaps between utopian 
thought and practice. This study is based on the premise that utopianism is an 
important intellectual activity whether in the form of social theory, fiction or 
utopian communities, and that utopian fiction has the potential to have the 
widest influence of all three, as can be seen by the high sales of works such 
Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward and Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia. 
There has been much written on the form and purpose of utopianism. 
Krishan Kumar, for example, in Utopia and Anti-Utopia in Modern Times (1987) 
argues that the literary form of utopia is not important as very few utopias are 
great works of literature, and many authors are perfunctory in their use of the 
form (25). While there is much truth in this observation, I think form repays 
analysis and that fictional elements, particularly the ultimate fate of the 
protagonist (for example, do they stay in utopia, marry, leave, escape, get 
thrown out?) says a lot about the attractiveness of the utopia, and the writer’s 
engagement with it. Non-fiction written in the utopian mode (the writers that 
Kumar suggests are Rousseau, Saint Simon, Marx and Engels) does not have 
this extra viewpoint which often provides a commentary on the most serious of 
utopian projects, and occasionally shows where authors have problems with 
accepting their own ideas. Tom Moylan uses the term “critical utopia” to 
describe the more sophisticated utopias of the 1970s which offer a critique of 
the utopian societies they envisage. While none of the earlier utopias I examine 
could be termed “critical utopias”, most of them contain some form of critique, 
however muted, of aspects of their perfect society. Some also see utopianism 
as a process of improvement, a model which Erin McKenna recommends in 
The Task of Utopia: A Pragmatist and Feminist Perspective (2001). Evolution, 
as H.G. Wells argued, put an end to the static utopia, but, as I discuss in 
Chapter One, replaced it with nightmare visions of inhuman perfection. 
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Eugenics, on the other hand, made it possible to imagine gradual 
improvements, generation by generation. McKenna bases her process model of 
utopia on the pragmatist philosophy of nineteenth-century thinker John Dewey, 
whose ideas have much in common with the utopian fiction inspired by 
evolution, including an interest in the power of intelligence to directly and 
consciously address social problems, and an awareness of the need of 
adapting to the physical and social environment to survive (McKenna 92-3). 
Ruth Levitas’s argument in Utopia as Method (2013) for seeing utopianism at 
the end of the nineteenth century as “speculative sociology of the future” (83), 
also fits well with my study. Levitas’s claim was certainly true of Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman, who wrote a number of utopian works to illustrate her social 
theory, and H.G. Wells, who argued that “the creation of utopias – and their 
exhaustive criticism - is the proper and distinctive method of sociology” (“So-
Called” 204). 
The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur is one of the many twentieth-
century commentators who distrusts the concept of utopia, describing it as 
having a “pejorative reputation” and representing “a social dream without 
concern for the real first steps necessary for movement in the direction of a new 
society” (1-2). Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel in Utopian Thought in the 
Western World (1979), a comprehensive study of utopian philosophy, have a 
more positive but equally visionary concept of utopianists, claiming that “They 
have discovered truths that other men have only vaguely sensed or have 
refused to recognize. The utopian often emerges as a man with a deeper 
understanding of the drift of his society than the hardheaded problem-solver 
with their nose to the grindstone of the present, blind to potentiality” (28). 
However, the vast majority of the utopian works of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century do not conform to either of these stereotypes. They were 
written by women as well as men. They were often practical as well as fanciful, 
sometimes offering complete blueprints for their realisation, sometimes simply 
satirising social trends.1 Most of the texts I examine contain not blueprints as 
such but alternative versions of reality that provide the chance to see how 
society would work if certain changes were made. They also offer, as Matthew 
                                                          
1 See for example Howard P. Segal’s Technological Utopianism in American Culture where he 
offers blueprints from twenty-five American technological utopias from the late nineteenth 
century or early twentieth century.  
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Beaumont suggests, valuable means of viewing social ideology in action 
(Utopia 6), or, in the case of eugenics, reading the hopes for eugenic 
improvement without the determinism of our current historical knowledge. 
As has already been suggested, the relationship between utopian fiction 
and eugenics predates Galton’s coining of the term eugenics in 1883. Peter 
Morton in The Vital Science: Biology and the Literary Imagination (1984) 
asserted that “Eugenics was indeed a component in most of the Utopian writing 
after 1870”, usually in the form of state regulation of parenting (129). Others 
have also found eugenic tendencies in utopian fiction going back to Plato and 
Campanella. John Carey is referring to eugenics in the introduction to The 
Faber Book of Utopias (1999) when he argues that: “How to beget excellent 
offspring has always been a prime utopian concern, and it offers, supposing it 
could be made to work, an absolutely fool-proof way of replacing real people 
with utopians” (xvii). Parrinder too takes a historical stance to argue that the 
“traditional utopia” relies as much on eugenics as “on stability, social 
stratification and the abolition of private property.” For him, reference to perfect 
beauty is enough to signify “a deliberate or inadvertent eugenic policy” 
(“Eugenics and Utopia” 1). In a similar vein, my research does not confine itself 
to what is labelled as eugenics, but looks for ideas of evolution, control of 
breeding, optimism (or pessimism) about human nature, and racial 
improvement. My focus is on understanding the various strands of social and 
scientific discourse which have contributed to the eugenic content of utopian 
fiction and discovering what the importance of eugenics in these works actually 
means for an understanding of eugenics. 
The link between dystopian fiction and eugenics is, on the face of it, 
more obvious. Yet, as I discuss in my fourth chapter, eugenics is not always 
seen as dystopian, even in dystopias. The relationship between utopia and 
dystopia remains a contested one. Utopian fiction was the dominant genre at 
the start of the twentieth century, and dystopianism was largely defined in 
opposition to it. Dystopias were simply known as anti-utopias until the 1960s, 
and were historically seen either as parasitically dependent on utopia, or as a 
form of parody. Gary Morson calls dystopia “an anti-genre” (115) while Kumar 
defines dystopia as the distorted image of utopia (100). Satires on utopia, such 
as Jonathan Swift’s Laputa or Samuel Butler’s Erewhon (1872), still tend to be 
classified as utopian. Even Thomas More’s Utopia can be seen as being as 
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much satire as serious proposal for improving the world. If utopia itself is 
dystopian, then it is also important to recognise that dystopias are in some 
sense utopian. Many dystopias have been written by writers who also write 
utopias, such as H.G. Wells and Aldous Huxley, or by those who hold arguably 
utopian political beliefs such as Yevgeny Zamyatin and George Orwell. Others 
have been written from the standpoint of a future utopian outcome to dystopian 
oppression such as Jack London’s The Iron Heel (1908) and Margaret Atwood’s 
The Handmaid’s Tale (1985). This ambivalence at the heart of dystopia makes 
the role of eugenics in dystopian fiction especially revealing, as there is often a 
utopian element to the representation of eugenics in these works, or an 
attraction to eugenic ideas notwithstanding their negative consequences. In the 
next section I will look at these utopian elements in more details, through an 
analysis of what eugenicists themselves saw as utopian in the idea of eugenics. 
 
1.2 What is Utopian about Eugenics? The Utopianism of Eugenics 
 
The history of eugenics as an ideology used to justify enforced 
sterilisation, racist immigration policies and anti-semitic racial cleansing makes 
eugenics seem anything but utopian, particularly when considering the atrocities 
of Nazi eugenics. However, it should be remembered that nineteenth-century 
eugenics began as a narrative about improving the human species, and was at 
the time seen by some as a genuine hope for a better future. This section of my 
introduction investigates the latent utopianism of this broader concept of 
eugenics, as a framework for understanding how eugenics came to be such an 
important element in utopian fiction. It also introduces the question of whether it 
was the specific historical circumstances of the development of eugenics in 
Europe and America that led to the disastrous trajectory of eugenics or the 
utopian ideas behind it. This question is particularly relevant to the ethical 
issues being raised by advances in genetic engineering. 
 “Hereditary Talent and Character”, Galton’s first two-part article 
proposing the idea of the hereditability of mental and moral characteristics, 
contained a reference to a rather modest meritocratic utopia where those with 
good exam results would be given financial incentives to marry each other. 
Published in Macmillan Magazine in 1865, the first part of the article showed the 
preliminary results of Galton’s investigation of how eminence, as defined by 
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biographical dictionaries, tended to run in families, an argument which he would 
advance in more detail in the book Hereditary Genius (1869). In the second part 
of the article, Galton supplemented the positive eugenics of his initial scenario 
with the negative eugenics of discouraging the less talented from breeding. 
There is no utopian fantasy presented to sell this idea, only the cold facts of a 
statistical elimination of caste B, “the refuse”, by caste A, those “selected for 
natural gifts” (319). This article neatly demonstrates the discontinuity between 
the two narratives of eugenics. Not simply positive and negative eugenics, but 
eugenics as science, in particular statistical science, and eugenics as an ideal. 
Galton’s statistical approach, which he used throughout his life to argue for 
eugenics, masks the fact that his assumptions and aims were not scientific but 
subjective. Even though Galton invokes what he refers to repeatedly in the 
article as Darwin’s “law” of natural selection, the assumption at the heart of his 
study is summed up in a single sentence supported by neither statistics nor 
evolutionary science: “Everything we possess at our birth is a heritage from our 
ancestors” (321), and his aim is nothing less than to “produce a highly bred 
human race” (319), capable of arresting “the intellectual anarchy “ caused by 
what he described as lack of “general intellectual capacity” (166). On the basis 
of this dogma, Galton built a whole research edifice dedicated to convincing the 
world of the truth of his observation, leading to him coining the term “eugenics” 
in 1883, co-founding the journal Biometrika with Karl Pearson and Walter 
Weldon for the purpose of publishing relevant biological data in 1901, and 
setting up the Eugenics Record Office in 1904.2 Galton also endowed a Chair of 
Eugenics at University College London, which was held by Karl Pearson from 
1911.  
 Despite the brief excursion into utopianism in his original article on 
heredity, Galton went out of his way to deny that there was anything utopian 
about eugenics. For him, eugenics was an objective and achievable scientific 
project. In his original definition of eugenics as it appeared in a footnote to 
Inquiries into Human Faculty (1883), Galton referred to “the more suitable races 
or strains of blood” prevailing “speedily over the less suitable” (25). However, he 
sought to adopt more neutral language in later definitions, defining eugenics in 
1908 as “the study of those agencies which under social control may improve or 
                                                          
2 The Eugenics Record Office became the Galton Eugenics Laboratory, part of University 
College London in 1907.  
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impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally” 
(qtd. in Pearson, Life 348). Indeed Galton tended to use utopian to mean the 
opposite of practical. In 1883, he commented that his project to statistically 
eliminate group B through early marriage of group A needed a definite working 
plan, otherwise “the consideration of improving the human race is Utopian” 
(Inquiries 211). By 1903 he was feeling more optimistic, writing in an article for 
the Daily Chronicle that “a material improvement in our British breed is not so 
Utopian an object as it may seem” (“Our ”). In 1908, in an address to the 
Eugenics Education Society, Galton emphasised “that Eugenics has a far more 
than Utopian interest; that it is a living and growing science, with high and 
practical aims” (qtd. in Pearson Life 349). Galton clearly identified with the OED 
definition of “utopian”, as something impractical, or to quote the definition in full: 
“Of a vision, plan, etc.: expressing or founded on an unrealistic belief in the 
perfectibility of society; excessively idealistic; impracticable; (of an ideal 
condition) illusory, unattainable” ("utopian, adj. and n." OED Online). 
Nonetheless, eugenics, despite Galton’s protestations, fits this definition 
particularly well. There is no doubt about Galton’s underlying belief in the 
perfectibility of society through eugenics, nor about the idealism of this belief. In 
1911, the last year of his life, Galton dictated his own utopian novel, The 
Eugenic College of Kantsaywhere, in the hope of conveying to the novel-
reading public what the perfect eugenic society might look like. Most of the 
unpublished novel was destroyed by Galton’s niece, but the sections on the 
eugenic mechanisms of the society were preserved. These pages, which build 
on his original utopian idea of the best men marrying the best women, offer 
possibly the least compelling vision of a eugenic community ever written. They 
describe a society based on the social attitudes that Galton believed would 
become normal if people could be persuaded of the importance of eugenics. 
Obsessed with ancestry, physical fitness and grace, these utopians mainly care 
about passing eugenic exams, marrying for eugenic benefit and ostracising 
those who fail to meet their eugenic standards. It is possible that the missing 
portion of the novel demonstrates the benefits to society of eugenic superiority, 
the pleasures of living in this world of such excellent people and the contribution 
they might make to the sum of human happiness, though it seems unlikely as 
there is little indication of this approach in the existing text. Galton also had to 
fight the narrative logic of his own story which clearly calls for a eugenic misfit to 
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overthrow the all-powerful college, marry the highest scoring of the women and 
disprove the whole eugenic system on which it is based. The nearest Galton 
could come to conflict was to provide a hero from outside the community who 
was unable to prove the excellence of his ancestry through lack of appropriate 
record-keeping, but who nonetheless was eugenically sound in every other 
respect. In a genre characterised by its didacticism, Galton’s attempt at utopian 
fiction stands out for not even providing a basic fictional dialogue between 
utopian guide and visitor, but letting the visitor learn all the details of the society 
from the College Calendar. Despite Galton’s hopes for popular appeal, there is 
also inevitably a chapter on the statistical basis of the marking scheme for the 
eugenics exam (Chapter V, 195-9). 
Yet despite all its weaknesses Galton’s attempt at imagining a eugenic 
society in action is worthy of attention for the way it exemplifies the fine line 
between possibility and impossibility in utopian thought. It demonstrates that, in 
the early twentieth century, utopian fiction could be a vehicle for very detailed 
schemes which were arguably, at least in their aims, utopian in a second sense, 
that of striving to be the best society imaginable. Galton’s lack of skill at writing 
fiction or in convincing the twenty-first century reader of the desirability of his 
scheme is irrelevant in this respect. By writing Kantsaywhere, Galton was re-
affirming his belief that eugenics was a practical possibility, but also positioning 
it as utopian by describing it in the context of an imaginary perfect society, that 
could exist, but does not. Plato places similar emphasis on the practicability of 
his schemes in The Republic, where in Part VII Socrates is asked to “show that 
the state we have described is a practical possibility” (189). Plato’s methods 
though are very different from Galton’s as they involve testing each hypothesis 
and building up a philosophical case for each proposal, resulting in a series of 
thought experiments. Even so, Galton may have used Plato’s Republic as a 
model or inspiration. He was certainly aware of The Republic and therefore of 
Plato’s use of the analogy with animal breeding to justify state control of the 
quality and quantity of children.3 Plato too describes procedures for selecting 
the right people to become Guardians, the best of whom will be given privileged 
breeding rights. However, while the College of Kantsaywhere scores people 
                                                          
3 Galton studied Classics for the Mathematical Tripos at Cambridge (see Gillham Chapter 3). 
Galton also quotes from Plato’s Republic in his 1907 Herbert Spencer lecture to demonstrate 
how customs which initially seem shocking can come to be accepted as normal (Probability 27). 
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mainly on physical qualities such as health, fitness, physique, grace and even a 
good singing voice, Plato tested for dedication to the truth, courage and 
resistance to being led astray. In The Republic, there are no exams, or 
elaborate statistical procedures, simply the setting of challenges and 
observation of the children as they grow up (114-5). Galton too admitted earlier, 
in 1908, that something he called character was more important than physique 
and ability, but he left it out of Kantsaywhere, probably due to the difficulties of 
assessing character on a statistical basis.4 Unsurprisingly, the College of 
Kantsaywhere does not produce wise Guardians, but Senators with a stake in 
maintaining the system through their own eugenically high-scoring offspring. 
The work of the College agents in deporting undesirables and setting up work 
colonies for the eugenically unfit confirms that for all practical purposes 
Kantsaywhere comes across as a dystopia.5 For Plato, eugenics is a means to 
an end, the training of philosopher kings who will ensure the good order and 
stability of society, and the eugenic selection procedures behind it only 
interested him to a limited extent. Galton on the other hand became obsessed 
by selection schemes as his initially simple but naive concept of dividing society 
into desirables and undesirables proved more difficult to achieve than 
anticipated. 
If there is little to recommend in the eugenic utopia of Kantsaywhere, and 
even less to inspire, it is clear that it is not the statistical science or the practical 
details of the social applications of eugenics that constitute its utopian appeal. 
Karl Pearson, Galton’s successor and biographer, claims that in the last decade 
of his life Galton attempted to turn eugenics into a religion: “He had in view 
Eugenics not only as a science, not only as an art, but also as a national creed, 
amounting, indeed, to a religious faith” (220). Kevles also argues that eugenics 
functioned as a religion for Galton, claiming that he “found in eugenics a 
scientific substitute for church orthodoxies, a secular faith, a defensible religious 
obligation” (12). Indeed, Kevles describes eugenics as a “secular faith”, 
                                                          
4 Galton thought that the worth of a person should be classified under three headings: physique, 
ability and character, asserting that character was the most important of these, but the least 
easy to rate (“Local Associations” 646). He proposed assessment of character based on the 
opinion of tutors and fellow students (Pearson Life 231) or the tenure of a position of trust 
(“Local Associations” 646).  
5 For example, Richardson points out the biologisation of class in Kantsaywhere with the Unfit 
being known as The Unclassed (Love 22). However, not all comments are negative. Gillham 
argues that “this fanciful, but unpublished, novel expressed more clearly than any dry scientific 
paper or popular article what he hoped eugenics would achieve” (342). 
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structuring his account of early eugenics around the concept of eugenics as a 
religion with chapter headings that reference faith, worship and gospel. Hansen 
and King though make the point that “defining eugenics as a religion provides 
little explanatory value” and that the real question is why this particular religion 
attracted so many followers. The interplay between the concept of religion and 
utopia has the potential for making this attraction clearer. While not suggesting 
that there is no difference between religious and utopian idealism, there is often 
an overlap, or blurring, between the two. Kevles, for example, argues that as 
well as being a religion, positive eugenics was also, at least for the social 
radicals who took it up, a form of utopianism (85), while Michael Burleigh 
suggests that eugenics had “evolved from primitive utopianism” into a “a 
collectivist, materialist, technocratic creed which promised to conquer, in a 
Promethean way, nature's final frontier” (Eugenic 64).6 The link between 
utopianism and religion is also explored by Manuel and Manuel who see “that 
strange absorption in a heaven on earth” of utopianism as a legacy of 
Christianity, fused with the Hellenic concept of the ideal city (16). In the case of 
Galton, eugenics as religion has a similar aim to his eugenic utopias, that of 
inculcating religious zeal into social behaviour around eugenics. In 1907, Galton 
talks of proclaiming “a ‘Jehad’ or Holy War against customs and prejudices that 
impair the physical and moral qualities of our race” (Probability 29-30). Far more 
characteristically, he hoped that someday communities would accept eugenics 
as “a quasi-religion” and direct their compassion and charitable donations away 
from the weak and sick towards “the more virile desire of promoting the natural 
gifts and the national efficiency of future generations” (“Local Associations” 
647). The only element of the established religions that Galton wished to 
emulate was their control over social mores, for it was not faith that would 
validate eugenic practices, only scientific evidence. His utopian fiction, on the 
other hand, provides an outlet for the utopian dream, unchanged between the 
1860s and his death, of society recognising the importance of eugenics and 
devising ways to put it into practice. In fact, by the end of his life, Galton 
seemed slightly surprised that eugenics had moved from his utopian dreamland 
to real life, finding it remarkable enough to point out to the nascent Eugenics 
                                                          
6 Burleigh’s reference to conquest of nature’s final frontier, is more of a utopian concept than a 
religious one, especially with its nod to Star Trek, which was, arguably, one of the most 
influential utopian visions of the 1960s. 
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Education Society that “its study is being seriously carried on under the shelter 
of the University – not of Gulliver’s Laputa – but of this London of ours” and that 
it has a “Research Fellow and a Research Scholar ... engaged all day on 
difficult statistical inquiry” in their very own “Eugenics Laboratory” (“Eugenics”). 
 If for Galton eugenics was a middle-class English scheme to ensure that 
the better people would breed and not waste their charitable instincts on the 
undeserving poor, for Pearson, who developed the statistical element of 
eugenics, it was a much more urgent and imperative necessity.7 There is no 
doubt that the status of Pearson’s scientific work was tied up with the 
acceptance of eugenics, but it is also evident from his biography of Galton that 
he was far more invested in the idealistic elements of eugenics than his mentor. 
Pearson’s dream was “in the distant future a rivalry of nations in the task of 
bringing to greater perfection their human stocks” through “an intensive study of 
biological law applied to man” (Life 218). This dream is larger than the College 
of Kantsaywhere, emphasising the whole of humanity coming under biological 
law, and new moral and social codes. Pearson was a socialist, and his vision of 
eugenics was also less class-based than Galton’s, believing that “There is a 
hereditary nobility, an aristocracy of worth, and it is not confined to any social 
class; it is a caste which is scattered throughout all classes …” (353).8 Pearson 
supported both national eugenics as “the only means left to provide any nation 
with men strong in mind and body” and international eugenics as “the sole 
possibility of producing finer races of mankind” (Life 219). The difference in tone 
between Galton’s rather under-stated claims for eugenics and Pearson’s 
commentary shows how much had changed between Galton’s death in 1911 
and the publication of the third volume of Galton’s biography in 1930. Writing in 
the 1920s, Pearson’s views were clearly shaped by the First World War, and 
the mounting tensions of nationalistic rivalry. He was concerned about declining 
intelligence, and had doubts about democracy itself: “We might as successfully 
ask the weeds in a garden to make way of their own accord for the flowering 
                                                          
7 Pearson continued the process of placing eugenics on a scientific footing by applying 
statistical techniques to eugenics, proposing large surveys, for example of 20,000 to 30,000 
children to discover the influence of unhealthy parental work environments on the health and 
intelligence of the child (Groundwork 8-9). Pearson’s data analysis encouraged him to state as 
a statistical fact that “It is five to ten times as advantageous to improve the condition of the race 
through parentage as through change of environment” (Problem 8). 
8 According to Kevles, Pearson was only lacking in class prejudice to the extent that he included 
“the ‘better’ sort of English workingman” in his definition of eugenic fitness, which was mainly 
“centered in the middle, and particularly the professional class” (32-33). 
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plants whose development they choke. Let my readers think what a gardener 
could achieve, if his tenure of office depended on the consent of the weeds” 
(Life 349). Pearson’s ideas show that it is not only positive eugenics that can be 
seen as utopian. With his analogy of gardening and weeds, Pearson developed 
the concept of negative eugenics for the greater good of the race, and thus a 
rhetoric of the ends justifying the means when it came to racial improvement. 
Despite Pearson’s reliance on the rational scientific certainty of his statistical 
methods, he was not as objective as he liked to believe. Kevles concludes that 
“When it came to biometry, eugenics, and statistics, he [Pearson] was the 
besieged defender of an emotionally charged faith” (36). 
R. A. Fisher, who was eventually to build a bridge between biometry, 
Mendelian genetics and Darwinian natural selection, as well as taking the Chair 
of Eugenics at UCL in 1934, gave an address to the Eugenics Education 
Society in 1913 which expressed continuing optimism about evolution:  
[T]he best are to become better by survival. It is in this that we differ from 
less biological Utopia seekers; ... eugenics comes at an appropriate time, 
when our civilisation is already sadly acknowledging that the great bar to 
progress lies in human imperfection; for the first time it is made possible 
that humanity itself may improve as rapidly as its environment. (310)  
Fisher also suggested that eugenicists themselves were the “coming race” or as 
he put it, “a new natural nobility of worth and birth”, as their eugenics practices 
would inevitably lead to them marrying well and propagating more children, not 
to mention displaying “higher ability, richer health, greater beauty” (314).9 Fisher 
also predicted a utopian future for the human species as a whole, quoting from 
Nietzsche: “What to man is the ape... so shall man be to Beyond Man” (310).10 
Fisher was not alone in connecting eugenics to the Nietzschean superman. Dan 
Stone in Breeding Superman (2002) documents the links between 
Nietzscheans and the eugenics movement, through figures such as Maximilian 
Mügge, A. R. Orage and Havelock Ellis (74-7). Maximilian Mügge, writing in the 
first volume of Eugenics Review in 1909, described the idea of the Nieztschean 
superman as “a poetic-philosophical concept of positive Eugenics” (185). As 
                                                          
9 Richard A. Soloway reports that “dedicated though they were to self-replication, officers of the 
Eugenics Education Society contributed on average no more than 2.3 children” (Demography 
35). 
10 ‘Beyond man’ was Alexander Tille’s translation of the Übermensch in his 1896 translation of 
Thus Spake Zarathustra. See Mazumdar 210, note 34. 
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well as linking Nietzsche’s superman to eugenics, Mügge argues that creating 
the eugenic superman is more important than other ideals, because of its 
universal appeal: “it is reasonable to assume that that ideal is nearest to the 
absolute, which is the most comprehensive, which touches the greatest 
possible number of individuals, which in the long run ensures the greatest 
happiness of all concerned. That undoubtedly is the racial ideal, the ideal of 
Eugenics and the Superman” (186). He also recognised that “anthropometric 
measurements, statistical observations, human experiments on Mendel’s Law 
and biological legislation” were not sufficient to generate an enthusiasm for the 
eugenic ideal, hence the need for what he too termed a eugenic religion with an 
ideal that “appeals to the unknown depths of man’s mind” (190). For Mügge, 
that ideal was the Superman and the aspiration of creating a race of supermen 
“as superior to the present mankind ... as man is superior to the worm” (191).   
Mügge also argued that: “We shall no longer, in choosing our mates, 
blindly yield to sexual attractions under the plea of ‘romantic love’, thus selfishly 
ignoring the welfare of the race” (190). Mügge’s plea for a form of rational 
reproduction would be taken up by many women in the eugenics movement, 
who saw in the correct choice of marital partners an important way that women 
could contribute to ideals of racial improvement. Richardson traces the origins 
of the idea of rational reproduction to the social purity movement of the 1880s, 
which, she argues, biologised morality and endorsed an essentialist view of the 
sexual natures of men and women, according to which women were naturally 
moral and men promiscuous (Love 49). Lucy Bland’s ground-breaking work on 
early feminism, Banishing the Beast: Feminism, Sex and Morality (1995) 
likewise argues that women were attracted to eugenics by “a promise of a new 
morality” and the potential scientific validation of their moral purity beliefs, as 
well as by their role in the “‘rational control’ of the nation’s reproduction” as 
mothers and educators of the next generation (229-30). Eugenics certainly had 
a strong appeal for women. Richard A. Soloway notes that half the membership 
of the Eugenics Education Society before the First World War were women, and 
that forty percent of those were unmarried (128), suggesting that the message 
of eugenics had a practical relevance to those hoping to start married life. 
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In fact, women were not just passive members of the Eugenics 
Education Society in its early days, but the organising force behind it.11 In an 
account of the formation of Eugenics Education Society in 1907, Lady Georgina 
Chambers makes it clear how important women were to the day to day 
operations of the society.12 Chambers, who eventually became joint Honorary 
Secretary with Fisher in 1920, reports that she was one of a team of six female 
office workers (four of them unmarried), working under the direction of Sybil 
Gotto, the founder and first honorary secretary of the society, and that there 
were another four women who “undertook special jobs”. Their work involved 
“Filing, cross-indexing and classification of subjects etc. and all routine office 
work”. Only one typist was paid. The motivation for their enthusiasm is 
suggested by Major Darwin’s praise of Gotto, as a woman who “by her vision, 
inspiration and self-sacrifice started so many wheels rolling for the benefit of the 
whole human race” (Chambers). Sybil Gotto (later Neville-Rolfe) was a young 
widow whose interest in eugenics and work with prostitutes and sufferers from 
venereal disease had convinced her of the importance of sex education and 
ensuring the eugenic quality of future generations.13 Lady Chambers describes 
Gotto as having “the vision to see the effect eugenics would have once Galton’s 
teaching permeated the mind of mankind no matter to what race they belonged” 
(Chambers).  
The ideals behind the founding of the Eugenics Education Society can 
also be seen in an early draft of the Society’s aims from around 1908, which 
states that “The Society exists to uphold the ideal of parenthood, as the highest, 
and most responsible of human powers; to proclaim that the racial instinct is, 
therefore, supremely sacred, and its exercise, through marriage, the loftiest of 
all privileges to be exercised in the service of the future of the race” (Eugenics 
Society). This form of wording evokes both religious and utopian idealism in its 
reference to the sacredness of the racial instinct (a euphemism for sexual 
appetite) and the contribution of this duty to the future of humanity. 14 In a similar 
                                                          
11 See also Ann Taylor Allen who argues that “Feminists were not passive recipients, but active 
creators, of eugenic theory and practice” (482). 
12 This account is an unpublished document from the archives of the Eugenics Society available 
on the Wellcome Trust website.  
13 For further information see Richardson, “Neville-Rolfe, Sybil Katherine (1885–1955)” 
14 Bland notes that eugenicists tended to term the “sexual instinct the ‘racial instinct’” (232). 
Saleeby, for example, describes the racial instinct as being “less rampant and less roving” in 
women than men (Woman and Womanhood 261).  
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vein of utopian rhetoric the Society’s objectives link “spreading a knowledge of 
the Laws of Heredity” to “the improvement and well-being of humanity”, while 
parenthood on the part of “the Diseased, the Insane, and the Habitually 
Alcoholic” was to be denounced, as “a crime against the future”.15 Neville-
Rolfe’s continuing belief in the importance of responsible parenthood can be 
seen in a 1925 article “Modern Marriage and Monogamy” where she 
emphasised the importance of selecting the right marriage partner: 
If the highest privilege accorded to us is that of fashioning posterity on 
such lines as will improve its inherent quality we must attach the greatest 
importance to selection in marriage. It is the gravest decision any human 
being takes in life as it affects not only himself and his partner, but the 
unnumbered ages of the future. (95) 
She also called for women to select in favour of sexual continence when 
choosing husbands to prevent “promiscuity and social degeneracy” (93), 
grounding her moral arguments in anthropological and biological evidence, 
which, she stated, showed that “the normal channel through which we may 
hope to attain better inherent quality in the human race is through monogamy” 
(92). Neville-Rolfe also spoke favourably of marriage laws in Scandinavia and 
many American States which prevented marriage for those considered insane, 
diseased or mentally defective, arguing that similar “legal machinery” should be 
put in place to ensure that “the unfit, while protected for their lifetime by the 
community, will be denied the right of handing on their defect to others” (95). 
This article gives an idea of how the high idealism of marriage for the benefit of 
the human race, and the concept of biologically determined morality, would 
result by the 1920s in a focus on restrictive legislation which was far from 
utopian.   
  On the other hand, Canadian born free-love activist Stella W. Browne 
became involved with eugenics to campaign for birth control for those who did 
not wish to be mothers, arguing in a 1915 paper for the British Society for the 
Study of Sex Psychology that: “Absolute freedom of choice on the woman's 
part, and intense desire both for her mate and her child, are the magic forces 
                                                          
15 Articles in The Eugenics Review also denounced syphilis and alcohol as “racial poisons”. See 
J. E. Lane “Racial Poisons: 1. Venereal Disease” and C. W. Saleeby “Racial Poisons, II, 
alcohol”. 
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that will vitalise and transfigure the race” (“Sexual Variety”). In a 1917 paper 
Browne advocated legislative support for unmarried women and their children 
and reform of the divorce laws, and re-iterated her belief in the eugenic benefits 
of women’s control over their own sexuality and reproduction: “Only from 
‘intelligent and voluntary motherhood’ can a finer and stronger race be 
developed” (“Race”). However, while Browne hoped to see women supported to 
have children whether they were married or not, she was absolutely opposed to 
the idea of “compulsory breeding” and did not think much of the frequent 
complaints in The Eugenics Review over “the ‘selfishness’ of the refusal of 
maternity by healthy and educated women of the professional classes” (“Birth 
Control”). In the aftermath of the First World War, feminist-backed schemes 
such as “endowment of motherhood” to promote women’s ability to bear 
eugenically fit children would also become an anti-feminist measure to restrict 
women’s freedom of choice over whether to become mothers.16  
 Dedication to the cause of eugenics was also evident in the female 
laboratory workers employed by Galton and Pearson. Women were generally 
paid less than men, and so represented good value when funding was limited. 
Rosaleen Love argues that the female laboratory workers involved with 
eugenics were motivated by the opportunity for “active participation in work 
which they believed offered the only hope for mankind” (158) and a sense of the 
importance of women for the future of the race (156). She claims that Ethel 
Elderton, who was employed as an assistant by Galton in 1906, was still 
underpaid in comparison to other forms of employment she could have 
obtained, and that it was her enthusiasm for a scientific career that led to her “to 
perform the work of an academic for the pay of a part-time clerk” (157). Elderton 
was certainly motivated by the idea of eugenics. Elissa Rodkey describes 
Elderton as “wholeheartedly embracing the eugenic cause” and her eugenic 
convictions were at the core of her scientific papers. Like Pearson, Elderton 
used statistical analysis to argue for the importance of heredity in areas such as 
alcoholism and intelligence, leading her to reject social reforms and temper her 
                                                          
16 Ann Taylor Allen argues that British feminists Eleanor Rathbone, Mary Stocks and Maude 
Rayden who founded the Family Endowment Society in 1917 “reformulated the socialist 
proposal for governmental subsidies payable to mothers for child-rearing as a feminist program” 
(489). However, as George Robb notes, “The primacy of motherhood in eugenic schemes often 
caused free-love proponents to veer perilously close to the pro-natalist rhetoric of 
conservatives” (602). 
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sympathy for educational improvements with the conclusion that: “It is no use 
having a perfect system of education if the brains that should profit by it are 
decreasing in power, if men and women of intelligence are leaving fewer and 
fewer children to inherit their ability” (408).  
However, if the ideas that motivated the female workers in eugenics and 
within the Eugenics Education Society and its successor organisations could be 
construed as utopian hopes for a better world, it is important not to 
underestimate the lure for women of working in an area where they believed 
they could contribute to knowledge or social change, as well as having a 
practical role to play.17 Greta Jones shows that members of the Eugenics 
Society were represented on numerous committees, leading to “eugenics being 
an area where power was exercised or potentially could be exercised. 
Consequently, discussions about eugenics and formulation of eugenic ideals 
might have very practical consequences” (483). It is clear that women were 
strongly motivated by idealism in getting involved with eugenics, but also by the 
possibility of a role for themselves in this process. Their hopes for the future 
were real, but less fixed on the distant horizon of racial transformation that 
inspired Pearson and Fisher, and more rooted in campaigns that would make a 
difference to the next generation and to which they could actively contribute and 
see the benefits in their own lifetime. Also, it is important to note that, however 
genuine this idealism may have been, not all feminists were converts to 
eugenics. Barbara Low, covering the First International Eugenics Congress for 
The Freewoman, called eugenics “hypocritical twaddle”, finding the event self-
serving and elitist. She criticised eugenicists for their “lack of understanding of 
their fellow human beings” and recommended organised opposition to eugenics 
“since at any moment we may find ourselves saddled with some monstrous 
Eugenic Law of the kind that Indiana and California now have in practice” (206).  
Understanding the utopianism behind eugenics offers several benefits. It 
creates the possibility of seeing at least some of its advocates as activists and 
social dreamers, rather than zealots. It allows for a more complex reading of 
eugenicists’ debts to Darwin, Nietzsche and the scientific ideas of the late-
nineteenth century. But most importantly it demonstrates a concern with the 
future that reflects both fears and frustration at the way society operated and a 
                                                          
17 For example, female writers and activists in the late-nineteenth century were in the forefront 
of developing eugenic ideas of rational reproduction (see Richardson 2003).  
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great hope that in the future people could become rational, intelligent, moral and 
healthy. My thesis shows that the ideals expressed by eugenicists are also key 
elements in utopian and dystopian fiction. Utopian designs for the perfect 
society return repeatedly to methods for perfecting and improving humans 
through social purity, monogamy, higher forms of love, idealised parenthood, as 
well as by regulating marriage, and eliminating the sick and mentally disabled. 
Eugenics was a convenient mechanism for achieving these various utopian 
aims, and offered a label and a scientific license for pursuing such dreams in 
fiction and in society. However, at the heart of all these ideas was something 
larger than the scientific and legislative activities of the eugenics movement, the 
concept of consciously improving human nature, which I introduce in the next 
section. 
 
1.3 Improving on Nature 
 
    Nature is one of the key elements of my argument as it underpins eugenic 
concepts but also highlights the divergence between eugenics as a practical 
policy, founded on what were believed to be laws of nature, and eugenics as a 
utopian idea, based on the concept of improving human nature. There are many 
definitions of nature, both considered historically and conceptually. The OED 
lists fourteen of them, and many more compound terms (“nature, n.” OED 
Online). Raymond Williams, who argues that “Nature is perhaps the most 
complex word in the language” offers three main concepts covered by the word: 
“(i) the essential quality or character of something; (ii) the inherent force that 
directs the world or human beings or both; (iii) the material world itself, taken as 
including or not including human beings” (219). The first of these concepts 
includes the question of human nature, which in the late nineteenth century 
after Darwin is connected to a wider concept of animal nature. What works for 
animals can also be applied to humans, as humans, depending on the 
perspective of the writer are also to be seen as animals, mammals or primates. 
This relationship could be seen as constructive or negative, and exposes a key 
dichotomy in responses to the theory of evolution. For the scientifically inclined 
it represented a way of better understanding human behaviour by analogy with 
how animals behaved in the wild. For others, the close relationship between 
humans and animals represented a threat or challenge. H.G. Wells saw 
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civilisation as a thin veneer with human morality barely able to control the 
instincts of the unreconstructed animal.18 The second of Williams’s definitions, 
being more active, often gets referred to as Nature with a capital N, and is 
sometimes personified as female, whether nurturing mother or capricious old 
crone. This version of nature is also the ultimate law-giver, with fixed laws that 
cannot be evaded. The third definition covers external nature or the 
environment, and is often contrasted with culture or civilisation in that it contains 
the phenomena of the physical world that occur outside the sphere of human 
control.  
 The history of attitudes to nature is also important to my thesis. Carolyn 
Merchant in The Death of Nature (1980) argues that in the seventeenth century 
a “mechanistic” view of nature replaced older organic metaphors of nature as a 
living being. Instead nature became a mechanism that could be rationalised, 
exploited or controlled. Merchant argues that this mechanistic viewpoint made it 
easier to see nature as a resource for the benefit of humans.  Max Horkheimer 
and Theodor Adorno in the Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) also held the 
Enlightenment responsible for what they called “the disenchantment of the 
world” and “the substitution of knowledge for fancy” (3). This disenchantment, 
they argue, led to alienation from nature, and its objectification and destruction. 
Williams also suggests that political changes which altered nature “from an 
absolute to a constitutional monarch” (222) had a similar effect, leading to an 
emphasis on understanding the laws of nature, which could be interpreted, 
classified and made predictable on the basis of precedents. This idea also fed 
into the concept of nature as a knowable and controllable force, and the 
identification of nature with reason.   
Concepts of mastering and controlling nature are implicit in eugenics, 
and often explicit in the utopian fiction I examine. However, a more significant 
change in attitude to nature for the purpose of this project is the move from the 
idea of nature as static, unchanging and unchangeable towards acceptance of 
the theory of evolution. In the early-nineteenth century, natural theologians had 
adopted Enlightenment methodology to use reason and logic to argue that 
everything in nature was created by God. William Paley in Natural Theology, or 
Evidences of the Existence and Attributes of the Deity collected from the 
                                                          
18 See “Human evolution, an artificial process” and “Morals and Civilisation” in Philmus and 
Hughes H.G. Wells: Early writings in science and science fiction (1975). 
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Appearances of Nature (1802) argued that just as the complexity of a watch 
implied a watchmaker, so the complexity of the natural world implied a divine 
creator. His analogy of a watch also fits with a mechanistic view of nature, as a 
perfectly regulated process. Similarly, the persistence of the medieval concept 
of the Great Chain of Being, nature arranged in an orderly hierarchy from the 
simplest forms of life to divine beings, fostered an essentialist belief in the 
unalterable and separate characteristics of different species and supported an 
image of human nature as superior and qualitatively different to that of animals. 
Evolutionary theory reintroduced complexity into nature. The evidence of 
geologists and palaeontologists showed that the Earth was much older than 
biblical scholars imagined. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck argued that classifications 
into separate species were artificial and in his 1809 work Philosophie 
Zoologique offered a theory of evolutionary change based on the concept of life 
as a force pushing towards increased complexity. More significantly for 
eugenicists, Darwin’s publication of Origin of Species in 1859 offered the hope 
that mechanisms for controlling nature could be derived from the network of 
complex interactions that he described. Darwin’s observations of nature and 
those of his scientific colleagues informed late-nineteenth-century and early-
twentieth-century assumptions about nature. They were appropriated and 
misappropriated by a number of social movements, including eugenics. Many of 
the writers of utopian fiction I discuss read Darwin and drew concepts directly 
from him to inform their views of utopia, or to justify their imaginings of improved 
people, evolving towards perfection. However, my argument is not that Darwin’s 
Origin, or The Descent of Man, which dealt more specifically with human 
evolution, led directly to the ideas expressed by eugenicists. My position is 
informed by recent criticism that demonstrates that Darwin’s work offered a far 
from simplistic version of nature, and was used to support a range of political 
positions, from Social Darwinists who used “survival of the fittest” to justify 
“laissez-faire” capitalism, to the anarchist Peter Kropotkin who saw Darwin’s 
work as supporting altruism and mutual aid. Gillian Beer’s Darwin’s Plots (1983) 
was influential in emphasising the complexity of Darwin’s thought. Beer 
describes Darwin’s theory as “essentially multivalent” and argues that his work 
is “rich in contradictory elements which can serve as a metaphorical basis for 
more than one reading of experience” (6). George Levine in Darwin Loves You 
(2008) claims that even though Darwin began with the perfect adaptation 
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position of Paley, he focussed on maladaptations, looking for what did not work 
rather than what did (16). Richardson shows that Darwin was far from reductive 
in his thinking, arguing that, unlike eugenicists, “Darwin offers new ways of 
thinking about scale, about chance, about intimate interrelatedness. He 
provides models for observing the natural world, giving us narratives of growth 
and profusion, of thinking about telos, and progress” (Love 4). In a recent essay 
on Darwin’s relationship with Galton, Richardson further emphasises Darwin’s 
views on the complexity and uncertainty of heredity in contrast to Galton’s 
“more coercive, interventionist position”, arguing that Darwin’s regard for 
freedom and individualism did not predispose him to favour eugenics (“‘I differ ’” 
29). Levine too emphasises that Darwin’s work cannot be used to support 
absolutely any position as his theory is “radically secular”, in that it “drives 
towards an explanation of all things, physical and spiritual, by means of natural 
law” (Darwin 21).  
It is this element of natural law in Darwin’s thinking that eugenicists were 
prone to take up and use to support social measures. Consequently, Darwin’s 
own definitions of nature give a valuable insight into his reading of nature. In 
Origin Darwin contrasts “the state of nature” to nature altered by humans in the 
form of domesticated animals or cultivated plants. He also saw nature as an 
agent or force for change, and therefore, metaphorically, carrying out natural 
selection. Nature is the source of the variations on which selection takes place 
and natural selection “is a power incessantly ready for action” (50). Unlike 
eugenicists, Darwin saw this power as being “as immeasurably superior to 
man’s feeble efforts, as the works of nature are to those of Art” (50). Darwin 
also talks of the “polity of nature”, meaning the areas of the world still in a state 
of nature, but is more reluctant to accept anything as a general “law of nature”. 
For him, laws can only be provisional, derived from long investigation and 
subject to disproof. On the other hand, Darwin did apply what he calls “the 
doctrine of Malthus” (51) to all plants and animals, claiming that “There is no 
exception to the rule that every organic being naturally increases at so high a 
rate, that if not destroyed, the earth would soon be covered by the progeny of 
the single pair” (52).19 This geometric rate of increase could only be checked by 
                                                          
19 Malthus, writing in 1798 argued that “population, when unchecked, increased in a geometrical 
ratio, and subsistence for man in arithmetical ratio” (15), and recommended “preventive checks” 
to population growth through moral restraint. 
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an equal level of destruction, leading Darwin to emphasise a view of nature as 
not just “bright with gladness” but full of death: “we do not see, or we forget, that 
the birds which are idly singing round us mostly live on insects of seeds, and 
are thus constantly destroying life” (50). This view of nature as a struggle for 
survival was one that many nineteenth-century writers took away from 
evolution, as I further discuss in Chapter One.  
T.H. Huxley, known as “Darwin’s bulldog” for his support of Darwin’s 
theory of evolution, also emphasised the destructiveness of nature. In his 1893 
Romanes lecture on “Evolution and Ethics” he argued that “In every part, at 
every moment, the state of the cosmos is the expression of a transitory 
adjustment of contending forces; a scene of strife, in which all the combatants 
fall in turn” (49). Huxley was troubled by “the moral indifference of nature” (59), 
and called for the curbing of the cosmic process and the substitution of what he 
called “the ethical process” to ensure the survival of those who were “ethically 
the best” (81). Huxley’s view of nature as a source of pain and strife led him to 
argue that it was necessary to “set man to subdue nature to his higher ends” 
(83). For him, social progress required modifying “the conditions of existence” in 
a long battle against nature using “intelligence and will, guided by sound 
principles of investigation” (85). Huxley’s sense of nature as ultimately 
unbeatable turned nature into an adversary which it was morally defensible to 
oppose. This view of nature as dangerous was one which is very evident in the 
utopian fiction of the late nineteenth century.  
 Galton was also influenced in his view of nature by reading Darwin’s 
Origin, but he accepted the harshness of natural selection as beneficial to 
humans: “In strength, agility, and other physical qualities, Darwin's law of 
natural selection acts with unimpassioned, merciless severity. The weakly die in 
the battle for life; the stronger and more capable individuals are alone permitted 
to survive, and to bequeath their constitutional vigour to future generations” 
(“Hereditary Talent” 323). For him, natural selection was not a theory but an 
absolute law which joined with the “Law of Heredity” to make nature knowable. 
Galton saw no contradiction between human nature and animal nature, and had 
no doubts about natural selection also being applicable to moral characteristics. 
For example, he argued that deficiency in sexual, parental, filial or social 
affection “would be a serious hindrance, if not a bar to the continuance of any 
race” (Hereditary 323). Galton was also responsible for popularising the binary 
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terms of nature and nurture in English Men of Science: their nature and nurture 
(1874). For him “Nature is all that a man brings with himself into the world; 
nurture is every influence from without that affects him after his birth”, with 
nature being “the stronger of the two” (12-16). In this way, Galton equates 
nature with heredity or, as it would later be called, genes. Biological 
determinism of the sort represented by Galton was rife in eugenics, and the so-
called laws of nature were often applied simplistically to social issues. Madison 
Grant’s racist manifesto The Passing of the Great Race (1916) called on the 
laws of nature to justify his claim that “race lies at the base of all manifestation 
of modern society” (xxi). American eugenicist Charles Davenport, arguing for 
eugenic sterilisation, considered the number of disabled people, criminals and 
paupers being supported by the state as a reproach to America’s otherwise 
proud ability to control nature (4). Nature, in both cases, was seen as a simple 
scientifically knowable force to be controlled by rational thought, offering laws 
that could be applied directly to society.  
Another consequence of the biologisation of concepts of human nature 
was a greater emphasis on the biological aspects of women’s roles. Caleb 
Saleeby discussed the principles of what he referred to as “Eugenic Feminism” 
in Woman and Womanhood, his 1911 book on the eugenic duty of women (7). 
He argued that feminism was biologically a mistake since women were 
“constructed by Nature, as individuals, for her racial ends” (14) and that the best 
interest of women would be served through marriage and motherhood, or in 
discharging “characteristically feminine functions” such as nursing or teaching 
(18). Women’s reproductive role often caused women to be seen as more 
“natural” beings than men, with negative consequences to their social standing. 
Merchant argues that “Because women’s physiological functions of 
reproduction, nurture and childrearing are viewed as closer to nature, their 
social role is lower on the cultural scale than that of the male” (Death 144). 
Merchant and other ecofeminists therefore see a conceptual link between the 
domination of nature by humans, and the domination of women by men. 
However, as I argue, nineteenth-century feminist writers of utopian fiction 
complicate this picture by aligning themselves with rationality and moral 
superiority over nature, a position which ecofeminist Val Plumwood critiques as 
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maintaining a dualistic account of human nature as separate from nature.20 At 
the same time, the dichotomy between sexual desire, seen as a masculine 
prerogative, and reproduction, resulting from sexual acts, made it seem urgent 
for women to take control of their reproductive life. Sex was often represented 
as a natural necessity by men, based on “the assumption that sexual energies 
had to be discharged if health was to be maintained after puberty” (Rosenberg 
78). Charles Knowlton in Fruits of Philosophy (1832), controversial for giving 
information on contraceptive devices, noted that “In spite of preaching, human 
nature will ever remain the same; and that restraint which forbids the 
gratification of the reproductive instinct will avail but little with the mass of 
mankind” (13). But if sex was natural, it was also seen as brutish or animal. 
John Noyes, founder of the Oneida Community, a utopian religious commune 
known for practising an early form of eugenics, developed a system of male 
continence to enable sexual intercourse without procreation, arguing that: “it is 
perfectly proper that we should endeavour to rise above “nature” and the 
destiny of the brutes in this matter” (Male 6). Feminist Henrietta Muller, writing 
in 1884, agreed that “self-control represented the basis of all moral life and ... 
the characteristic which distinguishes humanity from the rest of the animal 
world” (qtd. in Bland 164). On the other hand, methods of preventing 
conception, such as those described by Knowlton, were also seen as brutalising 
by encouraging excessive indulgence in sex and, as Bland describes, pushing 
“men and women back to an evolutionary stage of ‘brute’ existence in which 
sexual intercourse was devoid of the higher feelings of love and monogamous 
emotional commitment” (197). All these pressures led to a desire to see 
improvements in the reproductive life of women, expressed strongly in utopian 
fiction as a desire for chastity or asexual reproduction and the development of a 
civilisation where women could operate benign control over nature, as 
discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Three.   
Fredric Jameson argues that the rediscovery of ecology shows nature as 
not humanly constructed, but asks “whether this particular Nature ... is in any 
way to be thought of as somehow the same as that older ‘nature’ at whose 
domestication if not liquidation all Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment 
thought so diligently worked” (47). He sees it as nature with limits and restraints, 
                                                          
20 See Victoria Davion “Is ecofeminism feminist” (13). 
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as opposed to the Prometheanism of earlier constructions (47-8). A similar 
change can be traced in the ideas of eugenicists who started out with utopian 
ideas of altering the human race through mastering the laws of nature and 
ended up hoping to restrain reproduction in order to preserve nature. G.C. L. 
Bertram, writing in The Eugenics Review in 1951, linked eugenics to ecology in 
order to argue for population control, claiming that the ability to control 
reproduction was one of the factors which distinguished humans from other 
animals (15). For him, eugenics was closely related to human ecology, the main 
difference being that “Eugenics encompasses not only knowledge but a 
purpose as well - to improve the inborn qualities of people” (11). Even 
reconfigured as human ecology, and distanced from enforced sterilisation or 
Nazi hate crimes, the discourse of eugenics asserts a need to change and 
mould nature, rather than to understand and appreciate it. On the other hand, 
eugenics always involved a concept of humans as natural creatures and looked 
to principles from agriculture, biology and ecology to further its aims. Nature 
was never an artificial construct to be dominated, but a complex reality, which if 
mastered might lead to evolution beyond the present limitations of the human 
condition, a desire which pervaded much of eugenic thinking.  
 
1.4 Argument and Methods 
 
My thesis pulls together the three strands discussed above: the 
relationship between eugenics and utopian fiction, the dangerous utopianism of 
eugenic ideas, and the desire to adopt nature’s rules to advance human 
progress. I argue that eugenics is more utopian than is usually believed, and 
that the utopianism that motivated the early supporters of eugenics did not 
disappear after the Second World War. I claim that the analysis of eugenics as 
utopian idea through its manifestations in utopian fiction is important for 
understanding what is inherently problematic about the idea of eugenics and 
what can be learned for dealing with future incarnations of ideas of conscious 
genetic enhancement. I also see this discussion of the intersection between 
eugenics, utopianism and domination of nature as a valuable contribution to 
contemporary debates on the relationship between women and nature and the 
position of human aspirations of conscious improvement in a post-humanist 
world. 
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The time-period under consideration in this thesis runs from the 1870s to 
the 1970s, tracing eugenic thought in utopian fiction from initial reactions to 
Darwin’s Origin of Species through to a resurgence of utopianism in the 1970s 
and the belated demise of eugenic sterilisation some three decades after the 
Second World War. Taking into account a variety of voices, male and female, 
European and American, utopian and dystopian, the study aims to reintegrate 
eugenics into the wider context of utopianism and offer an in-depth exploration 
of how eugenic ideas contribute to the overall utopian vision of late-nineteenth-
century and twentieth-century writers. By exploring connections between 
utopian and dystopian works, my study exposes a sense of confusion among 
contemporaries over the perceived beneficial and harmful aspects of eugenics, 
and shows how some works which seemed to advocate eugenics were aware 
of its negative aspects, while others presented eugenics as a desirable aspect 
of an imagined future. This thesis also offers new perspectives on gender 
issues in eugenics by examining feminist utopian fiction by women writers 
alongside works written by men, in order to understand where ideas over 
women’s role in eugenic improvements offer a degree of cross-gender 
consistency and where these ideas diverge. The century-long time-period of my 
study also provides the opportunity of demonstrating the persistence, within 
utopian fiction, of ideas of consciously moulding human nature to create better 
citizens. It also makes it possible to examine how the concept of eugenics 
changes between the nineteenth century, when eugenics was still in its early 
stages, and the twentieth century, when many writers were ambivalent about 
labelling their ideas as eugenics or consciously aligning themselves with the 
eugenics movement. The variety of approaches to eugenics and the different 
motivations behind the desire to bring about changes to the quality of the 
population revealed by this study of eugenics in utopian fiction provide a 
significant addition to existing social, political and cultural studies of the 
eugenics movements, and aid in understanding the impact of eugenics on 
imaginative representations of the future.   
The works I have chosen to analyse have been selected for their 
representation of a significant and conscious interaction with eugenics or other 
scientific or evolutionary discourses that fed into eugenics. My approach to this 
research project has been to read the treatment of eugenics in the texts I study 
within the context of other ideas and explore connections to contemporary 
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thought. This study is organised in chronological order to show how following a 
specific strand of utopian thought such as eugenics can illustrate changes in the 
perception of that discourse, but also how certain ideas persist even as the 
terms in which they are expressed changes. Each chapter examines several 
texts to allow for the variety and specificity of utopian literature, which as a 
genre is formulaic in its structure, but idiosyncratic in its detail. The project 
therefore includes popular texts with huge impact, alongside more obscure 
texts. This approach allows me to be clear that the trends I discuss have a 
broad validity, while examining what the unique testimony of individual utopias 
indicate about popular reactions to eugenics, and the role of eugenics in the 
conceptualisation of utopian and dystopian worlds.  
I begin my study in Chapter Two by addressing the question of the 
relationship between evolution and eugenics through looking at the 
interpretation of Darwin’s theory of evolution within late-nineteenth-century 
utopian fiction. I demonstrate that the cultural impact of Origin of Species and 
Descent of Man led to a need to find alternatives to the “cosmic pessimism” and 
fears of degeneration that arose as a result of the idea of evolution. I consider 
how Darwin’s theory was read or misread by his contemporaries through an 
analysis of Samuel Butler’s satirical interpretations of evolution in his early 
works, beginning with the essay “Darwin Among the Machines” (1863), and 
culminating in “The Book of the Machines” , a section of Erewhon (1872) which 
envisages a future where humans are enslaved by machines. However, 
Erewhon also proposes a materialist morality based on strength, beauty and 
good luck, which anticipates elements of the eugenic utopianism promoted by 
Galton. Butler subsequently developed his own theories of evolution and 
engaged in a long dispute with Darwin and the rest of the scientific community 
to try to restore ideas of intentionality and purpose to evolution. In discussing 
this dispute I draw on recent research on Darwin to emphasise the complexity 
of Darwin’s ideas and the social factors that influenced Butler’s hostile 
interpretation of Darwin’s theory of evolution. By contrast, in America, Edward 
Bellamy developed a more optimistic interpretation of Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory for his best-selling work of utopian fiction Looking Backward (1888). 
Bellamy adopted Darwin’s ideas of female sexual selection from The Descent of 
Man to support a more positive view of human nature and a future based on 
shared wealth, mutual compassion and altruistic support.   
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In Chapter Three I focus on the biological and eugenic implications of 
late-nineteenth-century feminist utopias in the UK and the US, in particular the 
tension between women seen as being in touch with nature, and the aspirations 
within these societies to transform or transcend the biological determinism of 
women’s reproductive role. I look at the relationship between women and 
science and argue that, despite negative constructions of women’s nature by 
male scientists, science offered hope for improvements to women’s role in 
society. Late-nineteenth-century feminist utopias anticipate feminist interest in 
eugenics through proposals to regulate marriage, improve the health of the 
population and free women from the demands of sex and constant pregnancy. 
These feminist utopias also show the interest in separatism and a tendency to 
accept the binary of women as intrinsically moral and men as immoral. 
Elizabeth Corbett’s New Amazonia (1889) argues that a state run by women 
would necessarily achieve high moral standards, while the application of 
common sense and scientific control over nature would lead to an improved 
standard of living. Mary E. Bradley Lane’s Mizora (1880-81) proposes an 
entirely separatist world where the elimination men, following the development 
of an asexual process of reproduction, would lead to moral improvement and a 
perfect society. Alice Ilgenfritz Jones and Ella Merchant’s Unveiling a Parallel 
(1893) on the other hand questions the intrinsic immorality of men, showing a 
role reversal utopia where women behave as badly as men given the same 
societal freedom. Instead, evolution to a higher morality is seen as a task for 
both men and women through spiritual evolution, anti-materialism and chaste 
love.  
Chapter Four engages with applications of evolutionary theory to society 
in the works of Charlotte Perkins Gilman. I argue that Gilman’s theory of social 
evolution disputes some of the reductionist assumptions of eugenics by 
incorporating education and other environmental factors into its framework, 
demonstrating that for her eugenics is just one amongst many measures to 
bring about social improvement. However, Gilman’s proposals still require the 
sacrifice of the rights of the individual to the future good of society. Gilman’s 
early work of social theory Women and Economics (1898) uses evolutionary 
theory to support her claim for a more equal relationship between men and 
women, based on companionship rather than excessive sexual attraction. Her 
three utopian novels Moving the Mountain (1911), Herland (1915) and With Her 
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in Ourland (1916) show faith in women’s ability to change the world through 
education, mutual support and selecting the right husbands. Gilman also 
promotes the importance of women’s responsibility for preventing the 
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases to the next generation. Gilman’s 
Neo-Lamarckism meant that she never entirely agreed with the hereditary 
determinism of eugenics, and her own personal issues with motherhood made 
her wary of eugenic schemes to encourage motherhood. Her engagement with 
racial issues also offers the opportunity to examine the role played by racial 
prejudice in the US eugenics programme.  
In the fifth chapter, I turn to dystopian fiction to explore the role of 
eugenics in early-twentieth-century hopes and fears for the future. I argue that 
eugenics functions as a symptom of the prevailing scientism, the belief that 
scientific progress is more important than individuals. H. G. Wells’s dystopia 
When the Sleeper Awakes (1899) looks at the dangers of scientific progress 
without ethics, and of capitalism treating humans as resource for profit. The 
chapter also addresses Wells’s own ambivalence over eugenics and his early 
engagement with the idea of the Nietzschean superman. The dystopian fiction 
of the 1920s and 1930s likewise dramatises the debate over scientific progress 
and mechanisation versus individual rights. Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We (1924) and 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932) both present chilling versions of the 
scientific state turning people into machine components in the name of stability. 
Charlotte Haldane’s Man’s World (1926) is more ambiguous in its critique of the 
inhumanity of the scientific state. The state’s cult of motherhood places women 
in charge of improving the race through determining the qualities and gender of 
their children, but it turns motherhood into an all-consuming sacred vocation, 
requiring women to choose between motherhood and career, with compulsory 
sterilisation for those who are not going to be mothers. Kathryn Burdekin’s 
Swastika Night (1937) combines the cult of the mother with Nazi ideology to 
imagine women reduced to breeding animals in a male-dominated society. 
However, Burdekin represents the women as still able to exercise biological 
power by no longer bearing female children. The chapter demonstrates the 
importance of reproductive control and scientific progress in the early-twentieth-
century dystopia and the appeal of eugenics as well as its dehumanising 
effects.  
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Chapter Six contributes to recent scholarship that shows that eugenics 
did not disappear after the Second World War. I argue that the environmental 
utopianism of “ecotopias” proved hospitable to ideas of eugenics and to related 
discourses of reproductive control to limit populations. Despite the 
contradictions between the scientific instrumentalism of eugenics and the rights 
of nature, both eugenics and environmentalism share a viewpoint of nature as a 
real force in the world at odds with the post-war shift towards cultural 
constructivism. When B. F. Skinner wrote Walden Two in 1948 he took 
inspiration from Henry David Thoreau’s environmental classic Walden (1854) to 
re-imagine utopianism after the traumas of fascism. However, he continued to 
see behavioural conditioning and eugenics as important to this vision despite 
their implication in the totalitarian regimes of World War Two. Aldous Huxley’s 
Island (1962) shares spiritual values with the deep ecology movement and 
opposes population growth on environmental grounds, but Huxley continued to 
express concerns over declining IQs, and the citizens of his utopia use Artificial 
Donor Insemination to establish a voluntary eugenics programme. Both Skinner 
and Huxley diagnosed the needs of the post-war world as small-scale 
communities living in harmony with nature combined with conditioning to ensure 
resistance to dictators and undesirable cultural trends, along with the 
reconfiguration of the family to allow for experiments in improving intelligence. 
Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia (1975) rejects eugenics, cloning or other forms of 
genetic modification in favour of more natural forms of population improvement 
through female selection of appropriate fathers and masculine displays of 
strength through ritual War Games. A conscious reversion to Native American 
Indian tribal values underpins the environmental ethics and love of nature in 
Ecotopia but also justifies controlling population levels and implementing 
exclusionist anti-immigration policies.   
The concluding chapter examines two main areas of concern exposed by 
my study of eugenics in utopian fiction. The first is women’s role in reproduction 
and the desire to separate procreation from sexual activity. The second is about 
the implications of creating more perfect versions of humans and whether this is 
possible without destroying what it means to be human. I conclude by 
considering why fictional representations of eugenics continue to resonate in 
the twenty-first century.   
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Reading eugenics and utopianism together offers the opportunity to see 
how the eugenic ideas of human self-improvement through breeding for better 
people and eliminating the factors that impede their social utility came to inspire 
such fervent and deadly devotion in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
The utopian and dystopian fiction of the late nineteenth century and onwards 
can show more than just the rise and fall in enthusiasm for eugenics, but also 
how eugenics connected to a range of other ideas for making better people, 
whether through healthy lifestyles, education, moral improvement, spiritual 
development or improved social institutions. In fictional utopias there are no 
barriers to experimenting with ideas of what people might become, or imagining 
how science might aid in transforming real people into model citizens, and they 
therefore offer a fertile ground for exploring the apparently beneficial ideas that 
led to so many eugenic atrocities. 
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2. Darwin Among the Utopians 
 
H.G. Wells recognised when he came to write A Modern Utopia (1905) 
that the whole idea of utopia had been changed by Darwin’s The Origin of 
Species (1859) and the subsequent debates over evolution and its 
mechanisms, leading him to declare, famously, that “The Modern Utopia must 
be not static but kinetic...” (11). Wells saw that evolution meant that people 
could no longer hope to reach a state of utopian bliss that would be final and 
unchanging, whilst living in a world designed not by God but by the adaptive 
forces of natural selection. The “modern utopia” Wells describes would instead 
exist in the context of “a world of uncertain seasons, sudden catastrophes, 
antagonistic diseases, and inimical beasts and vermins” (12) where nature had 
been rewritten as a battleground. In this chapter I look at the impact of Darwin’s 
theory of evolution through natural selection on the utopian fiction of the 1870s 
and 1880s, in particular Samuel Butler’s Erewhon (1872) and Edward Bellamy’s 
Looking Backward 2000-1887 (1888). In the first section of the chapter I 
demonstrate that interpretations of the theory which stressed struggle, 
competition and extinction led to an element of ambivalence in the imagining of 
utopia during the 1870s and 1880s and uneasiness over the future path for the 
development of human beings. The kind of questions suggested by Darwin’s 
Origin were explored in depth by Samuel Butler in “The Book of the Machines”, 
a section of Erewhon involving a debate over the evolutionary advantages and 
disadvantages of humanity’s reliance on machines. I argue that the idea of 
machine consciousness allowed Butler to speculate on the more disturbing 
elements of the struggle for existence and extinction of species. Butler’s 
engagement with Darwin’s theory of evolution is also evident elsewhere in 
Erewhon, where Butler uses satire and the reversal of commonplace ideas to 
explore how humans might ensure evolutionary success through their own 
efforts. These ideas foreshadow Butler’s own theory of evolution based on 
memory and habit, developed during the 1870s and 1880s, which resulted in a 
bitter dispute with Darwin over the role of natural selection. In exploring this 
dispute I show that Darwin’s theory of evolution, although often misread by his 
contemporaries, was more complex and nuanced than its representation in 
British utopian fiction of the late nineteenth century would suggest.  
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However, by the end of the 1880s, utopian fiction had found a new lease of 
life through the success of Edward Bellamy’s Looking Backward. Bellamy 
offered an altruistic interpretation of evolution, based on co-operation and love, 
which enabled him to reintroduce a more positive version of the future to 
utopian fiction. Bellamy’s ideas on sexual selection by women were related to 
Darwin’s own observations on the importance of female choice, and offered a 
more reassuring route to species improvement than degeneration and eventual 
replacement by the inhuman victors of the struggle for survival. Moreover, 
Bellamy’s commitment to equality and solidarity fostered an inclusiveness that 
aligned evolutionary benefit with the community rather than the individual, giving 
everyone a stake in the evolutionary future. I conclude that the intense 
engagement with Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, and the 
desire for more teleology in evolution, resulted in writers of utopian fiction 
investigating alternatives to natural selection, including selection of marital 
partners for health and other desirable traits which would prefigure the concerns 
of the eugenics movement.  
 
2.1 Survival of the Fittest: Evolution in Utopian Fiction 
 
Samuel Butler was an early admirer of Darwin’s Origin of Species. He 
read the book not long after he arrived in New Zealand in 1859 and became so 
obsessed with it that he wrote a series of letters to the local paper, under a 
number of pseudonyms, debating its finer points. Perhaps it is not surprising 
that the message he took from the work was that of constant warfare between 
competing species for limited resources; after all, the evidence was all around 
him in everyday life in New Zealand where native species were coming under 
attack from the animals brought over by the European colonists. In “Darwin on 
the Origin of Species”, Butler’s first letter to the Christchurch Press in December 
1862, he wrote: 
Remember the quail; how plentiful they were until the cats came with the 
settlers from Europe. Why were they so abundant? Simply because they 
had plenty to eat, and could get sufficient shelter from the hawks to 
multiply freely. The cats came, and tussocks stood the poor little 
creatures in but poor stead. The cats increased and multiplied because 
they had plenty of food and no natural enemy to check them.  (158) 
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In this letter, Butler summarised succinctly what he saw as the main arguments 
of The Origin: in the battle for survival, the weak will go to the wall and the 
strong will survive, leading to species improvement. He asserted that: “The 
great agent in this development of life has been competition. This has culled 
species after species, and secured that those alone should survive which were 
best fitted for the conditions by which they found themselves surrounded” (161). 
When Darwin came across a copy of Butler’s dialogue soon after its publication, 
he wrote to the Editor of the newspaper to commend it as being “remarkable 
from its spirit & from giving so clear & accurate a view of Mr. Ds. theory” (Darwin 
Correspondence Project, “Letter no. 4058”).21 Darwin may of course have been 
impressed that even in the new colonies they were talking about his theory, but 
it is interesting that Darwin appears to have found nothing wrong with Butler’s 
emphasis on competition as the engine of evolution, even though he gave a 
significant role to social instincts in The Origin and would emphasise these 
again in The Descent. Butler‘s piece is full of words like “conquest”, “collisions”, 
“culling”, “warfare” and “struggle”. On this reading, there is no hint of co-
operation or altruism, simply individuals “selfishly striving” to hold their ground. It 
is a very un-nuanced view of natural selection, which leaves out Darwin’s own 
caveat in the Origin that the “Struggle for Existence” was a metaphor for a 
number of processes and dependencies which did not necessarily involve direct 
competition. However, it was very common for contemporaries to reduce 
Darwin’s message to the simple catchphrase “survival of the fittest”, a term 
coined by Herbert Spencer, which Darwin himself did not use until the fifth 
edition of The Origin (Claeys 223).   
Writers of utopian fiction were no exception to this interpretation of 
Darwin’s theory. For example, Ellis James Davis, in the utopian novel Pyrna: A 
commune; or, under the ice (1875), set in a vigorous but chilling society below 
the ice of a Swiss glacier, regards natural selection as an absolute law, 
synonymous with survival of the fittest: 
Everything that hath existence obeys one law – a law which has no limit, 
and knows no mercy. While nature lasts, while the world exists as it does 
now, that law will bind in its rigid clasp all created things. That law is 
                                                          
21 Darwin was sent a copy of the article anonymously, and the letter was probably written in 
1863. For further information see Darwin Correspondence Project. 
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called by you the law of natural selection, or the Survival of the fittest. 
(49) 
The people of Pyrna also believe that disease is nature’s way of purging the 
weak who must suffer and die “in order that superior may take the place of 
inferior forms” (49). Davis, a barrister who wrote four fantastical novels during 
the 1870s (Clute and James), blames civilisation for its role in protecting the 
weak, and advocates painless death for any children born with deformities, as 
well as euthanasia for the sick, and punishment for those with incurable 
diseases. Davis’s narrator, a traveller who falls into the world below the glacier, 
at first deems these measures “barbarous”, but becomes reconciled to the 
children of Pyrna being “sacrificed to their scientific theory of the improvement 
of the population” once he discovers that only one in a thousand is affected due 
to the excellent general health of the population (51). However, Davis does not 
offer unqualified approval of the way of life in Pyrna. Although the narrator is at 
first very impressed by the splendour of this hidden world, eventually the 
mixture of Social Darwinism and eugenics leads to a crisis in his approval and 
he begins to find fault with Pyrna, judging the women unattractive, the sub-zero 
temperature and diet of canned meat unenticing and the burial ground full of 
frozen corpses creepy. It reads as if Davis has scared himself with his 
extrapolation of the implications of Darwin’s theory, and discovered that he was 
not as fond of the idea of species improvement and superior forms as he was at 
the start of the book.   
At least Pyrna carries some kind of conviction as a utopia. There is a 
good education system, equality for women (though no role in government) and 
a society organised around a concept of love. By contrast, in The Coming Race 
(1871), Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s satire on utopian ideas, the inhuman superiority 
of the underground race of Vril-ya leaves little room for admiration. They may 
have limitless power, through the use of the miracle energy source Vril, but just 
like their strong and capable women, they represent a threat, not a model to be 
emulated. The Coming Race uses the utopian form to satirise America, the New 
Woman, democracy and Darwinism.22 Although Bulwer-Lytton mocks 
contemporary evolutionary debates by arguing that the Vril-ya were descended 
                                                          
22 Bulwer-Lytton wrote in a letter to his son: “I think you will like its solemn quiz on Darwin and 
on Radical politics” (qtd. in V. Lytton 468). 
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from frogs (139-43), he still sees competition and struggle as central to racial 
improvement:23  
Wherever goes on that early process in the history of civilisation, by 
which life is made a struggle, in which the individual has to put forth all 
his powers to compete with his fellow, we invariably find this result—viz., 
since in the competition a vast number must perish, nature selects for 
preservation only the strongest specimens. (119) 
The Vril-ya are depicted as the elect of evolution who are “destined to return to 
the upper world, and supplant all the inferior races now existing therein” (120). 
This legend shows that Bulwer-Lytton did not hesitate to apply Darwin’s theory 
of natural selection and the struggle for life to the history of human civilisations. 
Unlike Darwin who wrote about inter-species competition in very concrete, 
observational terms, with no set outcome, Bulwer-Lytton turned the process into 
an absolute law by which there was a direct relationship between the intensity 
of struggle and the level of progress. In his personal correspondence, Bulwer-
Lytton emphasised his fatalistic view of evolution, writing that “The only 
important point is to keep in view the Darwinian proposition that a coming race 
is destined to supplant our races”, resulting in a race that would be “deadly to 
us, not from its vices but its virtues” and “extremely dull” (Qtd. in V. Lytton 465, 
468).   
Gillian Beer in Darwin’s Plots addresses the issue of why so many of 
Darwin’s contemporaries misread Darwin’s “struggle for existence” and 
concludes that despite Darwin’s attempts at emphasising the metaphorical 
nature of the struggle “his trouble went for nothing, since so many of his 
contemporaries ignored such velleities and approximated the struggle for 
existence to Spencer’s “survival of the fittest” (53). One of the problems, I would 
argue, is that although Darwin makes it clear that the struggle for existence is 
meant to be read as a metaphor, its frequency within the text encourages a 
literal view of struggle. Moreover, Darwin applies the concept of struggle to 
processes that are not conventionally seen as struggles. For example, he wrote: 
                                                          
23 There have been different interpretations of Bulwer Lytton’s engagement with evolution. 
Jennifer Judge argues that Bulwer-Lytton uses the image of the giant frog to satirise both 
evolutionary debates and materialist philosophy (144). However, Ann-Barbara Graff observes 
that “Bulwer-Lytton uses Darwin’s new theory of evolution to buttress his very conservative 
notions about the natural order of society and to call for a retreat from social change” (41). 
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What a struggle between the several kinds of trees must here have gone 
on during long centuries, each annually scattering its seeds by the 
thousand; what war between insect and insect – between insects, snails 
and other animals with birds and beasts of prey – all striving to increase, 
and all feeding on each other or on the trees or their seeds and 
seedlings, or on the other plants which first clothed the ground and thus 
checked the growth of trees! (Origin 62- 63) 
One of the reasons for this emphasis was that in order to support his theory 
Darwin needed to make the struggle for existence into a driver for natural 
selection, so he used language that turned nature into a battleground, adding 
intentionality into processes that are often quite passive or non-aggressive, 
such as the growth of trees or foraging for food. Even the famous tree of life, 
which symbolises Darwin’s understanding of the interconnections that make up 
the ecosystem, is not exempt from the language of struggle: “At each period of 
growth all the growing twigs have tried to branch out on all sides, and to overtop 
and kill the surrounding twigs and branches, in the same manner as species 
and groups of species have tried to overmaster other species in the great battle 
for life” (106). 
Besides, The Coming Race and Erewhon were both written before the 
publication of Darwin’s The Descent of Man (1871), which altered the emphasis 
of natural selection by including chapters on the importance of social instincts 
and sympathy in animals. Also Butler’s, Bulwer-Lytton’s and Davis’s reading of 
Darwin took place in a social milieu where “survival of the fittest” had a general 
currency which went far beyond Darwin. As Gregory Claeys notes, “much of 
what we associate with the concept had been in formation for over half a 
century by the time the Origin of Species appeared in 1859” (228). However, 
late-nineteenth-century utopian fiction demonstrates how rapidly “survival of the 
fittest” came to be associated with Darwin’s theory of evolution, and how 
important referencing evolution was for the scientific credibility of any future 
world. The emphasis on the “struggle for existence” and the idea of being 
superseded by a superior species meant that the impact of evolution on utopian 
fiction led to ambivalence over the direction of utopia, as can be seen from a 
closer examination of the works of Samuel Butler. 
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2.2 Butler Among the Machines 
 
Bulwer-Lytton’s reservations about evolutionary models of progress are 
aptly expressed by Jennifer Judge’s characterisation of the coming race as a 
species that has “mechanized volition and morality, gutted sympathy, and 
lobotomized thought” (151). Samuel Butler too read Darwinian evolution as 
presenting a very mechanistic view of nature. In “Darwin Among the Machines”, 
another article written for the Christchurch Press (1863), Butler applied the 
language and concept of evolution to machines, and posited the evolution of 
machines into a superior race. In doing so, Butler makes overt what Lytton hints 
at in his description of the Vril-ya as invariably moral, and emotionally neutral, 
that the attributes of a superior race are similar to that of a machine: 
No evil passions, no jealousy, no avarice, no impure desires will disturb 
the serene might of those glorious creatures. Sin, shame, and sorrow will 
have no place among them. Their minds will be in a state of perpetual 
calm, the contentment of a spirit that knows no wants, is disturbed by no 
regrets. Ambition will never torture them. Ingratitude will never cause 
them the uneasiness of a moment. (“Darwin” 182-183) 
Butler’s reading of evolution as an ultra-competitive process led to him 
proposing that the machines must be destroyed for the sake of the survival of 
our own species. However, by depicting machines as the coming race, Butler 
managed to make the concept of advanced evolutionary beings inherently 
ridiculous.24  
“Darwin Among the Machines” and a subsequent essay, “Lucubratio 
Ebria” (1865), which argued that mechanical appliances like sticks, glasses or 
railway trains might be considered as part of humanity’s evolutionary 
development, were rewritten to form “The Book of the Machines” in Erewhon. 
This three-chapter digression towards the end of Erewhon was the earliest 
section to be written and supplied the justification for the defining factor of 
Erewhonian life, the outlawing of all machinery. As well as being resonant for a 
modern reader in its predictions of the development of artificial intelligence, and 
ideas of machine consciousness, “The Book of the Machines” is valuable for 
                                                          
24 There is often a tension in Butler’s writing between his desire to satirise and his serious 
points. David Gillott in a recent thesis on Samuel Butler quite justly notes that “one of the 
problems in writing about Butler is knowing when to take him seriously” (9). 
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showing the kind of questions that were being raised in response to Darwin’s 
work by contemporary readers, especially one as exacting as Butler. The “Book 
of the Machines” also demonstrates how Butler takes Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection as a starting point for speculating on other mechanisms of 
evolutionary selection as he begins to develop a more Lamarckian theory of 
evolution through will and cunning.   
“The Book of the Machines” is written in the form of a summary of the 
debate which led to the Erewhonian anti-machine revolution. Butler first 
investigates the plausibility of machine consciousness. Darwin’s Origin of 
Species promotes the idea of the evolution of life from one form to another; but 
for Butler, evolution was not sufficient without an understanding of first causes, 
and so he asks whether “when the earth was to all appearance utterly destitute 
both of animal and vegetable life” anyone could have predicted the evolution of 
life on this “seeming cinder” (Erewhon 198)? Butler argues that, if two types of 
life, plant and animal, could develop, apparently spontaneously, then why not a 
third? He highlights the mechanical elements in all forms of life, from a plant 
trapping a fly to a boy growing when kept adequately supplied with food and 
drink. Life is “a winding up process … [g]iven earth, air, and due temperature, 
the plant must grow....” (200). Although this mechanistic view of life is very 
different from Darwin’s representation of biological life as full of randomness, 
competition and waste, Butler manages to co-opt Darwin into his argument by 
evoking the “struggle for existence”. However, Butler’s version of the struggle 
for existence contains an element of Lamarckian striving, as his description of 
purposive growth processes in a potato demonstrates: “I will have a tuber here 
and a tuber there, and I will suck whatsoever advantage I can from all my 
surroundings.... He that is stronger and better placed than I shall overcome me, 
and him that is weaker I will overcome” (201). It is clear, as David Amigoni puts 
it, that “Butler was all the time dissolving the theoretical coherence and 
exclusiveness of natural selection, and melding it with a conception of mind-
guided adaptation and inheritance” (“Written” 102). 
Butler also argues that all human actions are just as pre-determined as 
those of a machine, maintaining that although we are unable to see all the 
forces coming into play, human behaviour is as predictable as the result of 
combining a set of chemical compounds. However, there are far too many 
“human combinations” to observe the regularity of laws of human behaviour, as 
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“[o]ur registry of results must be infinite before we could arrive at a full forecast 
of future combinations” (218). Butler was not alone in this supposition that 
human behaviour would be predictable if only we had all the data. As George 
Levine notes, this was a view held also by John Stuart Mill and other “rigorously 
inclined thinkers” (Darwin and the Novelists 92).25 Galton too was convinced 
that “man is little more than a conscious machine, the slave of heredity and 
environment, the larger part, perhaps all, of whose actions are therefore 
predictable” (Memories 216). Butler later takes this line of speculation to its 
logical conclusion by proposing the idea that humans might in fact be no more 
than giant wind-up toys:  
If, then, men were not really alive after all, but were only machines of so 
complicated a make that it was less trouble to us to cut the difficulty and 
say that that kind of mechanism was “being alive,” why should not 
machines ultimately become as complicated as we are, or at any rate 
complicated enough to be called living, and to be indeed as living as it 
was in the nature of anything at all to be? (Unconscious 14) 
Butler concludes that either it has to be admitted that the definition of 
consciousness is broad enough to encompass the type of consciousness 
possessed by machines, or failing that, since animals obviously evolved from 
non-conscious organisms, “there is no a priori improbability in the descent of 
conscious (and more than conscious) machines from those which now exist” 
(Erewhon 202).  
Having established that machines could be seen as being conscious, or 
able to develop consciousness, Butler looks at how their evolution might 
proceed. Firstly he predicts that machines might develop the capacity to hear 
and speak. The potential for natural selection to eventually turn animal sounds 
into language is implicit in Darwin’s work, but was disputed by Max Müller, who 
in The Science of Language (1861) claimed that “no process of natural 
selection will ever distil significant words out of the notes of birds or the cries of 
                                                          
25 Mill wrote “And though things do not really revolve in this eternal round, the whole series of 
events in the history of the universe, past and future, is not the less capable, in its own nature, 
of being constructed a priori by any one whom we can suppose acquainted with the original 
distribution of all natural agents, and with the whole of their properties, that is, the laws of 
succession existing between them and their effects: saving the far more than human powers of 
combination and calculation which would be required, even in one possessing the data, for the 
actual performance of the task” (System 250-1). 
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beasts”, and saw language as the chief distinguishing feature that separated 
man from other animals (490). Butler had no difficulty with the concept that the 
language of machines might one day be “developed from the cry of animals to a 
speech as intricate as our own” (Erewhon 203).26 In fact, Butler favoured a form 
of vitalism which, as Hans-Peter Breuer argues “led him to invest all matter with 
an increment of mind” (“Samuel Butler’s ‘The Book’” 366). 
Butler also examines the potential for machine reproduction, and in so 
doing develops the argument that human intervention in reproduction is more 
effective than the random action of nature. Butler moves from anthropomorphic 
regrets that “we are never likely to see the fertile union between two vapour-
engines with the young ones playing about the door of the shed” (Erewhon 210) 
to a cleverly argued piece of machine natural history, which draws strongly on 
Darwin’s writing on insects in Chapter VII of The Origin of Species. Here Butler 
maintains that although the reproductive cycle of the machine might not be the 
same as ours, machines are already involved with the production of machines, 
and in fact the role of humans could be seen as analogous to the role of bees in 
fertilising plants. Although Butler did not go as far as suggesting the idea of self-
replicating machines which would gain currency in the late twentieth century, he 
was shrewd enough to see that the idea of machines reproducing themselves 
was not only possible, but was in fact already happening. His account also 
gives more autonomy to the machines than that of the natural theologian 
William Paley, who, while proposing for analogical purposes that a watch could 
reproduce itself, saw one ultimate designer at work, rather than the evolving 
design of innovations and false starts that is behind Butler’s re-
conceptualisation of the natural history of machines.27  
Butler also looks at the interdependence between humans and machines, 
asking if the eye is “but a machine for the little creature that sits behind in his 
brain to look through?” (205). Butler’s speculations address questions of where 
the boundaries between human and machine lie, and whether humans as a 
species can even be said to exist outside the long-standing symbiosis with 
                                                          
26 See also Samuel Butler’s “Thought and Language” in which he questions many of Max 
Müller’s assumptions about what constitutes language, and argues that animals think reason 
and communicate without words but using a consistent code of symbols in a similar way to 
humans.  
27 Breuer argues that Butler avoids the necessity of final causes by realising that Paley’s watch 
could be the result of gradual improvements from many designers, without a definite final form 
in mind (“Samuel Butler’s ‘The Book’” 369). 
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machines. Butler argues that “Man’s very soul is due to the machines; it is a 
machine-made thing: he thinks as he thinks, and feels as he feels, through the 
work that machines have wrought upon him, and their existence is quite as 
much a sine qua non for his, as his for theirs”(207). Butler calculated that 
without the technology represented by knives, clothing and agricultural 
machinery: “we should become extinct in six weeks” (207) and that without 
steam power it would be “as though our population were suddenly doubled with 
no additional means of feeding the increased number” (220). This statement 
suggests both Malthusian fears over growing populations and disquiet over the 
ways in which life was being transformed by the arrival of steam power, which 
by the 1840s had “supplanted the power of water wheels, of animals, and of 
human muscles” (Sussman 3). Butler’s awareness of the dependencies 
between machinery and standard of living is not surprising given that, as James 
Smithies describes, he witnessed the rapid expansion of technology and 
engineering works in New Zealand in the 1860s (212).  
All the same, Butler could also argue for the positive influence of machines. 
In the final chapter of “The Book of the Machines” he introduced a second writer 
who maintained that machines were merely external limbs which could be used 
for a variety of purposes. For example, the spade is just an extension to the 
hand, and the umbrella an external organ to protect oneself from the rain. 
Sussman points to the increased use of prostheses due to industrial accidents 
as the root cause of the Victorian interest in the combination of human body and 
machine (50). For Butler, the nexus between organic body and machine was 
less important than the potential for machines to help humans take control of 
their own evolutionary process. “In fact, machines are to be regarded as the 
mode of development by which human organism is now especially advancing, 
every past invention being an addition to the resources of the human body” 
(Erewhon 223-4). But Butler did have reservations about access to mechanical 
assistance, believing it might short-circuit competition and lead to “inferior 
physiques” being transmitted to future generations, causing “a degeneracy of 
the human race” (224).28 Butler also feared that the outcome of evolution might 
lead to “man himself being nothing but soul and mechanism, an intelligent but 
                                                          
28 This was a common fear amongst eugenicists who objected to any form of assistance that 
might help the weak to survive and pass on their inferiority to future generations. 
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passionless principle of mechanical action” (224). This idea echoes Bulwer-
Lytton’s concept of the emotionless automaton-like Vril-Ya,29  
Butler further emphasised the connection between evolution and 
machinery by playing with its inverse – the idea that humans were responsible 
for helping machines to evolve. No designer would deny that technology keeps 
on improving; however, by applying “the struggle for existence” to machines 
Butler added a sense of sinister intentionality to the process: “The machines 
being of themselves unable to struggle, have got man to do their struggling for 
them” (207). Butler saw it as a short step from man as involuntary agent in the 
development of machine life, to man as slave to the machine:  
Is it not plain that the machines are gaining ground upon us when we 
reflect on the increasing number of those who are bound down to them 
as slaves, and those who devote their whole souls to the advancement of 
the mechanical kingdom? (208)  
Butler was tapping into growing fears about mechanisation, and the changes 
this was bringing to working life. The machine as malevolent entity was to 
become a dystopic theme of subsequent fiction, with H. G. Wells depicting the 
murderous idolisation of a power station engine in the short story “Lord of the 
Dynamos” (1894) and E. M. Forster’s describing a machine-controlled dystopia 
in “The Machine Stops” (1909). But Butler’s anti-machine rhetoric was nuanced 
by its satirical context, and a scientific and historical approach, which showed 
an awareness of the laws of thermodynamics, and a grasp of the significance of 
the change from technology running on human or horse power to one which 
requires its own fuel, some of the consequences of which are still being seen in 
the modern world in our reliance on oil. 
Butler’s analogy concludes with the idea that the development of 
machines is occurring at a far faster rate than evolution by natural selection: 
“[man] spends an incalculable amount of labour and time and thought in making 
machines breed always better and better; ... and there seems no limits to the 
results of accumulated improvements if they are allowed to descend with 
modification from generation to generation” (212). The selective breeding of 
                                                          
29 Sussman discusses how the rise of the self-regulating machine began to erode the concept of 
the soul being responsible for animating human action (49-50). Butler, on the contrary, imbues 
all forms of life with some element of soul, arguing in Luck, or Cunning? that “we must hold that 
all body with which we can be conceivably concerned is more or less ensouled, and all soul, in 
like manner, more or less embodied” (77). 
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animals was Darwin’s main analogy for natural selection, and Butler harks back 
to this with his concept of humans breeding machines. Darwin saw human 
efforts as a poor shadow of nature, partly because humans are not as amoral 
as Nature: “He [man] does not allow the most vigorous males to struggle for the 
females. He does not rigidly destroy all inferior animals but protects during each 
varying season, as far as lies in his power, all his productions” (Origin 70), but 
also because humans select for short term gains, and cannot work over long 
eras of evolutionary time. Darwin therefore saw the works of nature as being far 
superior to those of humans, a conclusion which he expressed in terms that 
come close to reinstating Nature as the designer or artificer of natural theology: 
“Can we wonder, then, that Nature’s productions should be far ‘truer’ in 
character than man’s productions; that they should be infinitely better adapted 
to the most complex conditions of life, and should plainly bear the stamp of far 
higher workmanship?” (70). Butler, on the other hand, doubted the superior 
efficacy of nature. “It must always be remembered that man’s body is what it is 
through having been moulded into its present shape by the chances and 
changes of many millions of years but that his organisation never advanced with 
anything like the rapidity with which that of the machines is advancing” (212-3). 
Butler shows that machine evolution has the potential to benefit from a 
ruthlessness that humans would not countenance, for example, the destruction 
of whole races in order to provide for a better design (207). However there 
remains something endearing about Butler’s master race of robots. They do not 
take to destroying each other or mistreating their human slaves. They are 
instead products of the Victorian love affair with machinery, children of the 
steam age that is once more exerting its fascination in the form of the 
steampunk and neo-Victorianism. For Butler, the ever improving races of 
machine life which he envisaged represent the potential for an enhanced and 
directed evolution to bring about a new kind of consciousness.  
Butler initially denied that “The Book of the Machines” was a satire on 
Darwin’s Origin of Species, as critics assumed. He wrote to Darwin in May 1872 
assuring him that the ideas were developed “for mere fun”, and were introduced 
into Erewhon to show “what absurd propositions can be defended by a little 
ingenuity and distortion and departure from strictly scientific methods” (qtd. in 
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Jones 156).30 Butler claimed instead that “The Book of The Machines” was a 
satire on Bishop Joseph Butler’s The Analogy of Religion, Natural and 
Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature (1736), a work of natural 
theology that both Butler and Darwin would have studied at school.31 In Analogy 
(1736) Butler used examples from nature to persuade his readers of the 
probability of various religious doctrines being true, and to argue that the 
difficulties arising from Christian doctrine were no more extensive than those 
surrounding our understanding of nature. Bishop Butler’s style of argument, built 
up from possibilities and inexact analogies, is certainly detectable in “The Book 
of the Machines”, as is Paley’s argument from design based on the analogy of 
the watchmaker. However, there is also a strong element of satire at Darwin’s 
expense. For example the following passage is clearly a pastiche of Darwin’s 
methodology and writing style:  
The writer attempted to support his theory by pointing out the similarities 
existing between many machines of a widely different character, which 
served to show descent from a common ancestor. He divided machines 
into their genera, sub-genera, species, varieties, subvarieties, and so 
forth. He proved the existence of connecting links between machines that 
seemed to have very little in common, and showed that many such links 
had existed, but had now perished (214).32 
Butler may not have been consciously trying to satirise Darwin, but the instinct 
to do so shows that he was beginning to move beyond his initial respect for 
Darwin’s work. “The Book of the Machines” is partly about the influence that one 
book can have on history. The fact that the book in question was so clearly 
based on the style and methods of The Origin of Species, suggests that by the 
1870s Butler was already feeling uneasy about the position of unchallenged 
orthodoxy that Darwin’s theory had attained.33 
                                                          
30 Butler also disclaims any intention of attempting to “reduce Mr Darwin’s theory to an 
absurdity” in the Preface to the second edition of Erewhon in June 1872 (“Preface” 29). 
31 Charles Darwin and Samuel Butler both attended Shrewsbury school, Darwin from 1818 
when Samuel Butler’s grandfather Dr. Samuel Butler was headmaster, and Butler from 1847 
onward. Peter Raby in his biography of Samuel Butler comments that “The system that Dr 
Butler installed was predominantly the curriculum and routine that his grandson Samuel was 
later to experience” (9).  
32 For further examples of Butler use of examples and phraseology from Darwin’s Origin for his 
satire on analogical reasoning, see Gillott (49). 
33 See also Breuer “Samuel Butler’s ‘The Book of the Machines’ and the Argument from 
Design”. 
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“The Book of the Machines” turns a patently absurd and exaggerated 
argument for the destruction of machines into a highly speculative exploration of 
the evolutionary future of humans and machines. Sue Zemka argues that 
“Butler’s playful inquiry into the evolutionary future of the machine-species 
expresses the loss of certainty that attends an expanding category of 
humanness” (463) in that Butler reduces all human cultural activity to a 
mechanistic enactment of survival of the fittest. Murray Code, on the other 
hand, sees in Butler’s imaginative extension of evolution beyond nature as 
opposing “the despiritualizing metaphysics of materialism” (107). Such 
diametrically opposed views are typical of criticism on Butler, due to what Gillott 
describes as “Butler’s wider project to show that all categories include elements 
of their opposite” (51). However, as well as exploring the boundaries between 
humans and machines, Butler is also trying to build an argument to demonstrate 
the flaws in Darwin’s theory of natural selection, and the importance of human 
will and conscious selection in evolutionary progress.34 Butler hints at humans’ 
ability to control their own evolution through strategic use of tools. Although he 
warns against over-dependence on machines, he sees limitations to natural 
selection as a mechanism for human progress. He is struck by the analogy of 
machines being improved through the continual agency of human beings, and 
begins to envisage a form of evolution involving a more Lamarckian sense of 
purposeful design and teleology than provided by natural selection. This is a 
strand of thought that Butler would pursue in more detail within the satirical 
utopia Erewhon itself. 
 
2.3 The Erewhonian Standard 
 
Even though “The Book of the Machines” is the section of Erewhon most 
obviously marked by Butler’s response to Darwin, the novel as a whole shows 
the strength of the link between evolutionary ideas and utopian fiction in the late 
nineteenth century. The setting within an imaginary world allows Butler to 
introduce a series of absurd ideas which permit him to explore some of the 
consequences of his own changing convictions about science and religion. In 
                                                          
34 Anna Neill argues that Butler’s work is compatible with present enquiries into non-genetic 
elements of evolution which in the case of humans includes the role of culture in evolutionary 
processes. 
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Butler’s invented world, ill health is a crime, the Musical Banks deal in a 
currency that no-one uses, children pester their parents to be born and the 
Colleges of Unreason teach Inconsistency and Evasion. Although Erewhon is 
written as satire on Victorian life, Butler also makes use of satire to discover his 
own position.35 In so doing, he becomes quite serious about some ideas, which 
despite their apparent absurdity, signal a move away from his fascination with 
natural selection as presented by Darwin towards seeing good health, physical 
beauty, and luck as key to the progress of humanity. By concentrating on these 
elements, Butler proposes an alternative version of evolution which has 
distinctly eugenic overtones in its emphasis on perfect bodies and good 
breeding. 
Good health is at the centre of one of the major satirical reversals of the 
book. In Erewhon, ill health is a crime punishable by prison or even death, while 
a good physique is equated with good character. The association between ill 
health and crime is strikingly represented in the description of the trial of a man 
for the crime of pulmonary consumption. This scene, which, as Henry Festing 
Jones, Butler’s friend and biographer describes, was transcribed directly from 
court reports (168), can be read purely as a satire on the procedures of the 
English legal system: “You were convicted of aggravated bronchitis last year: 
and I find that though you are now only twenty-three years old, you have been 
imprisoned on no less than fourteen occasions for illnesses of a more or less 
hateful character...” (115). However, it is clear that the link between ill-health 
and criminality was of more than satirical interest to Butler. Breuer has identified 
George Drysdale’s The Elements of Social Science; or Physical, Sexual and 
Natural Religion (1855) as one of the sources of Butler’s ideas on disease as 
crime (“Source” 317). Drysdale was a Malthusian and campaigner for 
contraception, and his book went through numerous editions, partly due to its 
reputation for sexual permissiveness. Drysdale’s argument was that 
Christianity’s prioritisation of the spiritual life over the physical had led to the 
neglect of bodily health and physical strength. Drysdale maintained that 
physical virtue was as important as morality in the “physical religion” he was 
promoting. He argued that “To break a physical law is just as culpable as to 
                                                          
35 U.C. Knoepflmacher contrasts Butler’s satirical procedure with that of Swift, arguing that while 
Swift mocks deviations from orthodox positions “Butler resorts to satire in order to grope for the 
norms necessary for such a position” (238). 
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break a moral one, and therefore all physical diseases must be regarded as a 
sign of sin, and as little in the one case as in the other can ignorance be 
received as an excuse. No man whose body is diseased whether hereditarily or 
individually can be called a virtuous being” (5). 
The association between disease and crime contains a strong evolutionary 
message. In terms of species survival ill health is far more of a crime than theft 
or embezzlement, which in Erewhon are treated simply as lapses requiring the 
services of a “straightener”. Butler’s narrator Higgs argues in favour of the 
Erewhonian system, as “the only means of preventing weakness and sickliness 
from spreading” and thereby “lowering the Erewhonian standard” (119), that is 
the high level of health and good looks that the narrator comments on 
throughout the narrative. The judge also specifies that the unhealthy should be 
prevented from breeding, or as he puts it in Erewhonian terms, “[t]he unborn 
must not be allowed to come near you” (116).36 A similar measure would be 
proposed by eugenicists, not as punishment, but to prevent the inheritance of 
range of supposedly heritable conditions. There are also hints of an earlier, 
more extreme eugenic practice in Erewhon of sacrificing the ugly and unhealthy 
“to propitiate the gods of deformity and disease” (96). Patrick Parrinder’s 
analysis of the significance of these rituals, conducted in the terrifying ring of 
statues that guard the border of Erewhon, leads him to conclude that “the 
statues represent the origins of Erewhonian eugenics” (“Entering” 17). While 
Butler’s satirical mode makes it hard to tell where he is endorsing and where he 
is mocking such ideas, there is no doubting that these issues represent a 
consistent thread within Butler’s apparently nonsensical speculations.  
Butler also placed a high value on beauty of form, which Drysdale 
describes as “that imperishable source of joy and stamp of nobility” (1). For 
Butler, his ultimate model was the gentleman or “swell”, described in his note-
books as one who “shows what may be done in the way of good breeding, 
health, looks, temper and fortune. He realizes men’s dreams of themselves, at 
any rate vicariously. He preaches the gospel of grace” (Note-Books 36). The 
people of Erewhon have similar characteristics. The narrator praises them 
                                                          
36 In Erewhon, the Unborn are incorporeal spirits waiting to be born, as will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
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variously as “the very best-bred people that I ever fell in with” (78), unequalled 
“in respect of physique” “as good natured as they were robust” (98) and “more 
like the best class of Englishmen than any whom I have seen in other countries” 
(158). Ross Stuart associates Butler’s figure of the swell with the idea of 
evolutionary superiority: “the superman, fittest to survive and most graceful 
owing to the absence of conscience” (153). The idea of physical perfection 
creating its own morality is reinforced in Butler’s notebooks, where he writes: 
“The question whether such and such a course of conduct does or does not do 
physical harm is the safest test by which to try the question whether it is moral 
or no” (Note-Books 29). Unsurprisingly, Erewhonians prefer to be remembered 
for their beauty than their morality. Their epitaphs are scrupulously honest about 
moral attributes like jealously and ill temper, but they always claim great beauty, 
and have statues made of themselves, which are either idealised or modelled 
for them by a more attractive friend (127-8). 
Butler later described beauty as “knowledge perfected and incarnate” 
(Life 38), reflecting a concept of aesthetic excellence as a sign of evolutionary 
advancement. Galton similarly assumed that beauty signalled good breeding, 
suggesting that the custom of the social elite in many countries of “purchasing 
the handsomest girls they could find for their wives ... has laid the foundation of 
a higher type of features among the ruling classes” (“Hereditary Talent” 165). 
Galton’s concept of beauty also shows a distinct racial bias. Cultural critic Anne 
Maxwell deduces from Galton’s infamous beauty map of the UK that he had a 
preference for a Nordic type of beauty, as well as a belief that “the highest 
forms of beauty were to be found in classical paintings and sculpture” 
(“Eugenics” 88). Butler too shows the Erewhonians as being biased in their 
notions of beauty, with the narrator’s fair hair being “greatly admired and 
envied” by the Erewhonians, due to its rarity, while the dark-skinned aboriginal 
tribes were considered “too ugly to be allowed to go at large” (96). Grant Allen 
in Physiological Aesthetics (1877) was more willing to recognise the relativity of 
racial norms for beauty, but, like Butler, associated beauty with elements of 
health, such as “lustrous deep-black skin, brilliant white teeth, clear and 
intelligent eyes, smooth round and glossy cheeks ... general plumpness of 
body” (108). His argument was:  
[H]uman beauty is, in part at least, a combination of abstract pleasures in 
form and colour, with a certain given, relatively-rigid, symmetrical, 
59 
 
normal, healthy type. All very wide divergence from the type is shocking 
to us, and is usually connected with disease, imperfection or morbid 
function (108).  
Butler’s aesthetics show less awareness of the physiological relativity of 
his judgements, and a more unquestioning association between beauty and 
health, as well as a conviction of beauty being a good indicator of heredity. 
Darwin, on the other hand, was less certain about the mechanisms for selecting 
for beauty. After looking at the role which ornament and colour played in sexual 
selection, Darwin stated:  
It is certainly not true that there is in the mind of man any universal 
standard of beauty with respect to the human body. It is, however, 
possible that certain tastes may in the course of time become inherited, 
though there is no evidence in favour of this belief; and if so, each race 
would possess its own innate ideal standard of beauty. (Descent 651) 
The final element in the materialist religion of Erewhon is luck. The judge 
concludes his address to the consumptive prisoner with the statement: “You 
may say that it is your misfortune to be criminal; I answer that it is your crime to 
be unfortunate” (117). The luck argument partly alludes to the element of 
chance within Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, which operates 
through the apparently random way in which new characteristics may arise, and 
through the chance conditions which allow these variations to establish 
themselves within a population. Butler also had a strong awareness of the 
arbitrary nature of even fundamental conditions of our life: “The Erewhonians 
say it was chance only that the earth and stars and all the heavenly world 
began to roll from east to west and not from west to east, and in like manner 
they say it is by chance that man is drawn through life with his face to the past 
instead of the future” (168).37 Butler set out his views on this subject of luck in a 
letter to the editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, containing extra examples which he 
added to the text of Erewhon for the second edition in 1872.38 He argued that 
the laws of society are based on respect for luck. We kill a lamb because “[i]ts 
                                                          
37 Though Butler does allow natural selection a role in destroying a race of men who could see 
into the future, maintaining that “if any were to be born too prescient now, he would be culled 
out by natural selection, before he had time to transmit so peace-destroying a faculty to his 
descendants” (168). 
38 See “The Ethics of ‘Erewhon’” (1872). In this letter Butler argues in typical contradictory style 
that even though we have little choice in our actions we still must take responsibility for them. 
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offence is the misfortune of being something which society wants to eat, and 
which cannot defend itself” (120). We tolerate the luck of hereditary wealth 
because “we cannot seriously detract from a man’s merit in having been the son 
of a rich father without imperilling our own tenure of things which we do not wish 
to jeopardise” (120). These examples were all annotated by Butler as being 
“meant seriously” in his own copy of Erewhon (Breuer, “Source” 321). This was 
because Butler also saw ideas of luck or good fortune as being important for 
ensuring advantageous evolutionary development:  
No-one with any sense of self-respect will place himself on an equality in 
the matter of affection with those who are less lucky then himself in birth, 
health, money, good looks, capacity, or anything else. Indeed, that dislike 
and even disgust should be felt by the fortunate for the unfortunate ... is 
not only natural, but desirable for any society, whether man or brute. 
(Erewhon 104) 
While the first sentence could be read as mere snobbishness on Butler’s part, 
taken in conjunction with the second it is clear that he is talking about the 
evolutionary advantage of associating with the fortunate, particularly when it 
comes to selection of a sexual partner; also that luck and fortunate variations 
have to be maintained through the will or cunning of those making the selection 
and promoted for the good of society. Butler added a final clause to this 
argument in the second edition (1872), concluding “what progress either of body 
or soul had been otherwise possible?”39 This sentence was underlined in 
Butler’s own copy with the note in the margin: “meant quite seriously” (Breuer 
“Source” 320). This addition suggests that Butler saw human progress as being 
linked to prudent sexual selection, based on health, good looks, monetary 
success or other indicators of evolutionary fitness to survive. Also by placing an 
emphasis on physical strength, beauty and good luck, as the basis for the social 
values and judicial system of Erewhon, Butler is turning away from a morality 
based on Christian ethics, to one based on “survival of the fittest”. Butler also 
argued in the 1901 revision of Erewhon that elements of this natural law which 
associated health with morality have always been in operation, leaving traces 
                                                          
39 Later removed in the 1901 revised edition 
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within our language, such as calling an injured arm a “bad” arm or using the 
word “peccant” for diseased matter within an abcess (103).40 
Another telling inversion within Erewhon is the World of the Unborn, in 
which the afterlife of heaven or hell is replaced by a pre-natal existence of 
incorporeal spirits striving to be born. The memory and identity of these spirits is 
destroyed at birth, but there remains “a bare vital principal, not to be perceived 
by human senses” (173). This idea foreshadows Butler’s theory of the 
persistence of personality through unconscious memory that he was to develop 
in Life and Habit (1877) and also emphasises the importance of heredity, the 
world before birth, and the sense of evolutionary chance:  
[T]hey [the Unborn] must draw lots for their dispositions before they go, 
and take them such as they are, for better or worse – neither are they to 
be allowed any choice in the matter of the body which they so much 
desire; they are simply allotted by chance, and without appeal to two 
people whom it is their business to find and pester until they adopt them 
(Erewhon 169).   
Butler uses the chapter on the Unborn to satirise the doctrine of original sin and 
baptism, again associating morality with the physical rather than the spiritual. 
The newborn child is the subject of a birth formula which releases the family 
from responsibility for its well-being, and the child is taken to task for being a 
drain on the resources of the family who “have perhaps already been injured by 
the unborn on some ten or twelve occasions” (164). Under this system, the 
struggle for survival is imported into the family. Sibling competes against sibling, 
and parents try to dominate and control children, as Butler was to demonstrate 
in his posthumous novel The Way of All Flesh (1903).  
Butler’s attempts to remodel family bonds along evolutionary lines and 
sideline the personal aspects of relationships provide, as David Amigoni 
suggests, a “poetic expansion” on Darwin’s work on parental investment 
(“Charles” 83). Darwin saw parental care for children not as evidence of the 
ethical superiority of humans over animals, but as analogous to practices in 
other mammals. Butler’s account of family life in Erewhon also takes away the 
                                                          
40 Butler was later to take issue with the whole concept of luck within the Darwin’s theory, most 
notably in his 1887 book Luck or Cunning as the main means of organic modification?, but he 
could never totally deny its importance, and admitted in his Note-Books that nine-tenths of 
conscious cunning is bound to be luck ( Breuer, “Source of Morality” 328). 
 
62 
 
ethical element by placing family relationships on a contractual basis, governed 
by a “birth formula” which regulates the relationships between family and child 
until the age of maturity. (Erewhon 162-166). In The Way of All Flesh, parental 
investment continues to be contractual, but with a stronger emphasis on the 
future of the family. In this way Alethea Pontifex invests in Ernest through her 
will, but withholds the money from him until his twenty-eighth year to allow him 
time to learn and develop. Ernest in turn sends his children away to a simpler 
but healthier environment, and provides for them through his choice of foster 
family, and money to promote their careers. The drive for both Alethea and 
Ernest is to act for the benefit of the children and to maximise their potential for 
transmitting the good qualities of the family’s inheritance, rather than 
subordinating their future to the needs of the parent. 
The perversity of Erewhonian ideas gave Butler ample opportunity to 
explore the consequences of a world where nothing could be taken for granted 
any more. His own personal loss of faith and his reading of Darwin combined to 
make Erewhon into a work of utopian fiction where utopianism gradually takes 
on an absurdist bent, which undermines the cultural values usually associated 
with utopianism. Butler reversed the usual mode of utopian thinking by 
concentrating on the outcome, which is perfect healthy people, rather than the 
moral or social refinements which might lead to this result. In doing so he was 
taking more interest in the development of the human race as a species, than 
the individual morality of its members, or promoting any high spiritual ideal.  
 
2.4 Butler versus Darwin 
 
In Life and Habit (1877), the first of four books speculating on 
evolutionary science, Butler looked at how skills for complex actions like 
walking, writing, reading and playing the piano can become unconscious 
through continuous practice. He compared the exercise of these skills with 
physiological processes like breathing or digestion and concluded that these 
actions could only have become automatic through long practice in previous 
generations. In the absence of any viable theory of heredity, Butler was not 
alone in looking for some mechanism by which the embryo would know how to 
grow into a human being, and an explanation of how the instincts that most 
species are born with are passed on from generation to generation. Butler’s 
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solution was to argue that we and our ancestors must be one and the same 
person:  
[I]f a man of eighty may consider himself identical with the baby from 
whom he has developed ... then the baby may just as fairly claim identity 
with its father and mother. By parity of reasoning each living form now on 
earth must be able to claim identity with each generation of its ancestors 
up to the primordial cell inclusive. (17)  
The significance of this idea was that evolutionary progress could be seen as 
accumulating through habit and instinct from one generation to the next, 
through what Knoepflmacher describes as an ongoing “Evolutionary 
Personality”, which subordinated individual identity to a compound life force 
(251). A change in environment could introduce conscious modifications, which 
would gradually be turned through habit into unconscious instinct. Hence Butler 
valued common sense and instinctive behaviour over reason and logic, and 
regarded all forms of orthodoxy and authority as dangerous, and liable to 
obscure the inner voice of common sense.41 
However, having written most of Life and Habit, Butler was shocked to 
find on re-reading The Origin of Species that Darwin did not necessarily see 
instinct as being formed by habit inherited from one generation to the next, thus 
undermining Butler’s main argument (Unconscious 23). Butler was influenced 
by St. George Mivart’s Genesis of the Species (1871), which pointed out some 
of the problems with Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Mivart argued that 
natural selection was unlikely to move distinctively or fast enough to account for 
evolution as variations occurring at random would cancel each other out and be 
unlikely to spread through a population. Also the rate of change achieved by 
this method would, in Mivart’s view, be too slow to fit with the fossil record and 
contemporary estimates of the length of time life had existed on earth.42 
Rereading The Origin in the light of Mivart’s criticisms Butler became more 
                                                          
41 See Breuer “Samuel Butler’s Notebooks: The Outlook of a Victorian Black Sheep” (1979) for 
the argument that Butler valued common sense above reason: “For Butler the answer was 
common sense, a faculty which in the best and nicest people was above reason but growing, so 
to speak, out of one’s unconscious memory which judges matters on a balance of pragmatic 
considerations, not reason and logic alone” (32). 
42 Morton notes that Mivart’s arguments were strengthened by incorrect calculations by such 
figures as the mathematician Fleeming Jenkins whose lack of understanding of the process of 
inheritance affected his calculations on the likelihood of a favourable variation spreading 
through a population, while the physicist William Thomson, later Lord Kelvin, placed a cap on 
the time available for evolution by incorrectly calculating the age of the sun (25-7).  
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critical of Darwin’s work, and felt that, despite the detailed accounts of the 
accumulation of modifications, there was no explanation of how variations came 
about, and that Darwin’s attempt to explain the main cause of variation 
“resolves itself into a confession of ignorance” (Life 275). This experience led to 
Butler hastily adding five extra chapters to Life and Habit, very different in tone 
to the earlier chapters, designed to show up the flaws in Darwin’s theory of 
evolution by natural selection.  
After publishing Life and Habit, Butler began to study the works of Darwin’s 
predecessors, Buffon, Dr Erasmus Darwin (Charles Darwin’s grandfather) and, 
most importantly, Lamarck. Butler was attracted to Lamarck’s theory of the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics as it gave a strong sense of intent and 
purpose to evolution, along with potential for rapid development of the species. 
Butler saw Lamarck as supporting his own ideas about the role of intentionality 
in evolution: “To me it seems that the ‘Origin of Variation’, whatever it is, is the 
only true ‘Origin of Species’, and that this must, as Lamarck insisted, be looked 
for in the needs and experiences of the creatures varying” (Life 263). Butler 
backs up his argument for evolution through conscious will by returning to his 
image of the symbiosis of human and machine, pointing out that in developing 
machine technology “We have man, the very animal which we can best 
understand, caught in the very act of variation, through his own needs, and not 
through the needs of others” (Life 255). 
Butler’s reading of the older scientific literature resulted in him writing a 
second book on evolution Evolution, Old and New (1879). It also led him into a 
dispute with Darwin over his failure to acknowledge the previous generation of 
evolutionary scientists or the older form of Darwinism developed by Erasmus 
Darwin in his encyclopaedic text Zoonomia (1794). Butler saw Erasmus Darwin 
as being far more ready to accept design and purpose into evolution than his 
grandson: “According to the older Darwinism the lungs are just as purposive as 
the corkscrew. They, no less than the corkscrew, are a piece of mechanism 
designed and gradually improved upon and perfected by an intelligent creature 
for the gratification of its own needs”. On the other hand, Butler argued, the 
newer Darwinism “sees nothing in the world of nature but a chapter of accidents 
and of forces interacting blindly” (Evolution 58-59). Butler had invested some 
effort in showing the potential support offered by Erasmus Darwin for his own 
theories on “the oneness of personality between parents and offspring” (198), 
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and was consequently much put out by several paragraphs appearing in a 
translation arranged by Charles Darwin of Ernst Krause’s Life of Erasmus 
Darwin which suggested that any attempt to revive the ideas of Erasmus Darwin 
showed “a weakness of thought and a mental anachronism that no one can 
envy” (qtd. in Unconscious Memory 39). This insult was made worse for Butler 
by the text being supposedly a faithful translation of a work written before 
Evolution Old and New was published, making it seem like Butler’s opinions 
were so ridiculous that they “were refuted in advance by one who could have no 
bias in regard to them” (40). 
 Charles Darwin was actually far more accepting of Lamarckian ideas 
than this dispute suggests. Adrian Desmond’s historical account of early 
nineteenth-century evolutionary ideas, The Politics of Evolution (1992), throws 
some light on Darwin’s ambivalence towards his predecessors. Lamarck’s 
theories were taken up by political radicals, and even Erasmus Darwin’s work 
was popular with radical scientists like Robert Grant, whereas Charles Darwin 
wanted to distance his evolutionary views from these associations: “He [Darwin] 
seems to have taken the move from Edinburgh, where his grandfather’s 
Zoonomia was praised by Grant, to Cambridge, where Paley’s Natural Theology 
treated it as a principal target in his stride, which surely says something about 
his growing social ‘ambivalence’” (Desmond 403). This ambivalence may also 
have caused Darwin to emphasise the spontaneous and accidental over design 
and need in his theory, to distinguish it from the less socially acceptable earlier 
version. However, Butler also overstates the anti-Lamarckism of Darwin’s work, 
and its lack of teleology. The concluding paragraphs of The Origin talk of 
“Variability ... from use and disuse” and the power of natural selection to ensure 
that “all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress towards 
perfection” (395). Desmond sees Darwin as “recasting nature as a self-
improving workshop” (405-6), and Darwin himself included a chapter on 
inheritance through use and disuse in Variation of Plants and Animals under 
Domestication (1868).  
 The essential difference between Darwin and Butler, I would argue, lies 
more in temperament than actual ideas. P.N. Furbank contrasts Butler’s evident 
enjoyment of the idea of “a toy-mouse in the shape of a man” to Darwin’s shock 
at discovering insects that imitated flowers (62). Darwin preferred to ground his 
theory in the careful accumulation of detail, and hedge it round with caveats, 
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while Butler tried to make the evidence fit his ideas. The obsessive nature of 
Butler’s procedure can be seen by his emotional reaction to opinions that 
contradicted his ideas, within the work of Darwin and other writers. Butler, after 
all, even taught himself German just to prove that Krause translated sentence 
did not appear in the original.  
Nonetheless, Butler’s obsessive criticism of The Origin did highlight the 
ambiguities and logical flaws in Darwin’s argument. Furbank sees the value of 
Butler’s evolutionary writing in his focus on language: “Butler displays how the 
tone of a defensive paragraph or over-qualified sentence may be made to 
reveal a dishonest intention in an argument” (73), while Amigoni points out that 
“Butler’s early critique was distinctive because of the way in which he drew 
attention to Darwin’s language, and to its ambiguity” (“Charles” 78). Butler’s 
argument with Darwin showed the importance of interpretation, and was an 
early indication of how hospitable Darwin’s work would be to different political 
views. The response to Butler’s intervention also showed how much evolution 
had become a new form of orthodoxy. Butler certainly saw it this way: “I might 
attack Christianity as much as I chose and nobody cared one straw; but when I 
attacked Darwin it was a different matter” (Letters 40). In the end, Butler found 
that the religion of science was as unsatisfactory as the Christianity that he first 
rebelled against, leading him to conclude that “[t]he spirit behind the High 
Priests of Science is as lying as its letter” (Way 350)  
 Butler made a second foray into utopianism towards the end of his life in 
Erewhon Revisited (1901), but the Erewhon which Higgs, the narrator of the 
previous books, returns to is one that has done away with Straighteners, allows 
machines and has a new religion, Sunchildism, arising out of Higgs’s seemingly 
miraculous escape at the end of Erewhon. By this stage in his life, Butler seems 
to have come to terms with the message of evolution, and, with Darwin long 
dead, no longer felt the need to prove his own case.   
However, the pessimism which Darwin’s work injected into utopian fiction 
persisted well into the 1880s. W.H. Hudson’s A Crystal Age, published in 1887, 
featured another race of superior beings who had evolved so far that sexuality 
was virtually unknown, all trace of human culture had been forgotten and old-
style humans were extinct. Similarly, in After London, published in 1885, 
Richard Jefferies portrayed an England which had reverted to feudalism, and 
human nature had deteriorated into an individualism where the rich enslave the 
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poor and fight pointless wars with their neighbours. The element of Darwin’s 
work most in evidence in both is the struggles between tribes and the rapid 
decline and extinction of whole races. In representing the decline of civilisation 
into savagery or dwindling out of existence, these works also show signs of the 
generalised late-nineteenth-century anxiety over degeneration expressed in 
Ray Lankester’s Degeneration: A Chapter in Darwinism (1880) as “we are 
subject to the general laws of evolution, and are as likely to degenerate as to 
progress” (60). 
Evolutionary utopianism in late 1880s Victorian Britain appeared to be at 
an impasse, manifesting an uneasiness which paralleled the debates around 
the implication of Darwin’s theory and its application to human society. Yet, in 
1888, in an America undergoing its own crisis of high unemployment and 
industrial disputes, Edward Bellamy published a best-selling utopian novel 
based on a completely different interpretation of Darwinism. Looking Backward 
tells the story of a man who wakes up from the competitive exploitative world of 
the 1880s to a utopian future where society has been reorganised along co-
operative lines which allow employment, education and wealth for all.   
 
2.5  Bellamy and Positive Evolution 
 
In diagnosing the ills of the late nineteenth century in Looking Backward 
2000-1887, Bellamy uses the first-person narrative of his hero Julian West to 
describe late-nineteenth-century America as a society ruled by the struggle for 
existence in an environment of scarce resources. The device of placing his 
utopia just over a hundred years in the future gave Bellamy the chance to adopt 
a historical perspective on his own time, and observe it from the outside just as 
Darwin had observed the natural world. It also allowed him to think about 
evolution and how it might support improvements to society. Bellamy argued 
that the laws of natural selection were being distorted by human-made rules, 
which allowed the rich to pass on wealth and position to their descendants. In 
Looking Backward he criticised the rich for believing themselves to be “of finer 
clay, and in some way belonging to a higher order of beings” (8), a delusion 
which reinforced the social divisions between rich and poor. Bellamy, like Butler, 
saw the differences between social classes as being like those between races. 
Where Butler had observed that wealth allowed the rich to tack a ferry or railway 
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carriage onto their identity, Bellamy used the less modern metaphor of a coach, 
pulled by the masses of humanity, with the rich sitting idle on the top.43 In fact, 
for Bellamy, industrialisation was another threat to the future, where corporate 
greed was preparing “the yoke of a baser servitude than had ever been 
imposed on the race, servitude not to men but soulless machines incapable of 
any motive but insatiable greed” (31). Bellamy’s attitude to mechanisation is 
more clear-cut than Butler’s, seeing it not so much as a threat to humanity’s 
dominance but as a means of dehumanising the working class and increasing 
the gap between rich and poor.  
 These negative images of Bellamy’s own time are counterbalanced by 
the optimism of the utopian future where the process of “industrial evolution” 
has led to social harmony and plenty under a nationalised industry. Bellamy’s 
version of evolution is still based on “survival of the fittest”, but his definition of 
fitness involved not competition but co-operation. So the larger corporations 
eliminated the smaller until “evolution was completed by the final consolidation 
of the entire capital of the nation” (32-3). Bellamy saw natural selection as 
working at the level of the group, and reasoned that a co-operative state where 
everyone worked for the common good was more efficient than “irresponsible 
corporations” and “syndicates of private persons” operating on the basis of 
“caprice” and individual profit (33). He fundamentally disagreed with the 
prevalent interpretation of human nature as competitive and self-serving:  
It was the sincere belief of even the best of men at that epoch that the 
only stable elements in human nature, on which a social system could be 
safely founded, were its worst propensities.... In a word, they believed ... 
that the anti-social qualities of men, and not their social qualities, were 
what furnished the cohesive force of society. (165) 
The qualities of human nature which Bellamy emphasised were courage and 
patriotism. His use of the term “industrial army” for the workforce was 
deliberate. He envisaged society being organised using the cohesion and 
discipline of an army, but more importantly with the ideals he associated with 
the military, of heroism, self-sacrifice and brotherhood.   
                                                          
43 See Beaumont for the argument that the “largely pre-industrial” image of the coach signifies 
that Bellamy’s tendency to ignore the role of capitalism in technological advances to focus on 
the abuses of capitalist society (Spectre 35). 
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In this respect, Bellamy’s utopian thinking shows a striking similarity to 
elements of Darwin’s work. As historian Thomas Dixon argues in The Invention 
of Altruism (2008) in both the Origin and the Descent Darwin refers to natural 
selection in relation to social groupings such as family, swarm, community or 
tribe (146). In particular, Darwin saw that a tribe which possessed a “great 
number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful members” would tend to 
triumph over less co-operative tribes (Descent 155). In the Descent, Darwin 
sees what he calls the social instinct (love of praise and fear of blame) as being 
reinforced in humans by the power of reflection, so that it becomes as important 
as stronger instincts like self-preservation, hunger, lust and vengeance (135-7). 
Courage, in particular, is highly valued because of its importance in the tribal 
history of humanity. Darwin concludes that social instincts, combined with 
sympathy, provide the primary impulse towards morality, and he makes the 
same point as Bellamy about human nature when he writes: “Thus the reproach 
is removed of laying the foundation of the noblest part of our nature in the base 
principle of selfishness” (145).  
Bellamy was at pains to show that his ideas did not presuppose a 
change in human nature, arguing that the abuses of power and self-interest of 
the nineteenth century disappeared in his utopian future because: “the 
conditions of human life have changed and with them the motives of human 
action” (36). Instead Bellamy saw humans as being perfectible, through 
education and changes in their social environment. The potential for people to 
be shaped or even programmed by their environment was demonstrated in 
Bellamy’s short novel, Dr. Heidenhoff’s Process (1880), where a fallen woman 
is saved from guilt by having the memories of her misdemeanours erased by 
electro-therapy. Dr. Heidenhoff theorises that there is no fixity to human 
personality. The person who commits a crime is therefore not the same as the 
person who is brought to justice over it, so if the memory of the act is erased 
then there would be no more point in punishing them than punishing an 
innocent man. In developing this idea, Bellamy was rejecting Christian ideas of 
guilt, and looking to medical means to eradicate crime. Like Butler, Bellamy saw 
criminal tendencies as not dissimilar to physical disorders, and wrote in one of 
his private notebooks: 
To have violent blood is a misfortune and after producing much 
unhappiness often leads to the gallows. To be humpbacked is a 
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misfortune and after causing much unhappiness often leads to 
consumption and spinal disease. The one predisposition, like the other is 
to be regretted and so far as possible should be sought to be cured. (qtd. 
in Schiffman 197) 
In Looking Backward crime is treated as atavism. Offenders are sent to hospital 
not prison, and their conditions treated as an illness: 
You used to call persons who stole, evidently without any rational motive, 
kleptomaniacs, and when the case was clear deemed it absurd to punish 
them as thieves. Your attitude toward the genuine kleptomaniac is 
precisely ours towards the victim of atavism, an attitude of compassion 
and firm but gentle restraint. (119) 
For Bellamy, the atavistic traits from the pre-human past were a rarity to be 
cured by a rational society, rather than a threat of degeneration.   
Education plays a key role in the future America of Looking Backward 
and universal education is seen as being beneficial to the whole of society. 
Bellamy’s emphasis is on equality of opportunity, but there is little diversity in his 
education programme. Its function is to inculcate shared cultural values, 
ensuring that “all have some inkling of the humanities, some appreciation of the 
things of the mind, and an admiration for the still higher culture they have fallen 
short of” (130-1). Regardless of the specifics of his programme, Bellamy 
recognised the importance of equality in education: “[t]o educate some to the 
highest degree, and leave the mass wholly uncultivated, as you did, made the 
gap between them almost like the different natural species which have no 
means of communication” (130). Bellamy also emphasised the importance of 
physical education, which, alongside adequate nutrition and improved living 
conditions had brought about improvements in the physical health of the people 
of future Boston, convincing Julian West that “there must have been something 
like a general improvement in the physical standard of the race since my day” 
(131-2).  
Bellamy was also influenced by theories on heredity and breeding. 
Eugenic thinking was beginning to make inroads into America in the late 
nineteenth century, through the influence of Galton, and agricultural breeders, 
while Richard Dugdale’s 1877 study of seven generations of criminality in the 
Jukes family also set the tone for hereditarian interpretations of social problems 
(Kevles 71). The Oneida Community’s experiment in “stirpiculture” which ran 
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from 1869 to 1879 was also underpinned by eugenic ideas. In his 1872 “Essay 
on Scientific Propagation”, the community’s founder, John Humphrey Noyes, 
acknowledged the influence of Plato, Darwin and, in particular, Galton on the 
experiment. However, the sexual radicalism of Noyes’s programme was not 
appealing to the American public, and it had no imitators.44 By the mid-1890s 
there were various campaigns for laws on marriage restriction and 
“asexualisation of the unfit”, as well as campaigns to restrict immigration, but 
these two movements were completely separate, and the term eugenics was 
not widely in use (Haller 40). Formal scientific study of eugenics in the US did 
not get underway until 1904 when Charles Davenport secured funding from the 
Carnegie Institution of Washington to set up the Station for Experimental 
Evolution at Cold Spring Harbor. 
Bellamy invokes a form of positive eugenics to account for the racial 
improvements described in Looking Backward, seeing it as working through the 
unhindered operation of sexual selection “with its tendency to preserve and 
transmit the better types of the race” (156-7). Bellamy theorised that without the 
biasing factor of wealth, selection could be made on the basis of “the gifts of 
person, mind, and disposition; beauty, wit, eloquence, kindness, generosity, 
geniality, courage” (157). Dr. Leete, Julian West’s guide in the utopian future 
Boston shows little doubt about the heritability of these traits, claiming that “race 
purification” through untrammelled sexual selection has led to “not only a 
physical, but a mental and moral improvement” (157).  
Although Darwin initially saw sexual selection as the “struggle between 
the males for the possession of the females” (Origin 73), in the Descent he 
began to look at choice exerted by the female, and accepted female sexual 
selection as a factor in evolution, at least where the female bird or animal had 
the mental capacity to choose (246). As Levine points out, this was a 
remarkably revolutionary stance to take given the cultural prejudices of Darwin’s 
time which tended to see women as intellectually inferior to men (Darwin Loves 
177). In Looking Backward, Bellamy is quite forthright about women being in 
control of sexual selection, and having the intellectual capacity to do so. They 
                                                          
44 Richards argues that the conservatism of eugenicists and the reluctance of the Oneida 
descendants to talk about the experiment in stirpiculture led to the Oneida Community having 
little influence on the eugenics movement itself, although both Wells and Aldous Huxley visited 
Oneida, suggesting that the community held more appeal for those interested in utopian 
experiments (61-6).  
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are portrayed as operating a ruthless triage to find the best and most successful 
males for the sake of the next generation, and use peer pressure to prevent 
anyone taking pity on the unsuccessful:  
Celibates nowadays are almost invariably men who have failed to acquit 
themselves creditably in the work of life. The woman must be a 
courageous one, with a very evil sort of courage, too, whom pity for one 
of these unfortunates should lead to defy the opinion of her generation – 
for otherwise she is free – so far as to accept him for a husband. (157-8) 
Bellamy describes women as “the wardens of the world to come, to 
whose keeping the keys of the future are confided” (158). Despite the 
importance of this role, Bellamy’s portrayal of women in his future world is quite 
problematic for modern readers. Edith Leete, the daughter of West’s host, is 
constantly referred to as an angel, her only skill seems to be shopping, and she 
is not technically competent enough to show West how to tune in his clock 
radio.45 All Dr. Leete’s descriptions of the vastly improved organisation of 
resources and working life refer exclusively to men, so it comes as a surprise to 
discover towards the end of the book that, contrary to appearances, women do 
work and even have their own separate industrial army. Bellamy’s “equal but 
different” philosophy would sound better if there were fewer caveats, such as: 
“Under no circumstances is a woman permitted to follow any employment not 
perfectly adapted, both as to kind and degree of labor, to her sex.”(151). 
Bellamy may have been attempting to counteract common arguments against 
allowing women to work by recommending that they have shorter working 
hours, frequent vacations and opportunities to rest; however, the suggestion 
that women should work because it is good for them comes across as 
condescending to the modern reader. Nevertheless, Bellamy was seriously 
committed to feminism, and in Equality (1897), the sequel to Looking Backward, 
he offers a fuller and more radical picture of female agency and employment.46 
However, for him, women’s role of selecting the right husbands for the future of 
their race was even more important than their civic role in society.   
                                                          
45 See Lewes p. 35-6 for more problems with Bellamy’s representation of women in Looking 
Backward. 
46 See Franklin Rosemont’s “Bellamy’s Radicalism Reclaimed” (173-177) for a good account of 
Bellamy’s feminism; for a more critical view see Sylvia Strauss “Gender, Class, and Race in 
Utopia”, both in Patai, Daphne, ed. Looking Backward, 1988-1888: Essays on Edward Bellamy.  
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It is clear that Bellamy’s view of the biological nature of inequality is at 
the root of the many institutions and customs of his future world.  He argued 
that everyone needed to be educated regardless of ability and earn the same 
wages whatever they achieved. This is why he recommended work 
opportunities for women and the disabled, and hospital treatment rather than 
punishment for criminals. As he saw it, “survival of the fittest” would be unlikely 
to deliver an equal society. Even though Bellamy put evolution at the heart of 
his concept of utopia, maintaining that Looking Backward was “intended in all 
seriousness as a forecast, in accordance with the principles of evolution, of the 
next stage in industrial and social development of humanity” (“Postscript”195), it 
was evolution based not on the competitiveness of natural selection, but on co-
operation and sexual selection. Like Butler, Bellamy saw humans as directing 
their own evolution and developing as a result of the intellectual capital of their 
predecessors: “How happened it ... that your workers were able to produce 
more than so many savages would have done? Was it not wholly on account of 
the heritage of the past knowledge and achievements of the race, the 
machinery of society, thousands of years in contriving, found by you ready-
made to your hand”(79)? Bellamy also equates evolution with rationality and 
social progress, describing the new system as “the logical outcome of the 
operation of human nature under rational conditions” (69). Ultimately, Bellamy’s 
positive picture of human nature is essential to his conception of the alternative 
evolution behind his utopia: “If I were to give you, in one sentence, a key to 
what may seem the mysteries of our civilisation as compared with that of your 
age, I should say that it is the fact that the solidarity of the race and the 
brotherhood of man, which to you were but fine phrases, are, to our thinking 
and feeling, ties as real and as vital as physical fraternity”(78). Bellamy takes an 
inclusive view of the evolution of the human race, arguing that “our solution of 
the problem of human society would have been none at all had it left the lame, 
the sick, and the blind outside with the beasts, to fare as they might” (78-9). 
This view marks him out as very different from American eugenicists such as 
Charles Davenport who in his 1911 textbook Heredity in Relation to Eugenics 
wrote:  
It is a reproach to our intelligence that we as a people, proud in other 
respects of our control of nature, should have to support about half a 
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million insane, feeble-minded, epileptic, blind and deaf, 80,000 prisoners 
and 100,000 paupers at a cost of over 100 million dollars per year. (4) 
Bellamy is often described as a Christian Socialist. He could also be 
called a Christian Darwinist, for the Christian gospel of brotherly love certainly 
marked his ideas of evolution, and Biblical quotes are used frequently 
throughout Looking Backward to reinforce his points. Bellamy did not see any 
contradiction between evolution and Christianity. To him, evolution was all 
about completing God’s plan, and in the final phrases of the radio-evangelist Mr 
Barton, Bellamy links evolution to humanity’s future: “For twofold is the return of 
man to God ‘who is our home’, the return of the individual by way of death, and 
the return of the race by the fulfilment of the evolution, when the divine secret 
hidden in the germ shall be perfectly unfolded” (171). 
 Looking Backward was phenomenally popular, selling ten thousand 
copies in 1888, 200,000 in 1889, and a total of a million by the early 1890s 
(Madison 457) and was possibly the second highest-selling American novel of 
the nineteenth century after Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852) (Auerbach 42).47 The 
book’s influence went far beyond fiction into politics, with the formation of 
Nationalist clubs to promote Bellamy’s ideas, and involvement in the 1892 
Presidential campaign. The success of Looking Backward also re-energised the 
utopian genre in the UK. William Morris wrote News from Nowhere in 1890 as a 
riposte to what Morris described as the “very extreme of national centralisation” 
in Bellamy’s utopia (356), and then Wells wrote The Time Machine (1895) and 
A Modern Utopia (1905) in response to News from Nowhere. Looking Backward 
also spawned numerous responses, imitators and sequels in the US and 
elsewhere.48 The appeal of Bellamy’s utopia has been attributed to a variety of 
causes, with, for example, Jonathan Auerbach citing “its urgent insistence on 
change” and promise of transformation and unity as key to its success, while 
Howard P. Segal concluded that it owed its popularity to Bellamy’s “middle-of-
the-road stance” on technology. However, it could also be argued that the 
book’s optimism about human potential through evolution was a strong factor in 
                                                          
47 Sales in the UK were good too, or as Marshall described them “sensational”, with over 40,000 
copies sold in its first year of publication and 100,000 copies by 1890 (Marshall 88). The 
success of Looking Backward boosted the sales of other works of utopian fiction, causing 
William Morris’s News from Nowhere to be more widely read in continental Europe than any of 
his other works (Marshall 93). 
48 See Matthew Beaumont’s The Spectre of Utopia (27-31) for further information on the 
publication history and influence of Looking Backward.  
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its appeal. Bellamy came to such a positive outcome for his version of evolution 
by openly equating “survival of the fittest” with the dystopian past; his 
descriptions of the struggle, dirt and inequalities of nineteenth-century Boston 
are the most vivid part of the book, and make the case for social change all the 
stronger. He also focussed on the social advances of his utopia, and kept away 
from the more extreme biological implications of evolution. Bellamy was also of 
a younger generation than Bulwer-Lytton and Butler. He was only nine years old 
when the Origin was published and did not live through the dramatic impact that 
Darwin’s theory had on Victorian society. Even Hudson, who was only nine 
years older than Bellamy, read the Origin not long after publication and went 
through a personal struggle to accept the truth of evolution (Morton 71-2). 
Bellamy’s formative years were spent in a Baptist household in small town 
America, imbibing tales of heroism, and as a student in Germany where he 
encountered Marxism and also the shocking poverty of European cities 
(Beaumont “Introduction” xii). He was also influenced by the New England 
transcendentalism of Ralph Waldo Emerson, drawing on Emerson’s concept of 
“the Over-Soul” in his early unpublished work “The Religion of Solidarity” 
(1874), to conceive a universalising spirit which subsumed the selfishness of 
individualism in the interests of the community.49 For Bellamy, evolution and 
natural selection provided a mechanism for bringing about social improvements 
and offered scientific backing to the theory of socialism, which he was careful to 
rebrand as nationalism for the American market. 
  The popularity of Looking Backward also seems to have been due to 
Bellamy’s ability to tap into contemporary concerns about “the labor question” 
while offering a pain-free solution which largely ignored the reality of working 
life. The utopian future Boston cheats in the same way as Erewhon does in 
portraying an educated, leisurely lifestyle similar to that of the middle class, 
while pretending it is no longer based on someone else’s labour. Bellamy sees 
natural resources as infinite, so as long as everyone works hard, and labour is 
efficiently organised, he sees no barrier to prosperity for all. By removing 
“survival of the fittest” from the picture, Bellamy also removed one of the main 
checks on population growth, but there is no mention of this in twenty first 
                                                          
49 Auerbach is critical of how Bellamy used Emerson’s ideas, arguing that “Bellamy converts 
Emerson’s self-evident, self-regulating laws into an equally self-correcting bureaucratic order” 
(38-9). 
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century Boston. In fact, the future world of Looking Backward is, as Auerbach 
points out, scarily empty, presenting just one family, and two service industry 
personnel (35). By contrast, the nineteenth century that West returns to in his 
nightmare is teeming with people, smells, noise and waste. This is the true 
exemplar of the Malthusian world which Bellamy and his contemporaries are 
trying to escape. Bellamy’s message is that there can be hope in evolution, 
providing the reductionist pictures of human nature adopted by Social 
Darwinists is replaced by the model proposed by Darwin in The Descent of 
sympathy and cooperation.  
Writers of utopian fiction in the 1870s and 1880s seem to have been both 
fascinated and repelled by Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection. 
They did not always appreciate the full complexity of Darwin’s argument, and 
there was a tendency to focus on a dominant reading centred on “survival of the 
fittest” and to extrapolate implications for the evolution of humanity which 
Darwin would never have supported. However, the response to Bellamy’s work 
shows that although the way in which Darwin was read may have contributed to 
a crisis within concepts of utopia, his writing could also be used to support a 
more constructive version of human nature and inspired a new wave of utopian 
fiction based on the social bonds of sympathy and altruism.  
 
2.6 Unnatural selection: Utopia and Eugenics 
 
Natural selection had a number of drawbacks in relation to constructing 
utopian societies, the main one being that it was a slow and uncertain 
mechanism for achieving the kind of change which evolutionary theory 
promised. Therefore writers of utopian fiction tended to turn to human agency to 
improve on natural selection, whether through technology, memory, new habits 
or education. Also, it could be argued that, by using the analogy of agricultural 
breeding for nature’s work in selecting species, Darwin opened the door to a 
more purposive version of natural selection, in the form of eugenics. Indeed, in 
The Descent Darwin does seem to endorse eugenics. In a passage about the 
danger of public health measures like vaccinations, he comments: “It is 
surprising how soon a want of care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the 
degeneration of a domestic race; but excepting in the case of man himself, 
hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to breed” (159). 
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However, as Levine points out, Darwin never did become a eugenicist because 
social instincts were more important to him than logic (Darwin Loves 63), as 
evidenced by his disclaimer against enforcing strict eugenic principles: “Nor 
could we check our sympathy, even at the urging of hard reason, without 
deterioration in the noblest part of our nature” (Descent 159). However, the 
connection between evolution, eugenics and utopia while not directly 
determined by Darwin was a strong one, arising from a wish to improve society 
through improving the health, intelligence and behaviour of those who lived in it, 
and a desire to avoid the consequences of unmediated natural selection. 
Butler’s ideas are too diverse and inventive to be categorised as 
eugenics, even though some critics have done so, notably Parrinder who 
argues that Erewhon “is not the playful and ultimately pointless anomaly that so 
many of its critics have thought. It is a major work in the eugenic utopian 
tradition” (20). Knoepflmacher agrees that Butler’s reverence for physical grace 
and health could be describes as a “eugenic religion” (244), while Smithies sees 
Butler’s writings on machine evolution as prefiguring a fascination with eugenics 
in New Zealand in the 1920s (212). However, I would argue that even though 
Butler plays with eugenic elements in Erewhon, his satirical approach leaves it 
unclear to what extent he endorses them, and his concept of a single 
evolutionary personality places the responsibility for evolutionary progress on 
the self-improving individual not the state. Nonethless, Butler’s emphasis on 
health, beauty and luck make it clear that he is promoting a new morality based 
on species development. Butler saw good heredity as important to progress and 
success, though he was less interested in intelligence than Galton, since he 
saw unconscious memory, developed in iterative fashion through successive 
generations, as the means of achieving the instinctive grace that he admired. In 
the end, Butler’s version of self-directed evolution places humans in charge of 
their own fate, not through eugenic regulations, but through desire and cunning, 
the ability to seize advantage from the random chance of the universe.   
Bellamy too recognised the importance of memory to evolutionary 
identity, but drew opposite conclusions to Butler. Instead of seeing an ongoing 
evolutionary person developing and progressing, Bellamy saw the individual’s 
memories subsumed into the greater whole, leading him to base evolution on 
communal solidarity rather than struggle and individual development. Bellamy 
does, nevertheless, endorse a society-wide form of eugenics in his altruistic 
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utopia, that of positive eugenics through female sexual selection. However, 
there is no suggestion of social engineering or negative eugenics, just a 
communal desire to improve and select for the positive qualities that Bellamy 
admired such as courage and love, and so restore direction and progress to the 
story of humanity. In developing Darwin’s ideas on female sexual selection, and 
applying them unequivocally to humans, Bellamy was also sanctioning an 
unprecedented role for women in evolution and the future direction of the 
human race. Bellamy’s vision of an improved humanity and society achieved 
through positive selection was one which would influence women writers of 
utopian fiction such as Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and set the tone for a new 
kind of collectivist evolutionism more hospitable to state-sponsored 
programmes such as eugenics, rather than trusting to an unmediated version of 
natural selection and “survival of the fittest”.   
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3 Eugenics in Late-Nineteenth-Century Feminist Utopias 
 
The last three decades of the nineteenth century saw the publication of 
an unprecedented number of works of utopian fiction or utopian speculation 
written by women. Darby Lewes lists at least sixty-five titles first published in 
Europe and America between 1870 and 1900, which is a large number for a 
genre where works by women were previously quite rare. Most of these works 
have been forgotten, or only rescued from oblivion by academics and specialist 
presses in recent decades. Written at a time of shifting gender relations, these 
lost utopias reflect the tensions and hopes in the lives of women as they 
struggled to reassess their role and identity in society. Some of them involve 
gender role reversals such as Annie Denton Cridge’s Man’s Rights; or How 
Would You Like It? (1870) or experimental communes where women and men 
work side by side to change gender roles as in Marie Howland’s Papa’s Own 
Girl (1874) or Jane Hume Clapperton’s Margaret Dunmore; or, A Socialist 
Home (1888). These early feminist utopias also demonstrate growing concerns 
over issues of sexuality and reproduction. Carol Farley Kessler’s examination of 
fifty nine pre-1970s US feminist utopias revealed that sixty four per cent saw 
marriage as a problem, compared to only twenty four per cent which “presented 
suffrage as part of a solution to women’s place in society” (8). Inequality of 
power in marriage was often an issue, but so were women’s responsibilities for 
choosing the right husband, regulating the size of their family and balancing the 
duties of motherhood with education and careers. This chapter looks at these 
issues from two perspectives important for eugenic feminism: women’s 
responsibility for sexual selection and women’s role in the future evolution of the 
human race towards a higher moral state. 
The texts discussed in this chapter all illustrate some aspect of the 
interaction between evolutionary ideas of progress and women’s arguments for 
being seen as equal or superior to men. They all recommend eugenic measures 
of some description, though without necessarily using the term eugenics, as 
eugenics was not a widely-established social movement at the point when these 
works were written. Instead they demonstrate the multiple sources of eugenic 
ideas extant in late-nineteenth-century society, borrowing from areas as diverse 
as Malthusianism, evolutionary science, Perfectionist spirituality and 
horticulture. The works of utopian fiction considered in this chapter also all 
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engage with scientific and biblical arguments over the nature of women, and 
see control over nature, both women’s biological nature and natural forces in 
the external world as important to the progress of society. They indicate that 
late-nineteenth-century feminists were uneasy about the commonly-held 
association between women and nature, and looked to science to provide a 
means of controlling and transcending nature, particularly those aspects which 
related to sex and reproduction. 
The first section of the chapter investigates Elizabeth Corbett’s New 
Amazonia: A Foretaste of the Future (1889), a feminist utopia set in a future 
Ireland where the highest posts in society are reserved for a cadre of celibate 
women, and excessive reproduction is criminalised. Corbett’s feminist 
arguments, provoked by double-standards over sexual behaviour, include 
eugenic regulation of marriage. I compare Corbett’s approach to eugenics to 
that of fellow utopianist Jane Hume Clapperton, who recommends use of 
contraceptives to remove the link between sexual activity and pregnancy. In the 
next part of the chapter I turn to America utopianism and focus on Mary E. 
Bradley Lane’s separatist feminist utopia Mizora: A World of Women (1889), 
originally serialised in a US newspaper in 1880-1. Mizora portrays a country 
where men no longer exist, reproduction occurs asexually, and the role of the 
mother is celebrated not penalised. In the final section of the chapter, the 
question of moral evolution is addressed in my examination of Unveiling a 
Parallel (1893), written by two women from Iowa, Alice Ilgenfritz Jones and Ella 
Merchant. Unveiling a Parallel presents two utopian societies, one a feminist 
satire on masculine values, and a second, more refined society whose citizens 
have consciously progressed beyond their appetite for greed and sex to form a 
more egalitarian, supportive society. I argue that all these texts display a strong 
belief in evolution as a means of refashioning human nature, and that their 
primary purpose was not simply establishing equality for women, but imagining 
a better world where values often associated with women, such as love, 
morality, chastity and spirituality could be achieved through evolutionary 
advances. However, in doing so, these writers often found themselves 
reinforcing traditional definitions of male and female social roles, or opting for a 
separatist approach based on role reversal or exclusion of men from these 
utopian societies. 
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3.1 Amazons, Science and Common Sense50 
 
John Stuart Mill in The Subjection of Women (1869) remarks that the 
authority of men over women might be justified if it were found to be “the result 
of a conscientious comparison between different modes of constituting the 
government of society” such as “the government of women over men, equality 
between the two, and such mixed and divided modes of government as might 
be invented” (6). In New Amazonia Elizabeth Corbett, although not consciously 
referencing Mill, takes up the challenge of imagining the government of women 
over men, and attempts to prove that this truly was “the arrangement most 
conducive to the happiness and well-being of both” (Mill 6). However, in doing 
so, she reverses the inequalities experienced by the women of her day by 
barring men from all government posts in her imagined society, on the grounds 
of their supposedly inferior moral nature. In the two decades between the 
publication of The Subjection of Women and New Amazonia, Mill’s logical and 
rational arguments for the lack of difference between the two sexes were being 
challenged by a new and apparently more scientific approach to the subject.51 
Mill argued that “What we now call the nature of woman is an eminently artificial 
thing” (Subjection 22), but many continued to argue that this nature was innate, 
circumscribed by physical laws. Anthropologists linked women and savages 
together as examples of a more primitive stage of evolution, while craniologists 
such as Paul Broca measured skulls and assumed a direct correlation between 
size and intelligence. Broca’s conclusions that female brains were on average 
10 percent smaller in volume than male brains were used in works such as 
George Romanes essay on “Mental Differences between Men and Women” 
(1887) to argue that women suffered under an intellectual disadvantage, 
particularly with respect to creativity and original thought, despite, in his view, 
equal access to the arts and science (384). 
Even where inferiority was not taken for granted, the idea of differences 
between men and women was underpinned by a conviction that certain 
                                                          
50 Some of the material in this section was originally published by me in the following article: 
“Amazons, Science and Common Sense: The Rule of Women in Elizabeth Corbett’s New 
Amazonia”. 
51 Cynthia Russett’s Sexual Science: The Victorian Construction of Womanhood demonstrates 
that by the late nineteenth century, Mill’s views were disregarded because he was seen as 
unscientific (12-13). 
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characteristics were innate to women’s nature and could not be changed. In 
The Evolution of Sex, published in 1889, the same year as New Amazonia, 
Patrick Geddes and J. Arthur Thomson argued that "man thinks more, woman 
feels more. He discovers more, but remembers less; she is more receptive, and 
less forgetful" (271). Geddes and Thomson attributed the differences between 
the two genders to cell biology, claiming that male cells were katabolic and 
dissipated energy, while female cells were anabolic and preserved energy. As a 
result, they saw different roles for men and women in evolution, with inherited 
characteristics being “perpetuated primarily by the female, while variations are 
introduced by the male” (270). This division also applied to temperament, with 
men being credited with more originality, and women with “greater stability and 
therefore more ‘common sense’” (271) 
Darwin is often seen as supporting this biologisation of the nature of 
women. In a much quoted section from The Descent of Man on the “Differences 
in Mental Powers of the Two Sexes” Darwin appears to suggest some strong 
innate differences between men and women: “The chief distinction in the 
intellectual powers of the two sexes is shown by man’s attaining to a higher 
eminence, in whatever he takes up, than can woman—whether requiring deep 
thought, reason, or imagination, or merely the use of the senses and hands” 
(629). By contrast, Darwin thought that women were more tender and less 
selfish than men and had higher powers of intuition and “rapid perception”. 
Darwin’s conclusions were based on observations of the distinctions between 
the male and female in many animals, which led him to attribute the difference 
in disposition of the two sexes in humans partly to the “maternal instinct” of 
women, and partly to sexual selection which, by requiring men to compete for 
women, had, over the course of generations, selected for “courage, 
perseverance and determined energy” in men. However, Darwin’s argument is 
not based on an essentialist position of there being one fixed, unchangeable 
nature for women. As Richardson argues, the very concept of evolution with its 
fluid boundaries between species, origins and extinctions is in itself anti-
essentialist (“Against” 25). Darwin’s Origin undermined the whole idea of fixed 
species and ideal essences, so although he saw current differences between 
male and female as being a result of their evolutionary history, in particular 
sexual selection, he did not see these differences as fixed or unchangeable. In 
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a letter to Boston feminist Caroline Kennard, Darwin suggested that women 
might eventually recover their equality with men: 
I certainly think that women though generally superior to men to moral 
qualities are inferior intellectually; & there seems to me to be a great 
difficulty from the laws of inheritance, (if I understand these laws rightly) 
in their becoming the intellectual equals of man. On the other hand there 
is some reason to believe that aboriginally (& to the present day in the 
case of Savages) men & women were equal in this respect, & this 
wd. greatly favour their recovering this equality. But to do this, as I 
believe, women must become as regular “bread-winners” as are men; & 
we may suspect that the early education of our children, not to mention 
the happiness of our homes, would in this case greatly suffer. (Darwin 
Correspondence Database, 13607) 
In this letter, never meant for publication, Darwin is torn between seeing 
inheritance and social forces as the determining factor in the differences 
between men and women, and as such is a good example of the kind of 
arguments that were shaping the debate over women’s potential to take an 
equal role in society. 
It is against this backdrop of the debate over the biological, evolutionary 
and socially-determined elements of women’s nature that I examine the 
significance of Corbett’s all-female state of New Amazonia, based on a belief in 
the moral superiority of women, and the conviction that an all-female 
government will deliver better results than the existing government by men. 
Although Corbett uses science to underscore the progressive elements of her 
new society, she does not necessarily regard the difference between men and 
women’s natures as being biologically determined. Her conviction of women’s 
superior morality arises more from a sense of female solidarity emerging from 
the women’s rights movement of the 1880s. In this section, I begin by exploring 
Elizabeth Corbett’s position in an active sub-culture of women’s rights 
campaigners, before examining the arguments for female superiority that she 
employs within New Amazonia and the position of eugenics in her vision for a 
society based on what she refers to as “science and common sense” (90). 
One of the striking features of New Amazonia is that such a confident 
depiction of an all-women state was written by a prolific but relatively unknown, 
provincial “authoress”. Elizabeth Burgoyne, who was born in Wigan in 1846 and 
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educated in Germany, began her career as a writer in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne in 
the early 1880s, where she contributed to the Newcastle Daily Chronicle 
(Suksang, Overtaking 76) and wrote a number of novels under her married 
name of Mrs George Corbett, not to universally good reviews. The reviewer in 
Fun magazine wrote unkindly of Corbett’s 1895 detective novel: “When the Sea 
Gives Up Its Dead Mrs. George Corbett’s book of that name will be appreciated 
– but not until then” (The Haughty-Culture-ist), while the review of Deb O’Mally’s 
(1895) from the Saturday Review described Corbett’s tale of a mill girl who 
marries a bigamist as “drearily, conscientiously bulky” (514). However, Hearth 
and Home in an 1893 article entitled "People, Places and Things" listed Mrs 
George Corbett alongside Dr. Conan Doyle as one of the masters of the art of 
the detective novel, and the Women’s Penny Paper described the fantastical 
novel Pharisees Unveiled, as “clever and entertaining” (“Reviews”). Some 
criticism clearly shows the misogyny of the age. Corbett was accused of 
“feminine garrulity” for writing the three-volume novel Cassandra in 1884 (G. B. 
Smith 408), and when she embarked on a career as a dramatist in the West 
End in the 1890s, one reviewer sneered at the idea of a play being written in 
conjunction with “a lady” (Bill of the Play). However, Corbett was successful 
enough to get her plays staged, and to be commissioned to write over seventy 
serials (Blain, Clements, and Grundy 237), while fifteen of her novels are listed 
in the British Library catalogue, ranging in dates from 1881 to 1922.  
Corbett’s active career ensured that, unlike many women of her age, she 
had an independent existence outside of the domestic sphere, as well as being 
a wife and mother.52 New Amazonia was not the only one of her novels to deal 
with the double standard of women’s position in society. Mrs Grundy’s Victims 
(1893) concerned two women victimised by gossip and middle-class hypocrisy, 
and The Marriage Market (1903) was “a first-person narration of a marriage 
‘broker’ characterized as a trafficker in legal prostitution” (A. Rose 18). Corbett 
herself wrote in 1889 to the Women’s Penny Paper: “I have seldom written 
anything in which I have not taken the opportunity of airing some of my views 
regarding the consequences meted out to erring women, in opposition to the 
popular treatment of equally or more guilty men”. The Women’s Penny Paper 
                                                          
52 According to census records Mrs Corbett had at least four children. Three of them were living 
with her at the time of the 1901 census. Her husband is absent from both the 1881 and 1901 
census, though Mrs Corbett is still listed as the wife of the Head of Family. 
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made a strong impact on Corbett, who wrote in the same letter: “A weekly 
perusal of the Women’s Penny Paper has shown me that others are brave 
enough to denounce existing evils, and has encouraged me in my determination 
to write unflinchingly, in at least one book, about many things that have often 
roused my indignation” (“Letters” 66).53 The pages of the Women’s Penny 
Paper contained profiles of prominent women as well as a lively letter column 
with frequent letters from women writing under pseudonyms such as “Eloisa” 
and “Minerva”.54 Corbett clearly felt at home in this subculture as she wrote 
another, more controversial letter criticising Queen Victoria for not recognising 
women in the New Year’s honours list, and a lively, chatty article on her 
experience of canvassing with the Newcastle Women’s Liberal Association in 
the 1890 local elections. Mrs Corbett’s letter concludes with the information that 
the unflinching book she had been encouraged to write by the Women’s Penny 
Paper was in fact New Amazonia. Within this context it is clear that the book 
can be read as a manifesto aimed at an existing audience rather than a wistful 
dream for the future. Beaumont is right to argue that “the real import of late-
Victorian feminists’ utopian fiction lies less in its manifest content, its grand 
dreams of a future matriarchy or gynocracy, than its latent content, its frankly 
more modest fantasy of a like-minded community of women in the present” 
(Utopia 90-1), but in his focus on the “lonely individual consciousness of the 
woman writer” (90) he overlooks the fact that for Corbett at least the like-minded 
community of women already existed, and that in writing New Amazonia she 
was to a large extent writing for this far from fantastical community.55  
The strength of this community of women was demonstrated by the 
protests that ensued when in June 1889 the Nineteenth Century published an 
anti-suffrage petition by novelist Mrs Humphrey Ward titled “An appeal against 
female suffrage”. The petition which claimed that “the emancipating process has 
now reached the limits fixed by the physical constitution of women” (782) was 
                                                          
53 The Women’s Penny Paper, whose strapline was “The only Paper Conducted, Written, and 
Published by Women” was founded in 1888 by Henrietta Muller, who edited it under the 
pseudonym of Helena B. Temple. Muller’s aim was to support the cause of suffrage by 
providing a newspaper for women which would give them an opportunity to voice their thoughts. 
54 Use of pseudonyms was common practice in the Victorian periodical press, see Van 
Remoortel (9). Also, Van Ardel in discussing contributors to The Women’s Signal, the successor 
publication to the Women’s Penny Paper, states that “Because they usually observed the 
Victorian imperative of anonymity it is hard to know just who they were” (93). 
55 Darby Lewes makes a similar point to Beaumont’s about the “isolation and vulnerability” of 
nineteenth-century middle-class women, and the “consolation of verbalizing their frustrations” in 
utopian writing (“Middle-class” 21).  
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signed by over a hundred women, many of them aristocrats or wives of 
prominent men. However, in response, over two thousand women signed a 
petition for the rival periodical the Fortnightly Review, protesting against the 
article; and even the Nineteenth Century was forced to print some examples of 
the contrary view in letters from Millicent Garrett Fawcett and Mrs Ashton 
Dilke.56 The Women’s Penny Paper also joined in the debate by pointing out the 
difference in social circumstances between the largely upper-class signatories 
of the appeal against suffrage and the middle class women who were fighting to 
get the vote.  
Those who stand on the middle rung of the social ladder [...] have a 
wider view and a more helpful experience; these see, in middle-class and 
artizan life, women taking their full share in the work of the world, they 
see them exact and scrupulous in money matters, careful managers of 
house and business and school, home-stayers while husbands are 
wasting their substance in riotous living, breadwinners for father-deserted 
children, for parents and brothers and sisters” (“Women’s suffrage” 7).  
Elizabeth Corbett openly aligned herself with the viewpoint of the Women’s 
Penny Paper. In the prologue to New Amazonia, which is devoted to the subject 
of the Nineteenth Century article, she declared that she was one of the 
signatories of the “gallant counter-protest” which was “signed by the cream of 
British WOMANHOOD” (7) rather than the “ladies” (6) of the Nineteenth Century 
magazine who supported “the most deplorable piece of treachery ever 
perpetrated towards woman by women” (capitals and italics in original) (1). The 
prologue ends with Corbett feeling heartened by all the counter-protests, 
including those by men, showing “that at least some portion of the male sex 
recognises the enormity and injustice of saddling one-half of the human race 
with all the disabilities it is possible to heap upon it, except,” she adds bitterly, 
“the disabilities of exemption from taxation”(8). This complaint, and others about 
the lack of fair wages for women, unequal marriage laws, and compulsory 
medical examination of women suspected of being prostitutes, makes the 
account of utopia that follows read less like a dream of a far-distant future than 
a protest against the inequities of the present. Such grievances are raised 
                                                          
56 See Frank Harris’s article in the Fortnightly Review for more information about the rival 
petition, and a sample list of signatories, organised by social class and profession. The replies 
by Fawcett and Dilke to the original petition appeared in Nineteenth Century, 149 (July 1889) 
86-103. The whole controversy is discussed in Beaumont’s Utopia Ltd. (121-3). 
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frequently within the text, either in conversation with the women and men of the 
future, who generally express incredulity over the misguided and unenlightened 
views of the narrator’s contemporaries, or else as part of the history of the 
formation of the state. Corbett also expresses frustration over “weak-minded 
women” who resist change and calls for women to be more assertive, so that 
they can “make political and social equality of the sexes a realisation of the near 
future” (133).  
Corbett’s political engagement and polemical intent is further underlined 
by the plot of New Amazonia, which is minimal, even for the utopian genre. 
There is no sign of the traditional courtship plot of many utopian novels. Instead, 
the narrator finds herself sharing her sojourn in New Amazonia with “a perfect 
specimen of the British masher” (10), a self-regarding, opinionated dandy who 
pretends to the title of the Honourable Augustus Fitz-Musicus. The role of Fitz-
Musicus is to act as a mouthpiece for masculine views current in Corbett’s time, 
and to provide some humour and conflict, since the narrator has only approval 
for the society she is visiting. Fitz-Musicus also provides examples of the 
methods used by men to put down women through his assumptions about his 
own importance, his attempts at patronising the narrator, and his disparaging 
remarks about the women of New Amazonia. Fitz-Musicus, being a product of 
Corbett’s times, also strengthens the sense that Corbett’s business is not only 
with the future, but with the present of 1889, presented, as in Looking 
Backward, from the vantage point of an improved state that has long outgrown 
these abuses. Even the place names of New Amazonia reference Corbett’s 
time, as the towns of future Ireland have been renamed for prominent late-
nineteenth century women, with names such as Fawcetville, Beecherstown and 
Andersonia. 
Corbett also uses the novel to refute, generally with indignation, some of 
the more common arguments used to justify women’s subordination to men. 
Corbett begins by setting science against biblical authority, by rejecting the 
argument that woman was created from a part of man’s body:  
Only a rib, forsooth! How do they know that woman was made out of 
nothing better than a man’s rib? We have only a man’s word for that, and 
I have proved the falsity of so many manly utterances that I would like 
some scientific proof as to the truth or falsity of the spare-rib argument 
before I give it implicit credence. (7)  
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Christian theologians interpreted woman as an imperfect man, and a source of 
sin and temptation. Corbett was well aware of the misogyny of the Church as an 
institution and provides her New Amazonians with their own matriarchal religion 
where they worship a benevolent, female “Giver of Life”, whilst retaining 
Christian morality and piety. Corbett blames St. Paul for the excessive 
misogyny of the Church, describing him as “quite as much bent upon insulting, 
humiliating and subjugating woman, as he was upon spreading the Christian 
cause” (107).  
Corbett also rejected other common assumptions about the nature of 
women, such as the idea that women stood somewhere between humans and 
animals. Corbett takes this up with scorn: “To be ‘only a woman’ was equivalent 
in the minds of many male egotists to being only ‘something better than his dog, 
and something dearer than his horse’” (36). In Corbett’s view, such judgements 
were merely further proof of the double standard in relation to women. Men 
criticised women for being “weak-minded”, Corbett argues, then when women 
showed themselves capable of similar abilities to men they were accused of 
being unwomanly and “regarded as an object of horror” (37). Corbett also 
alludes to the debate over female originality when Fitz-Musicus declares 
disparagingly: “They [women] can never manufacture any thing equal to men’s 
work” (67). By placing the argument in the mouth of Fitz-Musicus, the 
spokesman of masculine unreason, after he has demonstrated his own inability 
at original thought, Corbett highlights the ridiculousness of this particular 
generalisation.  
 Corbett does not engage directly in arguments over the biological 
differences between men and women. Rather she presents a picture of female 
evolution as it might occur if untrammelled by the negative environment and 
culture of Victorian society. The women of New Amazonia are nearly seven feet 
tall and built like goddesses: “A magnificent Venus, a glorified Hebe, a smiling 
Juno, were here all united in one perfect human being whose gait was the very 
poetry of motion”(11). They enjoy good health and youth till well over a hundred 
years of age, and freed from restrictive clothing and social barriers to exercise, 
they are athletic and strong. These descriptions express a strong conviction that 
given the appropriate environment, there would be no limitation on what women 
could achieve. Corbett is unperturbed by apparent scientific evidence for the 
physical and intellectual inferiority of women, and assumes that science is on 
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her side. In New Amazonia, scientific advances will deliver the treatments that 
provide for rejuvenation and longevity, weather control, and clean fuel and 
transport, with much of this science being undertaken by women. Anita Rose 
argues that Corbett distrusted science and found it “necessary to marginalize 
and discredit the conventional scientific discourse and values of the late 
nineteenth century to imagine a more Utopian future” (9-10). However, far from 
showing a distrust of science, Corbett invokes science as the ultimate authority 
for New Amazonia’s progressive development, noting the nineteenth-century 
antecedents of many New Amazonian inventions, including Professor Brown-
Sequard whose experiments with using animal nerve extracts inspired the New 
Amazonian rejuvenation process, or the physiologist Dr. Austin Flint, who she 
credits with predicting a revolution in medicine (91). The main elements of any 
alternative scientific discourse can be seen in a dislike of vivisection and a 
concern for animal rights in general, as well as a focus on practical inventions 
for improving quality of life. Rose calls this “science that works in favour of 
community values” but it could also be called utopian science, based on an 
optimistic belief that science would be able to transform all the unpleasantness 
of everyday nineteenth-century life into a society that can be protected against 
the forces of weather, age, disease and over-population. 
Corbett’s faith in the utopian potential of science and its benefit for 
women is not combined with any attempt at proving women’s biological 
superiority. The main assumption of difference between the two genders in New 
Amazonia is that of women’s moral superiority over men. Corbett explains that 
once women had been given the vote, they “showed themselves so much more 
just, so much more capable of governing than men, that they invariably enacted 
none but strictly fair and impartial regulations” (37). By contrast, she argues that 
“man’s political influence has in all ages proved corruptive and retrogressive” 
(111). This moral difference is the reason why men are barred from the higher 
echelons of government: 
The chief Governmental offices are all appropriated by women, in sheer 
self-defence, in the first instance, and, later on, because the world’s 
experience goes to prove that masculine government has always held 
openings for the free admission of corruption, injustice, immorality, and 
narrow-minded, self-glorifying bigotry. (80) 
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Corbett does here seem to be admitting an intrinsic difference between the 
nature of men and women that five hundred years of equality would be 
incapable of eroding. However, her argument about the nature of men derives 
more from history than biology. Her authorities are “the world’s experience” and 
“in all ages”, not man’s innate selfishness or sexual appetite or other scientific 
constructions of masculinity. Her ideal state abolishes the Church, not just 
because it is a masculine-dominated organisation, but because she sees it as a 
corrupt institution. The monarchy fares no better despite its female incumbent, 
who she blames for “the incidents which ultimately resulted in the disruption of 
the British Empire” (23).  
The closest Corbett comes to biologising the difference between men 
and women is when she pronounces that “The truly maternal instinct has no 
equivalent in the breast of man, and so long as none but men are the people’s 
representative, even so long will that people be deprived of a thousand rights 
which a just, earnest, womanly co-government would give them” (131). She 
links this maternal instinct to the proverbial “purity and wisdom of New 
Amazonian Government” (80). There is certainly evidence to show that the 
social purity movement, which was strong in the 1880s, turned to biological 
essentialism. Richardson argues that the purity movement “played a significant 
role in the post-Darwinian biologisation, and feminization, of morality [...] and 
began to feed off discourses of degeneration, biologising male sexuality as 
brutish if left unchecked” (48). Corbett’s social purity credentials are evident in 
the text. She describes the Contagious Diseases Acts, which gave legal 
backing to sexual double standards, as “the foulest and most disgusting 
legislation that ever disgraced the land”(35), and “purity” is undoubtedly one of 
the core values of New Amazonia. However, even though eugenics plays a 
pivotal role in the text, as discussed further below, Corbett’s concerns are more 
with social campaigns and alternative models for government than masculine 
sexuality, and her categorization of male and female behaviour is based more 
on observations of environmental factors than biological theory. Men are 
“arrogant idiots” and “egotists” (36), rather than threats to female purity. The 
women of New Amazonia treat Fitz-Musicus as a comic child, rather than a 
sexual threat, and his boasts that the women all admire him are clearly 
unfounded. Corbett also draws on proof from the outside world that women can 
do better than men by citing the example of Oskaloosa in Kansas where the all-
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woman government was enthusiastically re-elected because “within twelve 
months the place had made such wonderful strides in the trifling matters of 
social morality, sanitation, and prosperity, that it is the wonder of surrounding 
towns” (131). Corbett’s resentment of men securing “complete immunity from 
the consequences of systematic libertinism and immorality” (36) is part of an 
argument against the double-standards of the legal system rather than a 
blanket accusation of masculine immorality. A man who spends his time “loafing 
about public houses or race courses, and half his nights in dens of infamy” is 
less capable of making moral judgements than a “clever, capable woman” 
(131), but not all women are clever and capable; some, such as those who 
refuse to support women’s rights, are “unreasoning imbeciles” (36). Also, not all 
men are like Fitz-Musicus, who Corbett admits is not a fair representation of the 
male sex. The men of New Amazonia are depicted as being “as charming as 
the women in physique and culture” (105), and a positive example is provided 
by the mechanic John Saville, who supports all the ideals of the New 
Amazonian state, apart from its discrimination against men. His positive 
portrayal suggests that Corbett does see hope for socialising men into living a 
moral life.  
 Another indicator that Corbett’s depiction of women’s superior morality is 
more about choice than biology is that the highest roles in government and 
universities are reserved for women who have never been married. Grant Allen 
described woman as “the sex sacrificed to reproductive necessities” (qtd. in 
Russett 4), but Corbett’s New Amazonians evade this fate by bribing the 
brightest and best not to reproduce: “Our laws and social economy hold out 
wonderful premiums for chastity, and the result is that all our most intellectual 
compatriots, especially the women, prefer honour and advancement to the more 
animal pleasures of marriage and re-production of species” (81). Beaumont 
describes New Amazonia as “a eugenicist fantasy” (Utopia 124), but in effect 
Corbett is reversing the usual eugenic paradigm of encouraging the most 
intelligent to breed. Instead, the most gifted women are reserved for a kind of 
priesthood of the intellect, based on the belief that “perfect clearness of brain, 
and the ability to devote oneself exclusively to intellectual topics are inseparable 
from the celibate state” (81-82), while the women of lesser talents settle for 
marriage. One reason for offering disincentives for marriage was to maintain a 
stable population, and avoid “the ineluctable evils forced on other States by 
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over-population” (81). Any parent of over four children is “punished for such 
recklessness by being treated as a criminal, and deprived of very many 
valuable civil rights” (47), a policy enforced in accordance with “Malthusian 
doctrines” (46). Malthus’s argument for restricting births to avoid poverty and 
overpopulation were adapted by birth control campaigners to promote the use 
of contraceptive methods such as those recommended by Annie Besant, one of 
Corbett’s role models.57 In the Women’s Penny Weekly “Minerva” complained 
about “Neo-Malthusians ... asking wives to adopt the nostrums of courtesans” 
when the real problem is that “maidens accept impure husbands” (10). Corbett’s 
interest, though, was not in finding the best husbands, but in leaving women 
free to develop their public role by avoiding the biological necessity of 
reproduction altogether by not marrying. This solution was in line with the belief 
among feminists “that the position of all women could only be improved in as a 
society where there was a large class of celibate women” (Jeffreys 88). 
  Corbett’s fellow writer of utopian fiction, Jane Hume Clapperton, was 
less convinced about the efficacy of celibacy, and saw contraception as an aid 
to female autonomy, as well as a powerful agent of eugenics. Clapperton was 
an early convert to eugenics, writing in her non-fiction work, Scientific Meliorism 
and the Evolution of Happiness (1885), that eugenics was “the new field of 
inquiry into which enlightened reason is now carrying its penetrative 
investigations” (325). She feared that natural selection was being undermined 
by “sympathetic selection” which allowed the weak and otherwise unfit to 
survive. The solution for her was a third kind of selection – “intelligent selection” 
– which, she argued, would “systematically secure the birth of the morally, 
intellectually, and physically fit” (336). Far from recommending celibacy, 
Clapperton, like Galton, promoted the idea of early marriage for the more 
desirable types of people. She was convinced that the laws of heredity were as 
rigorously deterministic as mechanical laws and that once these were known 
“disease would be found no more an accident than the storm that breaks upon 
the seaboard, or the volcanic flames that burst from the mountain-top” (330). 
She was quite radical in her belief that enforced celibacy was a social evil: “To 
demand celibacy of men and women, whose defective organisms it is not 
desirable to perpetuate, would be in hundreds of thousands of instances to 
                                                          
57 For further information see Lucy Bland “Contraception, Morality and Malthus” in Banishing the 
Beast (198-200). 
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sacrifice unnecessarily present happiness to future gain” (333-4). Instead 
Clapperton advocated contraception to decouple marriage and procreation, 
maintaining that society need only concern itself with unions resulting in 
children: 
Marriage and parentage are not necessarily conjoined. It is with the latter 
alone that society properly deals. As guardian of public health, and of the 
coming race, it is entitled, nay required, to forbid the propagation of 
disease; but since, by careful use of artificial checks, parentage, and 
hence the propagation of disease, may be avoided, all adult individuals 
of ordinary public morality or conscientiousness are free to marry, as 
spontaneous impulse dictates. (334) 
Clapperton also maintained that love must not be made subservient to 
eugenics, and that the production of healthy children was not the purpose of 
marriage. However, she believed that even though the theory of heredity was “a 
nauseous draught for mankind to swallow”, it was of vital importance to the 
future of the human race (329). 
In New Amazonia, eugenic measures are treated as just another element 
in a common-sense programme of social reforms, so a “medical certificate of 
soundness” is required before marriage (46) and the issue of defective heredity 
is dealt with in a couple of sentences between tooth decay and equality in 
marriage proposals: 
“I suppose malformed or crippled children are occasionally brought into 
the world even here. What becomes of them?” 
“They are at once sent to spend their term of probation in less material 
spheres.” (89) 
For Corbett and many of her contemporaries, such a response to disability was 
regarded as more humane than letting the child live. In an era of high child 
mortality, the eradication of hereditary weaknesses was seen as more important 
than finding cures or improving living conditions as it offered the potential of 
preventing such illnesses occurring in future generations.  
A similarly coercive logic is applied to other areas of public health and 
safety. Food is “scientifically perfect” and therefore need only be eaten in 
moderation (58). Vegetarianism is mandatory because “[f]lesh eating is a habit 
which induces coarseness of mind and body, and robs both of the true beauty 
and vigour furnished by a vegetarian diet” (52).Infectious disease has been 
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conquered by “science and common sense” (90-1). Weather is controlled for the 
good of all through “altering the direction of a steady wind and thereby 
producing either wet or fine weather, by means of a huge artificially created 
vacuum” (53). Health is further protected by a complete ban on tobacco and 
alcohol. Euthanasia is practised in order to “liberate the spirit without any 
wasteful delay” (73). A similar policy is applied to those who are deemed 
incurably insane. Morality is enforced by extreme punishments, so any woman 
caught committing adultery is forced to take on menial work, while adulterous 
men are banished from the colony (82). Illegal immigrants are also subjected to 
forced labour then expelled. Duangrudi Suksang describes New Amazonia as 
containing “some of the features of dystopia”, singling out “reverse gender 
discrimination, infanticide of the handicapped, and continued restrictions against 
married women” as its worst features, but she concludes that “Despite its 
biases, Corbett's work allows her to present her viewpoint on women's suffrage 
and an alternative vision of society in which women's rule has brought about 
improved conditions for all women and men” (“Overtaking” 75, 83). Suksang 
does not condone the elements of New Amazonia which now strike us as 
undesirable, but is overlooking the fact that the biases she lists are intrinsic to 
Corbett’s version of the future, and that without them, there would be no nation 
of superior women. The Women’s Penny Paper’s review of New Amazonia has 
no concerns about the book’s agenda and concentrates on its positive aspects, 
reading it as “an amusing satire on present conditions, and a forecast of the 
future” (Dawson 118). For Corbett there was evidently little reason to doubt that 
equality, female governance and the sweeping away of corrupt nineteenth-
century laws and institutions would inevitably lead to a better world, especially if 
allied with science and common sense. She could confidently assert that New 
Amazonia, with its aims of “[h]ealth of body, the highest technical and 
intellectual knowledge, and purity of morals” could “boast of being the most 
perfect, the most prosperous and the most moral community in existence” (47). 
Jane Hume Clapperton’s fictional utopia Margaret Dunmore: Or, a 
Socialist Home (1888), a tale of a Fourierist-style experiment in communal 
living, offers a small-scale alternative to Corbett’s vision of the perfect female-
run state. Margaret Dunmore concentrates on what can be done in the present 
day, and sees no need to invoke female superiority or a separatist ethos to 
achieve its aims. For Clapperton, women’s subjection to men represented a 
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great risk to progress, and the socialist home was a project to adjust gender 
relationships and carry out the conscious evolution which she proposes in 
Scientific Meliorism. For this, she suggests that the home environment itself 
needs to be radically changed: 
The home itself must evolve. It must take on some new form ere it will 
fulfil its obligation to the youth of each generation, elevating it 
emotionally, educating it intellectually, and training it to virtuous habits of 
innocent, happy life. (Margaret 59)58 
Prevention of unwanted pregnancies is an important part of this process. 
Clapperton places “unhurtful scientific methods” of controlling births at the heart 
of her project for conscious evolution, arguing that “[f]or unhealthy persons to 
become parents is a crime against Humanity” (126-7). However, she is realistic 
enough to admit that “all schemes for a better social life, requiring an improved 
human nature, are only for realisation in the far future” (196). The goal of the 
home is to improve social conditions, in order to re-establish fellowship between 
men and women. Clapperton saw civilisation as having exacerbated the 
differences between men and women, but she believed that in the right social 
environment men and women could learn to co-operate so that “heart to heart 
they will pour into each the gold of the other’s nature” (194-5) In Margaret 
Dunmore, Clapperton offers an alternative form of female utopianism which 
seeks to resolve the question of how men and women might live together and 
how the problems of sexual activity and pregnancy might be resolved without 
recourse to celibacy. Clapperton shows a consciousness of the importance of 
evolution in determining the future, but domesticates the concept of hereditary 
progress from high ideals to a more realistic daily practice which accepts the co-
existence of sexual desire and morality. 
 
3.2 Evolution and female superiority in Mary E. Bradley Lane’s Mizora 
 
Late-nineteenth-century North America had its own culture of feminist 
utopian fiction, characterised by a sense of social change and new opportunities 
following the American Civil War. Mary E. Bradley Lane’s Mizora, which had its 
first publication nine years before New Amazonia, represents one of the earliest 
                                                          
58 All subsequent references from Margaret Dunmore. 
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separatist utopias, and as such is often seen as a lost feminist classic.59 It was 
first serialised in the Cincinnati Commercial in 1880-81, then reprinted as a 
book in 1889, a year after the publication of Bellamy’s Looking Backward. 
Mizora describes an all-female society, full of interesting domestic inventions, 
no criminality or social divisions, and universal health and prosperity. However, 
the women of Mizora practise an extreme form of eugenics which has enabled 
them to reach the peak of physical, mental and moral perfection. This aspect of 
the book sits rather uneasily with the claims for it as a lost feminist masterpiece, 
as does its racial politics, essentialist notions of what constitutes the feminine, 
and the niggling question of what has become of all the men. As one critic of 
Mizora has pointed out: “Rumours of a utopia’s foundation in androcide cannot 
fail to sully its reputation” (Anderson 86). In this section I explore some of the 
more problematic aspects of Lane’s myth of female superiority, including gender 
essentialism, eugenics and implicit racism. I show how these issues relate to 
contemporary ideas on matriarchal societies, concepts of female moral 
superiority based on women’s evolutionary role, and the socio-historical factors 
influencing attitudes to nature, science and race. I also assess whether the 
racial and sexual politics of Mizora discredit the empowering elements of this 
feminist utopia, and where its value lies for the modern reader and critic.  
  Mizora is narrated by a Russian political fugitive called Vera Zarovitch 
who discovers a wondrous land below the sea populated exclusively by 
women.60 She finds much to admire in this world, from the chemically prepared 
food to the system of universal education, but is disturbed by the mysterious 
absence of men and the fact that she is the only brunette in a land of blonde, 
blue-eyed women. After living a long time amongst these women, Vera 
discovers the truth, which is that the women have found a way of reproducing 
themselves without men. The details are never explained, but some laboratory 
cloning process is involved, as Vera is shown a minute cell in violent motion 
under a microscope (101). There is certainly no mention of pregnancy or 
childbirth in the text, and the very idea of sexual involvement seems to fill the 
                                                          
59 Mizora has been marketed to the twenty-first century audience as “the first known feminist 
utopian novel written by a woman” (back cover blurb of the University of Nebraska press edition 
in 1999) and “an 1880s radical feminist utopia” (Front cover of the Syracuse University Press 
edition 2000). 
60 The inspiration for Lane’s heroine may have been Vera Zasulich, whose shooting of Trepov, 
the repressive St. Petersburg chief of Police in 1878 “made her a heroine both in Russia and 
abroad” (Engel and Rosenthal 62).  
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Mizorans with horror. “Our children come to us as welcome guests, through 
portals of the holiest and purest affection” (130) Vera is told by her Mizoran 
friend, while she is looked at with “loathing and abhorrence” when she admits to 
having a husband and son. Lane’s scientific justification for the single-sex 
reproduction of the Mizorans is that “the MOTHER is the only important part of 
all life” and that in the “lowest organisms no other sex is apparent” (103, capitals 
in original). Comparing women to lower forms of life was a risky strategy for a 
feminist, as it played into the idea of women being less evolved than men. For 
example, American evolutionist Edward Drinker Cope thought that the earlier 
maturity of women meant that they were not fully developed, while Herbert 
Spencer suggested that the need to reserve energy for reproduction meant that 
women were under-evolved by comparison with men (Tuana 44-7). However, 
the comparison to earlier organisms and the importance of the mother, also 
suggests an alternative history of evolution where women are seen as the norm 
and men as an aberration. Feminist Eliza Burt Gamble in her book The 
Evolution of Woman: An Inquiry into the dogma of her inferiority to man (1893) 
argued that women represented a higher form of evolution than men. They were 
“the intelligent factor” in sexual selection, and therefore “the primary unit of 
creation” (29, 31). Gamble’s study of prehistoric societies also led her to 
conclude that "the higher faculties are transmitted through the mother" (80). She 
argued that: 
In whatever direction we turn, evidences are abundant going to prove 
that under simpler and more natural conditions, and before corrupted by 
our later civilization, mankind were governed largely by the instincts 
developed within the female constitution, and that long after her 
supremacy over the male was lost, the effects of these purer conditions 
were manifest in the customs, forms and usages of the people (101-2). 
Gamble drew on the ideas of German anthropologist Johann Jakob Bachofen to 
account for women’s supremacy. Bachofen argued in his 1861 book Das 
Mutterrecht that the age of patriarchy was preceded by an era of matriarchy 
where inheritance took place through the female line. Bachofen’s thesis was 
much disputed, but proved influential on subsequent thinkers.  
Lane’s matriarchal society refers to the Great Mother or Nature as being 
the final authority in Mizora, endorsing the idea of the mother, and matriarchy, 
being the more natural form of social organisation. However, Lane is also 
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evoking another aspect of lower organisms, which is that they reproduce 
asexually. In Mizora men have been allowed to die out completely. They were 
seen as representing all the negative aspects of human society, such as war, 
violence, immorality and vice, while women, in line with Gamble’s argument, are 
the source of the higher elements of human nature. The desire of Mizorans to 
escape what was seen as the lower or animal part of human nature is 
reinforced by the fact that animals have also been eliminated in Mizora, 
superseded by chemical food and machinery (54). The Mizorans’ belief that “the 
association of animals is degrading” (113) suggests that despite their veneration 
for Nature, the women of Mizora are disquieted by nature’s earthy reality, and 
more interested in artificially replicating nature than embracing it. They have 
laboratories where they strive to manufacture artificial fruits and vegetables 
(47), and “closely counterfeit the processes of nature” in order to produce 
chemical versions of milk, cheese, cream, butter and meat (56). For them, the 
artificial products of their own science are infinitely preferable to the natural 
products of nature, with all their impurity and unpredictability. This aspect of 
Mizora reflected trends in late-nineteenth-century America, where agriculture 
was becoming industrialised; Cincinnati itself was one of the meat capitals of 
America. At the same time, women were becoming less involved with 
agricultural activities such as milking cows and making their own dairy products, 
and could aspire to a life removed from domestic animals.61 Although women 
were romanticised by men as representing a link to nature, Lane’s utopia gives 
expression to an opposite feeling amongst women of wanting to get away from 
the messy realities of childbirth and animal husbandry, and looking for a cleaner 
domestic environment, where food could be guaranteed as safe and free from 
contamination.  
According to Merchant, the industrialisation of agriculture was a product 
of a mechanistic or instrumentalist view of nature which the capitalists of 
nineteenth-century America used to justify turning nature into a laboratory for 
experimenting on improving agricultural yields and profits (Death 199). In 
Mizora, Lane shows a similar instrumentalist view of nature, focussed on the 
                                                          
61 Merchant sees a further consequence of this change as restricting women to a reproductive 
role: “As male famers began to specialize in women’s traditional dairy, poultry, and vegetable 
production, and as textile mills took over their clothing production, woman’s primary domain was 
redefined as reproduction” (Ecological 233). 
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potential for controlling nature by following its laws.62 Mizorans are described as 
having passed “beyond the boundary of what was once called Natural Law” 
which has enabled them to become “Mistresses of Nature’s peculiar processes” 
(90). In Mizora, the association between women and nature, despite the rhetoric 
of motherhood, is the traditionally masculine one of control and domination, 
rather than the biologically constructed special relationship between women and 
nature, based on the process of childbirth. The same inversion of male and 
female associations occurs in relation to science. Science and scientific work 
are normally seen as masculine domains, but in Mizora science is personified 
more frequently than nature, and often given female attributes. For example, 
there is “benevolent and ever-willing Science”, who is a divinity or a goddess, 
favouring “persistent and earnest effort in a sensible direction” (121). The terms 
science and nature also seem to be used interchangeably. Nature is God, but 
Science is the Goddess. Mizorans devote themselves to science in order to 
discover the secrets of nature, and it is science that “has taught [them] how to 
make [Nature] obey us.”  
Lane, like Corbett, consistently represents science in Mizora as positive 
and empowering, even if in reality it was often used to support regressive social 
ideas such as women having smaller brains, inferior strength and a tendency to 
hysteria. Nevertheless, many feminists adopted scientific arguments as a way 
of challenging traditional authority in what Flavia Alaya calls “an alliance of 
heresies against a common orthodoxy” (262). Evolutionary science offered the 
opportunity to refute biblical and legal constructions of women as inferior. 
Darwin’s Descent of Man is often regarded as problematic for women, since his 
theory of sexual selection implied that men had evolved through the necessity 
of competing for women while women had failed to evolve. But as Levine points 
out in his reassessment of Darwin’s legacy: “he is also the man who, against 
the whole scientific and cultural establishment, introduced the concept of female 
choice into nature” (177). Darwin’s female contemporaries also took a positive 
view of the evolutionary arguments over the natural capacities of women, 
seeing an opportunity to engage with Darwin’s arguments to present the case 
for female equality. American women’s rights activist Antoinette Brown 
                                                          
62 Lane’s debt to 17th and 18th century natural philosophers can be measured by a rather 
unusual heading for Chapter IV (Part 2) (106) which contains a quote that is attributed to Bacon, 
but is actually from David Hume’s essay “Of National Characters” (1748). 
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Blackwell in her 1875 work The Sexes Throughout Nature questioned Darwin’s 
interpretation of the data on women, emphasising the factors that would ensure 
that female animals would evolve in parallel with their male counterparts:  
The higher the development of the species and the more differentiated in 
structure and functions, the greater need would there be of a complex 
opposite polarity of activities in the uniting elements. Therefore natural 
selection acting during immense periods of time would be able to 
maintain, through survival of the fittest, an approximate equality between 
the sexes at all stages of their development. (33-4) 
Drawing on her own experience as a teacher, Blackwell argued that women 
were as highly evolved as men, with just as great an intellectual capacity, 
though with strengths in different areas to men (Kohlstedt and Jorgensen 274-
8). However, she did not question Darwin’s basic hypothesis of sexual 
divergence, preferring to concentrate on complementarity and partnership 
between the two sexes. She also saw evolution as supporting arguments for 
social changes to the position of women through the supposition that women 
were evolving towards greater complexity (Richardson Against 36). Darwin’s 
Descent of Man also proposed an important role for sympathy in the survival of 
social groups, a trait which was seen as being innate to women through their 
role as mothers, an element which was picked up by Gamble in her argument 
for women’s superiority. Neither Blackwell nor Gamble found it necessary to 
contest the idea of biological determinism in these roles, preferring to accept the 
scientific basis of the observations, and argue instead over the interpretation of 
the data. 
Lane’s utopia bypasses much of this argument by downplaying the 
biological elements of evolution and focussing instead on its moral and spiritual 
aims. Her view of progress owes more to the Lamarckian idea of the inheritance 
of acquired characteristics and evolution through effort and industry than to 
Darwinian concepts of adaptation to ecosystems or struggle for survival. Vera is 
lectured on “the duty of every generation to prepare the way for a higher 
development of the next” rather than thinking in terms of their own lifetime 
(104). Lane’s version of the improving power of female sexual selection is to 
remove male choice altogether, by allowing only the elements of the supposedly 
superior female nature to be passed on. Evolution could then progress beyond 
the needs of the body to moral perfection. Lane’s Mizorans assert that: 
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The moral life is the highest development of Nature. It is evolved by the 
same slow processes, and like the lower life, its succeeding forms are 
always higher ones. Its ultimate perfection will be mind, where all 
happiness shall dwell, where pleasure shall find fruition, and desire its 
ecstasy. (104).  
Like Butler, Lane saw a connection between bodily health and morality, as the 
Mizorans felt that a “people universally healthy is sure of being moral” (108). In 
Mizora all hereditary diseases have been eliminated, and everyone is so 
healthy that the profession of doctor no longer exists. Criminality on the other 
hand is seen as an incurable abnormality of the brain. Education and better 
social conditions might reform those who had engaged in petty crime through 
necessity, but major crime left what Lane described as “an ineradicable 
hereditary taint” for which “the only remedy was annihilation” (109). Criminals, 
like men, needed to be phased out.   
As well as eliminating men and criminals, the Mizorans also engaged in 
what sounds suspiciously like ethnic cleansing. When Vera asks what 
happened to the people with darker hair and eyes, she is told they were 
“eliminated” because the Mizorans believed that “the highest excellence of 
moral and mental character is alone attainable by a fair race.” (92). There is no 
justification given for this belief within the text, and it is hard not to read into it 
the racial fears of American middle-class white women in the aftermath of the 
American Civil War. Certainly Cincinnati, a northern borderland city located 
across the river from the former slave-holding state of Kentucky, was the site of 
intense pro-and-anti-abolitionist divisions and racial tension that support this 
interpretation.63 Katherine Broad sees Lane as vocalising “white nativist 
anxieties over perceived threats to racial and social purity” (248), while Darby 
Lewes notes women’s frustration over the Fourteenth Amendment which gave 
the vote to black males while still denying it to women, a frustration which led to 
a new element of racism in women’s suffrage circles (46-7). The morally pure 
blonde, blue-eyed women of Mizora also conform to the ante-bellum image of 
the Southern “belle-ideal” of womanhood which valorised chastity, purity and 
                                                          
63 For debates over slavery and abolition in the antebellum years see Ellingson (1995) and H.L. 
Taylor (1993). Taylor also provides an overview of racial tension in Cincinnati throughout its 
history. For more information on the mixed elements of Cincinnati’s identity and the 
development of the National Underground Railroad Freedom Center which attempts to address 
Cincinnati’s long history of racial conflict see Frederickson (2008). 
102 
 
motherhood above all else. However, the evocation of the Southern belle is in 
itself suggestive of some dissonance, since Lane was from Ohio which was on 
the side of the abolitionists in the Civil War, and in Mizora she criticises slavery 
as “a canker that eats into the vitals of any nation that harbours it” (96). Lane’s 
dark-haired heroine Vera, from a cold, Northern climate, represents a site of 
resistance to some of the more extreme acts of the Mizorans. She 
understandably disagrees with the Mizorans over their assessment of those 
with dark complexions, and believes that Mizoran superiority is more due to “the 
formation of superlative character than the elimination of the dark complexion” 
(92). She also feels a kinship to the men she sees represented in a hidden 
portrait gallery, and weeps for the first time since coming to Mizora when she 
sees their pictures (91), and longs for the “wild, rough scenes” of her own world 
(115).64 
There is also evidence in the text for an alternative reading of the fair 
women of Mizora as fairy folk. Vera travels through a rainbow to arrive in Mizora 
and wonders if she has “drifted into an enchanted country, such as I had read 
about in the fairy books of my childhood” (15). Later, alarmed by the revelations 
about Mizorans, she asks if “the lovely blonde women” were “fairies – or some 
weird beings of different specie, human only in form?” (95) Mizorans are 
described as exceedingly beautiful, graceful, sensitive to colours we cannot 
see, and in possession of melodious voices. They are goddesses, naiads and 
possessed of unearthly loveliness (84). Vera’s friend Wauna, when brought 
back to the real world of nineteenth-century Europe and America, is too delicate 
to survive there. Even the quest to remove all “deleterious earthy matter” from 
food suggests the unearthliness of fairy food. This reading opens up an 
alternative interpretation of the relationship between the “fair” race of Mizora 
and the mixed races of Vera’s own time and place, and suggests something 
supernatural about Mizora and its lack of men that shows that the author at 
least did not wish this aspect of Mizora to undermine her ideas for social 
improvement. Vera herself concludes that the absence of men was not “criminal 
and ignoble” but “weird and mysterious” (88). 
                                                          
64 See Lydia Fisher “Darwinism meets Russian Mutual Aid” for an extensive treatment of the 
issue of race in Mizora and a discussion of the role of Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid in Lane’s 
construction of a racially homogeneous society. 
103 
 
Further evidence of Lane’s ambivalence towards the issue of an all-
female state is that at one point she directly criticises the action that led to 
Mizoran separatism. She describes how a small minority of “wise women” 
offered to “form a Government that should be the property of all intelligent adult 
citizens” (100). However this more inclusive approach was ruled out by anger at 
past injustices by men. There is a sense of missed opportunity in this 
description which is at odds with the certainty of the Mizoran women over the 
necessity of removing men. However, Lane is writing a serial for a newspaper, 
and a country of blonde blue-eyed women who kill off all the men is more likely 
to sell newspapers than a co-operative pact between men and women to reform 
government. The melodramatic declaration at the end of chapter eleven 
underlines this point: “At the end of that time not a representative of the sex was 
in existence” (italics in original) (101). Nevertheless, the less dramatic version of 
reform creeps back in a couple of chapters later when Lane describes a 
process of gradual reform which does not involve removing all the men. Instead 
social improvement is achieved through eradicating disease, establishing fair 
wages, guaranteeing full employment, and providing universal education (107).  
The dramatic removal of men, and the Aryan looks of the female 
population, has tended to distract attention from the more traditional eugenic 
measures which Lane proposes. Although there was no eugenic movement as 
such in 1880s America, and while Lane does not cite Galton directly, she 
proposes measures that were central to eugenics. In Mizora, statistical surveys 
and physicians reports are used to identify those with hereditary diseases and 
prevent them from having children. The whole population is also tested for less 
visible hereditary disease, and criminals are also barred from reproducing on 
the supposition that crime is hereditary (108-9). The Mizorans recommend that 
the mentally disabled be treated like “the useless weeds in your garden” instead 
of being housed in asylums, which Vera describes resentfully as “palaces” (61). 
As already noted, Mizora has often been seen as the earliest attempt at 
imagining what a female-only world might look like. Lydia Fisher describes it as 
“the first significant, all-female utopia written in the United States” (181). 
Although Annie Denton Cridge’s Man’s Rights (1870) predates Mizora, it is a 
straightforward role-reversal story which satirises gender stereotypes, but does 
little to show an alternative female-centred society. Mizora was written before 
New Amazonia, which shares many of the interest of Mizorans in better food, 
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social purity and scientific advances. Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s Herland from 
1915 may also have been influenced by Mizora, but Gilman hopes that 
Herland’s values of co-operation and altruism will eventually be adopted by both 
genders.65 Lane is the only one of these early feminist utopian writers who felt it 
necessary to permanently remove men from utopia to achieve her vision of a 
feminist society. While female-centred domestic developments are important to 
the text, I would argue that the elimination of men is a surrogate for the 
elimination of the physical, the mortal, and human passions as whole, and that 
Lane’s utopia is not a radical rewriting of women’s role in society, but a semi-
visionary representation of the quest for moral and spiritual improvement 
through science, and the perfecting of human nature. 
Mizora was written as a serial in a newspaper with Republican 
sympathies, and must have been well enough received by its readers for the 
publisher Murat Halstead to decide to publish it as a book in its own right. No 
doubt references to safer food, improved means of transport, and domestic 
labour-saving devices would have struck a chord of interest with many female 
readers, but the mystery element, kept up for half the book, must also have 
contributed to its success, along with the lavish descriptions of fairytale dresses 
and exotic architecture. Mizora is more readable than many a utopian novel, but 
its value for the modern reader is not in the plot or the imaginative details, but in 
the social attitudes and assumptions of its time that the text reveals. Lane was 
not a professional writer, but a teacher, and her serialised story provides a 
snapshot of views that might otherwise have gone unrecorded. It is easy to 
criticise Lane for racism and gender essentialism, but she is writing from a 
standpoint where evolution and eugenics seemed to offer real hope for 
improving society. Ultimately, however, the scientific and social ingredients that 
went into Lane’s version of utopia were empowering for women but limiting. 
Constituting Mizora as a matriarchy allowed Lane to develop a female-only 
society, but also meant that she was sidestepping the realities of women taking 
on roles in a mixed gender society, or working through realistic ways for women 
to move from a position of oppression to equality with men. Similarly, by 
populating her society with women who have developed so far beyond the 
                                                          
65 Fisher argues that the similarities between Mizora and Herland “are too marked to be 
coincidental” and that Gilman must therefore have had “some direct or indirect contact with 
Mizora” (182).  
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human as to be like fairy beings or goddesses, she reinforced masculine myths 
of idealised womanhood, whilst simultaneously suggesting that ordinary women 
are not ready for utopia. Moreover the model of evolution which Lane uses, 
drawing more heavily on Lamarck than Darwin, meant that there was no 
uncertainty or randomness in the upward progress of humanity, nor space for 
sympathy or sentiment. Therefore, by invoking a deterministic respect for the 
laws of nature, moral evolution comes about in Mizora as a result of immoral 
processes. Finally, whilst science is the tool that frees the women of Mizora 
from slavery to men and their own biology, the application of the same rigorous 
scientific laws was already being used to argue against the case for women’s 
equality. It is, in the end, the paradoxes and imperfections that make Mizora 
interesting to read. The juxtaposition of high ideals and flawed concepts 
encapsulates a point in time when women recognised the injustice of their 
position in society but did not know how to move beyond it. The novel ends in 
pessimism. Vera’s husband and son are dead, and her Mizoran friend Wauna 
fails to survive in the real world. All that is left to Vera is a hope that future 
generations will be better through the promises of universal education and the 
deeply questionable practice of eugenics. 
 
3.3 Unveiling a Parallel: Equality, Cupid’s Garden and Moral Evolution 
 
Unveiling a Parallel (1893) by Alice Ilgenfritz Jones and Ella Merchant, 
which was published thirteen years after the first appearance of Mizora, 
presents a far more confident position for women than its predecessor. The 
writers see no requirement to disempower men in order to develop a society 
where women hold key roles. Instead the men and women co-exist, though still 
with their own separate customs and social institutions, in a society which 
accepts that there is no intrinsic difference between the nature of women and 
men. Despite being set on Mars, there is very little emphasis on new 
technology, and science features mainly as an interest in astronomy. 
Nevertheless, evolution plays a strong role as the lever for development, in the 
form of an evolutionary religion of spiritual progress which assumes that 
biological advances can be achieved through conscious direction. In my reading 
of Unveiling a Parallel I look at how Jones and Merchant build their arguments 
for equality between men and women, and their strategy for debunking myths 
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about female nature. I also consider how this utopian text dramatises the 
tensions in the demands for female equality through the portrayal of a flawed 
but successful business woman, while at the same time representing traditional 
female values of morality and chastity as the ultimate goal of an evolved, 
perfected version of humanity.  
The two authors of Unveiling a Parallel lived in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 
another Northern American town dominated by the meat packing industry. Alice 
Ilgenfritz Jones, the daughter of a furniture dealer, was a published writer of 
fiction and travel essays until marriage led to a hiatus in her writing career; her 
co-author, Ella Merchant, was the daughter of a doctor who became the wife of 
a printing entrepreneur (Kolmerten xi-xiv). Both women held a position of 
middle-class respectability, but Jones at least had the benefits of the broader 
horizons of an education at a mixed-sex seminary in Wisconsin and the 
opportunity to travel. No information is available on how the two women came to 
write the book, or what their respective roles in its creation were. However, 
there is a definite sense of two minds being at work and interacting with each 
other. Most works of utopian fiction are based on one dialogue, between the 
traveller from our world and the guide to the new, but Unveiling a Parallel has 
several dialogues. There is the primary exchange between the unnamed male 
narrator and his male guide, Severnius; an alternative viewpoint presented by 
Severnius’s sister Elodia; and finally the dialogue around the difference 
between Elodia’s values and those of the Caskians. The Caskians are a 
separate nation which has engaged in developing a higher form of morality and 
eliminating hereditary flaws within its population. It is unusual for utopian fiction 
to offer up two parallel societies for the reader to choose between and certainly 
Unveiling a Parallel appears to be playing with the expectations of the utopian 
genre by initially building up the city of Thursia as a utopian place before 
revealing its imperfections, and then proposing its rival Caskia as the true 
utopia. Yet Caskia, is given so little space within the text, and its characters 
seems so lifeless compared to those of Thursia that it is hard to be convinced 
that this society has the whole-hearted engagement of both writers. 
At first glance, Thursia does appear to be a typical utopia. The narrator 
lands in a beautiful city, is refreshed with fruits freshly plucked from a tree and 
taken to “a superb mansion built of dazzling white stone” (3). The manner and 
grace of the Thursians convince him of their “high state of culture” (3), while 
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listening to “ineffable music” in Severnius’s private sanctuary provides an 
experience of spiritual uplift (11). However, the apparent utopia has to conform 
to the narrator’s standards of morality, and prove itself worthy of his love. As 
Jean Pfaelzer points out, nineteenth-century utopian fiction often borrows 
elements of its plot from the sentimental romance (6) and in Unveiling a Parallel 
each utopian society is explicitly linked to the character of a woman and the 
narrator’s desire to find love.66 In the case of Thursia, the narrator’s fascination 
with Elodia takes over as the motivating force for learning about the life of the 
city, and also provides an opportunity for Jones and Merchant to explore 
preconceptions about the nature of women. At the same time, their bold sketch 
of a social order where women can behave in the same way as men becomes 
the primary reason for the rejection of Thursia as a utopia. This tension between 
the case for women as men’s equals, and the problems arising from women 
adopting male values suggests a sense of unease over the position of working 
women in late-nineteenth-century America. The Association for the 
Advancement of Women (AAW), an organisation that aimed to improve the 
conditions of women, saw promotion of employment for women as the key to 
citizenship, 67 but the reality for many women joining the workforce was that 
they ran the risk of having their morality questioned and being seen as less 
respectable than their married counterparts (Wood 34-8). Jones and Merchant 
initially present their business woman heroine Elodia in a very positive light. She 
is not represented as unwomanly despite being nearly as tall as the narrator. 
Her grace, carriage and beautiful face all attest to her femininity in the narrator’s 
eyes. However, she is also keenly intelligent and lively, and not at all pious. The 
narrator is surprised that the brother and sister treat each other with the easy 
camaraderie and respect of equals, and amazed to discover that Elodia is a 
successful banker, on the city council and the head of a school board. Like the 
character of Fitz-Musicus in New Amazonia, the narrator’s role is to present the 
typical masculine arguments against female equality, but as the only 
representative of late-nineteenth-century America, he is also forced to provide 
data for both sides of the argument. Therefore he is surprisingly well-informed 
                                                          
66 Unveiling a Parallel was subtitled “A Romance”, even though it was published by Arena 
Publishing, a specialist in the area of social reform (Kolmerten ix). 
67 The AAW held its first meeting in the American Midwest in Des Moines, Iowa (about 100 
miles away from Cedar Rapids) in 1885, attracting 200 delegates (Wood 36). 
108 
 
about the “Woman Question” and can supply information on the number of 
women working as teachers, clerks, stenographers and type-writers in his town, 
and report that women’s wages in New York are so low that they are only 
equivalent to a third of the wages of a Thursian stableman (24-5). The narrator 
also talks of women aspiring to become “doctors, lawyers, editors, artists, 
writers” (26). Nevertheless he continues to fall back on the stereotypes of 
women being more religious than men, lacking in “the inclination to assume 
grave public duties” and not being men’s political equals (24-8). Most of the 
narrator’s assertions about women are robustly disputed by Severnius, who 
suggests that what the narrator sees as a woman’s nature is more a result of 
conditioning than nature. The narrator himself has to admit that not all women 
are angels: “I had a sudden vision of a scene in Five Points: several groups of 
frowsled, petticoated beings, laughing, joking, swearing, quarrelling, fighting, 
and drinking beer from dirty mugs”(30). Five Points was a notorious slum area 
in New York City, and the use of a word like “frowsled”, with its connotations of 
disarray and dishevelment, coupled with the detail of the dirty mug, suggest a 
real fear of what happens when women become out of control, and act in a 
similar way to men. This flip side to equality remains latent in all the positive 
arguments about equality. One of the generalisations about women that is not 
disputed is their “horror of speculation” (24), which is an early indication that 
although Elodia might be beautiful and philanthropic, she is already being 
questioned for doing a job that is not on the approved list for aspiring working 
women. Mostly, though, equality between men and women is seen as a positive 
thing, and represented as completely natural. This is backed up by the Martian 
creation myth in which, instead of woman being created from Adam’s rib, “God 
breathed a soul” into a pair of animals emerging from an enchanted lake and 
“they were Man and Woman, equals in all things” (32). Severnius also denies 
that there is any difference in nature between men and women:  
You would not have me think that there are two varieties of human 
nature on your planet, corresponding with your sexes, would you? You 
say ‘woman’s’ spiritual fibre and fine moral sense, as though she had an 
exclusive title to those qualities. My dear sir, it is impossible! you are all 
born of woman and are one flesh and blood, whether you are male or 
female. (47) 
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His point is that society has made the difference between men and women, and 
that it is only the restrictions on women’s behaviour that have made them seem 
more gentle and abstemious than men. The crux of the argument is that virtue 
is a habit, not an inherent difference between the genders.  
 As the exploration of Thursian society continues, the role of virtue 
becomes increasingly important. The positive initial impression of Elodia is 
continuously undermined by discoveries about her lifestyle and history. The 
focus of the parallel moves from highlighting the absurdity of the double 
standards for men and women, to investigating the moral consequences of the 
erosion of the double standard, as women start behaving as men do. Elodia is 
found to belong to a club for women with its own reading room, gymnasium and 
swimming baths, but also its own wine cellar, where, shockingly, women indulge 
in drinking. Woman do not smoke, but have their own equivalent, vaporising 
valerian root with alcohol, leading to noxious smells and health risks, as well as 
segregated “vaporizing” carriages on the train. Significantly, there are no mixed 
men and women’s clubs, and the separate habits of smoking and vaporising 
also lead to separate spaces for men and women. This demarcation of space 
reflects the segregation of men and women’s spaces in American cities of the 
late nineteenth century. Working men tended to frequent various masculine 
labour organisations, usually centred on saloons while women’s spaces were 
mainly to be found in shops, hotel parlours and parks (Wood 52-3). In 
Davenport Iowa, there were eighty-eight saloons available to men in the 
downtown area providing toilets, free lunch, loans, meeting spaces for men’s 
groups and a shared masculine space. Facilities for working women in the 
same area were more difficult to come by, and so the women of Davenport 
founded their own club rooms in 1887, “The Lend a Hand”, which offered a 
library, changing rooms, space for lunch, lectures and evening concerts (Wood 
51-2). Women’s clubs of the 1880s were also seen as a way for women to 
engage in public policy, and exercise some of the influence denied them 
through lack of suffrage. New York World columnist Jane Croly saw women’s 
organisations potentially forming an entire shadow government (Wood 47), 
which was perhaps what Bellamy had in mind when he developed his separate 
women’s corps in Looking Backward. Similarly, although Jones and Merchant 
gave the women of Thursia a public role, and equality to men, they still found it 
hard to imagine an integrated society where men and women worked and 
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socialised together. Moral boundaries remained troublesome when it came to 
imagining equality. Public spaces for women, like the “Ladies’ Mile” at the heart 
of New York’s shopping and amusement districts, were redefining the 
expectations of respectable women’s public behaviour, and causing an uneasy 
sense of transgression (Scobey 48-50). Merchant and Jones capture some of 
this uneasiness in their most damning illustration of the consequences of female 
equality: Cupid’s Garden, an Arcadian retreat where upper class women go to 
meet their lovers. This beautiful parkland is the home of vice and prostitution, 
and allows for discrete liaisons without women losing their reputation. Elodia 
herself has indulged in “love, passion, sentiment” without responsibility (101), 
resulting in an unacknowledged illegitimate child. The moral debate over 
whether Elodia as a woman was more reprehensible than a man in hiding her 
transgression goes on for several pages. Elodia has the best of it, though, with 
her fable of how each gender came to gain its alleged qualities:  
There was a great scramble, and your sex, having some advantages in 
the way of muscles and limb ... pressed forward and took first choice. 
Naturally you selected the things which were agreeable to possess in 
themselves, and the exercise of which would redound to your glory; such 
virtues as chastity, temperance, patience, modesty, piety, and some 
minor graces were thrust aside and eventually forced upon the weaker 
sex, - since it was necessary that all the Qualities should be used in 
order to make a complete Human Nature. (107) 
Jones and Merchant are arguing against the theory of the complementarity of 
male and female nature which had become another way of stereotyping women 
as being the opposite of men and biologising their differences. Elodia sums up 
the absurdity of this position: “How charming to have the one nature dovetail 
into the other so neatly!”(107). Unusually, for a debate within utopian fiction, 
neither protagonist is entirely happy with the outcome – Elodia is angry and the 
narrator is disillusioned. While it is clear that Elodia and Severnius win the 
argument over the absurdity of supposing women’s nature to be more moral 
than men, the narrator has a strong emotional reaction against the reality of 
accepting this: “I was sick at heart and angry, – not so much with Elodia as with 
the conditions that had made her what she was, a woman perfect in every other 
respect, but devoid of the one supreme thing, – the sense of virtue. She was 
now to me simply a splendid ruin, a temple without holiness” (110). This 
111 
 
extreme disillusionment runs counter to the carefully convincing arguments in 
favour of female equality and lead to a different conclusion, represented most 
strongly by the narrator’s reaction to watching female wrestling, which he 
experienced as “a physical as well as moral nausea” (70). The idea of women 
behaving in the same way as men is represented not as empowering, but as 
deeply troubling. 
The solution which Jones and Merchant offer to the conundrum of how to 
make women equal to men without them losing their virtue is to be found in the 
development of a higher form of human nature. The Caskians, the second 
civilisation described in the book, have embarked on a conscious programme of 
self-directed evolution, involving a centuries long endeavour “to counteract and 
finally to eradicate hereditary evils” (53). Caskian society has all the 
characteristics of a typical utopia, such as health, longevity and absence of 
poverty (117-18). The Caskians believe in cultivating all three elements of what 
they call “the triple nature” – the spiritual, intellectual and physical (57). 
Although they are so intellectual and spiritual that they sometimes forget to eat, 
they are responsive to the material world of nature and feel that “physical sins – 
neglect or infringement of the laws of health – are classed in the same category 
with moral transgressions” (127). They are also so sensitive to their own 
conscience that they no longer need laws and punishments, since they “have 
emancipated themselves from the thraldom of the law by absorbing its 
principles into themselves” (56). They have abolished the speculative capitalism 
of stocks and shares that Elodia pursued and condemn all forms of gambling as 
a “mad fever of greed” (134). However, the most notable feature of the Caskian 
development towards perfection is that their children are conceived in what is 
described as “immaculate purity” (58). As with Mizora, there is no scientific 
explanation of the process. Men and women do still marry and have children, 
but “they are lovers on the highest plane” (59), and “the law of chastity is graven 
in the inmost heart” (60), suggesting that sexual reproduction has been 
superseded by a non-sexual process. The two Caskian children that the 
narrator meets are described as being “as beautiful as Raphael’s cherubs ... 
two perfect buds of the highest development humanity has ever attained to” 
(114). Budding suggests plant reproduction, and this theme is also picked up 
with Ariadne, the Caskian woman who replaces Elodia in the narrator’s 
affections: “She resembled some elegant flower whose nature it is to be delicate 
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and slender. She seemed even to sway a little, and undulate, like a lily on its 
stem” (130). The development of the Caskians is also compared to the 
cultivation of roses: “God planted the species, a crude and simple plant, and 
turned it over to man to do what he might with it; and in the same way he placed 
man himself here, – to perfect himself if he would” (151). Horticulture as an 
analogy gets away from the randomness of natural selection and the moral 
issues of sexual reproduction. Rational selection of marriage partners by 
women is shown to be an imperfect vehicle for improvement amongst the 
Thursian where immoral women still manage to persuade gullible men to marry 
them, while others such as Elodia determine not to marry at all. Instead, the 
Caskians look to “the principle of differentiation” to produce the equivalent of the 
chromatic variety of intelligent horticulture. Although Mendel’s work on cross 
breeding different plants was not rediscovered until 1900, horticulture was 
becoming recognised as a science in its own right. Jones and Merchant based 
their concept of hereditary progress on horticulture, and so accounted for the 
variations within the Caskian population by explaining that: “Cultivation, though 
it softens salient traits and peculiarities, may develop infinite variety in every 
kind and species” (119). 
The key change in Caskia’s evolutionary process is the suppression of 
lust, which is seen as a crime, even within marriage:  
This matter of animal passion has been at the bottom of untold crimes 
and unnumbered miseries in our land. ... We ostracize the bastard; he is 
no more impure than the offspring of legalized licentiousness, and the 
law which protects the one and despises the other, cannot discriminate in 
the matter of after effects, cannot annul or enforce the curse of heredity. 
(59) 
Marriage was often seen as legalised prostitution, since, once married, women 
had no choice but to submit to the sexual demands of their husbands, and 
control over this aspect of marriage was important to feminists. Annie Besant 
argued that marriage needed to “include satisfaction for mind, heart and tastes 
as well as for body” (qtd. in Bland 149), which is more similar to the Caskian 
ideal of cultivating the triple nature of body, mind and spirit, than complete 
chastity. However, at a time when the main methods of birth control for most 
married couples were withdrawal or refraining from sex, promoting the ideal of 
chastity within marriage was an important means of controlling family size. The 
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success of such strategies can be shown by the fall in the average number of 
children born to white women in America from seven in 1800 to less than four 
by 1900 despite the absence of widespread use of contraception (D. Smith 43). 
Moreover, chastity was often seen as key to the advancement towards a higher 
form of life, and a prerequisite for a spiritual form of evolution, such as proposed 
by the Theosophical Society which attracted a number of feminist supporters, 
including Annie Besant and Henrietta Muller, founder of the Woman’s Penny 
Paper. Bland argues that the attraction of an organisation like the Theosophical 
Society to feminists was partly its recognition of both male and female principles 
as being necessary for spiritual evolution, and partly the commitment to celibacy 
of the inner circle (167). There is also an element of traditional Christian 
morality to Jones and Merchant’s emphasis on chastity. The curse of heredity 
that the Caskians are trying to evade is original sin itself, as becomes clear 
when the Caskian children are described as having “no germs of evil” and “no 
Adam’s curse” (114). The Caskians believe in the Rise of Man rather than his 
Fall, and work towards perfection through love. The Caskians also praise 
America as a land of great promise, destined for “future grandeur” (136), 
evoking the idea of the manifest destiny of America as the New Jerusalem.68 
This idea of America as the promised land also suggests how Jones and 
Merchant are using their two parallel societies, both to warn of the dangers of 
capitalism and immorality of the new urban America that they see coming into 
existence around them, and renew the Covenant of their Puritan forefathers 
through holding up Caskian society as the ideal that America is destined to 
achieve.  
Unveiling a Parallel offers all the confidence in the abilities of women 
shown by New Amazonia without being marred by separatism and essentialism. 
However, the utopian potential of the vision of equality is undermined by doubts 
about the moral status of independent working women. The acceptance of the 
equality in nature between men and women is what makes Unveiling a Parallel 
seem so different from Mizora, and yet, taken as a whole, Unveiling a Parallel 
can be seen as employing different tactics to make some of the same points as 
Mizora. In Unveiling a Parallel, spiritual evolution beyond the material world is 
still seen as more important than achieving equality in the current imperfect 
                                                          
68 See Sacvan Bercovitch’s The American Jeremiad (1978) for further discussion of American 
exceptionalism. 
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world. While women are no longer set up as morally superior to men (in fact the 
greatest spirituality in the text is represented by three men, the narrator, 
Severnius and the Master), the same areas of human nature which were 
rejected as exclusively masculine are still being rejected in Unveiling a Parallel, 
in the form of lust and animal passion. Nevertheless, the overall impact of 
Unveiling a Parallel on its readers is much more positively in favour of the 
realism of Elodia than the idealism of Caskia. Kolmerton comments: “Like so 
many other twentieth-century readers, I prefer the lustful Elodia to the sweet 
Ariadne” (xxxvii), and suggests that Caskia is there to mediate between the 
radical ideas of the first part and the likely moral responses of their readership. I 
propose instead that these disparities represent the negotiation between the 
views of the two writers. Elodia has too many good lines not to have the support 
of at least one of her creators, while the idealism of Caskia is too carefully 
constructed to be just an afterthought to make the book morally acceptable. 
Also the strong visceral response to female immorality provides a warning 
against women adopting male vices along with equality. Elodia is described as 
“magnetic yet faulty” (147), her wit, charm, intelligence and power are seen as 
valueless without any moral discrimination behind them, yet as is repeatedly 
demonstrated, she only fails in the narrator’s eyes because he insists on 
judging her against a separate moral standards for women. Elodia emerges with 
integrity despite her flaws and offers an alternative to the Caskian dream. She 
accepts her own “tastes, faculties, passions and propensities” (54) and does not 
have any desire to imitate the Caskians. She accuses them of being “machine-
like” (74) because their lives are so well-ordered, and even the narrator admits 
that they lack imagination and great emotions (123). Caskia may be an 
aspirational utopia for a thousand years in the future, but the arguments for 
female equality, whatever their consequences, resonate as being directly 
applicable to the women of Jones and Merchant’s time.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
Eugenic elements in late-nineteenth-century feminist utopian fiction show 
the growing importance to women of their responsibility for improving the health, 
fitness and morality of the human race. The presence of eugenics acts as a 
signifier for concerns about sexual activity, marriage and fertility, as well as a 
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more general interest in opportunities for women to re-imagine their role in a 
safer new world directed by human ingenuity not nature. In New Amazonia, 
eugenics is part of the programme of social improvements offered by an all-
female government, on a par with the eradication of disease and controlling the 
weather. However, although Corbett has a strong interest in science, she does 
not see scientific changes to reproduction as being desirable or necessary for 
promoting the equality of women. Instead she relies on a caste of celibate 
women without child-bearing responsibilities to provide leadership in her 
imagined society. The all-women government is justified by a discourse of 
female moral superiority based on women’s biological role as mothers, and the 
maternal instinct, even though the state, which is meant to be a mother to the 
people, is run by women who have never been mothers, and concentrates on 
regulation rather than nurturing. Evolution and sexual selection are of little 
importance in New Amazonia, where the social advances brought about by 
women getting the vote are seen as sufficient for reforming society. In Mizora, 
on the other hand, scientific changes to the process of reproduction, and, more 
importantly, the elimination of all the men, is a precondition to forming a 
separatist utopia. Eugenic selection is seen as way of elevating the women to a 
high level of moral purity and the mother/ daughter relationship is celebrated as 
the strongest social bond. However, the separatism of Mizora, based on racial 
cleansing and the destruction of men raises serious questions about the 
function of the feminist utopia and its reinforcement of sexual stereotypes and 
gender and racial essentialism. Unveiling a Parallel offers strong arguments 
against any division of male and female characteristics into separate categories 
and shows that equality for women is possible, at least for the upper-class 
women with access to childcare. Nonetheless, the moral questions raised by 
opening up these opportunities to women remain unresolved, and disquiet over 
sexuality leads to imagining a world where men and women have evolved 
beyond the need for sex. Eugenics in the form of the conscious cultivation of the 
best qualities of the species is seen as the solution to the problem of 
unregulated sexual desire and the achievement of spiritual progress. Increasing 
knowledge about contraception enabled Jane Hume Clapperton to allude to the 
use of birth control in Margaret Dunmore and talk about new forms of 
relationships between men and women without requiring complete celibacy or 
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changes to reproductive methods, though her hopes for the future evolution of 
humanity were also based on the adoption of a form of eugenics.  
Lack of precise information about the way inheritance worked made it 
possible to annex biological and scientific ideas to invent alternative means of 
reproduction that worked without requiring men, sex or childbirth. The drive to 
escape from sexual activity is present in both Mizora and Unveiling a Parallel, 
while New Amazonia and Margaret Dunmore both foreground the importance of 
choice over when and if women are required to have children. There is 
evidence here of a tension between women’s acceptance of the scientific 
construction of their nature as being more sympathetic, altruistic and intuitive 
than men, and therefore more moral, through their role as mothers, and the 
strong desire demonstrated within utopian fiction to escape from the biological 
necessities of this role. I suggest that this disconnect shows that the alliance 
between evolutionary science and feminist activism was an alliance of 
convenience designed to allow women their own sphere of influence prior to full 
inclusion in the social citizenship not yet available to them through suffrage or 
legal equality. The separatism of New Amazonia and Mizora can be seen as 
being about affirming a female identity which, while in some ways as 
essentialist as male representations of women, offered a sense of 
empowerment and an opportunity to work out ideas for the kind of world in 
which women would like to live. Issues around sex, celibacy and motherhood 
would continue to feed into the social debates on birth control, eugenics and 
population levels well into the twentieth century, and women writers of utopian 
fiction would continue to look at ways they could use science to control the 
forces of nature to make the world a safer place for themselves and their 
children. In the next chapter I investigate Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s Herland 
and revisit questions of separatism, eugenics and biological essentialism in the 
light of Gilman’s use of feminist separatism as a tool for reimagining women’s 
identity and role in the evolutionary progress of the human race. 
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4 Making Better People: Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Social Evolution 
  
In the previous chapter I explored how late-nineteenth-century writers of 
feminist utopian fiction were able to appropriate scientific developments and 
evolutionary theory to support their arguments for women’s suffrage and 
equality. In this chapter I focus on one particular writer, Charlotte Perkins 
Gilman, who made conscious use of evolutionary theory to argue that women’s 
subordination to men was a barrier to human evolution. Gilman saw social and 
economic relations as processes subject to the same natural laws as biological 
evolution and sought to ground her theoretical and fictional writings in scientific 
principles. She was also influenced by the utopian socialism of Edward 
Bellamy’s Nationalist Movement, where she began her early career as a writer 
and public speaker. Her interest in utopianism resulted in her writing three 
utopian novels Moving the Mountain (1911), Herland (1915) and With Her in 
Ourland (1916), as well as incorporating utopian ideas into her other novels. 
However, Gilman’s most successful work was Women and Economics: A Study 
of the Economic Relation Between Men and Women as a Factor in Social 
Evolution (1898) where she first argued that evolutionary progress and the 
development of the human race had been severely hampered by the subjection 
of women to men. Her subsequent works continued to develop this theme, 
looking at practical measures for improving the position of women, and 
emphasising women’s responsibility for improvement of the species through 
education and eugenic marriages. Herland, Gilman’s most famous work of 
feminist utopian fiction, addresses the same issues in fictional form through 
portraying an all-female society where women evolved in isolation from men, 
reproducing through a parthenogenetic process which facilitates continuous 
improvements of the race from one generation to the next.  
However, the eugenic measures and lack of racial diversity within 
Herland raise some of the same issues of white ethnocentrism as Lane’s 
Mizora. One of the chief difficulties in writing about Gilman is negotiating 
between the progressive and utopian nature of her feminism and the racism and 
ethnocentrism inherent in much of her writing. Critical reception of Gilman has 
swung from early uncritical adulation to some extensive and personal attacks 
which can make it difficult to assess Gilman’s work dispassionately and 
particularly hard to discuss her work in relation to eugenics which is a far more 
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difficult subject in the twenty-first century than it was in Gilman’s era. Whilst 
acknowledging the racists elements of Gilman’s work, my focus will be on 
exploring Gilman’s interpretation of race in relation to evolutionary theory and its 
contribution to her argument for changing the economic and social role of 
women. 
 I begin the chapter by demonstrating the links between Gilman’s early 
life and fiction, and her development as a social theorist capable of producing a 
fully formed analysis of gender relationships and female oppression in Women 
and Economics. I illustrate Gilman’s use of evolutionary ideas through analysis 
of the feminist argument put forward in Women and Economics and examine 
what was distinctive about Gilman’s approach to feminism, Darwinism and 
evolution. I then look at the justifiable criticism of Gilman’s views on race, and 
show, through examination of Gilman’s utopian fiction, to what extent her 
understanding of evolution allowed her to adopt a non-essentialist stance 
towards race, despite personal prejudice and nativist concerns about 
immigration. I also assess Gilman’s approach to eugenics and consider whether 
Gilman’s eugenics has been misinterpreted in the light of current questioning of 
her racism and a failure to distinguish between Gilman’s utopian fiction and her 
later articles on race and birth control. Instead, I suggest that Gilman offered 
only limited support for eugenic measures in her utopian fiction, as a minor 
component in her goal of conscious improvement of the human race through 
education and the eradication of congenital diseases. Finally, I assess the 
implications of eugenics and race on Gilman’s overall vision of social evolution. 
 
4.1 Tearing Off the Top Pattern: the Road to Reform Darwinism 
 
Gilman’s awareness that the gender relations of her time were 
historically determined is already apparent in her early works of short fiction. In 
“An Extinct Angel” (1891), she adopts an evolutionary perspective to comment 
on society’s expectations of women’s role, by discussing the Victorian “angel in 
the house” as an extinct biological species. This awareness that women’s 
position was socially constructed is also true of Gilman’s most famous short 
story, “The Yellow Wallpaper” (1890) which contains a critique of men’s power 
over women. The story is often read as a semi-autobiographical account of 
Gilman’s post-natal depression and her reaction to the rest cure prescribed by 
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the neurologist S. Weir Mitchell, a reading encouraged by Gilman herself in the 
short article “Why I Wrote the Yellow Wallpaper” (1913). However, the text also 
supports a number of different readings, and has had a lively critical history 
since it was republished in 1973. Initial feminist interpretations of the work in the 
1970s and early 1980s were superseded by a more critical interrogation of the 
ideology within the text, leading to readings which highlighted submerged racist, 
colonialist and queer content.69 It is also possible to carry out an evolutionary 
reading which contains elements of the analysis which Gilman would develop 
further in Women and Economics. As such, the yellow wallpaper of the title, 
which is described as having a bad smell that permeates the whole house, can 
be interpreted as the masculine oriented (or as Gilman later calls it 
“androcentric”) environment which systematically oppresses women, while the 
woman the narrator sees within the wallpaper, shaking the bars and trying to 
climb through, is an allegory of women’s need for liberation from the repressive 
environment that is hindering their evolution. The narrator can also be read not 
as an individual woman going mad, but as a fictionalisation of the oppression 
experienced by many women and the arguments men use to deny the validity of 
women’s experience. Alternatively, building on the idea that “The Yellow 
Wallpaper” is semi-autobiographical, it could be argued that the story recounts 
the politicisation of Gilman. At first the narrator simply dislikes the wallpaper, 
then she starts to see recurring patterns in it, and eventually realises that these 
maddening and inexplicable patterns are the cultural forms that imprison 
women. The narrator’s obsession with tearing off the top pattern of the 
wallpaper can then be construed not as a sign of madness, but as a statement 
of Gilman’s determination to work against the androcentric culture that is 
restricting the development of women. 
The tensions of Gilman’s first marriage to artist Walter Stetson, 
exacerbated by the birth of her daughter Kate in 1885, undoubtedly inform the 
psychological background to “The Yellow Wallpaper” and Gilman’s ongoing 
interest in women’s roles within marriage. However, her interests in evolution 
and feminism predated her marriage. Gilman’s estranged father, Frederick 
Perkins, provided his seventeen-year-old daughter with a reading programme 
                                                          
69See for example Susan S. Lanser "Feminist Criticism, ‘the Yellow Wallpaper’, and the Politics 
of Color in America", Denise Knight "Charlotte Perkins Gilman and the Shadow of Racism"; 
Samaine J. Lockwood “Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s Colonial Revival"; and Jonathan Crewe 
"Queering the Yellow Wallpaper? Charlotte Perkins Gilman and the Politics of Form". 
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that included anthropological texts informed by evolutionary theory (Living 36), 
while visits to her aunts Isabella Beecher Hooker and Harriet Beecher Stowe 
exposed her to suffragist ideas. Gilman’s engagement with key evolutionary 
texts adds a layer of sophistication to her analysis of women’s role in society 
which takes it beyond the autobiographical. Judith A. Allen, in her thorough and 
illuminating account of Gilman’s career as a public intellectual, places the 
evolutionary framework at the heart of Gilman’s feminism, stating that “To 
understand Gilman’s feminism requires analysis of reform Darwinism, the 
approach she sought to carry her analysis” (73-74). Indeed, Women and 
Economics references T. H. Huxley, Lester Ward and Grant Allen, while Gilman 
herself acknowledged the influence of Geddes and Thomson’s Evolution of Sex 
(1889) and Lester Ward’s “Our Better Halves” (1888), an article in which he 
argued that women were more important for evolution than men (Hill 266). This 
intellectual background is important for situating Gilman’s approach to feminism, 
and the political reformist engagement which informs her work.   
As can be seen in the Judith Allen quotation above, Gilman is often 
referred to as a reform Darwinist, a term generally applied in America to 
progressive evolutionary thinkers who, unlike social Darwinists, opposed 
laissez-faire capitalism and advocated intervention to promote the evolution of 
society.70 However, few critics acknowledge that reform Darwinism was a label 
applied retrospectively, rather than a movement that Gilman could have seen 
herself as part of during her lifetime. The earliest uses of the term can be traced 
back to the 1950s, where reform Darwinism was used as a means of 
differentiating the more progressive evolutionists from the Social Darwinists 
analysed by Richard Hofstadter in his seminal attack on American capitalism 
Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860–1915 (1944).71 Reform Darwinists 
are often also described as neo-Lamarckians, that is to say latter-day advocates 
                                                          
70 The OED defines Social Darwinism as “the theory that societies, classes, and races are 
subject to and a product of Darwinian laws of natural selection” (“social Darwinism n. at social, 
adj. and n. Special Uses 2.” OED Online), but the term was often used more pejoratively as a 
label for economists suspected of being in favour of unrestricted competition. Robert C. 
Bannister in Social Darwinism: Science and Myth in Anglo-American Social Thought (1979) 
argues that Social Darwinism itself was actually a myth fabricated by reformers to discredit 
laissez faire capitalism by depicting Social Darwinists as ruthless supporters of “survival of the 
fittest”. 
71 Pfeifer attributes the first use of the term “reform Darwinism” to Eric Goldman’s Rendez Vous 
with Destiny (1952) (397) 
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of Lamarck’s theory that acquired characteristics are heritable.72 Neo-
Lamarckians were an identifiable group formed to defend the concept of the 
heritability of acquired characteristics in response to Weismann’s “germ-plasm” 
theory, which posited an enclosed system for the transmission of hereditary 
information from one generation to the next, without any influence from the 
habits or environment of the parents.73 However, there was sufficient 
commonality between Darwinism and Lamarckism to explain the slippage in 
terminology that has led some subsequent critics to use reform Darwinism and 
neo-Lamarckism almost interchangeably to denote various positions within the 
spectrum of evolutionary thought. What reform Darwinism, neo-Lamarckism and 
Social Darwinism have in common is that, unlike Darwin himself, their 
adherents applied the biological process of evolution to society, albeit to quite 
different ends. 
 Gilman was well versed in the debates of her day over the application of 
evolutionary science to theories of social development. Maureen Egan 
comments on Gilman’s debts to a range of thinkers from all spectrums of the 
Darwinism debate, including John Fiske, who used Darwinism and evolution to 
argue for the inevitability of social progress in The Outlines of Cosmic 
Philosophy (1874); Henry Drummond, an evangelist interested in spiritual 
evolution; and the economist Henry George, who argued against Malthus in 
Progress and Poverty (1879) (M. Egan 107). Gilman’s involvement with the 
Nationalist movement that grew up in the wake of Bellamy’s Looking Backward, 
both as a writer of pro-Nationalist poems and as a speaker on Nationalist 
themes, also connected her to a progressive social movement associated with 
evolution.74 However, it was Gilman’s strong endorsement of the ideas of Lester 
Ward that has earned her the label of reform Darwinism. Ward was a very 
visible opponent of Spencer and laissez-faire economics, arguing that social 
interactions led to a purposive evolution which could allow humans to 
intentionally transform their environment in a way that was impossible for 
                                                          
72 The term “neo-Lamarckism” was coined by American scientist, Alpheus Packard in 1885, and 
it was in America that the theory found its greatest influence during the late nineteenth century 
(Bowler 59, 118). 
73 Richardson argues that Weismann himself was aware of the complexity of organisms, and did 
not discount the role of the environment, but that his theory was developed at a time when the 
rapid professionalization of science was leading to reductive thinking (“Darwin and 
Reductionism” 8). 
74 For more information on Gilman’s development as a poet and speaker for the Nationalist 
movement see Scharnhorst 194-6. 
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animals. As Egan argues, Ward made a distinction between physical evolution, 
based on natural selection, and a more purposive mental evolution available to 
humans. He was also a committed Lamarckian, seeing the inheritance of 
acquired characteristics through education as key to social evolution and the 
ability of humans to progress through their own efforts (Stocking 253). 
Gilman accepted natural selection as the chief mechanism for the 
evolution of the individual and the race, but like Darwin himself continued to 
assign a large role to use and habit.75 Gilman’s novel What Diantha Did (first 
published in serial form in The Forerunner in 1909-10) contains an account of a 
fictional experiment with guinea pigs to prove the transmissibility of acquired 
characteristics. One pair of guinea pigs was brought up in conditions of 
“ordinary guinea-pig bliss”, while another was “subjected to a course of 
discipline” involving exercise wheels and a jumping course. After five years of 
putting many generations of the descendants of the second pair through this 
routine, the experiment showed that the trained guinea pigs had become 
“nimble, swift, as different from the first as the razor-backed pig of the forest 
from the fatted porkers in the sty” (245-6). This fictional experiment gives an 
idea of Gilman’s investment in a version of evolution that placed the emphasis 
on progress through discipline and work, and therefore a moral process which 
would lead infallibly to social improvement and establish a scientific basis for 
deriving ethics.76  
For Gilman, social evolution was an extension of biological evolution. 
She did not recognise a difference between animal evolution and social 
evolution, but believed them to be part of the same process: 
The evolution of organic life goes on in geometric progression: cells 
combine, and form organs; organs combine, and form organisms; 
organisms combine, and form organizations. Society is an organization. 
Society is the fourth power of the cell. It is composed of individual 
animals of genus homo, living in organic relation. The course of social 
evolution is the gradual establishment of organic relation between 
individuals ... (Women 51) 
 
                                                          
75 For further discussion of Gilman’s interested in acquired characteristics see Mamigonian (63); 
Hausman (498-500); Lloyd (98); M. Egan (106). 
76 Malina Mamigonian sees Gilman as turning evolution into a religion, arguing that Gilman 
“transform[ed] the laws of nature into religious doctrine, without attribution or apology” (62). 
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Gilman saw social evolution as a move away from individualism to a more 
complex, and therefore more efficient, form of organisation. It involved 
“increasing interdependence” and much less reliance on “the once valuable 
process of individual struggle for success” (52). Gilman compared individuals 
attempting personal gain at the expense of the general social interest to the 
morbid action of a diseased organ. For Gilman this was not simply an analogy, 
but a transposition of biological processes from the body to society. Historian 
Lois Magner argues that Gilman "even claimed that the social organism did not 
exist merely as a useful analogy or illustration, but as a literal biological fact" 
(122). 
The importance of social evolution to Gilman can be seen in the subtitle 
to Women and Economics: A Study of the Economic Relation between Men and 
Women as a Factor in Social Evolution. However, social evolution is also 
problematic for Gilman. She can only argue that women’s subjection to men is 
anti-evolutionary if she accepts that “social evolution” is capable of taking a 
wrong turning, or if she can find another cause for women’s “unnatural” 
subjection to men, which does not challenge the validity of social evolution. She 
tries to put the responsibility onto “false conditions” which include “survival of 
rudimentary instincts”, “disproportionate pressure of individual interests” and 
most of all a distorted sexuo-economic relation between men and women (52-
3). However, this analysis leads Gilman from a view of the inevitability of social 
progress into a more dystopian outlook, which I explore further in the next 
section.    
 
4.2  Women and Economics: Gilman’s Dystopian Narrative 
 
In Women and Economics Gilman takes a stance that is the reverse of 
utopian. Where Corbett in New Amazonia and Lane in Mizora used the utopian 
form to imagine how society might work if it were ruled by women, Gilman 
employs evolutionary rhetoric to demonstrate that the status quo of her own 
society and culture is systematically dystopian in relation to women. Corbett’s 
and Lane’s utopian perspectives highlight the abuses of their own time through 
demonstrating the cultural embeddedness of their own societal norms. Gilman 
instead contrasts human social organisation with the natural world and builds up 
a narrative of thwarted evolutionary progress. Women and Economics begins 
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by stating its thesis of evolutionary decline in an introductory poem, or “Proem”, 
as Gilman calls it. In this poem, Gilman talks of the primordial equality of man 
and woman, as “comrades dear and daring”, living wild and free in the primal 
forests. However, in Gilman’s origin myth, it is man who finds the Tree of 
Knowledge and chooses to use his strength to “conquer Pleasure” and take 
control of women to be his exclusive property. This act leads to disease, crime 
and loneliness. In the poem, redemption for humanity comes from Nature 
(apparently interchangeable with God) which is prompting men and women to 
resume their former equality: 
Nature hath reclaimed thee, forgiving dispossession!  
God hath not forgotten, though man doth still forget! 
The woman-soul is rising, in despite of thy transgression – 
Loose her now, and trust her! She will love thee yet! (vii) 
Gilman saw poetry and fiction as an important way of influencing 
readers. Her earliest published work was a poem about evolution, and Lester 
Ward continued to value Gilman more as a poet than a social thinker throughout 
their correspondence (Allen 92). However, the narrative of paradise lost and 
then regained that Gilman manages to depict in a few verses requires fifteen 
chapters to argue in prose, and then results in a much less certain ending: 
“When the mother of the race is free, we shall have a better world, by the easy 
right of birth and by the calm, slow, friendly forces of social evolution” (167). 
This conclusion is not so much about the triumph of the “woman-soul” as gentle 
persuasion that the changing role of women is not a threat to social order. The 
emphasis is on women as mothers, not as socially disruptive suffragists, and on 
the idea that change through social evolution would be “easy”, “calm”, “slow” 
and “friendly”.   
Gilman’s central argument is that what she calls “the sexuo-economic 
relationship” between men and women is unnatural because “In no other animal 
species is the female economically dependent on the male. In no other animal 
species is the sex-relation for sale” (48). Therefore, establishing what is natural 
and what is not is extremely important to her argument. To do this, Gilman 
makes extensive references to the natural world and compares human social 
conventions such as selection of partners and child-rearing to those of other 
animals in order to establish which ones can be seen as natural and which ones 
are socially constructed. For example, monogamy is described as “a natural 
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development, inevitable in the course of social progress” because it is found in 
birds and mammals (13). This trans-species perspective sweeps aside social 
conventions and allows Gilman to label various consequences of the distorted 
economic relationship between men and women as unnatural and 
disadvantageous to social progress. She argues that the necessity of women 
selling themselves to men leads to economic functions being mixed with sex 
functions, putting “the immense force of sex-competition into the field of social 
economics” (56). The result, she claims, is increased individualism, and men 
focussing on economic gain rather than achievements which could benefit 
society.  
Gilman sees “excessive sex-distinction” as the root cause of the 
problems of the human race. Her argument is that in order to survive under the 
economic circumstances prevalent in human society, women needed to make 
themselves as sexually attractive to men as possible through over-development 
of secondary sexual characteristics relevant to sexual selection. Excessive sex 
distinction led to women being “over-sexed”, by which Gilman meant that they 
were only developing the physical and behavioural characteristics specific to 
their gender. Men could continue to contribute to the development of the human 
race while women were confined to reproductive functions and keeping house. 
Gilman again uses comparisons to other species to argue that “Woman’s 
femininity ... is more apparent in proportion to her humanity than the femininity 
of other animals in proportion to their caninity or felinity or equinity” (23). 
Therefore, the female is comparatively much smaller and weaker than the male 
in humans than within other species, to the detriment of their children and 
society as a whole. This anomaly, Gilman argues, results from the perversion of 
the process of sexual selection. Although Darwin originally saw sexual selection 
as males competing to take possession of females, he did also recognise a 
separate process of female aesthetic choice operating outside the parameters 
of natural selection (Richardson Love 55). Bellamy too built on the active role of 
women in selection and made the women of the future Boston of Looking 
Backward responsible for selecting the right men for the advancement of the 
race. But, as Gilman points out, women are not given any role in sexual 
selection, and worse still their economic dependence on men short-circuits any 
form of natural selection. Men, therefore, have become the economic 
environment for women, so women have evolved only the qualities which will 
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help them to succeed in this environment. Men have tended to select weak, 
delicate women, or women who meet their criteria of sexual attractiveness, 
while women have been forced to marry for financial advantage. 
Perversion of the process of sexual selection was only part of the 
problem of women’s subjection to men. Women were also ill-educated for the 
important role of bringing up children. Gilman saw two purposes to motherhood 
– reproducing and improving the race (89). Only women could carry out 
reproduction, but not all mothers were suited to bringing up children, or 
educating them in their early years. Gilman believed that too much reliance was 
placed on the mothering instinct, arguing that it would be hard for maternal 
instinct to “discriminate between Marrow’s Food and Bridge’s Food, Hayrick’s 
Food and Pestle’s Food, Pennywhistle’s Sterilized Milk, and all the other infants’ 
foods which are prepared and put upon the market by – men!” (97). Even 
though Gilman accepted the importance of maternal instinct in animals of lower 
intelligence, she felt that modern society and science offered better methods for 
bringing up children. Gilman’s view on instincts was that they were only right 
when the conditions in which they were developed were still present, as what 
was natural at one stage of evolution was not necessarily natural at another 
(103-04). The high infant mortality rate was also no advertisement for the 
benefits of segregating women from potential economic productivity to 
concentrate on child-bearing. Gilman argued instead that working women were 
just as capable of bearing children as the cloistered, specialised mothers of her 
social peers. However, Gilman retained enough faith in the maternal instinct to 
conclude that most women would “naturally choose those professions which are 
compatible with motherhood” (121). She backed up her case for working 
mothers by making recommendations for kindergartens, kitchen-less houses 
and professional cleaning services which would make the economic productivity 
of women a realistic option without disadvantage to their children.  
 The most difficult issue Gilman faced in arguing that women’s sexuo-
economic situation was unnatural was accounting for women’s long 
subordination to men. She drew on Lester Ward’s theory of women being the 
primary agent of human development, proposed in “Our Better Halves”, to 
argue that race preservation was initially a female function and men were 
“merely a temporary agent in reproduction and of no further use” (64). Men only 
developed the capacity to take on their share of evolutionary work through 
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encroaching on women’s freedom and compelling women to serve their 
needs.77 Gilman’s argument was that if women had remained free, and 
maintained their superiority to men, men would never have evolved beyond 
being hunters and fighters, whereas through taking on the responsibility for 
women and their children, men became feminised into “a sort of man-mother” 
(63), and therefore more fully human. Gilman has to work hard to make 
women’s long history of subordination to men sound positive. She asserts that 
by combining masculine energy with the constructive element of the female, 
men were able to push forward expansion and progress. Women, therefore, 
could be seen as Svengali-like agents behind the progress of mankind: “In her 
subordinate position, under every disadvantage, through the very walls of her 
prison, the constructive force of woman has made man its instrument, and 
worked for the upbuilding of the world” (66). This proposition is the least 
convincing part of Gilman’s argument as it is relies on an essentialist faith in 
women as agents of change. Also, to make this idea work, the very conditions 
that Gilman has argued against as impeding evolution, such as “woman’s 
abnormal development of sex” (66) have to be considered as beneficial after all. 
Recognising the difficulties with this argument, Gilman consigns these benefits 
to the past, and declares that woman’s condition of dependence is drawing to a 
close because “its racial usefulness is wearing out” (68). The women’s 
movement itself is evidence that times are changing, she argues. Women are 
becoming more equal, increasing in size and strength and more of them are 
part of the workforce (74-76). These changes are the result of a form of 
progressive social evolution which Gilman variously describes as “the spirit of 
the times”, “common consciousness” and “social consciousness”.  
 Women and Economics is remarkable, as Brian Lloyd says, for “its 
sustained effort to restore science as the nineteenth century understood it to a 
position of prominence in the women’s movement of the twentieth” (98). 
However, Gilman’s fluency with scientific theories and her desire to ground 
social science in scientific certainties cannot disguise the fact that she saw 
evolution very differently from Darwin. Her neo-Lamarckian framework allowed 
her to conceptualise evolution as a teleological process that would ensure the 
higher development of humankind, as opposed to natural selection which, 
                                                          
77A process which Gail Bederman describes as “the birth of the primitive rapist” (141). 
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without the purposive intervention represented by the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics offered no such certainty. However, by arguing that social 
evolution was a natural process following fixed laws, Gilman left no active role 
for women to play in bringing about reform, or as Lloyd put it, no “role for 
conscious agency in a deterministic analysis” (94), and so, Gilman was forced 
to interpret women’s demands for change as a sign that social evolution was 
occurring, rather than the cause of it.78 Although Gilman contested the culturally 
determined version of womanhood accepted by her contemporaries, and was 
committed to redefining a range of so-called masculine or feminine traits as 
human, she failed to disassociate herself totally from an essentialist view of 
women. Biologically she limited what was intrinsically female to those traits 
connected to sexual reproduction, but her readings in evolutionary science also 
led her to equate women with moral superiority and altruism. Although her view 
of women’s nature was nuanced by the understanding that evolution meant that 
no characteristics were fixed, she saw men as evolving towards the qualities 
already possessed by women, but not vice versa. The economic subjection of 
women which had forced men to evolve to become more like women had no 
counterpart in women. Women were, she remarked, in a “position of arrested 
development”, but their restoration to economic independence would result in 
“clarifying and harmonizing the human soul” through changes of habit, such as 
losing “the vices of a slave” (Gilman 162-3), rather than them evolving to 
become more like men. Gilman coveted masculine freedom and agency, but not 
masculine traits, such as combativeness and competitiveness, which she saw 
as primitive residues of earlier social conditions. 
The most distinctive element in Gilman’s use of evolutionary science was 
her determination to apply it to society in support of feminist ideas, although she 
was not the first feminist writer to do so. As already discussed, Antoinette 
Brown Blackwell and Eliza Burt Gamble both disputed some of Darwin’s 
conclusions about the role of women in evolution, but they focussed on 
contesting the biological arguments for the inferiority of women rather than 
detailing the long-term implications of such biological arguments for society. 
Penelope Deutscher, in an article comparing Blackwell, Gamble and Gilman, 
                                                          
78 Ann Palmeri notes: “Gilman’s problem in particular was to show why the economic 
dependence of women upon men was outmoded and how the movement out of this stage might 
occur” (112). 
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points out that: “For Gamble, the savage represents an ideal state of humanity 
in which altruism and concern for the social group are still primary ... and the 
female is still the progressive principle” (49). Gilman has none of Gamble’s 
nostalgia for the past. For her, the savage and the primitive represent earlier 
stages of evolution, symbolic of women’s under-evolved condition and the 
regressive forces which threaten women’s growing independence. She felt that 
women needed to escape from the passive conditions of their past reliance on 
masculine economic power and be given the opportunity to work for a better 
future. Ann Palmeri argues that “The evolutionary thesis that women are the 
first sex was, for Gilman, primarily a moral, not a factual assertion” (114). 
Although Palmeri’s justification for this statement is based on the importance of 
motherhood in evolutionary development, it also highlights the fact that the 
emphasis of Gilman’s work was on examining the consequences of women’s 
current position rather than scientifically proving the case for equality. It could 
be argued that Gilman was the first feminist to engage with the emerging field of 
sociology and give a unique feminist perspective to the social evolutionary 
theories being discussed. Palmeri suggests that Gilman’s main contribution to 
extending Lester Ward’s theories “was in her analysis of the economic value of 
women” (106). 
Feminist writers in Britain also used evolutionary arguments to support 
the case for women’s rights. Richardson argues that Mona Caird questioned 
biological essentialism in her novels, developing an anti-essentialist argument 
from Darwin’s emphasis on variability and evolutionary change, and was able to 
build on his observations to support a pro-feminist argument (Love 182-3). In “A 
Defence of the So-Called ‘Wild Woman’”, published in the Nineteenth Century in 
1892, Caird called for an increase in the “distinctly human qualities” in women, 
as opposed to “those merely instinctive or maternal” (51). She rejected the idea 
of women’s social position being determined by nature, seeing their condition as 
one forced on them by men and capable of amelioration through a better 
balance between childbirth and other work. Unlike Gilman, she did not consider 
motherhood as women’s great work for racial progress and argued against the 
necessity of generations of adults sacrificing their chance of personal 
development in favour of their children, or, as she put it, “this perpetual 
renunciation for a race that never comes” (56). Gilman on the other hand saw 
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individualism as a lower stage of evolution and made it clear that social 
evolution involved co-operation and social cohesion. 
Olive Schreiner in Woman and Labour, written over a decade later, in 
1911, used very similar arguments to Gilman’s to demand for women a share of 
“honoured and socially useful human toil” (68). In Schreiner’s analysis, though, 
the “sex-parasitism” of women was a result of falling birth rates and increasing 
mechanisation which had robbed many women of their traditional roles as 
mothers and managers of productive households (107). Schreiner’s arguments 
are interestingly similar to Gilman’s but instead of seeing civilisation and 
progress as forces which would inevitably improve women’s position, Schreiner 
feared that the historical importance of women’s role was being eroded by 
modern conditions, and that women risked becoming “mere instruments of 
sexual indulgence”, earning their living as prostitutes, mistresses or kept wives 
(116).  
 Gilman makes a strong case for women having a wider role outside the 
domestic arena, and yet, as Hausman argues, just like other early feminists, 
Gilman could not avoid seeing motherhood as one of the most important roles 
for women (506). Women and Economics simultaneously emphasises women’s 
importance in the process of ensuring that children grow up to be better than 
their parents, and argues against the necessity of mothers taking sole 
responsibility for children in their early years. Freeing women from childcare and 
housework was important for Gilman’s vision of women moving on to do 
“human” work that was not pre-determined by their gender, for example starting 
successful businesses or designing houses as in What Diantha Did. One way 
out of this impasse was to place greater emphasis on women’s role in selecting 
the right husband. Such a choice concerned not only what Gilman refers to as 
“good physique” but also character. For Gilman character and morality were as 
much capable of being inherited as physical characteristics, which meant that 
the selection of depraved fathers would lead to depraved sons. However, 
women also had a duty to raise their sons to be moral and of good character 
and break the cycle of vice. Here Gilman seems conflicted between wanting to 
assert the mother’s importance in this process and denying that early education 
should necessarily be the sole responsibility of women. She squares the circle 
by arguing that only economically independent women can effectively educate 
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their children and provide them with “the necessary knowledge of the world so 
indispensable to every human being” (93).   
Towards the end of Women and Economics Gilman blames “man’s dual 
nature”, that is, the conflicting demands of good and evil in human beings, on 
women’s evolutionarily arrested condition. She argues that the generations of 
marriage between civilised men and primitive women have “bred a race of 
psychic hybrids” (163). In this example, women are no longer the force for 
evolutionary advance that she saw them as earlier, but simply slaves to men’s 
sexual passion. For Gilman, these contradictions all revolved around sex. 
Women were morally superior to men under the prevailing social circumstances 
as men had too much sexual energy, bred by the sexual subservience of 
women; however men, unlike women, had a life outside their sexual role, and 
so they had an opportunity to develop other social qualities necessary for 
progress. Either way, the sexual relation between men and women was at the 
root of the problem, but in one version, women could save the world by 
practising right selection; in the other, men had to end their misalliance with 
sexually subservient women. In Women and Economics Gilman draws on the 
discourse of miscegenation to strengthen her case for women’s release from 
sexuo-economic dependency by referring to “the innate perversion of character 
resultant from the moral miscegenation of two so diverse souls” (165). Such 
language is visceral in its strength. Gilman’s hopes for the future of social 
evolution feel tame by comparison, leaving an impression of humanity trapped 
in a dystopia at the mercy of a hypothetical advance in masculine morality or 
feminine independence.  
Nevertheless, Women and Economics was an immensely successful 
book. It was described by the Nation as “the most significant utterance on the 
subject of women since Mill's The Subjection of Women," and made Gilman’s 
reputation as a public intellectual and social critic (Kimmel and Aronson xx). 
Women and Economics was judged by Gilman herself as her most important 
work (Allen 8). Gilman’s understanding of the sexual nature of women’s 
subjection makes her analysis original and far-reaching and her suggestions for 
changes to the home and childcare offered practical steps for improvements. 
Yet the major advances that Gilman hoped for from social evolution were not 
immediately forthcoming, and in the succeeding years Gilman continued to 
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revisit her argument, both in fiction and non-fiction, and particularly within 
utopian fiction, which I discuss in the next section. 
 
4.3  Gilman’s Utopian Lands 
 
In 1909, Gilman started her own magazine, The Forerunner, to publish 
some of her work that was being rejected by the mainstream publishers. 
Possibly her ideas were too radical for the editors, as Allen suggests (281). 
Gilman herself wrote that she set up The Forerunner because "Social 
philosophy, however ingeniously presented does not command wide popular 
interest. I wrote more and sold less" (Living 303-4). The Forerunner, which she 
published for seven years, was written entirely by Gilman, totalling twenty-eight 
to thirty-two pages a month. It contained a mixture of fiction, non-fiction and 
reviews. In the course of the seven-year run Gilman serialised seven novels, 
including three speculative works of utopian fiction Moving the Mountain, 
Herland and With her in Ourland, as well as the utopian-oriented What Diantha 
Did and The Crux which illustrated ideas for social change. Although Moving the 
Mountain appeared in book form, Herland was only ever published as a serial 
until its republication in the 1970s as a lost feminist classic. Larry Ceplair 
estimates that The Forerunner, which was mainly sold to subscribers or 
purchased from political organisations, would have been read by at most 5,000 
to 7,000 people (188). The strict publishing schedule and the serial nature of the 
work undoubtedly had an impact on the fiction, both in its tone, which is 
sometimes uneven, and the content, which shows signs of Gilman writing to 
answer questions raised by her previous instalments. However, such a modus 
operandi accorded with Gilman’s didactic intentions for her fiction. Kessler notes 
that “her purpose in fiction was not so much aesthetic or belletristic ... but rather 
rhetorical, the goal we have come to expect of nonfiction writing” and further 
clarifies that Gilman believed that fiction could bring about social change (42-3). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Gilman included fiction in The Forerunner, or 
that much of it was utopian in nature since utopian fiction was the perfect form 
for presenting alternative possibilities and dramatising the social changes she 
hoped to promote.  
Pfaelzer talks of the “unparalleled literary expression of social anxiety 
and political hope” of the utopian fiction of the decade between 1886 and 1896 
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during which over one hundred works of utopian fiction appeared in the United 
States” (3). However, by the early twentieth century, the post-Bellamy boom in 
utopian fiction had already passed. Gilman mentions four works of Utopian 
fiction in the preface to the book publication of Moving the Mountain (in 1911), 
but only one of them, H.G. Wells’s In the Days of the Comet (1906), was 
comparatively recent. Moreover, Wells’s novel contained very little utopian 
world-building, being mainly about the events leading up to the passing of the 
eponymous comet, and the resultant changes to human nature. Wells’s main 
social innovation was to put forward a justification for polyamorous free love. 
Gilman was unimpressed by the book, and criticised Wells for finding it 
necessary to introduce “some mysterious outside force”. For Gilman it was 
important that her “baby utopia” offered a realisable projection of what could be 
achieved within thirty years. Even her narrative device for introducing an early-
twentieth-century man to the utopian world was more realistic than most, 
involving no supernatural agency, merely a man who had lost his memory and 
lived with Tibetan peasants for thirty years. This novel offered Gilman the 
opportunity to show in practice the results of the changes she had written about 
in her essays and non-fiction, as well as in stories such as What Diantha Did. 
As discussed further below, Gilman introduces a range of social improvements 
including child gardens, communal kitchens and women working outside the 
home, and engages in a dialectic process to win over her resistant male 
narrator to the benefits of the new social set-up.  
However, despite successfully demonstrating the benefit of empowering 
women as active members of society in Moving the Mountain, Gilman still felt 
the need to go back to utopianism in 1915 to write Herland and its sequel With 
her in Ourland in 1916. There were a number of reasons for Gilman choosing to 
revisit feminist utopianism. In The Man-Made World; or Our Androcentric 
Culture (1911), the one work of non-fiction from The Forerunner which was 
published in book-form, Gilman returns to the question of the long subjection of 
women to men, outlining the negative consequences of the “androcentric 
culture” which she holds responsible for the repeated failures of social evolution 
through the dominance of masculine values which have led to war, prostitution 
and poverty. The restatement of Gilman’s evolutionary argument from Women 
and Economics in even more forthright terms suggests that she felt that the 
society portrayed in Moving the Mountain, or the small-scale examples of 
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women’s successful business ventures in What Diantha Did and The Crux, did 
not go far enough in promoting social evolution. Increasing pro-suffrage 
activities in New York and the outbreak of the First World War in Europe also 
had a profound effect on Gilman. Since she associated war with masculinity, 
she saw the need for a changed relationship between men and women as ever 
more urgent. Herland also represents a retreat from the optimism of Moving the 
Mountain, where women can change the world in thirty years simply by “waking 
up” to their duties and responsibilities. Herland requires an isolated country and 
two thousand years of evolution away from men to produce a race of what 
Gilman calls “wonder women”. This longer time period may acknowledge some 
of the issues facing neo-Lamarckian theories of evolution. Without the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics, substantial change to women’s physical 
and psychological make-up would clearly take longer. Also, the longer time-
span allows Gilman greater freedom to reverse the androcentric scenario of 
Women and Economics and Man-Made World, resolve the issue of women 
being evolutionarily retarded in relation to men and explore what a 
gynaecocentric world might really look like. 
 With Her in Ourland changes the parameters of utopia once again, since 
it is not so much a utopia as Gilman’s opportunity to measure the world, and 
America in particular, against the utopian standards she has set up in Herland. 
The critic Thomas Peyser argues that by the early twentieth century the long 
tradition of American exceptionalism was beginning to give way to 
cosmopolitanism, or be reconfigured as a dream of industry-based “universal 
democratic expansion” (14-15). Gilman still represents America as the best 
hope for the world, but the narrative of Ourland is largely taken up by a critique 
of the problems of America. Ourland is the most problematic of Gilman’s three 
utopian novels, and is the one that attracts the most criticism for its presentation 
of racist views within the text. However, one of the reasons for this increased 
level of criticism is that in Ourland Gilman takes an international perspective 
that forces her into a much greater awareness of racial issues and America’s 
own shortcomings than in previous works. Racism is closely linked to eugenics 
in the critical reception of Gilman’s work, and my next section will look at the 
role of race within Gilman’s utopian fiction, as well as her later appraisal of 
questions of race, which complicates some of the criticism she has received in 
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relation to race. I will then go on to examine the relevance of eugenics to 
Gilman’s plans for making better people. 
 
4.4 Gilman and Race 
 
No credible discussion of Gilman’s fiction and social philosophy can take 
place without acknowledging the problem of racism within her work. Bederman 
asserts that Gilman’s use of the term race meant the “white” race and that 
Gilman’s feminist arguments were based on replacing male supremacy with 
white supremacy. Susan Lanser sees the yellow colour of “The Yellow 
Wallpaper” as a sign of anti-oriental racism in Gilman’s work, while Denise 
Knight notes many examples of racism in Gilman’s personal writing. Ann J. 
Lane, a major biographer of Gilman, sees “Gilman’s racist, anti-semitic, and 
ethnocentric ideas” as “scar[ring] her theoretical work” (255). Dohra Ahmad, in 
line with Bederman, argues that Gilman’s writing is inherently developmentalist, 
obsessed with ideas of racial purity and the desire to demonstrate the 
superiority of white women over black men. Alys Weinbaum is concerned about 
the uncritical acceptance of Gilman by earlier feminists and the damage that a 
false picture of Gilman might create within feminist criticism. Judith Allen, 
however, is critical of these approaches, arguing that the topic of race only 
represented a small proportion of Gilman’s output, that contemporaries and 
general historians of Progressive Era racism did not see Gilman as racist, and 
that Gilman voiced strong criticism of contemporary racist practices such as 
anti-miscegenation laws and economic discrimination (335-7).   
 While Allen’s argument that much discussion of Gilman’s racism is 
inclined towards “presentism” and represents an un-nuanced view of the 
arguments that Gilman is making is persuasive, Gilman’s world view was 
informed by a framework which sought to classify the characteristics and 
qualities of each race on a supposedly scientific basis. Her work presupposed a 
hierarchy of races and assumed that the white races of Northern Europe were 
at the top of this hierarchy. She was therefore a strong advocate of integrating 
African Americans into the dominant white American culture, believing that the 
only possible path to industrial progress and civilisation was through 
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assimilation.79 However, I will argue that although Gilman’s acceptance of the 
validity of racial hierarchies is problematic, she did not see other races as 
inherently inferior or incapable of change and development. I will also suggest 
that, paradoxically, it is just when Gilman begins to question the assumption 
that white Northern Europeans races represented the pinnacle of evolution and 
to take an active stand against racial discrimination that her writing on the topic 
becomes most susceptible to the charge of racism.  
 The critic Tzvetan Todorov makes a useful distinction between racism as 
behaviour, involving hatred or contempt towards individuals who are seen as 
different, and racism as an ideology (90-91). Allen points out that the term 
“racism” was not formally in use in Gilman’s lifetime, and was initially defined in 
1935 as “the ascription of inferior, negative characteristics judged innate, 
inherent, and inalterable, and thus which justified segregation, enslavement, or 
extermination” (Allen 302). Gilman demonstrates racism in the first sense of 
irrational dislike and prejudice in some of her private correspondence, for 
example when she wrote to her daughter Katharine in a 1922 letter that she had 
been forced to change berths because "To have sat in the sun opposite those 
coons and their baggage - & their lunch - the boy squirming about and making 
all manner of noises - would have used me up pretty badly" (qtd. in Lane, 
337).80 However, in her public writings Gilman strove to avoid race prejudice, 
writing in Ourland: 
I think your prejudice against the black is silly, wicked, and – hypocritical. 
You have no idea how ridiculous it looks, to an outsider, to hear your 
Southern enthusiasts raving about the horrors of ‘miscegenation’ and 
then to count the mulattos, quadroons, octoroons and all the successive 
shades by which the black race becomes white before their eyes.... (323) 
Although this passage reveals Gilman’s assimilationist stance in its emphasis 
on shades of blackness, it is also a clear statement of Gilman’s belief that racial 
prejudice was morally unacceptable. Later in Ourland, Ellador contests racist 
stereotypes such as the “innate laziness of the negro race” and their supposed 
ineducability, praising the achievements of African Americans despite several 
generations of slavery (356-8). On the other hand, Gilman did believe that “the 
                                                          
79 For further discussion of Gilman’s assimilationism and its relationship with her feminist 
principles see Louise Newman (132-57).  
80 This passage is described by Knight as “one of the most flagrant examples of Gilman’s 
racism...” (167). 
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human race is in different stages of development” and that not all people or 
races were fully developed enough to be ready for American democracy. When 
it came to the ideology of racism, Gilman tended to express her developmental 
hierarchies in terms of savage versus civilised, that is to say, stages of 
development rather than race or colour. While Gilman makes frequent use of 
the term “race” in Women and Economics, she was usually referring to the 
human race as a whole, as was the common practice at the time. Bederman, 
however, argues that “Gilman’s knowledge of the discourse of civilization made 
her understand that to specify ‘white’ would be redundant” (135). While this is 
true, Gilman’s main interest was in how the human race as a whole could 
progress and the factors, specifically gender-related, that might impede this 
progress. Gilman tends to use species and race interchangeably, suggesting 
she intended the term race to encompass all humans, rather than specifically 
her own caste of white Americans.  
The work most frequently cited in relation to Gilman and racism is her 
seemingly well-intentioned but ultimately misguided article in the American 
Journal of Sociology entitled “A Suggestion on the Negro Problem” (1908). Here 
Gilman proposes enlisting African Americans “below a certain grade of 
citizenship” into a social army with the aim of improving their education, 
employability and social development. The army with its “music, banners and 
impressive ceremonies” and its programme of beneficial works evokes 
Bellamy’s social armies of Looking Backward, but the inclusion of such 
elements as enforced enlistment and a heavy programme of manual work 
makes the suggestion sound uncomfortably like a paternalistic re-introduction of 
slavery.81 Behind the suggestion is the explicit assumption that the “negro” is a 
“backward race”. Gilman makes her position clear when she suggests that, on a 
sliding scale of one to ten, Race A (her own race, white Americans) has 
progressed to a ten in terms of social evolution, while Race B (black Americans, 
imported as slaves) are still only at four (79). Moreover, the presence of this 
                                                          
81 Winwood Reade whose book The Martyrdom of Man Gilman cites approvingly in Ourland 
makes a similar suggestion: “[A] European Government ought perhaps to introduce compulsory 
labour among the barbarous races that acknowledge its sovereignty and occupy its land. 
Children are ruled and schooled by force, and it is not an empty metaphor to say that savages 
are children. If they were made to work, not for the benefit of others, but for their own, if the 
rewards of their labour were bestowed, not on their masters, but on themselves, the habit of 
work would become with them a second nature, as it is with us, and they would learn to require 
luxuries which industry only could obtain.” (416). 
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“large body of aliens, of a race widely dissimilar and in many respects inferior” 
(78), as she puts it, risks retarding the social development of America as a 
whole. In this statement, we can see Gilman the instinctive racist reinforcing 
Gilman the social scientist, who believes in racial hierarchies and holds it self-
evident that her own culture represents the vanguard of civilisation, making it 
possible for her to argue that “The African race with the advantage of contact 
with our more advanced stage of evolution, has made more progress in a few 
generations than any other race has ever done in the same time, except the 
Japanese” (80). For Gilman, African Americans may be inferior, but they are 
making good progress. As she explains in Ourland: “the human race is in 
different stages of development, and only some races – or some individuals in a 
given race – have reached the democratic stage” (323). In this respect, her 
argument is similar to that which she employed in relation to women: progress 
is being held back by the disempowerment and lack of citizenship of a section 
of the population. However, in contrast to her views on women, Gilman clearly 
sees the African American population as being a problem for America rather 
than an untapped resource for evolutionary advance. Also the subjection of 
women affects the whole human species, while the “negro problem” is specific 
to America, and in Gilman’s eyes, a threat to American democracy and 
reputation in the outside world.  
For Gilman, the proposed segregation in work camps of the 1908 article 
only goes part-way to a solution to this threat. In Ourland she comes up with a 
more chilling idea, genetic absorption into the white population: “As a mere 
matter of interbreeding, following the previous habits of the white men, it could 
be worked out mathematically – how long it would take to eliminate the negro, I 
mean” (358). This shift from paternalistic exclusion to assimilationism reflects 
concerns over immigration and American identity which led Gilman to question 
white supremacy and introduce a more racial element to her work. She no 
longer portrayed social evolution as a universal, inevitable process, but one 
which was relative, and under threat from forces outside America. Gilman’s 
writing from the mid-1910s onwards begins to be far more concerned with 
America than the human race as a whole. In Moving the Mountain (1911) 
immigrants are welcome providing they do not object to submitting to 
“Compulsory Socialization” (55), a process which segregates the immigrants 
until they pass their citizenship exam. At that point, Gilman was still confident 
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about America’s mission to lead the way in universal social improvement: “No 
Country on earth offers so much happiness to its people. Nowhere else – yet – 
is there as good opportunity to be helped up, to have real scientific care, real 
loving study and assistance!” (57). Ourland, by contrast, although written only 
five years later, offers a much less positive view of America and its relationship 
to other nations. The novel’s structure of a journey from Europe to America, 
observed from the outsider perspective of the native Herlander, Ellador, allows 
Gilman to embark on a comparative sociological analysis of different 
civilisations. In doing so, she returns to her original model of civilisations 
developing at different rates, though with a new consciousness that savages 
may include “back-sliders” from established civilisations. For the first time, 
Gilman appears to doubt that progress is inevitable. Gilman also examines what 
constitutes the concept of “civilisation”. Van, the narrator, offers a rather 
simplistic division of the world into the civilised white nations, and the rest of the 
world, described as “black, red, brown and yellow” (300). Gilman then sets 
Ellador to interrogate this assumption, pointing out inconsistencies such as 
categorising China as uncivilised when it is “one of the very oldest civilizations 
we have” (300). Gilman sees the “dissimilar peoples” of our world as being 
“more separated by their varying psychology than by geography, politics, or 
race; often ignorant of one another, often fearing, despising, hating one another; 
and each national group, each racial stock, assuming itself to be ‘the norm’” 
(300-1). She recognises that racial prejudice is not unique to white people. Van 
informs Ellador that “the flatter-faced Mongolians regarded us as hawklike in our 
aquiline features; and that little African children fled screaming from the 
unnatural horror of a first-seen white face” (301). 
Elsewhere in the book, Ellador argues against the proposition that 
negroes were inherently lazy, incapable of learning or that there was “universal 
race antipathy” between black and white, using as examples the high price 
negro slaves used to fetch and the fact that there needed to be laws against 
miscegenation. Ellador concludes by offering “a list of achievements of the 
negro race... Their development in wealth, in industry, in the professions, even 
the arts...” (357-8). Gilman’s argument still assumes that further racial progress 
is necessary, but does counter some of the more common prejudices of her day 
against black Americans. In Ourland, Gilman also criticised certain horrific 
aspects of America’s past, most obviously the genocide of the Indians, as well 
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as America’s crimes against Hawaiians through the introduction of syphilis and 
tuberculosis (307).  
 Gilman’s anti-semitism is clearly problematic, although she tried to 
rationalise it as dislike of the Jewish people’s lack of willingness to assimilate 
into American culture. In Ourland, Gilman describes the custom of endogenous 
marriage as “primitive” and categorises Jews as arrested in a tribal stage of 
development, unable to achieve nationhood, which to her was a more advanced 
form of social organisation. This analysis allows Gilman to conclude that “the 
more definitely organized peoples have, not a racial, but a sociological aversion 
to this alien form of life, which is in them, but not of them” (360). Judith Allen’s 
analysis of Gilman’s anti-semitism situates it within the context of the increasing 
anti-semitic propaganda of the inter-war years, and as part of Gilman’s general 
dislike of androcentric religious practices. Allen argues that “[t]he more she 
contemplated and compared world religions, the more she blamed them for 
androcentric subjugation of women. On this count, Judaism seemed to be 
among the worst” (310).  
It is clear that Gilman’s recognition of cultural relativism and America’s 
problems went hand-in-hand with a need to focus on preserving the values of 
the America she knew. She no longer believed that anyone and everyone could 
be trained to become a good American, or even that it would be desirable to 
achieve this. Gilman argues that nations are built on people having similar ideas 
and coming from the “same general stock” and rejects the famous analogy of 
the “melting pot”, asking “do you think that you can put a little of everything into 
a melting-pot and produce a good metal?” (Ourland 321, 323). Gilman was not 
alone in questioning mixed race immigration. Concern about levels of 
immigration began to grow with the closing of the frontier in the 1890s, and took 
on a racial focus in the early years of the twentieth century, with fears that the 
“native” Anglo-Saxon stock was being crowded out by immigrants from so-
called inferior races. The economist Edward A. Ross coined the term “race 
suicide”, which was taken up by Theodore Roosevelt and characterised as the 
“greatest problem of civilization” (Leonard 696). In 1916, the same year as 
Gilman published Ourland, Madison Grant wrote The Passing of the Great Race 
in which he argued that Nordic civilisations were being outbred by inferior races. 
By 1923, Gilman was demonstrating a similar belief in the importance of the 
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Nordic races to the well-being of America. In an essay entitled “Is America Too 
Hospitable” she proposed that only certain races mix well together: 
Since genus homo is one species, it is physically possible for all races to 
interbreed, but not therefore desirable. Some combine well, making a 
good blend, some do not. We are perfectly familiar in this country with 
the various blends of black and white, and the wisest of both races prefer 
the pure stock (1985). 
Again, the contradiction between Gilman’s opposition to anti-miscegenation 
laws in Ourland and her preference for “pure stock” suggests that Gilman’s 
personal prejudices were at odds with her social philosophy She could not 
argue for America’s racial purity, since America was already a mix of races, or 
for its racial superiority, when it could be outranked by older civilisations such as 
India and China. Instead she was forced to concentrate on the composition of 
the racial mix, contending in the same article that “The American blend is from a 
few closely connected races” (1985). These she defined as the English, Dutch 
and Scandinavian, who owing to a combination of geographic, historic and 
cultural circumstances had provided “a distinct national character” for 
Americans, based on “a flexible progressiveness, an inventive ingenuity, a 
patience and a broad kindliness of disposition” (1988).    
Gilman also felt threatened by what she perceived as the new 
immigrants’ lack of respect for America, their preference for their own 
languages and allegiance to their original country.82 While the feminist element 
of Gilman’s prejudice against immigrants from cultures she considered to be 
more patriarchal than her own is consistent with her earlier work, her increasing 
focus on race as a problem indicates an erosion of her conviction that educated 
white Americans like herself represented the most advanced stage of human 
evolution, and could speak on behalf of the whole human species. Although 
Gilman’s ethnocentric stance was incontrovertibly racist, by not addressing 
issues of race Gilman’s earlier writing tended to appear less racist than her later 
works where she struggled with the loss of her own certainty of racial 
superiority. Historian John Higham argues that in early twentieth-century 
America “the regnant values of progressivism tended to inhibit racial anxiety” 
(174), while increasing levels of immigration and the demands for national unity 
                                                          
82 See “Is America” 1988-9 
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of the First World War led to a more racist outlook on immigration and cultural 
assimilation. This tendency was certainly evident in Gilman’s writing. Her 1923 
article “Is America Too Hospitable” demonstrates a loss of confidence in 
America’s ability to assimilate all races, leading to her opposition to immigration 
and distrust of certain racial mixes, as discussed above. Her observation in this 
article that “Almost any race is superior to others in some particular” (1988) 
demonstrates that Gilman did try to come to terms with other cultures, but her 
determination to justify her nativist prejudices on sociological grounds remained 
a barrier to her wholly overcoming racial prejudice or accepting the culture of 
certain racial groups.  
Gilman’s statement about race in her final work, her autobiography, The 
Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1935), sums up the changes she observed 
within her own lifetime, during which she experienced a shift from the late-
eighteenth-century assumptions of revolutionary France and America that 
humanity is all one and that “The Rights of Man” applied to everyone, to a 
greater consciousness of differences between races and nations:  
 The Great War has shown us, lit by that world conflagration, the deep, 
wide, lasting, vital differences between races. Race-consciousness is 
increasing rather than decreasing, it is rising and moving more 
portentously than ever. The stir among Africans, the uprising in India, the 
sudden emergence of Japan, the huge efforts toward a more conscious 
national power in China ... all this does not bear out the innocent claim of 
Liberty, Equality and Fraternity which visualizes a world of brothers. 
(329-330) 
By problematising race, Gilman becomes less naively ethnocentric in her 
discussion of America in relation to other nations, but more troubled by the 
problems of America’s mixed racial heritage. This shift in focus is visible in 
Herland and With Her in Ourland, where Gilman contrasts the progressive 
homogeneity of Herland to the competing agendas of war-torn Europe and 
mixed race America. In the next section I look at the role of eugenics and the 
regulation of procreation in Gilman’s quest for a more assimilated world, and 
consider how eugenics relates to Gilman’s thesis that co-operation rather than 
war and struggle is the key to human progress. 
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4.5 Gilman’s Eugenic Reputation 
 
Gilman is credited by Ahmad with being “the first utopian author to 
implement both negative and positive eugenics” (57). Although the claim to 
being the first is debatable, Ahmad’s assertion does highlight the fact that 
Gilman makes references to eugenics in all three of her utopian novels, as well 
as giving eugenic marriages a major role in The Crux. It is not surprising 
therefore that eugenics has joined racism in the charges directed at Gilman in 
recent years, even though Gilman’s relationship to eugenics was complicated, 
and her endorsement of eugenics was not as whole-hearted as Ahmad’s 
statement implies. For example, in Moving the Mountain the population has 
been stabilised and improved, but Gilman sought to emphasise that the salient 
element was not eugenics, but women’s empowerment to make their own 
choices: 
This is not eugenics – we have made great advances in that, of course; 
but the chief factor in this change is a common biological law – 
‘individuation is in inverse proportion to reproduction,’ you know. We 
individualize the women – develop their personal power, their human 
characteristics – and they don’t have so many children. (58) 
Lane argues that Gilman “vigorously dissent[ed] from the newly revived 
eugenics movement, which was rooted in the belief that most human traits were 
irrevocably genetic in origin and therefore unchangeable” (255). However, 
Gilman did share the eugenics movement’s interest in health measures to 
ensure that diseases were not passed on, particularly sexually transmitted 
diseases. In Moving the Mountain a clean bill of health is required from “the 
Department of Eugenics” before a marriage license is issued (77-8) and those 
with hereditary diseases are “either prevented from transmitting the inheritance, 
isolated, or voluntarily living single” (134). More shockingly, the new state “killed 
many hopeless degenerates, insane, idiots, and real perverts”, though not 
before trying to cure them of their criminality through “elaborate baths, 
massage, electric stimulus, perfect food, clean comfortable beds, beautiful 
clothes, books, music, congenial company, and wonderful instruction” (136). 
These measures, and the assertion that “Happy people do not become 
criminals” (136), show that Gilman regarded environmental factors as being just 
as relevant to delinquency as inheritance. Her commitment to the transmission 
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of acquired habits led her to view environment and heredity as closely 
intertwined. She saw criminals as a throwback to the past, describing anti-social 
behaviour as “a survival of a lower pre-social period”, perpetuated by poverty; in 
other words, criminality was an inherited tendency, occasioned by unnatural 
environmental conditions which prevented participation in the social evolution 
that the rest of society was undergoing.  
“Making better people” is undoubtedly a strong theme of Moving the 
Mountain, as it is in Gilman’s other utopian novels, but the improvements in the 
quality of the population result from better education rather than from any kind 
of positive eugenics programme. For Gilman, the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics meant that improved conditions could be expected to lead to 
rapid changes in the health, well-being and morality of the population without 
requiring any selective breeding programmes. Gilman’s thesis was that 
responsible female choice of marriage partners would lead to improved health 
of the succeeding generation. Her denial that the improvements of Moving the 
Mountain are largely due to eugenics might be related to her dislike of such 
eugenically inspired schemes as “The Endowment of Motherhood” proposed by 
H. G. Wells. Picking up on the discourse of race suicide, Wells suggested that 
women from better quality households (i.e. middle-class women) should be paid 
to have more children. Gilman strongly expresses her disapproval of this 
scheme in Moving the Mountain:  
That turbid freshet of an Englishman, Wells, who did so much to stir his 
generation, said, “I am wholly feminist”- and he was! He saw women only 
as females and wanted them endowed as such. He never was able to 
see them as human beings and amply competent to take care of 
themselves. (76) 
Eugenics was a problematic subject for Gilman as she genuinely believed in 
women’s potential to improve society through marrying the right men, but had a 
horror of women’s role being reduced to their reproductive function through 
schemes for positive eugenics. The alternative for her was education, or what 
she referred to as “humaniculture”, the proper rearing of human beings (85). 
Gilman argued that: “Social evolution is a distinct process. Below us, you see, 
all improvements had to be built into the stock – transmitted by heredity. The 
social organism is open to lateral transmission – what we used to call 
education” (101). In other words, evolution only used to occur through heredity, 
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but with the aid of education, it has speeded up and education has become a 
major mechanism for social evolution. For this reason, Gilman focussed on 
education, not just in Moving the Mountain, but in non-fiction works such as 
Concerning Children (1900). In Moving the Mountain, she proposed “child 
gardens” that would ensure that all children were looked after by specialists in 
“child culture”, relieving women of the individual burden of child rearing while 
ensuring that all children had “proper nourishment, and clothing, and 
environment – from birth” (112). It was these environmental factors rather than 
eugenics, which accounted for the rapid improvements in the health and 
behaviour of the younger generation in Moving the Mountain, which she 
described as being like another race: “Big, sturdy, blooming creatures, boys and 
girls alike, swift and graceful, eager, happy, courteous...” (110-11). 
The focus of eugenics in Moving the Mountain was mainly on preventing 
the demonstrably unfit from breeding, and as such was not very different from 
the kind of measures proposed by writers such as Butler, Bellamy and Corbett. 
However, Gilman placed particular emphasis on the impact of sexually 
transmitted diseases, which was also central to her earlier novel The Crux 
(1911), where the traditional romantic marriage plot is subverted by the 
revelation that the potential groom has a sexually transmitted disease. Dana 
Seitler describes The Crux as a “eugenic-feminist regeneration narrative” 
because of its focus on physical health and evolutionary uplift (81). Evolutionary 
improvements were seen to result from women going out West to civilise the 
male-dominated society of a frontier town, where the imbalance in the female-
to-male population allows women to pick and choose amongst the men to 
obtain the right husband. The “brilliant stillness of the high plateau” described as 
the women arrive in Colorado prefigures the elevated plateau of Herland, and 
suggests a utopian space where women can take on a range of roles not open 
to them in the restricted society of New England. However, at the core of the 
book is an insistence that women avoid “biological sin” and a sermon on the 
horrors of children born blind, deformed or twisted as a result of gonorrhoea. 
Before society can be transformed, the legacy of congenital defects arising from 
sexually transmitted disease needs to be eradicated, and the only way to do this 
is by not marrying the carriers. When the heroine Vivian discovers that her 
childhood sweetheart, Morton Elder, is infected with gonorrhoea, she foregoes 
marriage, mainly for the sake of her future children but also as part of a wider 
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programme advocated by her grandmother, to “religiously rid the world of all 
these ‘undesirable citizens’” (246). Although Vivian does ultimately marry, it is to 
a man who has learned to live like a woman in terms of the tidiness of his 
house-keeping and the moderateness of his personal habits. In the light of 
Herland, it could be postulated that the “undesirable citizens” are in fact men, 
and that the ultimate aim of Gilman’s feminism was the very non-eugenic 
fantasy of a society without men.  
Gilman’s version of eugenic feminism was more connected to 
contemporary social hygiene movements than to issues of “race suicide”. In 
fact, Roosevelt’s opinion that deliberately avoiding having children made a man 
or woman “a criminal against the race” (Bederman 202) is contested within The 
Crux, where women are repeatedly told that it is their duty to marry, yet are not 
given the opportunity to do so. While the decision to relocate to Colorado is 
seen as a eugenically sound and common-sense solution to the lack of men, 
Gilman constructs it as the antithesis of the passivity that requires women to 
wait to be asked to marry. Her thesis is that if women set up business and 
become active members of society, then eugenic marriage between two healthy 
and equal partners will ensue. It can also be seen as a move towards restoring 
the natural working of sexual selection where the excess of men over women 
means that women can choose the best fathers for their children. However, 
eugenic marriage is not the main purpose of The Crux. Characters such as Dr 
Bellair who cannot have children because of being married to a man infected 
with gonorrhoea and Vivian’s grandmother, who is too old to have any more 
children, also flourish in this frontier environment, showing that for Gilman the 
most important aspect of the move is the empowerment of women to run their 
own business and interact with men on equal terms. Breeding takes place off-
stage, and the marriages, some of them between mature characters, privilege 
companionship over sexual passion. Just as Richardson highlights rational 
selection and lack of passion in her description of eugenic feminism so Gilman’s 
characters show little sign of sexual passion in their marital choices, and they 
do not allow sexual love to override eugenic concerns, in particular the fate of 
their children.  
There is also an absence of the biologically deterministic morality that 
equates women with superior moral standards. Mrs St. Cloud who preaches 
courtly love and high morality turns out to be a hypocrite and a destructive 
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influence, while the eugenic sin of Morton Elder is seen as a result of bad 
education rather than intrinsic male immorality. The representation of masculine 
immorality as being a boyish mistake supports the idea of sexual appetite as a 
relic of an earlier stage of evolution that more mature men like the eugenically 
named Dr Dick Hale have learned to control. However, fears of race suicide 
undermined support for masculine sexual restraint, legitimising the excessive 
male sexuality that Gilman had criticised in Women and Economics.83 As such, 
it is hardly surprising that Gilman’s view of eugenics focussed more on selecting 
the right partner than the necessity of maintaining the race. The Crux shows 
that Gilman’s aims were firmly centred on female empowerment, equality in 
marriage, and healthy motherhood. Her eugenic programme was a modest one 
of preventing the next generation from being infected by sexually transmitted 
diseases.  
 Gilman’s engagement with eugenics in The Crux and Moving the 
Mountain is a very pragmatic one, limited to the avoidance of congenital 
disease. However, in the imaginary world of Herland, where the active role of 
women in society is secure, and motherhood is a non-sexual act, Gilman is able 
to embrace a more radical version of eugenics, which looks not just at 
eradicating disease but also at raising the quality of the population through a 
meritocratic system of motherhood. In Herland, women have to be deemed fit to 
breed, and even then they are restricted to one child each, unless they are 
honoured with the opportunity of having a second child (69). Parthenogenesis 
takes away the pressure of choosing the appropriate partner, and leads to a 
shift away from avoidance of heredity diseases towards a celebration of lineage, 
arising from the women of Herland’s proud boast of coming from “a ‘pure stock’ 
of two thousand uninterrupted years” (122). The assumption by the narrator that 
the women are of “Aryan stock” (54) invites interpretation of the eugenics within 
Herland as being concerned with racial purity. Asha Nadkarni describes Herland 
as Gilman’s “baldest model of eugenic feminism, a nation where racial or sexual 
difference is irrelevant because Herlanders are of ‘Aryan stock’ and descended 
from a single ‘race mother’” (226). Katherine Fusco argues that Gilman is trying 
to “identify a pure American genealogy” (429). Hausman asserts that the 
                                                          
83 Bederman observes that “This widespread discussion of race suicide between 1903 and 1910 
probably facilitated the development of modern ideologies of gender, in which sexual 
expressiveness became a hallmark of healthy manhood and womanhood” (205). 
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eugenics of Herland is more about “maternal fitness than racial difference” but 
points out that “the suggestion of an Aryan race reminds the reader of the 
linkage of eugenics to ideas concerning racial purity” (499). Kristen Egan also 
acknowledges the racial purity angle of Herland’s eugenics, not just in the 
women’s single lineage, but in the male visitors’ assumption that Aryan or white 
represented racial superiority (81-2). Yet, I argue, the main significance for 
Gilman of two thousand years of pure stock is not racial segregation, but the 
opportunity to break habits developed through subjection to men, in particular 
sexual habits. The time-span of two thousand years comes up repeatedly in 
juxtaposition with men or with the female-centred society their absence has 
created. The difference between the women of Herland and the women of 
Gilman’s own world can be accounted for by “Two thousand years of one 
continuous culture with no men.” (94). Lack of “sex-feeling” came about 
because “Two thousand years’ disuse had left very little of the instinct” (92). The 
women of Herland see themselves as active participants in the world because 
“in the unbroken sweep of this two-thousand-year-old feminine civilization, the 
word woman called up all that big background [activity] .... and the word man 
meant to them only male – the sex.” (137). The purity that most interests 
Gilman, it would appear, is the purity of a world without men. From this 
standpoint, parthenogenesis can be seen more as a device to allow 
reproduction without men than a metaphor for the rejection of miscegenation.84  
Another problem with parthenogenesis is that it relies on mutations to deliver 
improvements. Hausman argues that the whole issue of mutation “is 
problematic for Gilman, because mutation is a random factor in evolutionary 
genetics” whereas “Gilman consistently argued for planned progress and 
improvement” (499). However, a close reading of the scene where mutations 
are discussed suggests that the women of Herland by no means accept that 
mutation is the main force behind their progress. It is Terry, the character who 
represents the worst traits of patriarchal society, who asserts that acquired 
characteristics are not transmissible. But as the narrator reports, the Herlanders 
“never disputed our absolute statements, only made notes of them.” In this 
case, they can be seen as humouring Terry when they respond: “If that is so, 
                                                          
84 Seitler argues that Herland’s parthenogenesis is a means of avoiding any potential for 
contagion from sexually-transmitted disease: “the women become pregnant by their own will, 
not by intercourse, thus eliminating the conduit for contagion that might lead to degeneration” 
(77). 
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then our improvements must be due either to mutation, or solely to education” 
(78). Gilman may have wanted to address criticisms of the kind that Terry is 
making, while leaving open the possibility that “acquired characteristics” play a 
role. The eugenic practices of Herland in fact strongly suggest that acquired 
characteristics are important. With a population bred from the same woman, the 
lack of diversity would mean that there would be very little benefit from allowing 
the most gifted (however that is defined in Herland) to breed. In fact, it could be 
argued, that society would benefit more from their virtues if they were not busy 
with childbirth. However, if acquired characteristics are passed on, then letting 
the best women have more children will continually raise the quality of the 
population. It is significant that Herland is the only novel in which Gilman 
advocates positive eugenics. Gilman seemingly could only countenance 
positive eugenics in this economy of low childbirth where it is no longer 
women’s duty to have as many children as possible, but to refrain from breeding 
to maintain quality of life for all. Gilman contrasts the elevated motherhood of 
Herland with the “helpless involuntary fecundity” of her own world (68). This 
form of eugenics turns motherhood from a duty to a reward. In contrast to the 
eugenics of race suicide, or of endowment of motherhood, Gilman’s model rests 
on self-restraint and denial. The women of Herland have to carry out 
displacement activities to prevent conception: “When that deep inner demand 
for a child began to be felt she would deliberately engage in the most active 
work, physical and mental” (70). In this environment Gilman can safely place 
motherhood on a pedestal, as “a Sacrament” which follows “a period of utter 
exaltation” (70), without there being any danger that motherhood will be seen as 
the only purpose of women.  
In terms of the negative eugenics of Herland, Gilman seems to accept a 
more Mendelian approach to heredity. The “inherited characteristics of a long 
race-record” which “crop out from time to time – alarmingly” (82) suggest 
recessive genes. However, Gilman states that criminality took six hundred years 
to breed out, while egoism and excess sexuality were even more difficult to 
eradicate, suggesting that her chief concern is atavism, and the bad habits 
inculcated through millennia of women’s subjection to men. The women of 
Herland do not need to enforce compulsory sterilisation, as most women with 
undesirable traits are either sterile or accept the need not to breed. Those few 
who do have children without permission have them removed to be brought up 
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by professional childminders, demonstrating again that for Gilman education 
was just as important as heredity. There is very little need for mutation in this 
system. Acquired characteristics provide for improvements in quality; education 
is the route towards innovation and negative eugenics roots out any persistent 
undesirable habits.  
In Herland, as elsewhere, Gilman characterises sexual desire as an 
undesirable characteristic, associated with the excessive sex distinction 
promoted by a male-dominated society. Hausman notes that: “Reading 
Gilman's Herland in the context of her gynocentric evolutionism helps us to 
understand how the absence of sexual difference creates a society in which 
there is no sexual desire as such” (503). However, it is a society which despite 
the lack of difference and a two-thousand-year absence of men, still seems to 
fear sexual desire. Van comments: “who shall say what long-forgotten feeling, 
vague and nameless, was stirred in some of these mother hearts by our arrival” 
(92), and he suspects Alima of having “a far-descended atavistic trace of more 
marked femaleness, never apparent till Terry called it out” (130). Despite 
Gilman’s experiences of intense and possibly erotic friendships with various 
women including Grace Ellery Channing, Adeline E. Knapp and Harriet Howe 
she does not express any concerns over the possibility of same-sex desire.85 In 
Herland there is a complete absence of sexual desire between women, and the 
only threat comes from heterosexual desire. Sexual desire towards men 
threatens the control over reproduction that has been established by the single-
sex process of parthenogenesis. If men are to be reincorporated into the sexual 
economy of Herland, it has to be in terms of a completely different type of 
partnership where sex is for procreative purposes only and at a time of the 
woman’s choosing. Ellador is appalled by the idea that married people continue 
to have sex “in season and out of season, with no thought of children at all” 
(127). Gilman is at pains to show that constant sexual attraction is unnatural, 
and describes Ellador deliberately over-exposing Van to a de-feminised version 
of herself to take the erotic charge out of their relationship, until he discovers 
“that under all our cultivated attitude of mind towards women there is an older, 
                                                          
85 Judith Allen reviews the evidence for Gilman’s possible lesbianism in Chapter 2 of The 
Feminism of Charlotte Perkins Gilman: Sexualities, Histories, Progressivism. 
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deeper more ‘natural’ feeling; the restful reverence which looks up to the Mother 
sex” (130).86   
Gilman’s concern with de-sexualising the relationship between men and 
women could, as Allen points out, be based on the lack of effective birth control 
and the fact that “more coitus meant more babies or more abortions for average 
women ...” (233).  Alternatively, as Kristin Carter-Sanborn argues, rejection of 
sexual desire could be about an orderliness which eschews “[t]he Rabelasian 
world of excrement, blood, semen and other effluvia” (14). Carter-Sanborn 
contrasts Herland’s orderliness with the chaotic savagery of the surrounding 
forests to support her argument that Gilman’s feminism is imbued with 
imperialist racism. Kristen Egan also links Gilman’s fear of masculine sexuality 
with fears of “racial contamination”, but also with a concern for “environmental 
purification” (81-2). Certainly, control over sexuality is mirrored by a desire to 
control other elements of the environment. The women of Herland apply 
eugenic techniques to cats to tame their sexuality by muting their voice, and 
reducing the mating season to once a year (51). Fear of environmental 
contamination also surfaces in the saga of the Obernut moth. Ellador, as a 
young girl, discovers a beautiful butterfly and shows it to her teacher. The 
teacher praises her, not for discovering a rare butterfly, but for bringing her a 
pest to destroy: “We have been trying to exterminate them for centuries. If you 
had not caught this one, it might have laid eggs enough to raise worms enough 
to destroy thousands of our nut trees” (102). Here again in miniature Gilman is 
exposing the threat that limitless fecundity imposes on the environment. While 
Gilman’s selective approach to what it is useful to preserve and what to destroy 
could be seen as a metaphor for racial preferences, it also ties in with the 
environmentalist concerns of the early twentieth century, and the Progressive 
agenda for rational scientific management of resources.87 Jennifer Hudak 
comments: “Herlanders have civilized nature, modernized it”, treating the land 
“as raw material to be shaped, molded, and altered so that it better serves their 
purposes.” (466-7). The overall impetus of Gilman’s ordering of the space and 
inhabitants of Herland is about maintaining a sustainable ecosystem where the 
                                                          
86 In “Birth Control” (1915) Gilman argues on the subject of sex that “our present standard of 
‘normal indulgence’ is abnormal” as in other species with the same gestative period “the 
impulse to that form of sex-expression comes only in a yearly season” (179).  
87 See Garland E. Allen for links between eugenics and the conservation movement in the early 
20th century. 
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population does not exceed the carrying capacity of the land, rather than racial 
exclusion. Since “restful reverence” towards women and avoidance of sexual 
intercourse are not useful strategies for ensuring a high birth rate, it would 
appear that despite Gilman nativist allegiances, anxieties over “race suicide” 
were not central to Gilman’s concept of eugenics at the point of writing 
Herland.88  
Another factor which militates against the idea that parthenogenetic 
purity is primarily a metaphor for racial purity is Gilman’s engagement with 
diversity within Herland. The physical diversity of Herlanders is striking by 
contrast to the hegemony of blonde, blue-eyed women in Mizora. Celis who 
marries the chivalrous Jeff is “blue-and-gold-and rose”, but Alima is “black-and-
white-and red, a blazing beauty”, a description which hints at the elements of 
sexuality in her personality, while Ellador is “brown; hair dark and soft, like a 
seal coat; clear brown skin with a healthy red in it; brown eyes – all the way 
from topaz to black velvet” (91). Only the “healthy red” suggests that her skin 
colouring is the result of an outdoor life rather than any racial mixing. Gilman 
also makes a point of arguing that physical similarities do not lead to similarities 
in “ideas, feelings and products” (78). While there is little evidence of this in the 
text, it could be argued that the need to demonstrate the successful outcome of 
many generations of careful education leaves Gilman little choice but to 
emphasise the universal good qualities of her advanced society of women. 
They all have even tempers, perfect patience, good natures, lack of irritability 
(46), intelligence and social inventiveness (81). It would appear, as Carter-
Sanborn puts it that “Years of feminine civilization have raised the mean, but 
narrowed the standard deviation...” However, I maintain that the “evident 
unanimity”, described as “the most conspicuous feature of their whole culture” 
(204), has another purpose, that of demonstrating an alternative, more co-
operative model for evolution. The women are described as resolving the 
population problem “[n]ot by a ‘struggle for existence’ which would result in an 
everlasting writhing mass of underbred people trying to get ahead of one 
another”, but by thinking through co-operative solutions (68). Gilman is unwilling 
to depart from nature for her authority, so takes an anthropomorphised version 
                                                          
88 However, see Weinbaum for the argument that “if Gilman's fiction is read through the lens of 
her nonfiction it becomes evident that both forms of writing are driven by fears of racial mixing 
that neatly coincide with the discourse of ‘race suicide’" (282). 
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of ants and bees as her model: “This place is just like an enormous ant-hill – 
you know an ant-hill is nothing but a nursery. And how about bees? Don’t they 
manage to co-operate and love one another?” (67). This argument, put forward 
by Jeff, the most romantic of the three men, leaves Gilman vulnerable to the 
counter-argument that insects represent a lower form of evolution than animals, 
or as Terry puts it “the higher grades of life are reached only through struggle—
combat” (99). Gilman’s only answer to this is repeatedly to show the masculine 
violence of Terry being defeated by the co-operative actions of the women of 
Herland. Kathleen Lant argues that Terry’s attempt at raping Alima “uncovers 
the shameful secret at the heart of Gilman's novel: that, her feminist ideology 
notwithstanding, this story is almost exclusively impelled by the ‘sex-motive’” 
(303). However, I would argue that the ideological struggle in Herland is not just 
between masculine and feminine values, but between “survival of the fittest” 
where fitness is represented by strength and violence, and co-operative 
evolution, represented by the combined love and problem-solving skills of the 
citizens of Herland. As such, the sexually-motivated violence of Terry is a 
necessary component of the text, and Terry’s final attempt at “mastering” Alima 
is required in order to precipitate a resolution that leads to Terry’s expulsion, 
and the validation of the values of Herland. Nonetheless, Terry’s description of 
Alima kicking, jumping and yelling calls into question whether in fact violence 
has triumphed over co-operation on this occasion (143). However Alima’s 
removal to the far corner of Herland suggests that men and women cannot co-
exist where violence and struggle continues between the two sexes, and that 
the only effective way forward from an evolutionary point of view is the mutually 
respectful partnership of sexual restraint that Van and Ellador work out. 
It can be seen that the eugenics of Herland plays a dual role. Firstly, 
eugenic improvement of the population provide an evolutionary environment in 
which women can become the equals of men, allowing Gilman, as Nadkarni 
argues, to resolve the problem of the psychic hybridity resulting from the 
mismatched marriages between evolutionarily retarded women and over-sexed 
men that she introduced in Women and Economics (226). Secondly, 
parthenogenetic eugenics provides an alternative version of evolution that 
allows education and conscious striving for improvement to deliver evolutionary 
advance without being undermined by random chance or selecting for 
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secondary sexual characteristics, and reinforces Gilman’s argument that social 
evolution is rooted in co-operation and education, not struggle and warfare. 
 In Ourland Gilman reiterates many of the same eugenic-related themes 
as in her previous works – the perils of overpopulation, sexually-transmitted 
disease, hereditary disease and the degrading effect of overindulgence in sex. 
Gilman continues to be ambivalent about eugenics as a movement, referring 
derogatorily to “compulsory eugenics” (345). However, her interest in making 
better people, through a variety of means, remains. Ellador asserts that people 
could be changed within three generations: “You could improve this stock, say, 
5 percent, in one, 15 in two and 80 percent. in three” (375). While this 
calculation might suggest a purely eugenic process, Ellador makes it clear that 
education and environment, alongside any corrective negative eugenics are the 
main factors: “There is the wide surrounding help of conditions, such conditions 
as you even now know how to arrange. And there is the power of education – 
which you have hardly tried. With these all together and with proper care in 
breeding you could fill the world with glorious people – soon” (375).  
 Ourland shows Gilman’s strong distaste for birth control, exemplified by 
Ellador’s horror at the suggestion that “removal of parental power is no loss of 
‘sex’” (379). However, by the 1920s Gilman came to accept birth control as a 
necessity. In “Progress through birth control”, an article published in 1927, fear 
of over-population and the contribution of population pressure to war led Gilman 
to conclude reluctantly that birth control had a role to play. She argued that it 
was women’s duty to regulate population levels, and have more children “if her 
race is decreasing” and fewer if her country gets overcrowded. She continued to 
apply the principle she explored in Herland of a rational calculation of the 
carrying capacity of a country, and to see reproduction not as a personal choice 
but civic duty, and one that belonged to women not men. “Biologically, 
politically, economically and ethically, women should face their special work of 
regulating and improving the race,” she declared (628). However, Gilman 
reconciles herself to the use of birth control with the thought that those who use 
it will leave no successors. She argued that pending the development of “a race 
less sex crazy than at present, and capable of rational continence when it is 
necessary”, birth control had a place in restricting the size of families in the 
service of eugenics, and maintaining wage competition (629). By this time, aged 
67, Gilman was comfortable about chastising her fellow American women for 
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not producing enough children, even though she herself had only had one child. 
Unlike in her earlier fiction, race suicide is clearly at the forefront of her mind 
when she warns against white American women reducing their birth-rate:  
For the women of a race to become slackers in this primitive duty is 
contemptible. The charge lies close at our own doors, for the women of 
the stock that made our country, and whose birth rate used to be such 
that if they had kept it up we should be as numerous as we are now—
and Americans, without any immigration whatever — these women have 
so ignored this duty that some of our highest types have a mere fraction 
of a child, as it were. (629) 
Gilman also became more concerned with the potential dysgenic effect of 
welfare and health care. In the article “Birth control, religion and the unfit” 
(1932), Gilman recommends sterilising the unfit and laments, apparently without 
any sense of irony, that there is opposition to such legislation not just from the 
religious, but from those deemed unfit themselves. She picks up on growing 
concerns about sub-standard mental ability, declaring that “We are mortified at 
our moronic average, alarmed at the increasing numbers of those far below it” 
(108). 
 These two articles show how much Gilman’s views on eugenics changed 
later in life, and have influenced the interpretation of the eugenic agenda of 
Gilman’s utopian fiction. In the 1910s, when Gilman wrote her three works of 
utopian fiction, she was mainly concerned with the effects of sexually 
transmitted disease and rooting out hereditary disease. By the 1930s, she was 
more focused in on mental disability which by this time had become the target 
of eugenic sterilisation programmes.89 Historians Wendy Kline and Daniel 
Kevles both point out the link between the development of intelligence testing 
and the assumptions about the eugenic necessity of sterilising those labelled as 
educationally sub-normal. In Herland and Ourland Gilman expresses shock at 
the idea of abortion or sterilisation, but by the 1930s she was openly calling for 
sterilisation. It is possible to argue that the seeds of these more extreme 
positions were already emerging in Herland and Ourland, but it should also be 
noted that eugenics itself became more extreme in 1920s and 1930s America. 
Kevles discusses the impact of social changes such as industrialisation, 
                                                          
89 The American eugenics movement had targets to sterilise or segregate 10-15 million of the 
so-called unfit (Brave and Sylva 42-3). 
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immigration and the excessive growth of cities in the early twentieth century on 
the rise of the eugenics movement in the USA, while Thomas Leonard points 
out concerns over the dysgenic effects of the rise of industrial capitalism (693). 
However, Gilman’s concern with population levels, and women’s role in 
regulating population remained a constant throughout her career. Writing 
Herland in 1914 in the early days of the Great War, Gilman saw Germany’s 
aggression as based on population pressures leading to the need for more land. 
Initially a pacifist, she eventually came to support the war, but continued to 
maintain her opposition to the anti-progressive effects of war, which led to 
women’s rights becoming subservient to military necessity.90 Gilman also saw 
war as non-eugenic, claiming that “it eliminates the fit, and leaves the unfit to 
perpetuate the race” (Man-Made 215). Moreover, the process of war could lead 
to victory for the strongest, which offered another example where “natural” did 
not equate to right in Gilman’s view: 
It was known that some races were stronger than others, and assumed 
quite rightly that the stronger should conquer the weaker and 
exterminate, disperse or enslave the conquered. This was certainly a 
"natural" process, following the precedent of all previous life forms. But 
when we observe that a conquering people is not necessarily superior to 
the conquered, and that social progress has been most seriously 
retarded by the destruction of more advanced societies by the less so, 
this primitive process of selection seems quite unsatisfactory. (“Progress” 
626) 
Gilman’s desire to improve on natural selection as a process of evolution is 
expressed quite clearly here, just as it is in Herland where co-operation is 
promoted as an effective alternative model for social evolution in place of 
survival of the fittest.   
 Gilman’s interest in “making better people”, controlling levels of 
reproduction and evolution through sexual selection, align her with eugenicists, 
but she rarely advocates a state-controlled policy to achieve these measures. 
Education and collective endeavour are far more important to her than the 
forces of hereditary. Herland illustrates the effect of removing genetic factors 
from the evolutionary equation by demonstrating what can be achieved through 
                                                          
90 See Allen, who argues that Gilman “connected women’s lack of citizen rights, especially 
suffrage, to the proliferation of pointless, horrifying global war” (124). 
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continuous improvements using the same original genetic material. Moreover, 
through removing the bias of sexual desire, Gilman is writing a manifesto for a 
new style of conscious evolutionary development based on co-operation 
between men and women to ensure that each generation will be an 
improvement on the last.   
The sheer volume of Gilman’s writing makes it difficult at times to reach 
clear and consistent conclusions on everything that she thought. However, her 
belief in social evolution remained a constant factor throughout her writing. 
Human beings were in the process of evolving towards a better future as a 
result of the qualities developed through the complex collective transactions of 
living and working together. Gilman’s vision of how social evolution would be 
achieved changed over time from being an unstoppable force evidenced by the 
strengthening women’s movements of her time, to one that needed fostering 
through education and political commitment to change. However, the key 
elements in Gilman’s advocacy for social evolution remained the empowerment 
of women to take responsibility for their choices in marriage and for when they 
had children; likewise, for the education of those children to improve society. 
Gilman’s life as an activist and writer exemplified her commitment to social 
change, but the changes in the political environment between when she wrote 
Women and Economics in 1898 and her death in 1935 led to Gilman wrongly 
identifying immigrants, Jews and the so-called feeble-minded as being a threat 
to the social progress she had worked so hard to achieve. Nonetheless, by 
historicising the development of Gilman’s social philosophy it is possible to get a 
better understanding of the role of race and eugenics in Gilman’s utopian fiction, 
and fully appreciate the utopianism of her vision without reading back into her 
fiction views which she developed at a later date in response to changing 
political conditions. By returning the focus to Gilman’s utopianism, it can be 
seen that Gilman was able to build on aspects of Darwin’s work often neglected 
by her Darwinist contemporaries to develop a more positive, utopian version of 
Darwinism by providing a focus on evolution through co-operation, education 
and responsible sexual selection, rather than competition and struggle for 
survival. 
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5. Eugenics and the “Dystopian Turn” 
The previous chapters have shown that by the early twentieth century the 
idea of eugenic improvement of the population had become an established 
element in the toolkit for creating the perfect fictional utopia. In many cases 
eugenics converged and interacted with other late-nineteenth-century concerns 
such as improved physical health, social purity, Malthusianism and birth control. 
In this chapter I look at the representation of eugenics in dystopian fiction, and 
argue that even where eugenic measures are perceived as dystopian, the idea 
of social improvement through eugenics retains an element of attraction and a 
utopian resonance despite some of its disturbing implications. Dystopian fiction 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries barely seems to register 
eugenics as an issue. For example, H. G. Wells in When the Sleeper Wakes 
(1899) plays on fears of overpopulation, mega-corporations, urban sprawl and 
mechanisation, but he only touches on eugenics in the form of a nod towards 
the Nietzschean superman. Eugenics does become more evident in the 
dystopias of the 1920s and 1930s. Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We (1924) and 
Charlotte Haldane’s Man’s World (1926) both explore the consequences of 
state control over reproduction. Aldous Huxley makes use of eugenics, 
alongside behavioural conditioning, to create the dystopian atmosphere of 
Brave New World (1932), but his attitude towards eugenics remains ambivalent. 
It was not until the rise of Nazism in the 1930s that eugenics came to seem truly 
dystopian, as for example in Katharine Burdekin’s Swastika Night (1937).  
Raffaella Baccolini and Tom Moylan describe the late twentieth century 
as taking a “dystopian turn”, but a similar term might also apply to the early 
twentieth century when utopianism spawned a more cynical undercurrent of 
dystopianism that questioned the utopianism that had come so naturally to late-
nineteenth-century writers.91 Krishan Kumar emphasises the close connection 
between utopia and dystopia, seeing dystopias more as a critique of the 
aspirations of utopianism than a commentary on the dystopian elements of 
existing societies. In a similar vein, Gary Morson identifies two sub-genres of 
dystopia, one “that discredits utopias by portraying the likely effects of their 
realization, in contrast to other anti-utopias which discredit the possibility of their 
                                                          
91 Such works were known as anti-utopias up until the 1960s, but for consistency, I will use the 
modern term dystopia throughout. 
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realization or expose the folly or inadequacy of their proponents’ assumptions or 
logic” (116). My analysis focuses on the first type, dystopias which, even in 
satirical mode, seriously engage with the utopian ideas they present, sometimes 
to the extent that it is hard to disentangle which ideas the author is critiquing 
and which they might be endorsing. I also elaborate on two aspects of Kumar’s 
concept, the future orientation of dystopia, as a critique of what does not yet 
exist, and the strong connection between utopia and dystopia. Wells wrote 
When the Sleeper Wakes partially in response to Looking Backward and then 
went on to write his own work of utopian fiction A Modern Utopia (1905), which 
offers a more positive version of ideas presented in Sleeper. Huxley wrote 
Brave New World in response to the Wellsian utopia, but then went on to write 
his own utopia, Island (1962). Haldane’s Man’s World can be read as either 
utopian or dystopian, while prior to writing Swastika Night, Katharine Burdekin 
adopted a utopian perspective to critique 1930s Britain in Proud Man (1934).   
In this chapter I trace the development of eugenics as a specifically 
dystopian idea within the dystopian fiction of the first four decades of the 
twentieth century. I begin at the very end of the nineteenth century by looking at 
how Wells developed some of the more pessimistic implications of Darwin’s 
theory of evolution in his early scientific romances, specifically in When the 
Sleeper Wakes. I then examine the rise of the eugenics movement in the United 
Kingdom and the United States in the early twentieth century and its literary 
footprint in dystopian fiction set within the scientifically managed state. I argue 
that although eugenics plays a significant role in We and Brave New World, it is 
mass-production and the loss of individuality resulting from scientific 
rationalisation of state resources rather than eugenics itself that concerns these 
authors, while in Man’s World, the eugenics of the scientific state is represented 
as being for the ultimate good of humankind. Finally I focus on the future history 
of a Nazi-dominated Europe in Swastika Night to illustrate how eugenics 
completed the transition from utopian to dystopian in the representation of a 
society where women are reduced to the status of breeding animals, and full 
citizenship is reserved for men of German blood.   
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5.1 H. G. Wells and the Modern Dystopia 
 
When H. G. Wells laid out his manifesto for the post-Darwinian utopia in 
A Modern Utopia, he saw himself as writing a specifically modern form of 
utopia. However, it is Wells’s contribution to the invention of the modern 
dystopia that has had more impact in genre terms. Mark Hillegas suggests that 
“Although Wells’s work had various ancestors, it is from him that the writers of 
anti-utopias learned the use of this form” (5). Wells’s early scientific romances, 
written in a spell of intense productivity from the publication of The Time 
Machine in 1895 through to The First Men in the Moon in 1901 explored some 
of the more dystopian aspects of evolution. Although Samuel Butler and Edward 
Bulwer-Lytton had been ambivalent about the long-term consequences of 
evolution, Wells’s projections for the future of the human race were even 
bleaker, as he believed it likely that humans would degenerate or be out-
evolved by other species. Wells was first exposed to ideas of evolution when he 
studied under T. H. Huxley at the Normal School of Science in 1884 for what 
Wells describes in his autobiography as “beyond all question, the most 
educational year of my life” (Experiment 201). Reconciling Huxley’s concept of 
the brutal “cosmic process” of evolution with the “ethical process” necessary for 
social progress was to become one of the central issues of Wells’s early work. 
During the early 1890s, while pursuing a career as a scientific journalist, Wells 
frequently returned to the question of man’s evolutionary position, emphasising 
what Patrick Parrinder describes as a “sense of dethronement” (49). Wells 
worried that human generations did not occur fast enough to benefit from 
natural selection, and feared that humanity might be outflanked by faster 
breeding species. This fear also lent power to his concerns about “the natural 
man, who is the product of natural selection, the culminating ape”, who in 
biological terms was barely evolved from the Stone Age, and whose instincts 
were destined to be in tension with the “artificial man” of modern civilisation 
(“Human Evolution” 217). The discrepancy between the high pace of 
development of modern civilisation and the slowness of human evolution was a 
key factor in Wells’s critique of utopianism in his early novels. In his first novel, 
The Time Machine, Wells interrogates nineteenth-century assumptions of 
utopian progress by portraying an apparently idyllic pastoral world, only to 
reveal that the contented Elois are being preyed on by the bestial Morlocks and 
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that evolution has produced two not-fully human successors to humanity, one 
weaker and less intelligent, the other savage and degenerate.92 In The Island of 
Doctor Moreau (1896) Wells parodies efforts to create utopia through a 
grotesque simulacrum of society invented by Doctor Moreau’s biologically 
altered animals. However, it is in When The Sleeper Wakes that Wells creates 
his first fully-realised dystopian society. His vision of a repressive authoritarian 
regime, a sybaritic upper class seeking amusement in Pleasure Cities, the 
artificial environment of the overgrown “super city” and extreme class divisions 
was to influence later dystopias including Jack London’s The Iron Heel (1908), 
Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We (1924), Huxley’s Brave New World and George 
Orwell’s 1984 (1949). The projection of scientific progress against a backdrop of 
class warfare and political discontent allowed Wells to blend late-nineteenth-
century ideas of progress with his evolutionary pessimism and to represent a 
society where the perfection of utopia is marred by greed, factionalism and 
decadence. It is this interplay of progress and pessimism in When the Sleeper 
Wakes which makes it a good starting place for exploring the relationship 
between dystopianism and eugenics at the end of the nineteenth century.  
Kumar claims that “When the Sleeper Wakes was in fact the first of 
Wells’s utopian stories” (187). He describes it as a transitional work within the 
oeuvre of an upwardly mobile Wells, containing all the elements of utopia, 
wrapped within “a largely anti-utopian fable” (187). On the other hand, Bernard 
Bergonzi is unable to see the utopian side to the world depicted in Wells’s 
novel, calling it “repulsive rather than desirable”, though he does concede that 
certain passages of the novel give “the impression that an idealizing and a 
satirical intention are both at work” (146-7). However, both critics agree that the 
reader is left unsure as to how Wells wants them to feel about his futuristic city 
and whether they are meant to admire or be horrified by its scientific inventions.  
This difficulty may result partly from the opening chapters of When the 
Sleeper Wakes, which are structured like a utopian tale. As Ferns argues, 
dystopias tend to dispense with “the ponderous narrative mechanisms used to 
account for the visitor’s transfer to utopia” and “begin in media res” with the 
narrative of someone living within the dystopian society (111). In When the 
Sleeper Wakes Wells uses exactly the same device as Bellamy to transport 
                                                          
92 For more details see Steven McLean, The Early Fiction of H. G. Wells; and Kathryn Hume, 
“Eat or be Eaten: H. G. Wells’s Time Machine”. 
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Graham, the sleeper, to the London of 2100. Graham experiences the usual 
disorientation, followed by amazement at the inventions and technology of the 
future city. However, here the resemblance to the utopian plot ends. Unlike 
Julian West, Graham’s awakening destabilises a society already in the throes of 
revolution. Graham’s guide to the world in which he has awakened is the 
revolutionary-turned-dictator Ostrog, rather than the benevolent Dr. Leete. 
Instead of being led to admire a perfected social system, Graham sees the dark 
side of this future London in the form of the oppression of the workers of the 
Labour Company, and their lack of access to natural light and air. Also, unlike 
most visitors to utopia, Graham eventually switches from being an observer to 
becoming an active participant in the political struggles of the new age, and the 
book ends with him plunging to possible death in his plane following a battle to 
defend the workers from Ostrog’s troops. In effect, the plot structure of the novel 
turns from utopian to dystopian in the course of the story. It also acquires mythic 
resonances when Graham, whose Arthurian connections are signposted by his 
long sleep beginning in Boscastle, just along the coast from Tintagel, takes on 
the role of figurehead to the revolution. As Parrinder points out: “His final 
incarnation as an airborne knight-errant fighting off the dark hordes may be 
seen as a new version of the Arthurian Last Battle that gripped the imagination 
of so many of Wells’s Victorian predecessors” (“Introduction” xxv).   
 Even though the structure and tone provide confusing signals for the 
reader, the main cause of the slippage between the utopian and the dystopian, I 
argue, is an apparent ambivalence in Wells over two elements in his future 
world, its technologically advanced civilisation and the oppressed/ enslaved 
workers that this civilisation has created. Graham is initially impressed by the 
signs of progress. He finds that clothing production has been automated, books 
can be played as cylinders, the alphabet had been rationalised and a form of TV 
had been invented. However, he is sickened to realise that the new technology 
is being used to relay live scenes of pornography. Likewise, his first impressions 
of the city show it as both breathtaking and inhuman: 
The place into which he looked was an aisle of Titanic buildings, curving 
spaciously in either direction. Overhead mighty cantilevers sprang 
together across the huge width of the place, and a tracery of translucent 
material shut out the sky. Gigantic globes of cool white light shamed the 
pale sunbeams that filtered down through the girders and wire. Here and 
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there a gossamer suspension bridge dotted with foot passengers flung 
across the chasm and the air was webbed with slender cables. (35) 
Wells’s vocabulary emphasises the size of the city, it is “overwhelming”, 
“Titanic”, “mighty”, “gigantic”. People are mere dots on a bridge. The sky is 
roofed over, and artificial light is stronger than natural sunlight. The city 
represents the conquest of nature taken to extreme. Giant wind-turbines provide 
clean energy, but are also festooned with advertisements and have taken over 
the countryside “where once the hedges had interlaced, and cottages, 
churches, inns, and farmhouses had nestled among their trees” (115). Wells’s 
nostalgia for the lost countryside and dislike of the claustrophobic city vies with 
his admiration for the engineering achievements of the future. Although Hillegas 
claims that, unlike most twentieth-century writers of anti-utopias, “Wells frankly 
could not see anything ugly or evil about the machine” (69), Graham does 
dislike the mechanical wet nurses he finds in the city’s crèche and the whole 
system of mechanical child-rearing, as well as the Babble Machines which 
compete to shout news, advertisements and propaganda at the helpless 
populace of the underground city. Nonetheless, Wells’s interest in technology 
and its potential effect on day- to-day life does tend to undermine the satirical 
and dystopian impact of his descriptions. For example, he allows himself to be 
momentarily sidetracked into explaining how improved transport systems would 
lead to the disappearance of the town and village, and how economic and social 
pressures would draw people into the cities. Wells anticipated that “After 
telephone, kinematograph and phonograph had replaced newspaper, book, 
schoolmaster, and letter, to live outside the range of the electric cables was to 
live an isolated savage” (117). For Wells, the city was the only option for these 
amenities and so the super-sized cities of the future world could simply be seen 
as “the logical consequence of an epoch of invention” (117).93  
  Yet, the city is at the heart of Wells’s ambivalence over the high-tech new 
future he invents. At times, the city means civilisation, security, world peace. 
Wells evokes the World State he would promote in his later utopian fiction: “a 
vision of city beyond city, cities on great plains, cities beside great rivers, vast 
cities along the sea margin, cities girdled by snow mountains” (118). The world 
of 2100 is civilised, speaks mostly one language and has dealt with racial 
                                                          
93 Wells would subsequently change his mind about the megacity, and following further analysis 
in 1900 concluded that “a period of town dispersal was already beginning” (“Preface” 8). 
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conflict (albeit in a European, imperialistic fashion). However, civilisation has a 
negative connotation as well, summed up in Wells’s phrase: “The whole world 
was civilised; the whole world dwelt in cities; the whole world was property” 
(118). In When the Sleeper Wakes, Wells places freedom and civilisation in 
opposition to each other. Ostrog’s niece Helen tells Graham that “The city – is a 
prison. Every city now is a prison. Mammon grips the key in his hands” (158). 
The cities of When the Sleeper Wakes are the means by which the poor have 
come under the control of the rich, through the concentration of labour in one 
place and monopoly employers like the Labour Company.94 The city is symbolic 
of capitalism and the amassing of vast fortunes, as was the case in Gilded Age 
America after the Civil War. Parrinder notes that “The novel reflects the specific 
conditions of capitalism as perceived by Wells and his contemporaries at the 
end of the nineteenth century. Its principal features are American rather than 
English, just as the novel’s skyscrapers were taking shape in fin de siècle 
Chicago and New York rather than in London” (Introduction xvi). However, the 
novel also reflects the appalling living conditions of the poor of London, which 
were coming under the scrutiny of commentators like the Reverend Andrew 
Mearns who coined the phrase “Outcast London” in his 1883 work “The Bitter 
Cry of Outcast London: An Inquiry into the Condition of the Abject Poor” and 
Charles Booth, who published four editions of his survey of living conditions in 
the East End of London, Inquiry into the Life and Labour of the People in 
London, between 1889 and 1903. In inventing the underground portions of 
London where the workers rarely see the light of day, Wells was imaginatively 
extending the conditions described by Booth when he wrote: “Even now, does 
not an East-end worker live in such artificial conditions as practically to be cut 
off from the natural surface of the earth?” (Time 61). W. Warren Wagar, in an 
essay on Looking Backward, suggests that “Wells used When the Sleeper 
Wakes, somewhat as he had used The Time Machine earlier, to question the 
premise that capitalism was doomed to defeat” (“Dreams” 113-14). The 
protagonist Graham, a Victorian radical, acts as a vehicle for contrasting 
utopian expectations with Wells’s own forecast for the future. Graham had 
expected two hundred years of civilisation to lead to progress, but instead the 
                                                          
94 However, the capitalism of When the Sleeper Wakes does seem somewhat socialist. There is 
the Labour Company to provide work for all, the British Food Trust, which sounds like a 1950s 
government body and the International Creche Syndicate to provide childcare. 
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hopes for freedom and peace of the Victorian age that he represents have been 
unfulfilled despite the technological achievements: “Great cities, vast powers, a 
collective greatness beyond our dreams.... How is it with the common lives? As 
it has ever been – sorrow and labour, lives cramped and unfulfilled, lives 
tempted by power, tempted by wealth, and gone to waste and folly” (209). 
Graham discovers that the opposition to capitalism had been ineffective 
because “any organisation that became big enough to influence the polls, 
became complex enough to be undermined, broken up, or bought outright by 
capable rich men” (122). Wells was no supporter of democracy, believing that 
politicians did not pay enough attention to scientists and other specialists. In 
1901 he predicted that the next war would see the demise of “this grey 
confusion that is Democracy” to be replaced by “the higher organism, the world-
state of the coming years” (Anticipations 175).  
 When the Sleeper Wakes also contains an evolutionary criticism of 
capitalism. The novel charts the beginning of the division between the rich and 
poor which ultimately leads to the two extreme tendencies of evolution 
represented by the Elois and the Morlocks of The Time Machine. The workers 
are portrayed as being “a distinct class, with a moral and physical difference of 
its own – even a dialect of its own” (189). By contrast the rich are represented 
as decadent pleasure-seekers. The final conflict of When the Sleeper Awakes 
pits “multitudes dulled by mindless labour and enervated by the tradition of two 
hundred years of servile security against multitudes demoralised by lives of 
venial privilege and sensual indulgence” (210-11). One of the problems with 
civilisation for Wells was that it meant suppressing the primitive instincts that 
had been so important to humanity’s survival. Steven McLean argues 
persuasively in relation to the Time Machine that the Time Traveller defeats the 
Morlocks by drawing on primitive, savage traits, suggesting that “Wells sees 
something of the “ape” and “tiger” as necessary to human progress” (40).95 
Similarly in When the Sleeper Wakes, Graham describes himself as primitive in 
                                                          
95 McLean’s reference is to Huxley’s essay “Evolution and Ethics” where Huxley wrote: “For his 
successful progress, throughout the savage state, man has been largely indebted to those 
qualities which he shares with the ape and the tiger; his exceptional physical organization; his 
cunning, his sociability, his curiosity, and his imitativeness; his ruthless and ferocious 
destructiveness when his anger is roused by opposition” (Huxley 51-2). One of McLean’s 
central arguments is that Wells disagreed with Huxley’s concept of “ethical” evolution, and saw 
the competition element of the “cosmic process” as being necessary for human progress 
(McLean 40).  
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relation to the people of future London, but prefers his own instincts to the effete 
insouciance of the privileged class: “Civilisation has driven pain and danger so 
far off – for well-to-do people.... I would rather be a wounded sentinel freezing in 
the snow than one of these painted fools.... Their fountain of rage and fear and 
anger is sealed and closed, the habits of a lifetime make them cheerful and 
easy and delightful” (184).   
 At least among the working class the struggle for existence still 
continues. The labyrinthine underground passages of London are the scene of 
a “fierce, inglorious economic struggle” (119), which Wells dramatises further in 
“A story of the days to come” (1897), a short story set in the same world as 
When the Sleeper Wakes. In this story, a young married couple run out of 
money and are forced to work for the Labour Company. The husband, Denton, 
has to learn to fight his co-workers to survive his daily shifts in the factory. Wells 
depicts the couple as falling into a horrific bestial world where all the civilised 
behaviour of their previous life is meaningless. Their archaic interests in 
Victorian furniture and poetry are of no use to their day-to-day existence, where 
only animal characteristics such as strength, agility and passion can help them. 
This story highlights Wells’s ambivalence over the evolutionary potential of the 
working class. They have the energy that he admires, but not the values and 
education. Nevertheless, Graham sees the workers of future London as the 
best hope for change in the city: “Was this city, this hive of hopeless toilers, the 
final refutation of his ancient hopes? Or was the fire of liberty, the fire that had 
blazed and waned in the years of his past life, still smouldering below there?” 
(125). Graham backs the workers not because he is working class or 
necessarily even sympathises with them, but because he sees more hope for 
the future in them than in the decadent upper class. But at the same time 
Graham fears the inhuman power of the mob and what their force might do 
once awakened. His descriptions emphasise the frightening nature of the 
crowd: “monstrous crowds, packed masses of indistinguishable people, 
clamouring his name” (72) and their daunting unanimity: “The whole mass of 
people was chanting together.... And the feet of the people were beating time – 
tramp, tramp” (73). Wells’s descriptions echo the concerns over crowd 
behaviour of 1890s Britain, encapsulated in Gustave Le Bon’s influential work, 
The Crowd, translated into English in 1896. Le Bon’s description of the group 
consciousness of crowds concludes that:  
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Whoever be the individuals that compose it, however like or unlike be 
their mode of life, their occupations, their character, or their intelligence, 
the fact that they have been transformed into a crowd puts them in 
possession of a sort of collective mind which makes them feel, think, and 
act in a manner quite different from that in which each individual of them 
would feel, think, and act were he in a state of isolation. (27)  
Le Bon was no advocate of the “wisdom of the crowd”; he thought that crowds 
were lacking in intelligence and overly suggestible. Wells, through Graham, 
expresses similar doubts. The mob is inefficient: “Think of this foolish tumult, 
that cannot even find its weapons”(215) and not susceptible to the forces of 
reason and progress: “But the crowd ... was a crowd still, helpless in the hands 
of demagogue and organiser, individually, cowardly, individually swayed by 
appetite, collectively incalculable” (120). Ostrog, for all his efficiency, misjudges 
the crowd. He does not see that having used concepts of freedom to manipulate 
the crowd, he cannot just shut them down again, and is surprised that “this 
vague out-of-date humanitarianism” (164) has taken root in their psyche. All the 
same, Ostrog believes that the crowd can be controlled, through the 
propaganda of the Babble Machines, and if necessary through force. Their 
subjugation is inevitable: “Suppose – which is impossible – that these swarming 
yelping fools in blue get the upper hand of us, what then? They will only fall to 
other masters. So long as there are sheep Nature will insist on beasts of prey” 
(167). Ostrog’s solution for dealing with the rebellion is “the black police”. While 
the racial politics of Graham’s insistence that “White men must be mastered by 
white men” (197) are dubious, the idea of countering crowd violence with 
representatives of what the Victorians saw as a more primitive people, fits with 
Le Bon’s assertion that “a man descends several rungs in the ladder of 
civilisation” when he joins a crowd (32). Ostrog sees the African police as more 
reliable because they have never been exposed to the revolutionary ideas of 
their European counterparts: “They are fine loyal brutes, with no wash of ideas 
in their heads – such as our rabble has” (164). But Ostrog misjudges the impact 
of using African troops, as it is the news of their arrival that triggers the revolt, 
and causes Graham to break with him. It could therefore be argued that the 
workers are not so much fighting for freedom as to maintain their place in the 
racial hierarchy, and that Graham’s heroic defence of the city is more about 
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preventing planes containing a thousand “half-savage negroes” from landing 
than defeating Ostrog.   
 John Carey in The Intellectuals and the Masses (1992) accused Wells of 
wishing to get rid of the “mass of low-grade humanity such as inhabits the 
underground in When the Sleeper Wakes” (123). While Carey is not wrong in 
highlighting Wells’s fears of the degenerative potential of the uneducated 
masses, it is too simplistic to take the views of Ostrog on the crowd as being 
Wells’s own. In fact, a more subtle debate is being played out between the 
values of Romanticism and the evolutionary technocracy of the late Victorian 
era.96 Ostrog himself admits to reading Shelley and dreaming of liberty in his 
youth, but he has moved on to a belief that “some day the Over-man may come, 
that some day the inferior, the weak and the bestial may be subdued or 
eliminated”(166). The Over-man is clearly a reference to Nietzsche’s 
Űbermensch, introduced in the first book of Thus Spake Zarathustra (1883). For 
Nietzsche, the Over-man represents the next phase of human evolution. 
Humans are at “the great noontide” standing midway between animal and 
superhuman in what Nietzsche represents as “the journey to a new morning” 
(104).   
Ostrog equates the Over-man with the “aristocrat”, not the decadent 
upper-class pleasure-seekers of the city, but the winners in the game of 
evolution who will drive progress. “It is the way that change has always 
travelled. Aristocracy, the prevalence of the best – suffering and extinction of 
the unfit, and so to better things” (166). In terms of the Huxleyan debate 
between “cosmic nature” and “ethical nature”, Ostrog represents the triumph of 
“cosmic nature”. The “prevalence of the best” is just another term for “survival of 
the fittest”. Ostrog’s project can be seen as similar to that of Moreau’s in The 
Island of Doctor Moreau, except that instead of trying to turn animals into 
humans, he is trying to turn human beings into a higher form of life. Ostrog 
argues that “The world is no place for the bad, the stupid, the enervated. Their 
duty – it’s a fine duty too! – is to die. The death of the failure! That is the path by 
which the beast rose to manhood, by which man goes on to higher things” 
(167). Ostrog’s reductive certainties that he can suppress the workers and lead 
the rich to “graceful destruction” in the Pleasure Cities, which he characterises 
                                                          
96 Michael R. Page gives some background to the argument that Wells was heavily influenced 
by the Romantic poetry of Shelley and Blake (150). 
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as “the excretory organs of the State” (167) are contested by Graham who 
believes “there is something resists, something you are holding down – 
something that stirs and presses” (165). Graham’s words are an echo of 
Moreau’s when in his frustration at failing to reshape the brains of his 
experimental animals he declares that there is “something that I cannot touch, 
somewhere … in the seat of the emotions. Cravings, instincts, desires, that 
harm humanity” (Wells Island 78). With the character of Moreau, Wells shows 
that there are limits to what science can achieve to accelerate evolution. With 
Ostrog, he presents science in the hands not of the scientist, but the military 
dictator with unlimited resources, and in this case the outcome is much less 
certain. However, like Moreau, Ostrog’s social experiment gets out of hand. 
Ostrog portrays Graham’s nineteenth-century dreams of “human equality” and 
“a socialistic order” (197) as anachronistic, but these are in fact the ideas that 
are motivating the rebellion. These concepts that Ostrog sees as empty and 
redundant are more motivational than he realises and cannot be eradicated by 
the usual forces of mind control. Helen, Ostrog’s niece, sums it up: “Ostrog has 
awakened something greater than he dreamt of – he has awakened hopes” 
(161). In this respect, When the Sleeper Wakes is far more optimistic than 
Wells’s other scientific romances of the 1890s. Nineteenth-century values and 
dreams, however racist they may seem to us today, are represented as still 
having power beyond the era of their inception, and as being vital for the 
advancement of humanity.  
Some of the contradictions of When the Sleeper Wakes, it can now be 
seen, stem not from Wells’s ambivalence but are part of a deliberate dialectical 
process. The contrast between utopia and dystopia in the representation of the 
London of 2100 play the same role of highlighting the divisions between the rich 
and poor of its citizenry, as Wells achieved in The Time Machine, where, as 
Linda Dryden describes:  
[P]hysical London-of-the future mirrors the evolutionary decline and split 
of its citizens. ... The upper world of meadows, exotic vegetation, 
neglected culture and crumbling architecture implies the decadent leisure 
of those who benefit from the Morlocks’ toil. The claustrophobic, foul-
smelling caverns underground, throbbing and humming with the 
vibrations and din of unspecified monstrous machinery are the underbelly 
of the metropolis. (162) 
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 The volatility of the crowd and Graham’s defence of his Palaeolithic habits are 
part of a debate over the value of primitive instincts to humanity in an age where 
technology has taken away the role of physical courage. The two sets of 
characteristics are interrogated more overtly in “A Story of the Days to Come” 
through its pairing in the same collection with “A Story of the Stone Age”. “A 
Story of the Stone Age” goes back to prehistoric times to consider the forces at 
play in the creation of modern man. In “A Story of the Days to Come” Denton 
overcomes his despair at the realisation that his escape from the Labour 
Company has come through chance rather than his own exertion by recognising 
that, although humans are latecomers in terms of evolutionary time, they are 
gradually making progress. By contrast, the men of the Stone Age are “but 
shapes of men, creatures of darkness and ignorance, victims of beasts and 
floods, storms and pestilence and incessant hunger” (“Days to come” 322-3). 
Richard Pearson argues that cultural evolution was far more important to Wells 
then biological evolution as he saw humanity as being biologically static. Wells 
wrote that “man (allowing for racial blendings) is still mentally, morally, and 
physically, what he was during the later Palaeolithic period” (“Human” 211). 
Wells saw social rituals and taboos as being necessary to hold in check 
humanity’s savage tendencies. Therefore, by abolishing these taboos and 
allowing the powerful to take what they want in When the Sleeper Wakes Wells 
was not just critiquing capitalism, but continuing the debate over whether 
progress without social justice is counter-evolutionary. Graham’s alarm on 
discovering that moral codes had been dispensed with, suggests that the 
absence of moral evolution is an important element of Wells’s dystopian vision 
of the future: “These people were two hundred years further on in the march of 
civilisation than the Victorian generation. It was not likely they would be less – 
humane. Yet they had cleared their minds of formulae! Was humanity a formula 
as well as chastity?” (56). The dystopian critique of When the Sleeper Wakes, I 
argue, comes from this central idea of a society built around scientific progress 
without any guiding ethical principles and the organising powers of civilisation 
being turned towards exploiting humans for profit, rather than creating 
improvements for all.   
While When the Sleeper Wakes does not have the consistency and 
impact of some of Wells’s other scientific romances of the 1890s, it does 
provide a thorough overview of the dystopian issues that were concerning Wells 
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at the time.97 It is important to note therefore that eugenics only appears in 
When the Sleeper Wakes obliquely and by implication. There is no 
governmental plan to regulate marriage or requirements for certificates of 
eugenic health. There is no programme to prevent the swarming masses of the 
workers from having children. Ostrog does promote the Pleasure Cities as a 
eugenic measure for the upper classes: “They go there, they have their time, 
they die childless, all the pretty silly lascivious women die childless, and 
mankind is the better” (167). But there is no coercion involved in the process. 
Likewise, in “A Story of the Days to Come” lifestyle and environmental 
conditions determine the eugenic outcome. Elizabeth’s rich suitor discovers that 
his life of indulgence and vice has ruined his constitution, so he cannot marry 
Elizabeth and have children. Also, Denton and Elizabeth’s child, originally 
healthy, dies once they have been forced to don the blue canvas of the Labour 
Company. This death can be seen as a symbolic, for the child had already been 
placed in a crèche where the efficiency of the electronic nurses is meant to 
result in lower death rates than the Victorian system of individual motherhood. 
The child dies because the dehumanisation of the labour pool only allows the 
roughest, and least civilised to survive, suggesting the counter-evolutionary 
effect of the Labour Company’s policy of providing work and shelter for all. The 
mechanised crèches of the middle class also have a eugenic air to them in the 
sense that children are no longer seen as individuals, but resources to be raised 
in the most efficient manner possible to benefit the state.   
Ostrog’s endorsement of the coming of the Nietzschean Over-man also 
provides a link to eugenics, as discussed in the introduction. Ostrog, however, 
is not trying to breed the Over-man. In his religion, evolution, if left to run its 
course will inevitably result in the extinction of the weak and the coming of the 
Over-man. In the next section of this chapter I compare Ostrog’s vision of the 
Over-man with the eugenic ideas that Wells developed in the early twentieth 
century. I argue that, despite similarities in use of language between Wells and 
his creation Ostrog, Wells saw eugenics as a means of escaping the 
                                                          
97 Wells himself saw the story as rushed and unsuccessful, leading him to publish an edited 
edition in 1910 under the title The Sleeper Awakes, which mainly addressed his dissatisfaction 
at the suggestion of a love story between Graham and Helen, the niece of Ostrog. However, by 
1921 Wells was happy to claim the original edition as the first in a series of books which he 
described as “fantasias of possibility” (“Preface” 7). 
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unsatisfactory evolutionary trajectory of humans, while Ostrog embraced the 
“cosmic process” of evolution, and could assert, without resorting to eugenics, 
that “The end will be the Over-man – for all the mad protests of humanity. Let 
them revolt, let them win and kill me and my like. Others will arise – other 
masters. The end will be the same” (167).   
 
5.2 Wells, Eugenics and the Death of the Over-Man 
 
Wells’s career underwent a change of direction at the start of the 
twentieth century when he published Anticipations (1902), a piece of prophetic 
writing which set him up as a social commentator and forecaster.98 The book, 
which was first written as a series of papers for the Fortnightly Review in 1901, 
sold unexpectedly well.99 Wells regarded it as a new type of work, describing it 
in his autobiography as “the first attempt to forecast the human future as a 
whole” (Experiment 645). John S. Partington is sceptical about its originality, 
suggesting that it was “simply an experiment in extrapolation” (51), but Wells 
saw it as being very different from the “exaggeration of contemporary 
tendencies” which he had employed in When the Sleeper Awakes (Experiment 
645). Wagar describes it as “the first comprehensive nonfictional example of 
innumerable Wellsian exercises in utopian speculation and prophecy” (H. G. 
78). Although Wells’s articles do start off as simple forecasts of future trends in 
such areas as transportation and cities, he moves rapidly into analysing the 
impact of social forces and new technology on the development of the human 
race as a whole, and developing ideas for a “New Republic”, governed by an 
intellectual elite. The growing ambition of the work can be seen in the change of 
title from “Anticipations: An Experiment in Prophecy” in the Fortnightly Review 
to Anticipations of the reaction of mechanical and scientific progress upon 
human life and thought when published in book form. The act of forecasting 
moved Wells away from considering the inevitable fate of humanity as 
described in his earlier scientific romances to looking at solutions. Anticipations 
                                                          
98 Wagar sees this as a second career which Wells embarked on alongside becoming a novelist 
in the literary mainstream: “One course that Wells chose in or about 1900, was to harness 
himself in the service of world reconstruction, the second of the two careers on which he 
embarked after the his early successes in fantasy and science fiction” (H. G.16). 
99 Wells reported in his autobiography: “Macmillan’s, my English publishers, were caught 
unawares by the demand and had sold out the first edition before they reprinted. It sold as well 
as a novel” (646). 
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can be seen as marking the beginning of a phase of utopian writing, and also 
the beginning of Wells’s codification of his ideas about an improved future for 
the human race.  
However, the positive future that Wells portrays in Anticipations is set 
against the threat of slipping down into the abyss. Wells uses the word abyss 
over thirty times in the book, coining the phrase “People of the Abyss” as 
shorthand to describe the uneducated working class and agricultural labourers 
who were in danger of being left behind by modern society. He sees them not 
as a resource to be manipulated or exploited as his character Ostrog did, or 
surplus people to be eliminated, but simply as those not well equipped to 
survive in the modern age of machine power. However, as Wells gets more 
involved with developing ideas for his ideal future “New Republic”, he moves 
from a position where he predicts that it will be the destiny of the “People of the 
Abyss” to die out in a process that “will be largely or entirely out of all human 
control” (280) to discussing measures that the New Republic might take to 
accelerate the process through birth control and by making “the multiplication of 
those who fall behind a certain standard of social efficiency unpleasant and 
difficult” (315). Wells also proposed to eliminate what he saw as the surplus 
populations of other less able races, “those swarms of black, and brown, and 
dirty-white, and yellow people, who do not come into the new needs of 
efficiency” (317), though he does make it clear that race is not as important a 
criteria for citizenship as efficiency: “Whatever men may come into its efficient 
citizenship it will let come—white, black, red, or brown; the efficiency will be the 
test” (316). Partington, a strong supporter of Wells in other respects, describes 
the eugenic proposals of the final chapter as “detestable, indeed murderous, 
public policy” (51). Partington argues that Wells was so shocked by negative 
reactions to Anticipations, in particular that of his friend Joseph Conrad, that he 
made a “volte-face” and completely repudiated eugenics.100 It seems doubtful 
that Wells regretted Anticipations as much as Partington suggests, since in his 
autobiography he refers to Anticipations as “the keystone to the main arch of my 
                                                          
100 Anticipations has attracted criticism from a number of critics, including Carey who picks up 
on the term “People of the Abyss” to support the hypothesis that “anxiety about overpopulation, 
rooted in his childhood vision of woods and fields destroyed at Bromley, is the key to Wells’s 
reading of modern history” (Carey 119), while Michael Coren, in his revisionist biography of 
Wells, describes Anticipations as “the most structured and complete manual of eugenics ever to 
be written by a reputed author” (69). 
174 
 
work” (Experiment 643). Also, not all reaction to Anticipations was negative. The 
book sold out its first edition (Searle 52), and many of Wells’s ideas were picked 
up with approval, winning praise from Sidney and Beatrice Webb, founders of 
the Fabian Society.101 Wells’s proposals of the final chapter can also be seen as 
a response to his earlier cosmic pessimism where the only two options for the 
future were the weakness of the devolved Eloi or the brutality of the degenerate 
Morlocks. In Anticipations Wells comes up with a middle way, government by a 
self-selecting elite, the New Republicans (who would later turn into the Samurai 
of A Modern Utopia), and so he becomes concerned with adjusting the direction 
of human evolution in favour of the portion of the population who can contribute 
most to human progress. Wells believed that discouraging the inefficient from 
breeding would re-start “a process of physical and mental improvement in 
mankind, a raising and elaboration of the average man, that has virtually been 
in suspense during the greater portion of the historical period” (Anticipations 
307). Wells’s apparent callousness can also be seen within the context of two 
facets of his thinking, explored in various essays. In The Discovery of the Future 
(1902), he argues that the future is fixed and determinate, and that the social 
forces at work lead to the future being just as quantifiable and knowable as the 
past. For this reason, he writes off whole groups of people in a fatalistic fashion. 
However, “The Rediscovery of the Unique” (1891) asserts the fallacy of 
classification. Wells saw individuals as unique and labels as a convenience, so 
while Wells sounds dismissive of whole classes of people, he is not being 
essentialist. Rather, as Philmus and Hughes observe, Wells is switching 
between two different standpoints, the cosmic and the human (“Introduction” 6). 
His technocrats of the future, he makes clear, may come from any background 
or race. 
Wells’s ideas for reducing what he viewed as surplus population, 
however unsound they might appear today, contain crucial differences to the 
Nietzschean ideas Ostrog proposed in When the Sleeper Wakes. Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra advocated exploiting the labouring class in order to create a higher 
race, which would supersede humanity. Wells, on the other hand, saw the 
educated middle-class as the hope for the future and the “People of the Abyss” 
as the superannuated remnants of an earlier era who would soon disappear. 
                                                          
101 Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie report that the book “had greatly impressed the Webbs, who 
liked his idea of “New Republicans” – an elite who could regenerate the nation” (290).  
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Wagar also refutes the concept that Wells saw Ostrog’s views as desirable: 
“Ostrog’s fantasies of subduing or eliminating the working class chime with 
nothing that Wells ever wrote, before or after, about labor”.102 Wagar concludes 
that “Like Griffin, the Invisible Man, he [Ostrog] is a caricature of Wells, 
mouthing some of Wells’s thoughts about leadership and evolution, but in the 
last reckoning, a villain devoid of humanity” (H.G. 74-75). Even Carey doubts 
Wells’s total commitment to Nietzsche: “His heroes and heroines can sound 
Nietzschean, and they share Nietzsche’s enthusiasm for alpine glaciers and 
mountaineering as denoting superiority to the ‘grubby little beasts down there’. 
Yet the avowed Nietzscheans in Wells’s fiction – Edward Ponderevo or young 
Walsingham in Kipps – are always preposterous.” (140) 
Wells’s view of the Nietzschean Over-Man may also have been 
influenced by late-nineteenth-century readings of Nietzsche which tended to 
emphasise Nietzsche’s mental health problems and see his work as a confused 
mixture of strange ideas.103 This perception was due in part to the fact that the 
complete works of Nietzsche did not appear in English until Levy’s eighteen-
volume translation of 1909-1913.104 It is unlikely that Wells had access to 
complete translations of Nietzsche’s work when he wrote When the Sleeper 
Wakes, though he may have gained some of his knowledge of the Nietzschean 
Overman from Max Nordau’s Degeneration (1892), which contains numerous 
quotes from Nietzsche’s work, not just Thus Spake Zarathustra, but Beyond 
Good and Evil and The Gay Science.105 Nordau wrote a whole chapter on 
Nietzsche in which he interprets Nietzsche’s Overman as an enemy of the 
development of humanity as a whole: “Nietzsche readily admits that the 
‘splendid beast of prey’ is pernicious to the species, that he destroys and 
ravages; but of what consequence is the species? It exists for the sole purpose 
of making possible the perfect development of individual ‘over-men’, and of 
                                                          
102 Wagar is arguing against Bergonzi who states “it is demonstrable that Ostrog represents 
Wells’s own developing intellectual convictions” (152). 
103 The Pall Mall Gazette described Nietzsche’s philosophy as “[a] strange wild jumble, one that 
does not come to much” (1896), while Max Nordau criticised Nietzsche’s works as “a 
succession of disconnected sallies, prose and doggerel mixed, without beginning or ending” 
(419). 
104 See Bowler’s chapter on the “Nietzsche Vogue” in which he concludes that “Much of the 
early debate concerning Nietzsche and Darwin in the English-speaking world thus occurred 
before his views were widely or accurately known” (282). 
105 Wells was certainly aware of Degeneration since he refers to it in his novel The Wonderful 
Visit (1895). Wells also uses the same term as Nordau for his translation of Űbermensch, “Over-
man” not “Beyond Man” or “Superman”, as others used.  
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satisfying their most extravagant needs.” (431). However, Nordau had no 
quarrel with the concept of the great leader per se, just not “the ego-maniac, the 
criminal, the robber, the slave of his maddened instincts”, as he characterised 
Nietzsche’s “overman”. Instead he advocated his own concept of the Overman 
as “the man of richer knowledge, higher intelligence, clearer judgment, and 
firmer self-discipline” (472). Wells idea of an elite group of intelligent leaders is 
similar to Nordau’s concept, but he emphatically rejected the necessity of an 
outstanding individual to lead the development of the human race. In Discovery 
of the Future Wells argued that great men have less influence on history than 
generally supposed:  
I must confess I believe that if by some juggling with space and time 
Julius Caesar, Napoleon, Edward IV, William the Conqueror, Lord 
Rosebery, and Robert Burns had all been changed at birth it would not 
have produced any serious dislocation of the course of destiny. I believe 
that these great men of ours are no more than images and symbols and 
instruments taken, as it were, haphazard by the incessant and consistent 
forces behind them. (42-3) 
Wells believed that social and political factors determined future progress not 
one or two great men. He continued to endorse this view even in the 1930s 
when the rise of fascism caused him to consider Mussolini and Mosley as part 
of “a spotty stage in the adolescence of mankind, a spotty stage that will pass. It 
is the Great Man idea and method in final pathological decay” (Experiment 649). 
Wells’s New Republicans were not Nietzschean supermen, but “a naturally and 
informally organized, educated class” (Anticipations 262). They were not going 
to be bred, but would “pick ... themselves out more and more clearly, from the 
shareholder, the parasitic speculator and the wretched multitudes of the Abyss” 
(278).  
While Wells’s New Republicans were sceptical of democracy, much like 
the Nietzschean superman, this was on the grounds of efficiency, not through 
any desire to set themselves up as dictators. Wells saw the voting public as 
being apathetic, easily manipulated by electioneers and irrational in their 
interests (Anticipations 147). He did not indulge in the elitism of early twentieth 
century supporters of Nietzsche such as sociologist Georges Chatterton-Hill, 
who in The Philosophy of Nietzsche (1912) emphasised the master/ slave 
element of Nietzsche’s thought, arguing that “the slaves, the great mass of 
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humanity, mediocre and uninteresting, must exist as a pedestal for the 
monument of genius” (221).106 Chatterton-Hill saw the only value to the 
development of human society as being in its potential to create “a higher race, 
a race of conquerors, of masters, who shall, by their works, give meaning to 
humanity” (italics in original) (221). Unlike Wells, who worked throughout his life 
to bring into being the World State, Chatterton- Hill argued that Nietzsche hated 
the State for fostering mediocrity and suppressing the development of the 
talented (76).  
Similarly, Wells had little sympathy with the “aristocratic stock breeding 
vision of society” (Stone 92) that characterised Nietzschean eugenics. In 
Mankind in the Making in 1903, Wells questioned the practicality of breeding for 
such nebulous qualities as beauty, energy, and even health:  
It is quite conceivable that you might select and wed together all the most 
beautiful people in the world and find that in nine cases out of ten you 
had simply produced mediocre offspring or offspring below mediocrity.... 
These considerations should at least suffice to demonstrate the entire 
impracticability of Mr. Galton's … suggestions. (44, 50) 
Wells was prepared to defend his view of the impracticality of eugenics to 
Galton himself at a meeting of the Sociological Society in 1904. He argued that 
Galton’s method of counting the number of eminent people within a family was 
flawed by not taking into account social factors such as “special knowledge of 
the channels of professional development”, while his list of desirable 
characteristics was too simplistic (10). Wells’s conclusion was that “in the all-
round result the inferior usually perish, and the average of the species rises, but 
not that any exceptionally favourable variations get together and reproduce. I 
believe that now and always the conscious selection of the best for reproduction 
will be impossible” (11). On the other hand, the negative eugenics of banning 
the unsuitable from breeding remained an important component of Wells’s 
utopian thinking. In A Modern Utopia (1905), Wells spends some time 
elaborating the fair and humane ways in which the necessarily just government 
of Utopia would ensure the elimination of undesirable elements of society, 
starting with restrictions on breeding for those receiving a minimum wage from 
the government, followed by “social surgery” to deal with lunatics, criminals and 
                                                          
106 Dan Stone argues that “Chatterton-Hill typified early interpretations of Nietzsche” (62). 
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the diseased, and finally, with a touch of glee, segregation of appropriate 
sections of the population to “the islands of the hopeless drunkards” and “the 
Island of Incurable Cheats” (101). The extent to which this is a satire on 
contemporary ideas is unclear, but Wells’s argument to Galton that criminals 
were just as likely to be exceptional people as other sections of the population 
suggests that he was not seriously endorsing such measures (“Discussion” 10). 
More likely his islands were part of A Modern Utopia’s ongoing debate with 
previous utopias.  
 It is clear that Wells, despite his interest in negative eugenics, did not 
turn eugenics into a religion. He showed no interest in breeding for a 
Nietzschean superman and his endorsement of negative eugenics was mainly 
part of a fatalistic acceptance that the “cosmic process” of evolution could not 
be halted or evaded. Like many of his contemporaries, he saw placing 
restrictions on breeding for certain sections of the population as a common-
sense measure that would boost the efficiency of the state. The next section of 
this chapter will explore the consequences of following this line of reasoning. I 
look at how eugenics moved from being an idea discussed by writers of utopian 
fiction and social hygienists to becoming a potential or actual element of 
government policy, and how the dystopian fiction of the 1920s and 1930s 
dramatises the conflicting elements in this debate over eugenics.  
 
5.3 Eugenics and the Scientific State 
  
The First World War can be seen as a turning point for eugenics. 
Soloway describes the Great War as “a eugenics nightmare” which “allegedly 
destroyed the finest physical, mental and social stock in the country” (138), 
leading to numerous schemes to preserve and enhance the genetic heritage of 
the country. In October 1918, Major Leonard Darwin, Chairman of the Eugenics 
Society suggested that the “slaughter of the best types” in the war justified 
imposing wider restrictions on breeding, beyond those deemed “grossly unfit”. 
He recommended propaganda to encourage “the poor to limit the size of their 
families” while promoting “the fertility of the well-to-do” (145-6). Historian Marius 
Turda emphasises the nationalistic aspect of eugenics of this era, arguing that 
“After World War I, eugenics intensified its racial content, accentuating its 
ambition to reconfigure the national community according to hereditarian 
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programs based on the biological selection of valuable racial elements” (“Race” 
6). The imbalance between the male and the female population also led to a 
shift in eugenic responsibility away from women chosing appropriate husbands 
towards more scientific methods of determining optimum heredity, such as 
intelligence testing. IQ tests developed by US army psychologist Robert Yerkes 
became popular within the general population after the First World War and as 
Kevles argues “gave quantitative authority to the eugenic notion of fitness” as 
well as increasing fears over “the heedless fecundity” of those deemed to be of 
low intelligence (84). The post-war decline in population in Europe also led to 
some radical speculation on scientific solutions to resolve the problem. J. B. S. 
Haldane in Daedalus or Science and the Future (1923) predicted the use of 
“ectogenesis”, or embryos fertilised and grown outside the womb. Haldane saw 
ectogenesis as an opportunity to improve the quality of the population through 
artificially breeding from the best people. He predicted that a small number of 
superior men and women would be selected as ancestors for the next 
generation, leading to startling advances “in each generation in any single 
respect, from the increased output of first-class music to the decreased 
convictions for theft” (66). He also joined in the general eugenic refrain of the 
threat to civilization from “the greater fertility of the less desirable members of 
the population in almost all countries” (66-7). Haldane does not mention how he 
would prevent those “less desirable members of the population” from breeding 
in the old-fashioned way, nor how he would select for the best.  
In Icarus or the Future of Science (1924) philosopher Bertrand Russell 
wrote a response to Daedalus in which he expressed his fears that “science will 
be used to promote the power of dominant groups, rather than to make men 
happy” (5). Eugenics was one area of scientific policy he was concerned about. 
He predicted the negative consequences of governments acquiring the right to 
sterilise undesirables: “This power will be used, at first, to diminish imbecility, a 
most desirable object. But probably, in time, opposition to the government will 
be taken to prove imbecility, so that rebels of all kinds will be sterilized” (49). 
Russell also feared that eugenics might be used for political ends, to “breed a 
subservient population convenient to rulers but incapable of initiative” (51). 
Although he was sceptical about the use of intelligence tests, Russell was not 
immune to the scaremongering of his day over differential birth rates, arguing 
that “government opposition to birth-control propaganda gives a biological 
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advantage to stupidity, since it is chiefly stupid people whom governments 
succeed in keeping in ignorance” (47). Despite being a widely travelled socialist, 
Russell was still concerned about maintaining the racial supremacy of white 
nations, fearing that birth control would contribute to a decline in numbers “at a 
time when uncivilized races are still prolific and are preserved from a high 
death-rate by white science” (47). 
Russell’s Icarus demonstrates the conflicting feelings present in the inter-
war debate over eugenics and the adoption of scientifically-informed policies by 
government. Wells’s proposal for a scientific elite that would make the correct 
decisions was proving more problematic than had been anticipated. 
Nevertheless there was enthusiasm for science as a potential solution for a 
range of social problems. Turda calls the emergence of scientism in the post-
war period “a surrogate for religion in an age of increased atomisation of the 
social and political life and emerging totalitarianisms” (Modernism 14). This 
mixture of enthusiasm and fear over scientific progress is manifested by a new 
ambivalence within the utopian genre, leading to the rise of the dystopia. 
Richard Gerber’s useful list of British utopian fantasies of the early twentieth 
century (in the appendix to Utopian Fantasy (1955)) suggests that scientific 
states vied with socialism and reversion to barbarism as the chief influence on 
futuristic speculation. Utopias or dystopias involving a scientific future include 
2010 by Frederic Carrell (1914), a world where science abolishes poverty and 
disease; Rose Macaulay What Not, a Prophetic Comedy (1918), a satire on 
eugenics where the “Ministry of Brains” passes a “Mental Progress Act”; and 
John Sagur (1921) by the pseudonymous Nedram, in which a scientist becomes 
master of the world and produces happiness and prosperity (146-8). Nan 
Bowman Albinski in her study of women’s utopias argues that “During the 1920s 
... anti-utopian satires flourish as they had not since the eighteenth century” 
(75). She also notes that “eugenic science and politics are prominent” in a 
number of anti-utopian satires and dystopias written by women from 1919 
through to 1944. In this section of the chapter, I focus on three examples of 
dystopian fiction from the inter-war years, Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We (1924), 
Charlotte Haldane’s Man’s World (1926) and Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World 
(1932). We and Brave New World both use satire to examine the role of 
eugenics in the development of the scientific state, while Man’s World contains 
the most fully developed representation of day to day life in the scientific 
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dystopia. Man’s World also demonstrates the swing to nationalism in the 
eugenics debate and explores the specific implications of eugenics for women, 
while the works of all three demonstrate what happens when the complete 
resources of the state are dedicated to the social engineering of the population.  
 Karl Pearson’s conviction that statistical modelling could be used to 
make public policy finds a dark reflection in Russian writer Zamyatin’s 1920s 
dystopia We, where life is led with mathematical precision according to “The 
Tables of Hourly Commandments”. Yevgeny Zamyatin had been based in 
England during the First World War, and was well-versed in English literature, 
particularly Wells’s scientific romances. He wrote We in 1920 while living in 
what he referred to as “post-revolutionary Russia”.107 Zamyatin was particularly 
concerned with the impact of state control on the life of its citizens, anticipating 
as Michael Glenny points out the combination of ideology and terror that would 
lead to Stalinism (17). In his dystopia, the “One State” controls every aspect of 
human life in the enclosed city with scientific precision. Sex is only allowed by 
prior arrangement, and the right to the privacy of closed blinds is sanctioned by 
pink coupons. D-503, the narrator, whose initial enthusiasm for the regulations 
of the regime provides much of the satirical humour of the book, finds it absurd 
that any government might allow its citizens to engage in sexual activity 
“[c]ompletely unscientifically, like brutes” (30). For him it seems laughable to 
“know horticulture, poultry culture, pisciculture ... and yet be unable to reach the 
last rung of this logical ladder: child culture” (30). The One State requires 
prospective parents to conform to what it calls Maternal and Paternal norms. 
For example, D-503’s sexual partner, O-90 is not allowed to have a child 
because she is ten centimetres shorter than the Maternal Norm (22). The level 
of precision in the Norms of the One State also evokes the standardisation of 
industrial components, in line with We’s references to Taylorism, the scientific 
management system developed by Frederick Winslow Taylor in his influential 
book The Principles of Scientific Management (1911).108 Taylor’s ideas involved 
treating workers as synchronised components in a rationally organised 
machine. Zamyatin takes this idea further by extending the dehumanising 
efficiencies into all elements of a person’s life, in particular their sex life. The 
                                                          
107 We was first published in English translation in 1924, and was not published in its original 
Russian version until 1952. 
108 See Van Atta for more information on the adoption of Taylorism in the Soviet Union. 
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One State treats love like any other commodity, and attempts to eliminate its 
irrational effects. D-503 proudly proclaims: “Naturally, having subordinated 
Hunger ... The One State launched an offensive against the other sovereign of 
the universe – against Love” (37). In Love and Eugenics, Angelique Richardson 
looks at the scientific rationalisation of love by Galton in his eugenic utopia 
Kantsaywhere and concludes that “passion – an inhibitor of rational choice – 
was edited out of the love-plot” (85). In Zamyatin’s One State sex has been 
“organized” and “mathematized” by decreeing that “Every number has the right 
of availability, as a sexual product, to any other number” (37). Yet the 
suppression of passion and sexual desire is unsuccessful, as it is through 
sexual desire that D-503 comes to rebel against the state.  
 Although eugenics might not have been the primary target of Zamyatin’s 
satire, We shows clearly that applying scientific principles to elements of 
personal life such as sex and reproduction can have a dehumanising influence. 
Brett Cooke argues that "... all a writer has to do is depict a society that 
enforces practices significantly outside the normal range of human activity and 
most human characters, and the reader will feel threatened by dehumanization" 
(126). This process is exemplified by Zamyatin through the image of a 
fantasiectomy, the operation developed by the state to surgically remove the 
imagination. The Benefactor , the head of the One State, argues that the whole 
idea of heaven is a form of fantasiectomy: “Remember, in Heaven they no 
longer know anything of desires, of pity, of love; there you will find only the 
beatified ones, with fantasiectomy already performed on them” (204-5). While 
Zamyatin situates this commentary within an argument, developed from 
Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, of freedom versus happiness, it can also be 
seen as asking the question whether humans would be happier without their 
imagination and unruly passions. Zamyatin’s representation of the lobotomised 
humans as “a humanoid tractor”, mindlessly ploughing through the crowd, 
makes it clear where he sits in the argument. However, D-503 does spend most 
of the novel in a state of sexually-inspired delirium and, indeed, throws away 
everything that he ever valued, suggesting that the argument is not as clear-cut 
as it first appears. As many critics have pointed out We is also a version of 
Paradise Lost, the temptation of Adam by Eve, and the story of humanity’s 
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expulsion from paradise.109 While Zamyatin’s text strongly endorses the 
necessity of leaving paradise, the tension between the chaos of primitive 
society, represented by the rebellious “mephi” who live outside the city wall and 
the infinitely knowable and controlled world of the One State drives the narrative 
forward.110 A sense of mourning for the absurd paradise is epitomised by D-
503’s closing paean to the public lavatory: “There, above ground, everything 
was perishing, the greatest and most rational civilization in all history was 
crashing, while, here, through someone’s irony, everything remained as it had 
been, in all the splendour of its beauty; the gleaming walls; the comforting 
murmur of water; the music also like unto water, crystal clear, its source 
unknown, lending beauty to digestion” (218). 
In Brave New World, Aldous Huxley also presents a world where 
freedom is curtailed in favour of comfort, through a combination of eugenics, 
conditioning and drugs. Breeding for different skills and intelligence levels 
ensures that everyone is well adapted for their place in the workforce; no-one is 
unhappy because they are conditioned to enjoy what they do, and, besides, can 
take “a soma holiday”, the perfect drug escape if anything gets too stressful 
(53). Huxley, like Wells, was in favour of some aspects of eugenics, and was 
particularly concerned about levels of mental health problems. Following an 
alarming report from the Joint Committee on Mental Deficiency in 1929, Aldous 
Huxley estimated that on current trends a quarter of the population of Great 
Britain might consist of half-wits in a century or two, leading him to advocate 
sterilisation (“What” 50). However, in Brave New World, Huxley turns eugenics 
from beneficial to horrific through the Bokanovsky process which industrialises 
human reproduction to produce scores of identikit humans from one egg. Each 
embryo is categorised according to its heredity qualities, then given a range of 
treatments which will stimulate or retard its development. So, in the Embryo 
Store, the Alphas are inoculated against diseases, while the Epsilons are 
deliberately deprived of oxygen or otherwise poisoned to keep them below par.   
The prophet of Brave New World is not Taylor but Henry Ford. Huxley 
was deeply suspicious of mass production and the Fordian assembly line, 
seeing it as dehumanising the workforce by removing the skill of labour. He 
                                                          
109 Richard A. Gregg sees the central myth of the novel as being drawn from the Biblical Story of 
Adam and Eve (1988). 
110 T. R. N. Edwards asserts that Zamyatin takes the part of the devil, seeing Paradise as 
entropy and the devil as life-affirming energy (75). 
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wrote in an essay of 1931: “The machine, say its panegyrists, is a liberator. 
Low-level routine work, such as the machine demands from its attendants, sets 
the mind free.… But free to do what?” (“Sight-seeing” 75). This is indeed one of 
the questions addressed by the hedonistic, but ultimately vacuous world of 
Brave New World, in which Ford’s famous statement that history is bunk is 
taken quite literally. All traces of classical civilisation, religion, music and 
Shakespeare have been removed, leaving a society with no culture, living in the 
moment with the debased entertainment of the ‘feelies’ and games like 
Centrifugal Bumble-puppy.  
 However, the critique of Brave New World is undermined throughout by 
an element of ambivalence. In particular, the eugenically-selected and 
conditioned population of Huxley’s new world is contrasted with John, the 
Savage, a character brought up outside the controlled society of Brave New 
World, and seen as a surrogate of natural man. In a debate with the Controller, 
the Savage claims the right to nobility and heroism, to expose “what is mortal 
and unsure to all that fortune, death and danger dare” (239). Carey sees Huxley 
as being on the side of the savage, concluding that Huxley devised the 
character “to show that the savage’s decency, uprightness, contempt for mass 
values and love of Shakespeare are not just preferable but natural. They have 
the endorsement of uncorrupted Nature” (Intellectuals 89). However, the 
Savage, like D-503, is driven to destruction by his own unregulated passions. 
He is so badly traumatised by his upbringing as to make the abolition of family 
and exclusive love relationships seem almost justified. David Bradshaw argues 
that the Controller is “Huxley’s ideological spokesman” on the stability agenda, 
concluding that “we can now also recognize that Brave New World embodies in 
an absurd and distorted form ideas and opinions that Huxley framed in earnest 
beyond his novel’s satirical parameters” (“Huxley’s” 161, 168). Given Huxley’s 
fears about stability, and his interest in planning, the final sentences of the 
debate between the Controller and the Savage read like a regrettable necessity. 
“What’s the point of truth or beauty or knowledge when the anthrax bombs are 
popping all around you?” is a line given a new lease of life by modern terrorism. 
The courage of the Savage in claiming not just poetry and freedom, but all the 
ills of the world, including cancer, typhoid and old age, turns him into a Christ-
like figure. But the Controller has the last words, saying “You’re welcome” (240) 
and it is hard not to agree with him.  
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 The ambivalence over the scientific state is explored most fully in the 
Charlotte Haldane’s Man’s World which is so completely on the cusp between 
utopia and dystopia that some critics have read it as utopian. Albinski suggests 
that “Haldane intends Man’s World to be read as an eutopia” (80), while Susan 
Squier argues that “the novel may have been intended, and was certainly 
received, as a feminist utopia” though she doubts that Haldane’s original 
intentions can ever be reconstructed (144-5). On the other hand, Elizabeth 
Russell is confident that it is meant to be read as a dystopia (27). The fact that 
Charlotte Haldane had recently met and married the scientist J. B. S. Haldane 
at the time of writing the book also adds a presumption that the writer’s 
intentions were to write a positive novel about the scientific state, as does her 
later work, Motherhood and its Enemies (1927) in which she endorses some of 
the ideas about the importance of women’s role as mothers presented in Man’s 
World. However, it is hard to reconcile the white supremacist activities of 
Charlotte Haldane’s scientific state, which even involve developing a chemical 
weapon that works exclusively on black skin (64), with her background as a 
German Jew, passionately interested in human rights and with a personal 
awareness of anti-semitism.111 Therefore, I will adopt Squier’s approach of 
dealing with Man’s World as a contradictory text, but argue that the conflicts in 
the text go beyond Haldane’s personal difficulties with reconciling feminism and 
scientific discourse, and relate more to her growing uneasiness over scientism 
and its incursions into areas of personal life.  
The opening of Man’s World reads much like a standard utopia since it 
deals with the establishment of the scientific state in purely uncritical terms. The 
state is introduced through a tribute to its founder, the visionary Mensch who 
“accurately foresaw the scientist, not as the perverter nor the destroyer of 
mankind, but as the new director, the inevitable successor to the priest and the 
politician” (4). The discovery of the means to determine the sex of babies prior 
to birth is represented positively as the great breakthrough that makes the rule 
of the scientific state possible through its provision of an unlimited supply of 
“Man Power” (36) and its resolution of the “surplus women” problem. Haldane 
proposed similar ideas on the benefits of gender determination in an article she 
                                                          
111 See Haldane’s Truth Will Out (1949) which opens with a discussion of the impact of the 
Dreyfus affair on her childhood. She claims that the menace of anti-semitism, and exposure to 
feminism were the largest influences on her mind when she was growing up (6). 
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wrote on the subject for the Daily Express in 1924, suggesting that the birth of 
more boys than girls would benefit Britian’s colonial status and ensure that any 
woman could become a mother.112 Squier comprehensively identifies the 
problems with Haldane’s stance from an equality and diversity viewpoint: 
“These meliorist predictions ignore the links between gender and war, the 
implicit racism in the construction of the colonizing project, and the 
phallocentrism of the assumption that only women who are legally married may 
become mothers and that unmarried women are problematic because 
‘surplus’”(140). Haldane’s views in this article, along with the pro-natalist 
argument of her later book Motherhood and its enemies (1927) lend weight to 
the interpretation that she considered the pre-natal gender determination aspect 
of Man’s World as utopian.  
 However, once Haldane begins to introduce her protagonists, it 
gradually becomes clear that the benefits of the state cannot be taken at face 
value. She is not writing a standard utopia, but a dialogic work which, true to the 
dystopian mode, contains opposition to the dominant values enforced by the 
state. The difference is that, unlike Huxley and Zamyatin, there is little satire or 
irony in the representation of the state, and where it is present, it is very subtle. 
Haldane’s critique is contained not in the narrative voice, but in the thoughts 
and actions of the characters, specifically her two main protagonists, the brother 
and sister Christopher and Nicolette, who decide to rebel against the 
stereotypical gender divisions of the state. In the scientific state of Man’s World, 
women have three possible roles which they have to choose between once they 
reach puberty: professional motherhood, neuters (career women) or 
entertainers (artists/ courtesans). This arrangement is represented as being for 
the benefit of women, as they no longer need to play all these different roles, 
leaving mothers free to “produce and rear children” (59). Both the neuters and 
the entertainers are sterilised to prevent unplanned births, while the mothers 
take on the role of propagating the race and making themselves into “perfect 
vessels” (51) or as various characters in the books disconcertingly call them, 
“mother pots”. They are sent to mother settlements where “the mothers of the 
                                                          
112 For a summary of the article see Squier (140). Bertrand Russell also alludes to the idea of 
gender determination in Icarus (1924): “The study of heredity may in time make eugenics an 
exact science, and perhaps we shall in a later age be able to determine at will the sex of our 
children. This would probably lead to an excess of males, involving a complete change in family 
institutions” (10). 
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future might be apprenticed to learn the elements of their craft” (53) and then 
mated with the appropriate partner. Nicolette is not ready to be a mother when 
the time comes to make the choice of career, while Christopher is unhappy 
fitting in with the masculine stereotypes of the society, so they form a plan to 
challenge the right of the state to enforce the choice between mating or sterility. 
On this basis, the story conforms to a familiar dystopian pattern. The characters 
rebel against the status quo, and begin to understand the problems of the 
existing social set-up. They also find out that the state is not as benevolent as it 
seems, when they discover the fate of the community of Exton which was 
ruthlessly eradicated for failing to prevent an epidemic. 
However, Haldane’s dystopian utopia continues to resist simple 
interpretation. For example, Antonia, the mother to Christopher and Nicolette, 
carries out a passive resistance to the requirement to produce another son: 
She carried on all those exercises prescribed to develop the masculinity 
of the growing embryo listlessly. She was not disobedient but rather 
unobedient.... She cheated even in the matters of her diet and her 
exercises. It was a negative rebellion ... but at a time when sex was still a 
matter more or less of experiment and the most stringent precautions 
were necessary in order to successfully to coerce nature, it had its effect. 
(86) 
However, Antonia’s “negative rebellion” is represented as irresponsible rather 
than as a critique of state control of reproduction. The whole process of gender 
selection seems to require an intense amount of discipline, which enhances 
women’s role and puts them in control of what might otherwise be seen as 
purely masculine scientific procedure controlling the female body. As such, the 
women of the book mainly do not want lose their primary role in breeding and 
rearing the next generation. They fear being superseded by “ectogenesis” and 
so collude in maintaining their position in “Man’s World” Even Emmeline, 
Nicolette’s neuter aunt, who has sacrificed her chance of children for her career 
is insistent that the state’s sterilisation policy is right:  
Either you become a mother or you must be immunized. It is the only 
safeguard that must be taken for the future of the race. As soon as you 
abandoned it, children would be born haphazard everywhere, would be 
bred by the pure and the impure; ... it would simply lead to the dirty, 
bestial breeding of the past again. The race would be doomed. (127-8) 
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Nicolette’s rebellion is also undermined by J. B. S. Haldane, or his surrogate 
within the book, Bruce Wayland. Bruce is a charismatic embodiment of scientific 
masculinity, who like J. B. S. Haldane himself is so committed to science that he 
will carry out scientific experiments on his own body. Nicolette falls in love with 
him, and allows Bruce to turn her act of rebellion into another experiment, so 
that she can be reincorporated into the scientific state. Bruce however, has no 
illusions about what the state is doing to manipulate women: “If you invent a 
biological religion, as we had to do for them, and call it vocational motherhood, 
heretics will be as surely attacked by the female inquisitions as protestants were 
by the catholic one” (200). For him though, and for Nicolette under his influence, 
the restrictions are worthwhile in their quest for “a self-conscious race” (299). 
 If Nicolette’s rebellion is ultimately represented as misguided, the 
interpretation of Christopher’s position is less clear-cut. He is the most 
thoroughly conceived character in the book, though not as Elizabeth Russell 
maintains the only person who receives any characterisation at all (18). He and 
Wayland are opposites, not just in their fight for the affection of Nicolette, but in 
the struggle between rationality and emotionalism. Like Zamyatin, Christopher 
does not care for a world where everything is scientifically measured: “You 
people, who go on noting and measuring, measuring and noting, how often do 
you dare try to interpret?” (140). Christopher is not alone in this position. The 
community of Isola, where Nicolette’s rejected suitor comes from, is mocked for 
turning out “the world’s extremely valuable mediocrities according to plan” (132-
3). In what could easily be a parody of eugenics, Isola is describes as being 
founded “by a group of people interested solely in maintaining the highest 
possible temporary average.” Their mating programme aimed for consistency 
not genius resulting in the community becoming “famous as the source of 
brilliant second-raters” (132-3). Haldane, despite her desire to promote 
motherhood, was not in favour of eugenics, arguing: “One would require a 
certificate of psychological purity even in the case of certain scientists before 
one would entrust them with so dangerous a profession as that of human 
geneticist” (qtd. in Squier 153). Another oppositional character, the Jewish artist 
Arcous Weil, also criticises the scientific approach to life promoted by the state: 
“Better and worse, a little, more.... Abolish them as applied to achievement, and 
you lose a mean, a standard. You get mediocrities at once” (155). Weil 
endorses Christopher’s view of the unethical nature of the state: “The leaders of 
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to-day are treating the people as if they were Versuchtieren, and the earth one 
great laboratory” (158). On the other hand, he appreciates the utopian results: 
“Art flourishes, science rules. War and epidemics have vanished, the attitude 
towards sickness transforms pain into pleasure; we can remain young as long 
as we like, and a generation lives and dies together” (158). For Christopher, 
though, the cost of utopia is too high. Individuality has been lost, comfort has 
taken the place of striving, and non-conformity is impossible because any form 
of deviation from the interests of the state is pathologised and cured: “science 
takes him into her loathsome workshops, where she repairs him according to 
the way he ought to go, not the way he wants to” (159-60). In effect, 
Christopher’s rebellion takes the form of rejecting Man’s World’s equivalent of 
the fantasiectomy – hypnosis or drugs to cure him of his supposed abnormality. 
Instead of allowing his mind to be tampered with to fit in with the state, 
Christopher chooses to kill himself by flying his plane without oxygen, soaring 
above the world in a state of mystical transcendence, before plunging to his 
death.   
 The fate of Christopher might suggest that his criticism of the scientific 
state is invalid. Bruce Wayland pronounces the scientific verdict on him, 
describing him as “intermediate sexually” as a result of Antonia’s failure to 
observe the proper procedures for having a son (297). Squier argues that in 
Motherhood Haldane blames the “intersex woman” for undermining women’s 
position by failing to have children. But in Man’s World, the danger of 
Christopher‘s intersex position comes not from his failure to breed, but from the 
autonomy it gives him in relation to the state and its aims: “It was not the 
homosexual body they dreaded, but the homosexual soul; the soul in which the 
seeds of ‘love’ were doomed to infertility, the soul that was sufficient unto itself” 
(Man’s World 282). Haldane views Christopher as a tragic failure, much like one 
of Wells’s doomed victims of evolution, concluding, as Wayland puts it, that 
“there will always be Christophers, and they will always suffer” (299). However, 
for Wayland, the goal of a “self-conscious race” is more important than the 
rights of the individual (299). Wayland’s commitment to this vision and the long 
“experiment begun by the race thousands of years ago” (299) makes Man’s 
World utopian despite its manipulative politics. But the book ends with Nicolette 
weeping for Christopher, even as Wayland drives her along the “shining road” 
leading “back to the future” (299). The suicide of Christopher represents the 
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price that is being paid for this utopia, and maintains the ambiguity of the tone. 
Haldane recognises the inhumanity of the scientific state, but represents it as 
worthwhile for the future of the human race nonetheless. Haldane’s interest in 
eugenics, unlike that of Wells, is more concerned with overcoming gender ratio 
imbalances and improving maternal care, rather than eliminating undesirable 
characteristics. The frequent references to intelligence in the book suggest the 
contemporary interest in testing intelligence, while Mensch, the genius who 
founds the scientific state, evokes not just everyman and humanity, but the 
Űbermensch, or the Nietzschean Over-man. While Wayland, the experimental 
scientist is sympathetically drawn, the technocratic elite who manipulate society 
for what they believe to be the good of humanity, are ultimately chilling. Judith 
Adamson, Haldane’s biographer, suggests that “[t]he novel reflects the extent to 
which Charlotte’s fascination with science had already been undercut by a 
sensible suspicion of the potentially dangerous uses to which it might be put” 
(54).  
In the last analysis, whether Man’s World is classified as utopian or 
dystopian is of questionable significance. Its value is in Haldane’s ability to 
dramatise the appeal of the eugenically controlled scientific state, alongside its 
quite considerable disadvantages. Haldane is more anti-utopian than either 
Zamyatin or Huxley in the sense that Man’s World represents a state based 
solely on utopian ideas. While Zamyatin and Huxley mostly focus on tendencies 
that they dislike within existing societies, the Communism of post-revolutionary 
Russia or the consumerism of capitalist America, Haldane is imagining the 
scientific ideas and values of J. B. S. Haldane and his contemporaries put into 
practice. All three see benefits as well as drawbacks to the idea of a world run 
on scientific lines, but in spite of this, also capture some of the problems with a 
society where individual rights are subject to the demands of the state. In the 
next section, I look at how elements of dehumanisation explored in We, Brave 
New World and Man’s World are pushed to their logical conclusion in Swastika 
Night (1937), in a future Nazi world where women are viewed as animals with 
no function apart from breeding. I argue that in the face of the Nazi nationalist, 
racial and gender prejudices, the dystopian aspects of eugenics and the risks 
for women from an ideology of enforced motherhood become far more evident, 
causing the idea of scientific adaptation of humans in the name of progress to 
lose much of its appeal. However, despite the evident drawbacks to selective 
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breeding, the hopes of evolution making humans more fit for peaceful co-
existence in a future utopian world remained as strong as ever.  
 
5.4 Swastika Night and Nazi Eugenics  
 
In the aftermath of the First World War, G.K. Chesterton described 
Germany disapprovingly as “the very land of scientific culture”, designating the 
former Prussia as “the model State of all those more rationalist moralists who 
saw in science the ordered salvation of society” (113). However, as literary critic 
Geoffrey Winthrop-Young argues, the early historians of the Second World War 
preferred to emphasise the anti-rational forces at work in the Third Reich, in 
order to make a clear distinction between Germany and the Allies (892).113 In 
Winthrop-Young’s analysis of alternate history versions of Nazism, he 
concurred with more recent historians, such as Jeffrey Herf, that the German 
Right combined cultural conservatism with advanced technology to produce a 
reactionary form of modernism that used science to promote nationalism 
(889).114 Historian Robert N. Proctor argues that although the Nazis were 
perceived as being hostile to science, there were certain sciences that 
flourished under the Nazi regime, including genetics, anthropology and various 
forms of racial sciences (so called Rassenhygiene, a racially inflected version of 
eugenics) (5). However, as Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann point 
out, Hitler replaced scientific terminology with more emotive concepts such as 
“maintenance of the purity of the blood” (39).   
In Swastika Night, Katharine Burdekin presents a pseudo-medieval 
society that has largely turned away from science. Instead her future world 
focuses on two elements of Nazi ideology, nationalism, based on German 
blood, and gender discrimination. In doing so, the novel reflects how science 
and universal progress moved away from the centre of the eugenic discourse to 
                                                          
113 See for example Hugh Trevor-Roper’s The Last Days of Hitler (1947) and William Shirer’s 
Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (1960). 
114 Herf argued that “Although technology exerted a fascination for fascist intellectuals all over 
Europe, it was only in Germany that it became part of the national identity. The unique 
combination of industrial development and a weak liberal tradition was the social background for 
reactionary modernism” (10). Burleigh and Wippermann interrogate this dichotomy further to 
conclude that the Third Reich was not a modernising regime, but a regressive one based on 
racial ideology (304-6). In particular, they reject the theory propounded by Götz Aly, Susanne 
Heim and Karl-Heinz Roth that the ‘Final Solution’ was about economic modernisation (18-19). 
For further discussion of modernity and modernisation in relation to the Nazi state see also 
Baranowski and Roseman. 
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be replaced by specifically nationalist concerns over the quality and quantity of 
the population and their use in the competitive arena of warfare. Turda talks 
about what he calls “the biologisation of national belonging” in the Inter-War 
period which resulted in eugenic action to disenfranchise those that were not 
perceived as meeting the biological standards of the nation (Modernism 67). In 
Burdekin’s Nazi state, the female half of the population is excluded from 
citizenship on the grounds of their gender. Whereas in Haldane’s Man’s World, 
women were mated with a view to racial improvement and played an important 
role in bringing up the next generation, in Swastika Night, women are treated 
like animals and have all male children removed from them after eighteen 
months.  
Written in 1937 under the pseudonym of Murray Constantine, Burdekin’s 
Swastika Night seems prescient of the Nazi atrocities that would later come to 
light. In her future world, set over 700 years into the reign of Our Lord Hitler, the 
Jews have been exterminated while women have been turned from human 
beings to “speaking animals” (73), through coercive practices such as close 
confinement, shaved heads, and uniform clothing, not dissimilar to the tactics 
used to dehumanise Jews in the Nazi death camps. Daphne Patai argues that 
“Burdekin’s special insight was to join the various elements of Nazi policy into 
one ideological whole. She saw that it is but a small step from the male 
apotheosis of women as mothers to their degradation to mere breeding 
animals” (“Introduction” xi). Carlo Pagetti adds that Burdekin’s account “also 
brings out a deep connection, in the larger perspective of the narration, between 
totalitarianism and male chauvinism, between the establishment of a strong 
state based on theocratic principles and the inevitable reduction of the female 
component to a totally subordinate role” (361). The racism and anti-semitism of 
Nazi ideology was clearly visible in Hitler’s Mein Kampf (1925-6), which was 
published in abridged form in the UK in 1933, and during the 1930s many 
intellectuals and writers in the UK, including Charlotte Haldane were involved 
with opposition to the Nazi regime.115 Burdekin herself was a keen observer of 
events in Germany, as can be seen by her references to Roehm and Barth, who 
appear alongside Lenin and Stalin as the four arch-fiends in her future religion 
                                                          
115 In her autobiography Truth Will Out (1949) Charlotte Haldane writes: “I gave up my literary 
career, after 1936, to become an active anti-Nazi” (1). 
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of the Holy Hitler.116 Burdekin also gave Germany and German values a central 
role in The End of this Day’s Business, a companion piece to Swastika Night in 
which women rule over men.117  
Patai suggests that “Hitler’s rise to power apparently helped crystallise in 
[Burdekin’s] mind the dangers of conventional notions of masculinity” (x). The 
image of masculinity promulgated by Burdekin’s future Nazi State requires that 
women be submissive and have no possibility of undermining men’s “sense of 
manly dignity” (71) by rejecting their sexual advances. Women’s subordinate 
position is turned into an ideology by the fictional Rupprecht Von Wied, who 
argued that “women were not part of the human race at all but a kind of ape” 
(79) and “that it was the wickedest possible folly to allow an animal (for women 
were nothing more than that) to have complete control over human beings at 
their tenderest and most impressionable period, their infancy” (81). Patai points 
out the similarity of Von Wied’s ideas to those of the Austrian philosopher Otto 
Weininger, whose book Sex and Character (1903) described women as passive 
and immeasurably inferior to men (“Introduction” vii-viii). Burdekin argues that 
the extremes of masculinity fostered by fascism are incompatible with women 
retaining any sense of self-respect or ability to resist male construction of their 
identity. In Mein Kampf Hitler emphasises strength and Nietzschean will-power 
in his vision of Aryan masculinity: “a man of little scientific education but 
physically healthy, with a good firm character, imbued with the joy of 
determination and will-power, is more valuable for the national community than 
a clever weakling” (371). Women’s role, on the other hand, is reduced to a 
responsibility to breed: “The goal of female education must invariably be the 
future mother” (377).   
The other element of Nazi ideology that Burdekin refutes is the 
nationalism of German eugenics. The Nazi regime took the task of maintaining 
the German population very seriously. Himmler set up the Lebensborn 
organisation in 1936 to help the mothers of future Germans receive appropriate 
care and urged members of the SS to father children with racially acceptable 
                                                          
116 Ernst Roehm was a former friend of Hitler’s who was executed in 1934. Burdekin also refers 
to him in The End of This Day’s Business. Karl Barth led Church opposition to Hitler’s regime. 
117 According to Patai, The End of This Day’s Business was written around the same time as 
Swastika Night in 1935. It was not published until 1989 (“Foreword” xx) 
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women (Kevles 117).118 In Burdekin’s future world of Swastika Night 
maintaining the level of the German population is also a key concern. The 
Aryan elite of Knights and Nazis are under pressure to keep up the birth-rate 
and Nazis are punished if they have not had any children by the age of thirty 
(22). More importantly, as the book opens, the German race is threatened with 
extinction because no female babies are being born. Suddenly the devalued 
section of the population gain importance, leading one of the Knights to 
accidentally tell the women to bear daughters rather than sons (13). This 
reversal of the official position is so subversive that the Knight has to pretend 
that the women misheard him, as the whole repressive system is based on 
women being unaware of their power: “If a woman could rejoice publicly in the 
birth of a girl, Hitlerdom would start to crumble” (14).  
Burdekin’s critique of gender relations goes beyond the specifics of the 
Nazi regime, though, to look at how women have colluded in their subjection: 
If men want them to be beautiful they will be beautiful. If men want them 
to have an appearance of perfect freedom, even an appearance of 
masculine power, they will develop a simulacrum of those things. But 
what men cannot do, never have been able to do, is to stop this blind 
submission and cause the women to ignore them and disobey them. It’s 
the tragedy of the human race. (70) 
Like Gilman, Burdekin was interested in what women would be without the 
influence of men. She believed there had never been a time when women could 
be themselves, rather than a reflection of what men made them. In The End of 
This Day’s Business women create their own society, but it is still a repressive 
one, shaped by the need to keep men unaware that they were once the 
dominant gender. Women are secretive and aloof from men, educated for the 
responsibility of running society. All the former history and literature has been 
translated into Latin, which only the women can read. Men are treated like boys, 
given time to play aggressive games, drink and have sex with any women who 
are interested in them. But they have no political power, and are only employed 
to do the more physical jobs suited to their greater strength. The women are 
                                                          
118 For more information on the eugenic policies of the Lebensborn homes see Schmitz-Köster. 
Lebensborn was also involved in the programme to re-Germanise children from the occupied 
Eastern European territories, deemed to be of good Aryan stock. For further information see 
Mühlhäuser and Morawetz. 
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terrified that if men regain power they risk “a return to male violence and 
unreasonableness” (Business 143). Burdekin’s role reversal shows men being 
as anxious to gain favours from women as women formerly were from men. 
Grania, who disobeys the dictates of society by telling her son the truth about 
men’s position, recognises the role of social conditioning in determining gender 
roles: “You can change men or you can change women, almost unrecognizably, 
by sex, shame and starvation of their psyches, but human needs are always the 
same. The human need for the self-esteem necessary for full mental and moral 
development never changes, any more than the animal need for enough food to 
develop the physical body as fully as possible” (48).  
However, Burdekin also sees a fundamental biological difference 
between men and women. Patai points out that “Burdekin clearly assumes a 
direct connection between male biology and violent behaviour” while 
associating “reason and discipline” with women (“Afterword” 181-2). In 
Burdekin’s earlier novel, Proud Man (1934), an asexual ethnographic 
researcher from the future explains female subjection as resulting from male 
jealousy over women’s greater biological importance through their ability to 
have children. He/she predicts that “If women retain their biological importance, 
and become pleased with themselves from birth, and learn to associate power 
with the womb instead of with the phallus, a dominance of females over males 
is not only possible but likely” (31). However, the visitor recognises that this 
would not resolve the problems of the human race, but merely reverse privilege 
in favour of women. Instead, he/ she sources hope in the rise in homosexual 
groups of men and women whose dual nature “physically of one sex and in 
behaviour of another” were “groping, in a very clumsy and childish way, towards 
a more human state of existence” (38). Elizabeth English argues that Burdekin 
sees “a correlation between inverted identities and the promise of utopia” (95) 
and that “for Burdekin the invert is an agitator or revolutionary, pushing forward 
the social, political, and even biological evolution of the species” (104). English 
traces the roots of Burdekin’s argument to the works of early twentieth century 
sexologists such as Havelock Ellis and in particular Edward Carpenter. 
Carpenter argued that the invert represented a higher stage of evolution and 
that far from being sterile was able to originate transformative ideas (105). Like 
Christopher in Man’s World, the invert is “a venerated figure elevated above the 
throng of (heterosexual) humanity by his or her heterodox nature, possessed of 
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an acute understanding of society and the ability to enact social revolution” 
(105). For Burdekin, the route to lasting peace between the two genders is 
either science or evolution. Science, such as J. B. S. Haldane’s ectogenesis, 
could mitigate the biological importance of women, which for Burdekin, unlike 
Charlotte Haldane, represented a positive development: “In this case the root 
jealousy of the male would disappear, and there would be nothing to prevent a 
lasting peace between the sexes” (Proud Man 31). Alternatively, evolution could 
lead to a future society that has evolved beyond the need for sex and gender, 
as depicted in Proud Man, through a perfect fusion of the two sexes. Leonora, a 
woman who befriends the alien visitor, baulks at the idea of a sexless future, 
complaining that “without sex there is no passion or feeling of any kind. No evil, 
but no good either.” Burdekin’s future observer responds that this fear, while 
natural is not a reason to reject evolution: “Naturally, being sexual, you don’t 
want to be without sex. But being reasonable, you should not mind evolution” 
(192).  
Man’s World promoted a racist white supremacist society on the grounds 
of higher efficiency and racial evolution. In Swastika Night, Germans believe 
themselves superior to all nations, including other white Europeans, and 
develop a mythology around the Aryan archetype and Hitler as its 
representative. Haldane contested the scientific rationalism of the state through 
the character of Christopher, who concludes that the religious life is “the 
individual’s sole effective protest against the community. Only in the name of his 
god can man truly rebel against the law of man” (84). Christopher’s religious 
revolt was a source of instability in the scientific state, because science has 
become a religion. However, Burdekin recognises that the Nazis have taken this 
a step further by discarding the scientific trappings of movements like eugenics, 
and turning them back into articles of faith. So, the religion of Hitler has its 
Creed and holy relics in a parody of Christianity, but it is also a conscious 
means of controlling the Germans and their empire. Alfred, the English 
protagonist of Swastika Night, although on pilgrimage to the Holy Places of 
Germany, is already a sceptic. He explains to Hermann, his German friend that: 
“Your Empire is held together on the mind side of it by Hitlerism. If that goes, if 
people no longer believe Hitler is God, you have nothing left but armed force” 
(26). He also expresses a key point for Burdekin, that if the German Knights 
believe themselves to be racially superior, “by blood”, rather than by their own 
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ability, then none of them can be real men, because their position is based on 
that privilege and they do not have to take responsibility for their actions. Blood 
privilege also means that in Burdekin’s Nazi state, eugenics, as such, is no 
longer required as those who are the wrong gender or the wrong nationality are 
automatically stigmatised in a process that replaces scientific justification with 
religion. Turda argues that “eugenicists reinstated the sacred nationalist 
connection between identity and territory” as a result of the rearrangement of 
political boundaries after the First World War (Modernism 69). Eugenics 
became a key to national rejuvenation, through public health measures and a 
protectionist approach to the nation’s genetic stock. However, Burdekin also 
portrays a different type of nationalism, based on geographical distinctiveness 
that she sees as more positive. In The End of This Day’s Business, Grania 
appeals to her friends Anna’s German spirit to help her campaign to liberate 
men:  
But what is a nation? It must be the land itself.... You have the power of 
this land in you, you have the vitality, the tremendous concentration, the 
spiritual strength and hardness of a German person. You can use it for 
the safety and stagnation and injustice and lovelessness of Germany and 
the world; or you can use it for courage, Anna, for growth, for change, for 
love, and for a better life. (152) 
Likewise, Burdekin uses Stonehenge as a symbol of Englishness in both 
Swastika Night and The End of This Day’s Business. Alfred, whose name 
evokes the early English king, Alfred the Great, is attracted to the ancient 
stones of Stonehenge, and hides the book which reveals the secret that Hitler is 
not really a god within a dugout near Stonehenge. It might look like Burdekin is 
replacing biological determinism with geographical determinism, but she is 
making a wider point about individuality, and being true to what you are. Once 
Alfred learns the truth about the subjugation of women, he works out that 
“Everything that is something must want to be itself before every other form of 
life” (107). So women must want to be women and believe themselves superior, 
and men likewise. For Burdekin, the route to good gender relations and an 
improved world is though pride in what you are, or “soul-power”, which would 
prevent any section of the population accepting an inferior position.   
In the end, despite its grim depiction of a Nazi world, Burdekin’s work is 
optimistic. She sees hope for change in Alfred’s understanding of the secret 
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history of his world, and in the preservation of knowledge represented by the 
Knight’s book.119 Similarly in The End of This Day’s Business, although Grania 
is put to death her ideas have been passed onto Anna, and are likely to live on. 
Burdekin is showing that a state based on either male or female privilege will 
not succeed. For her, the goal of evolution is not breeding supermen or 
improving one race over another, but moving towards peaceful co-existence of 
men and women. Fundamentally Burdekin’s analysis is not very different from 
that of Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Although Burdekin’s work is more hard-hitting 
than Gilman’s, as it goes beyond “the condition of woman located within the 
idealization of an Amazonian society” (Pagetti 361), Burdekin echoes many of 
Gilman’s criticisms of war and women’s collusion in their own oppression voiced 
in With Her in Ourland. Burdekin, like Gilman, also uses reproduction as a 
metaphor for women’s position of biological power. Where Gilman’s women 
miraculously provide parthenogenetic daughters, Burdekin’s women decide not 
to replicate their debased condition by no longer bearing female children. In 
both cases, they are asserting women’s ability to unilaterally control what 
happens to their bodies, and reclaim power from men. Burdekin still sees 
evolution as a positive route to improve gender relations. She rejects the 
androcentric values of Fascist societies and their nationalist-oriented eugenics, 
in favour of a vision of evolution as moving towards an integration of the 
genders to produce what is described in Proud Man as a fully human 
consciousness. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The dystopian fiction of the early twentieth century provides a far more 
complex treatment of eugenics than simply warning against its dystopian 
implications. For Wells, eugenics was mainly an aid to human evolution, helping 
along the inevitable extinction of certain unviable types. But, through the 
character of Ostrog, he warned against science without ethics and the capitalist 
exploitation of the masses for profit. Wells also saw the danger of the cult of the 
Nietzschean superman and disputed the value of trying to breed humans for 
                                                          
119 Rosenfeld argues that Burdekin’s portrayal of the good German Knight, Hess “represented 
the belief, still held by many Britons in the 1937, that Germany might still rid itself of the Nazi 
diseases without bloodshed” (37). 
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specific qualities, preferring to imagine a world run by a scientific elite drawn 
from all classes and maintaining some of the energy of humankind’s primitive 
forebears. For Zamyatin and Huxley, writing after the First World War, eugenics 
had become less hypothetical, but it was the Fordism or Taylorism of America, 
the industrialisation of man into the human components of the automated world, 
which concerned them most. Haldane, on the other hand, embraced the idea of 
the Wellsian scientific utopia with professional mothers in charge of gender 
determination. However, her exploration of the reality of this state for those who 
did not conform reveals the true human cost of subordinating personal interests 
to a state run in the name of human progress. Even so, in all of them, there is a 
yearning toward control and scientific organisation, represented by such figures 
as Ostrog, Mensch, the Benefactor and the Controller, and an ambivalence that 
reveals the attraction that programmes like eugenics held for scientific thinkers 
of the early twentieth century. Only Zamyatin and Haldane criticise the negative 
eugenics of sterilisation, through the illicit pregnancies of O-90 and Nicolette, 
showing these policies as invasive and a deprivation of human rights. In 
Swastika Night, written in response to the rise of Nazism at a time when 
eugenics was being used to define national boundaries and determine 
citizenship and human rights, Burdekin critiques an ideology that bases power 
on “blood” and grounds masculinity in physical strength and aggression. 
Whereas Haldane accepted state eugenic control of women’s reproductive 
options as a means of maintaining women’s central role in improving the human 
race, Burdekin showed the consequences of treating women merely as a 
resource for breeding the next generation of men. However, Burdekin also 
rejected the idea of women reversing the power relationship through dominance 
over men, and anticipated a time when gender would no longer be an issue and 
human beings would incorporate the best characteristics of both men and 
women.  
Gary Morson’s definition of the difference between utopia and anti-utopia is 
useful when considering the representation of eugenics in dystopian fiction. 
Morson wrote that “Utopia claims to know, anti-utopia asks why think we know” 
(121). Even where eugenic measures are accepted as necessary to preserve or 
improve the race, or simply to provide stability, dystopian fiction asks more 
questions about eugenics than utopian fiction ever did and exposes problems 
that even the opponents of eugenics do not always consider. Dystopian fiction 
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charts the intellectual history of the concept of eugenics in ways that are not 
always clear from contemporary debates by portraying the human 
consequences of eugenic concepts. The early-twentieth-century dystopia 
moves from the threat of the Nietzschean superman to demonstrating the 
bankruptcy of master/ slave morality, from the technophilia of Wells’s megacity 
and Haldane’s scientific experimenters to reassertion of the individual’s right to 
love and private preference. There is a general antipathy to standardisation of 
human life, but a continued interest in evolution and human progress, thereby 
retaining an element of utopianism even within the most dystopian of situations.  
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6 Eugenics in Eden: the Rise of the Post-War Ecotopia  
The decades following the Second World War saw the emergence of a 
new type of scientific utopianism, based on ecology and environmentally-
friendly technology.120 These “ecotopias” as they became known, a term 
derived from the title of Ernest Callenbach’s 1975 novel Ecotopia, were not as 
hostile to eugenics as might have been expected given the atrocities of Nazi 
eugenics during the Second World War. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
the inter-war years saw an exploration of the dystopian aspects of utopianism 
and a growing awareness that the utopias science might create threatened 
freedom, individuality and basic human rights. Indeed, both Nazi Germany and 
Stalin’s Russia could be seen as the end result of utopian ideas being put into 
practice.121 However, the events of the war also added urgency to the question 
of how to make a better world, spawning new forms of utopianism in the post-
war era, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Kumar 
argues that for all the talk of the death of utopia in the twentieth century, the 
utopia “launched a vigorous challenge” to the dominance of dystopias in the 
second half of the twentieth century (387-8), with the ecotopia retaining “the 
utopian vision and intensity in its conviction that a society organized according 
to ecological principles ... offered the best possible life for all its members” 
(405).122 At the same time, eugenics remained government policy in many 
countries despite the negative connotations of the term, with eugenic 
sterilisation continuing in some states of the USA until the 1960s, and in Nordic 
countries such as Sweden up until the 1970s.  
In this chapter I focus on three texts which illustrate the new 
environmental utopianism of the decades following the Second World War, 
while at the same time indicating the persistence of eugenics in post-war 
utopian fiction. The earliest of these is Walden Two, the utopia of behaviourist 
                                                          
120 According to SF writer and critic Brian Stableford, the term “ecology” was used by Thoreau in 
1858, seven year before being defined as a branch of biology by Ernst Haeckel (259). 
121 Jay Winter describes Stalin and Hitler as major utopians, going on to comment that “the term 
‘utopia’ is now thoroughly discredited by contamination through association with the crimes of 
the great killers of the twentieth century” (72). 
122 Stableford also saw elements of ecotopian desire in the dystopias of the 1940s, such as 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) which, he argues, “retains an element of nostalgic 
Nature-worship in its depiction of Winston Smith’s brief escape to an enclave of rural harmony ” 
(269). Kenneth Keniston, writing in 1960, was less positive about post-war utopian fiction, 
arguing that “utopias have become warnings, not beacons” due to “a more general ‘loss of faith’ 
in the West” (182). 
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B. F. Skinner, published shortly after the Second World War in 1948, which 
demonstrates the transition from the scientific utopia of the inter-war years to a 
more environmentally-friendly, small-scale utopia, set in the real world of 
contemporary rural America. I argue that despite its environmental credentials, 
fear of further world-scale conflict leads Skinner to enforce co-operation through 
behaviourist techniques not dissimilar to those of Huxley’s Brave New World 
and to continue to endorse the concept of eugenics. Eugenics also remains an 
important element in Aldous Huxley’s Island (1962), a utopian novel set on an 
imaginary island in the Pacific Ocean. Pala is the site of an experiment to build 
the perfect society by combining Western science with Eastern spirituality, and 
developing new models for family life and self-realisation through sexual 
freedom and psychedelic drugs. However, this utopia with an ecological 
conscience is still haunted by some of Huxley’s earlier tropes through the 
viewpoint of its protagonist Will Farnaby, who sees the mass of humanity as 
swarming maggots, pointlessly addicted to TV (Island 109-10). I argue that fear 
of overpopulation and the influence of popular culture led Huxley to endorse 
eugenics and seek to use meditation as a new kind of behaviourial control. 
Ernest Callenbach, by contrast, explicitly rules out any eugenic agenda in 
Ecotopia (1975), a utopia based on an ecologically sustainable state in the 
Pacific North West of the United States. Eugenics for him means cloning, 
genetic manipulation and breeding advanced humans, and has no role in his 
steady-state society where even science has an ecological niche. Instead 
Callenbach, in an echo of feminist utopianism, places sexual selection firmly in 
the hands of women, who also have complete access to contraception and 
abortion, primary instruments in the state’s official policy of population 
reduction.  
The argument of this chapter is that, contrary to expectation, eugenics 
and other scientific techniques for managing human behaviour remained 
essential to the imagining of utopia in the decades immediately after the Second 
World War, and even into the 1970s when Ecotopia was written. The increasing 
environmental consciousness of utopian fiction offered a new way of expressing 
hopes for the development of human society which moved utopianism away 
from the discredited totalitarian projects of the pre-war years, while the 
partnership with the natural environment and the science of ecology gave a new 
impetus for considering human development on a species level. I argue that 
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ecologically-inspired utopianism was particularly receptive to some of the 
concerns of eugenics, such as population control and elimination of defective 
genes, as these ideas fitted in with this new version of species survival, centred 
on the environment. I demonstrate, as well, that even within these apparently 
natural paradises there remains the necessity of behind-the-scenes 
manipulation of human nature through eugenics or behavioural conditioning. 
The next section of this chapter provides context for these arguments. Firstly, I 
examine the evidence for the persistence of eugenics after the Second World 
War and then consider the rise of environmentalism and its impact on the idea 
of the ecological utopia. This discussion will be supported by detailed readings 
of Walden Two, Island and Ecotopia in subsequent sections.  
 
6.1 Eugenics and Environmentalism after the Second World War 
 
The Second World War is generally seen as a watershed for eugenics; 
the point at which it was no longer viable to profess support for eugenic policies. 
Kevles shows that the backlash to the mainstream eugenics of sterilisation had 
already begun before the revelation of the atrocities of Nazi eugenic policies 
(118). Soloway maintains a similar position, arguing that “Even before the war 
... the growing doubts about isolating the hereditary components of intelligence 
or other human characteristics from the environmental, had already made it 
extremely difficult to spread the eugenic gospel very widely” (336), while British 
eugenicists’ hopes of using fears of declining populations to keep eugenics on 
the agenda were thwarted by the post-war baby boom (349). Soloway attributes 
the “[f]ailure of the eugenic dream” to the difficulties that British eugenicists 
faced in distancing themselves from what Blacker, general secretary of the 
Eugenics Society 1931-1952, described as “the perverted ‘Nietzschean 
eugenics’ of the Third Reich” (350). Historian of eugenics Pauline Mazumdar 
likewise contends that the eugenics in Britain declined after the Second World 
War, killed off by the break-down of the British class system under the new 
welfare state, stating that: “The loss of the old clarity of the class dimension, in 
public opinion, if not in any other way, meant the end of the British eugenics 
movement” (255). Kevles sees a similar decline in the credibility of eugenics in 
the US, reporting that “Well before Nuremberg, the reports from Germany had 
joined with the scientific, the political, and the religious opposition to turn the 
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tide against eugenic sterilization.... Enforcement of United States sterilization 
laws plummeted sharply in the early forties and was minuscule by 1950” (169).  
However, the German sociologist Stefan Kühl has shown the extent to 
which eugenics continued to survive as both a science and a political movement 
in the years between the end of the Second World War and the 1960s in both 
Europe and the US. In a new edition of his book For the Betterment of the 
Race, translated into English in 2013, Kühl argues that the view that Nazi 
Germany was the only nation to practise racist eugenics, that is eugenics 
“primarily concerned with the genetic improvement of a particular group defined 
by race” (3), underestimates the support Nazi racist policies received within the 
international eugenics community. Kühl also disagrees with Kevles that the 
more racist extremes of eugenics were seen as unscientific, arguing “that it was 
precisely the race-oriented eugenicists who ... in the 1920s and 1930s 
attempted to save the claim of eugenics as true science by intensifying race 
research” (3). Kühl’s research shows that eugenicists were so embedded in the 
scientific community that many of the more prominent racial hygienist of the 
Nazi regime managed to hold onto jobs in German universities as professors in 
human genetics, anthropology and psychiatry after the war (135). The view that 
eugenics disappeared after the Second World War has also been challenged by 
Clare Hanson, who in Eugenics, Literature and Culture in Post-War Britain 
(2013) argues that many supporters of eugenics, such as William Beveridge 
and Richard Titmuss, went on to play key roles in the founding of the post-war 
British welfare state. Hanson examines how eugenic ideas influenced many of 
the policies of the welfare state and traces the links between eugenicists and 
government committees, as well as organisations such as the Marriage 
Guidance Council. She argues that eugenic concepts influenced the debate 
over mental deficiency in the post-war years, inflating the importance of the 
issue, and reviving the idea of poverty being a result of hereditary defects. 
Sterilized by the State (2013), by Randall Hansen and Desmond King, makes a 
similar argument about the ongoing post-war influence of eugenics, but in 
relation to the USA. As in the UK, supporters of eugenics were careful to 
distance themselves from Nazi eugenics, but continued to advocate sterilisation 
and exercise influence over policies relating to population, welfare and birth 
control.  
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Hanson also argues that population policy offered new area for 
eugenicists to pursue their goals. C P Blacker became administrative chairman 
of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and, according to 
Hanson, pursued “crypto-eugenic” strategies to achieve eugenic ends by other 
means (124). In the case of population control this meant promoting 
contraception within Third World nations, ostensibly to improve standards of 
living but also to counteract fears “that the changing balance between races 
could pose a threat to the development of the species” (124). Eugenics and 
population control were similarly intertwined in the US, for example in the work 
of influential ecologist William Vogt, who in Road to Survival (1948) called for 
improved contraception, and incentives for sterilisation, particularly in Asia, 
where he saw the growing populations as backward and a threat to the world’s 
ecosystem (Robertson 53-54). The link between overpopulation and 
environmental degradation became a useful lever for eugenicists looking to 
promote checks to population growth, for, as one letter writer to Eugenics 
Review suggested, “it must be continually driven into people’s minds that the 
various inconveniences and frustrations from which we suffer to-day – 
destruction of the country-side, over-crowded transport, road accidents, noise – 
all have their roots in over population” (Pelly 255). This concern, as historian 
Thomas Robertson argues, led to an “environmental Malthusianism” which 
contributed to the thinking behind the environmental movements of the 1960s 
and 1970s.  
Ecology, the study of the interaction of organisms with their environment, 
became the chief science of the new environmental movement, covering 
interests from pollution to preservation of the wilderness. Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring (1962) offered an exposé of the effects of pesticides on the environment, 
while James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis, formulated in journal articles in the 
early 1970s, developed the idea of a self-regulating Earth. Scientific concerns 
about the environment were underpinned by a growing awareness of the impact 
of people and industry on the ecosystem, and the potential consequences of 
environmental degradation to quality of life. In 1973, the Norwegian philosopher 
Arne Naess coined the term “deep ecology” to encourage a more holistic 
approach to understanding the roots of environmental problems, and to assert 
the value of nature in itself, irrespective of its usefulness for human beings. 
Naess distinguished between “deep ecology” which questions the place of 
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humans in nature and “shallow ecology” which he characterised as mainly being 
concerned with pollution and resource depletion in developed countries.123 One 
of the tenets of deep ecology was that the environment would benefit from a 
lower human population. Popular concerns over population levels were fuelled 
in the late 1960s by Paul Ehrlich’s sensationalist The Population Bomb (1968), 
which suggested that the environmental crisis was due to overpopulation: “Too 
many cars, too many factories, too much detergent, too much pesticide, 
multiplying contrails, inadequate sewage treatment plants, too little water, too 
much carbon dioxide – all can be traced easily to too many people” (44). Garrett 
Hardin in the influential article “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) likewise 
argued that population levels needed to be restricted to prevent pollution and 
environmental degradation, warning that “No technical solution can rescue us 
from the misery of overpopulation. Freedom to breed will bring ruin to us all” 
(1248). 
The increased environmental consciousness of post-war utopian fiction 
provides an additional layer of complexity to arguments about eugenics in 
utopia, since ecological thinking challenges the ideology of progress central to 
the scientific utopia. It could be argued that the concept of a green utopia is a 
contradiction in terms, since utopias have traditionally focussed on developing 
the ideal social and cultural conditions for humans to flourish rather than 
adopting an eco-centric perspective. However, Dutch political scientist Marius 
de Geus argues that “not all utopias portray nature as an instrument for the 
benefit of humanity, nor that humans have the right to dominate nature” and 
goes on to identify “an influential ecological-utopian movement where nature is 
completely respected and not subordinated” (55). His examples of ecologically 
sustainable utopias include the cloistered community of Thomas More’s Utopia 
(1516), Thoreau’s wilderness idyll of Walden (1854) and William Morris’s 
garden cities in News from Nowhere (1890).The wider purpose of de Geus’s 
study is to consider what can be learned from utopian fiction to inform the 
practical discussion of sustainability and argue for the value of utopian thinking 
in offering positive images of alternative societies. Eco-critic Andrew Dobson 
also picks up on the link between ecological thinking and utopia, stating that 
                                                          
123 For Naess’s seven original tenets of deep ecology see “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-
Range Ecology Movement: A Summary” (1973). Naess later developed eight points of deep 
ecology in collaboration with George Sessions in 1984 (see Rothenberg Chapter VII “Defining 
the Deep”). 
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“[t]he Green sustainable society is a Utopian society, properly speaking” (5). 
More recently, sociologist Lisa Garforth has likewise promoted the potential of 
utopian fiction to contribute to reimagining the future in a more environmentally 
conscious way, bemoaning the fact that “there has been little attention to the 
ways in which the reflexive and critical strategies of recent Utopian narratives 
can make a distinctive contribution to radical ecology's social critiques and the 
process of imagining more environmentally cautious forms of society” (393). In 
2013, the journal Green Letters: Studies in Ecocriticism devoted a whole issue 
to Utopias and the Environment (Vol 17, Issue 3). Guest editor Geoff Berry 
endorsed the value of “ecotopian dreaming” (“Guest” 195), rejecting older 
utopian ideas of global abundance that fuel the unsustainable growth models of 
modern capitalism in favour of the utopia of sufficiency identified by De Geus as 
the basis for ecotopian imaginings. Berry sees the critical ecotopia as a vehicle 
for renovation, arguing that “From deep within such an ecotopian worldview, we 
may see fit to release ourselves as a people from the fuel fetish/light 
worship/power dream of perpetual abundance that continues to drive the 
postmodern, global urban marketplace” (“Afterword” 292). In all these 
discussions, ecotopias appear to have transcended their fictional status to be 
regarded as examples of good environmental practice. However, as I show in 
the following sections, the environmental credentials of the post-war ecotopia 
remain debatable, while their credibility as blueprints for a better world are 
called into question by the eugenics agenda of the post-war years.   
 
6.2 Walden Two: A Green Dystopia? 
 
B. F. Skinner’s Walden Two is not dissimilar to the dystopias of the inter-
war years, both in its active adherence to scientific principles and in the 
resulting confusion over whether it should be considered a utopia or dystopia.124 
Indeed, early commentators treated Walden Two with considerable hostility, 
mainly due to Skinner’s advocacy of behaviourial conditioning to achieve his 
utopian aims. For example H.A.L. reviewing for The Journal of Philosophy, 
linked Walden Two to Huxley’s Brave New World and Ape and Essence, stating 
                                                          
124 Glen Negley and J. Max Patrick in The Quest for Utopia (1952) consider Walden Two to be 
dystopian, and Keith M. Booker lists it as a dystopia in Dystopian Literature: A Theory and 
Research Guide (1994). For more examples of both positive and negative responses to Walden 
Two see also Kenneth M. Roemer “Mixing Behaviorism and Utopia” (126). 
208 
 
that: “The mid-twentieth century utopia is horrible, not because it is full of Buck 
Rogers gadgets, but because it is based upon the notion of the systematic, 
planned control of human beings by other human beings...” (654-5). Skinner 
believed that a science of behavioural control was possible, and that through 
manipulating environmental conditions human behaviour could be improved 
more dramatically than via genetic changes. He was an experimental 
psychologist whose earlier publication The Behavior of Organisms (1938) pulled 
together the results of ten years of research on the conditioning of rats. Walden 
Two proposes the use of the same behavioural techniques on humans, and the 
description of how this concept works within the setting of a small community of 
around a thousand people forms the substance of the novel. Despite this initial 
hostility, by the 1970s Walden Two was perceived more positively, and had 
even become the inspiration for a number of intentional communities run on 
similar lines.125 In 1972 Skinner reported that “In the first fourteen years, the 
book sold only ten thousand copies; last year it sold a quarter of a million” 
(“Walden (One)” 1). When Walden Two was reprinted in 1976, Skinner wrote an 
introduction, “Walden Two Revisited”, in which he repositioned it as a response 
to the issues of pollution and consumerism that were high on the environmental 
agenda at the time. My analysis of Walden Two will look at these two facets of 
its reception and consider firstly the link between behavioural engineering and 
coercive practices such as eugenics, and secondly the green credentials of 
Walden Two and the legitimacy of its position as an environmental text.  
The plot of Walden Two is quite minimalist, even for a work of utopian 
fiction. It involves a group visit to the utopian community of Walden Two, and 
largely consists of a dialogue between Frazier, one of the founders of the 
community, and the visitors, in particular a sceptic named Castle, and the 
narrator, Burris, who eventually joins the community. The visitors are given 
privileged access to the community, and look at the usual areas of education, 
economics, governance and the minutiae of daily life. But it is the behaviourist 
elements which excite the most discussion. The visitors hear about the 
behavioural conditioning which takes place from an early age in the form of 
simple exercises in self-control. Young children are trained to defer the 
gratification of eating lollipops, or wait in front of steaming bowls of soup until 
                                                          
125 Most notably Twin Oaks Community in Virginia (http://www.twinoaks.org/). 
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given permission to eat them (98-100). The sceptical Castle considers this a 
form of torture, but Frazier maintains that these techniques help the children to 
adjust to adverse circumstances (101). The purpose of this training is to 
promote behaviours suitable for the community living of Walden Two, using 
experimental practices to find out how behaviour can successfully be modified. 
Frazier declares, in language which echoes the rhetoric of negative eugenics, 
that “when a particular emotion is no longer a useful part of a behavioural 
repertoire, we proceed to eliminate it” (93).   
 Kumar argues that Skinner’s version of conditioning was very different 
from the Pavlovian conditioning of stimulus and response satirised by Huxley in 
Brave New World (354). Skinner’s conditioning, known as “operant 
conditioning”, involved the reinforcing effect produced by the consequences of 
behaviour. Instead of just mechanically responding to stimuli which manipulate 
emotions, “operant conditioning” focuses on the results of the behaviour. 
Desirable behaviour receives positive reinforcement through rewards; 
unsuccessful behavioural strategies are eliminated through negative 
reinforcement. The consequence of this, as Kumar describes, is that the 
environment comes to play a crucial role because “[t]he environment is the 
source not just of the stimulus but of the ‘reinforcement’” (355). Skinner saw the 
environment as acting on behaviour in a similar way to natural selection, 
selecting for certain feelings and traits which enhance survival in the natural and 
social environment.126 However, Skinner’s concept of the behavioural 
modification process was initially more mechanical than biological. Roy Moxley, 
who has written extensively on aspects of Skinner’s behaviourism, points out 
the tension between mechanical determinism and biological selectionism in 
Skinner’s view of conditioning, and argues that Skinner moved from a belief that 
a knowledge of all the variables could lead to absolute certainty to a more 
relativistic post-modern position where truth is provisional, based on 
experimentation and subject to change (“Two Skinners”). A mechanistic account 
of behaviourial modification, based on industrial processes, is still very much in 
evidence in Science and Human Behavior (1953), where Skinner asks: “Why 
should the design of a culture be left so largely to accident? Is it not possible to 
                                                          
126 For example see Beyond Freedom and Dignity (1971) where Skinner wrote: “The role of 
natural selection in evolution was formulated only a little more than a hundred years ago, and 
the selective role of the environment in shaping and maintaining the behavior of the individual is 
only beginning to be recognised and studied” (25). 
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change the social environment deliberately so that the human product will meet 
more acceptable specifications?” (427). 
The concept that the needs of the community take precedence over 
those of the individual is fundamental to the project of behavioural conditioning 
described in Walden Two, leading to the criticism that the individual has no 
rights. Although the residents of Walden Two have joined the community by 
choice, once there they submit to being controlled by the leaders of the 
community who are unelected technicians and specialists who make decisions 
for the majority. This level of control occurs in all aspects of community life. The 
medical practitioners “can place the whole community in quarantine with respect 
to the outside world” and “can ask for personal examinations of the members as 
often as [they] like”(176). Dentists eliminate tooth decay through enforced 
check-ups and fluoridisation. There are no limits placed on what can be tried, 
provided it seems scientific. Babies are grown at the right temperature like 
plants in a greenhouse, with the nursery supervisors explaining that “The 
newborn baby needs moist air at about 88 or 90 degrees” (87). However, unlike 
the baby factories of Brave New World, the conditions are not imposed to 
achieve a specific end result, but have been developed through observation of 
the babies and the conditions that provide the best levels of comfort. All the 
same, M. Keith Booker has a good case when he argues that “the faith shown 
by Skinner in scientific reason comes dangerously close to that shown by the 
rulers of Zamyatin’s One State and many other dystopian regimes” (249). 
 Given the scientific management of all aspects of personal life, it is no 
surprise that Walden Two practices its own version of eugenics. Frazier takes it 
for granted that a certain amount of eugenic care is important, and that family 
life is open to experiment in the same way as other aspects of community life:  
We discourage childbearing of the unfit of course, but that’s all. You must 
remember that we’ve only recently reached our present size, and even 
so, we aren’t large enough for serious experimentation. Later, perhaps, 
something can be done. The weakening of the family structure will make 
experimental breeding possible. (126) 
This weakening of the family structure involves the group care of children, 
designed to prevent strong emotional ties and instead implement scientific 
principles of child care. Marriage happens at an early age, and is based more 
on compatibility than romantic interest. There is even a post of “Manager of 
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Marriage”, responsible for checking the physical, intellectual and temperamental 
suitability of couples for marriage (125). Early marriage is seen as a way of 
resolving the conundrum of allowing women career opportunities while ensuring 
that they carry out their reproductive duties. Women in Walden Two can 
complete their child-bearing in their early twenties, then go on to join the 
workforce. As Clare Hanson points out, women did not juggle child-bearing and 
careers in the post-war era in the same way as today, because they were 
expected to devote their full attention to their children, and so “women’s dual 
role was always conceived sequentially” (27). However, in Walden Two, women 
are also freed from the duties of raising children. Far from representing child-
care as an essential role for the brightest and best women, as Hanson 
describes happening in post-war Britain (31), Skinner sees child-rearing as 
impersonal and scientific.127 For example, Frazier describes the role of the 
nursery worker as being “very close to that of a highly skilled laboratory 
technician” (134) and emphasises that there is no stigma attached to men 
taking on jobs in this area. In Walden Two, Frazier criticises the gendered roles 
of the traditional marriage partnership: “To make matters worse, we educate our 
women as if they were equal, and promise them equality. Is it any wonder they 
are soon disillusioned?” (136). However, even though Walden Two offers 
women the opportunity to have a career as well as children, it is at the expense 
of family life as a whole, and gives scientists the responsibility of raising children 
in laboratory conditions.  
Skinner uses the terms “genetic experiments”, “genetic program” or 
“genetic plan” rather than eugenics in Walden Two, however the concept of 
selective breeding is most definitely alive and well. The communal care of 
children offers the potential for a more radical style of eugenics:  
The hereditary connection will be minimized to the point of being 
forgotten. Long before that, it will be possible to breed through artificial 
insemination without altering the personal relation of husband and wife. 
Our people will marry as they wish, but have children according to a 
genetic plan. (133) 
                                                          
127 Hanson refers to Alva Myrdal and Viola Klein’s Women’s Two Roles: Home and Work (1956) 
which stressed women’s duty “to improve the quality of the next generation” (28) and Judith 
Hubback’s Wives Who Went To College (1957) which “arg[ues] for motherhood as the primary 
duty of intelligent women” (31).  
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Here Frazier is suggesting that genetic connections within families would be 
abolished in favour of breeding to plan from desirable genetic material, though 
there is no indication of which genetic traits would feature in this “genetic plan”. 
Castle criticises the dissolution of family life for “flying in the face of strong 
natural forces”, an accusation that Frazier brushes aside by suggesting that no-
one knows much about “the nature of parental relations” (italics in original) (133-
4). Skinner’s point here is that family relationships are culturally-constructed, 
and therefore scientific breeding plans and separation of offspring from parents 
are no more unnatural than other traditions of family life. However, since these 
practises have no equivalent outside of agricultural practices of animal 
husbandry, Skinner is still side-stepping the issue that they will be perceived as 
being unnatural. It is also clear that Skinner sees behavioural conditioning and 
anonymous genetic heritage as a response to the racial hatred displayed in the 
recent war, arguing that: “The family was only a little race, and it had better go” 
(291).  
Some of the energy and urgency of Walden Two comes from a sense 
that there needed to be changes after the horrors of World War Two. Frazier 
argues that “The competitive talents which have made man pre-eminent – right 
up to the invention of the atomic bomb – aren’t enough for the step he must 
take next” (280). But Skinner’s solution is not very different from earlier utopian 
writers, in that he sees science as the key to saving humankind. Moxley argues 
that Skinner adopts a positivist stance in Walden Two, displaying a belief in 
scientific certainty, a predisposition to unified systems of knowledge and the 
assumption of continuous progress (“B. F. Skinner’s” 20). All of these traits can 
be seen in the character of Frazier, who holds an unshakeable confidence in 
the efficacy of behavioural conditioning and the perfectibility of people through 
this method. Moxley also points out the influence of Wells and Bellamy on 
Skinner, and the relationship between behaviourism and the scientific 
management of Taylorism that Zamyatim satirises in We. M. Keith Booker goes 
further in arguing that Frazier can be seen as being in a “long line of 
“benevolent” dystopian rulers that include Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, 
Zamyatin’s Benefactor, and Huxley’s World Controller” (252).  
Despite these links to the scientific utopia and to a scientific methodology 
associated with the exploitation of nature in the service of human interests, 
Walden Two has rightly earned a reputation as an inspiration for green 
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utopianism. De Geus includes Walden Two in his list of ecological utopias of 
sufficiency and praises the book’s criticism of various alienating effects of 
American society of the 1940s, including consumerism, lack of individual 
agency within the democratic process and the anonymity of large-scale social 
organisations (139-40). Another factor in the perception of Walden Two as a 
green utopia is its evocation of the utopian communities of nineteenth century 
America such as the Oneida Community, Brook Farm or, of course, Thoreau’s 
Walden experiment.128 Skinner states in his introduction to the 1976 reprint that 
he was inspired to write Walden Two by reading Alice F. Tyler’s Freedom’s 
Ferment (1944), an account of “perfectionist movements” in nineteenth-century 
America (vi). Tyler based her account on the books and pamphlets of the 
various political, religious and utopian movements that sprang up in the century 
following American Independence, characterising this period as a time of new 
ideas, experimentation and idealistic enthusiasm for causes and progress. 
Skinner shared Tyley’s sense of the newly independent America as being an 
exceptional site for utopianism: “The founding of America was a unique event in 
the history of the world. Here was a nation which seemed to be explicitly 
designed in advance. Its success induced Americans to set up smaller versions 
of designed ways of life” (“Walden (One)” 2). The strong link between Walden 
Two and actual nineteenth-century utopian communities is signalled by the fact 
that Walden Two is situated neither in an imaginary future nor in a 
geographically remote region, but in a rural area of mid-twentieth-century 
America. As critic Kenneth M. Roemer says: “All it takes to get to utopia is the 
price of bus and train tickets and a few bumps endured while traversing a rural 
road in a station wagon” (129). Moreover, by naming his book after Thoreau’s 
Walden, Skinner was referencing one of America’s most highly regarded writers 
on the natural environment. Walden is the account of Thoreau’s experiment in 
self-sufficiency, living in a cabin he built for himself at Walden Pond, near 
Concord, Massachusetts. Thoreau spent over two years in the cabin, living off 
the land and some occasional lecturing work, simplifying his life down to what 
he saw as his true needs: “Food, Shelter, Clothing and Fuel” (Walden 11). De 
Geus describes Thoreau’s Walden as “a hymn to the nature around his forest 
                                                          
128 Roemer points out that Skinner’s undergraduate college “was located near the site of John 
Humphrey Noyes’s Oneida Community” while Skinner grew up in Susquehanna, Pennsylvania 
near to where “Joseph Smith dictated the Book of Mormon and the Harmony settlement” (130). 
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hut”, and praises Thoreau’s non-instrumentalist view that “nature was not 
created to be a possession of man, but exists in and of itself, and deserves to 
be treated with affection” (80). Skinner was undoubtedly a Thoreau enthusiast. 
In a speech read at the Thoreau Society in 1972, he described his love of 
Thoreau’s work and his personal connection to Walden through living in 
Harvard and visiting Walden Pond (“Walden (One)” 1).  
Still, the extent to which “back to basics” was at the heart of Skinner’s 
concept for Walden Two remains debatable. Certainly, one of his central 
arguments is that it is possible to live well on working only four hours a day if 
the whole community is involved. However, the technology to support this 
includes cars and trucks, radio sets, modern agricultural equipment and labour-
saving devices such as dishwashers. Admittedly, Skinner justifies this use of 
machinery on the grounds that the sharing of communal community resources 
leads to a far lower level of consumption than if they were owned by individual 
families. His argument, though, is not primarily about consumerism, but about 
time. Freeing up time for creative activities is as much the aim of the community 
as reducing their environmental footfall. Relaxation is valued, so long as it has 
an educational benefit. Art, science, music, physical activities and debates are 
all encouraged to combat what Skinner perceived as a value-free lifestyle of 
modern America engaged in “the blind struggle to ‘have a good time’, or ‘get 
what we want’”(148). However, Skinner does not link this rejection of modern 
culture to loss of contact with nature as later environmental writers would.129 
Instead, he seems more interested in the self-fulfillment that comes from 
“sports, hobbies, arts and crafts” and a curiosity about the world (148).130  
De Geus argues that “A multitude of subtle clues in the text of Walden 
Two suggest a profound interest in the theme of nature and the environment” 
(149). These include re-using and repairing materials and designing for energy 
saving, practices which suggest an environmental awareness, but also a desire 
for efficiency and thriftiness. Love of nature for its own sake is much less 
evident. There are pleasant walks to the pond, which the children use as a 
swimming environment, and ingenious devices to allow sheep to be deployed in 
                                                          
129 For example, eco-philosopher Chellis Glendinning wrote in a 1992 essay: “I believe Western 
culture is suffering from “Original Trauma”, caused by the systemic removal of our lives from 
nature, from natural cycles, from the life force itself” (37) 
130 However, see also Stableford’s discussion of the association between hedonism and 
ecocatastrophe in the early twenty-first century (277). 
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lieu of lawnmowers, but little place for wilderness or wild animals. Nature is a 
resource like everything else in Walden Two. If it needs to be protected then the 
inhabitants will be conditioned to value it, but there is little sense of Thoreau’s 
enthusiasm for observing and appreciating nature. Frazier is described as being 
fascinated by “trade treaties with nature” (18), that is to say the small ways in 
which the natural environment can be used to enhance the built environment of 
Walden Two, such as using a pine grove to screen the workshops from the 
sleeping quarters (17-18). While this interest in using natural materials in the 
design for Walden Two shows an environmental sensibility, the focus is still on 
valuing nature for what it can do for humans, rather than in its own right. 
Skinner seems to be aware of this lack in his protagonist. Burris comes to the 
realisation that while Frazier dreams of “economic structure and cultural design” 
he is out of touch with reality: “I thought of Emerson at Brook Farm, tilling the 
soil for the love of it, and I felt a sudden sharp concern that Walden Two might 
have some fatal flaw” (71). Burris is reassured by the practical competency of 
the dairyman milking the cows, but Frazier’s own relationship to the simple life 
he recommends remains problematic. Frazier is an unusual representative of 
utopia, as he is awkward, often angry or frustrated, and not always able to 
persuade others of his point of view. This characterisation was a deliberate ploy 
by Skinner, who tried to avoid Frazier simply coming across as a mouthpiece for 
his ideas by giving him what he called “negative charisma” (qtd. in Roemer 
135). Skinner also uses Frazier’s maladroitness to counter the suggestion that 
Frazier was some kind of fascist-style dictator with a personal following of his 
own. Walden Two was written in 1945 just after the defeat of Hitler, and bears 
the marks of this era in Frazier’s determination to disclaim any similarities to 
Hitler’s cult of personality (218). Nonetheless, Frazier does see himself as a 
God-like figure, claiming that the creation of Walden Two “was closer to the 
spirit of Christian cosmogony than the evolution of the world according to 
modern science” (281) and that it was more deliberately planned than any of the 
outcomes of evolution. Frazier is shown at the end of the book viewing the 
community from afar through a telescope, “examin[ing] various details of his 
handiwork” (282). However, Skinner makes it clear that Frazier is not a product 
of Walden Two, and therefore his shortcomings are those he brought with him 
into the community. Frazier admits that “No one is more competitive – more 
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aggressive – than I” (280). He is not meant to be Thoreau or Emerson, as that 
will be the role for the next generation.  
Literary critic Harvey L. Gable Jr. argues that in terms of relationship with 
nature “Walden Two is essentially a post-modernist utopia” (2), conforming to 
Fredric Jameson’s declaration that “To do away with the last remnants of nature 
and with the natural as such is surely the secret dream and longing of all 
contemporary or post-contemporary, postmodern thought” (46). Gable argues 
that for Skinner nature is an invisible infrastructure which needs to be controlled 
in order for his experiments to work: “the primary goal of the reformer is to 
disintegrate (human) nature, because nature is inconvenient when it conflicts 
with the cultural values one wishes to instill” (2). However, Skinner’s view of 
nature is more real than Gable’s postmodern paradigm would suggest. Nature 
is more than just another element of the cultural environment of Walden Two, 
but is its real, and possibly only, adversary. The efforts of behaviourism are 
directed towards creating a co-operative culture where the sum of happiness is 
more important than that of any individual, and so any competitive urges are 
channelled into a battle against nature rather than against other people. 
Competitiveness, as noted earlier, has become a disadvantage to human 
development and needs to be eliminated, or changed into a “noncompetitive 
intelligence” (280). Walden Two is designed to be a community where co-
operation will provide an environment in which everyone can flourish. So, 
competitive sports are banned, and praise is given to “those who dive with 
exceeding grace, or polevault at a high setting of the bar. Their achievements 
are triumphs over nature or over themselves” (222). The same applies to 
education, where Frasier states that “[w]e carefully avoid any joy in a personal 
triumph which means the personal failure of somebody else.... Triumph over 
nature and over oneself, yes. But over others, never” (103). Interestingly, 
Skinner includes dogs in this co-operative culture. Frazier argues that “The co-
operation of man and dog is very different from the slavery of man and beast”, 
proposing the former as the model for progress. So for Skinner, “the urge to 
control the forces of nature” (116) is an important motivating force for the well-
adjusted, trauma-free citizens of Walden Two, providing an incentive for 
working hard in a non-competitive environment.  
 Although co-operation can be seen as a positive trait from an 
environmental point of view, the conditioning of children in the novel to prevent 
217 
 
competitiveness risks lack of diversity. As James W. McGray points out, “their 
training has exorcised a number of behavioral possibilities. It is impossible for a 
Walden Two product to be competitive, wild, perverse, heretical, impulsive, 
jealous, etc.” (21). But for him, this early training is justified on the grounds that 
there is an urgent need to “provide an alternative to our uncontrolled, chaotic, 
and competitive social structure” (22). Kumar, on the other hand, feels that the 
loss of diversity through conditioning is a serious problem: “The more 
successfully a species or society adapts to the current environment, the less 
store of diversity it preserves to meet future contingencies.” He concludes that 
with every suppression of unnecessary character traits by a rationalising elite 
“the species or society launches itself further along the path to extinction” (376). 
Nevertheless, Skinner’s experimental ethos includes a strong survival instinct, 
for example in the refusal to limit the birth rate, which is one way of ensuring the 
diversity and continuation of the community. He overcomes potential objections 
to overpopulation by arguing that “It’s no solution of the Malthusian problem to 
lower the birth rate of those who understand it.” (126). However, by the time that 
Skinner wrote “Walden Two Revisited” for a new edition of his novel in 1976, he 
accepted the need for limiting populations in order to save resources for the 
future, arguing that “It should be easy to change the birth rate in an 
experimental community” (xi).   
In the same essay, Skinner referenced E. F. Schumacher’s Small is 
Beautiful (1973), recommending a network of small towns or Walden Twos to 
deal with some of the “ills of bigness” caused by large cities (ix-x). A Bueprint 
for Survival (1972), an influential document from the editors of the Ecologist, 
makes similar suggestions, proposing decentralisation into small communities 
of around 5,000 people, divided into neighbourhoods of around 500 to allow for 
local decision-making, sense of community and small-scale self-sufficient 
farming. In this respect, Walden Two could be seen as the very model of the 
1970s environmental community, and forward-thinking despite its roots in the 
pre-war philosophies of scientific rationalism. However, Skinner’s commentary 
on Walden Two in the 1970s shows a much greater environmental awareness 
than the original text and a tendency to proclaim himself as an environmentalist 
avant la lettre, for example in his realisation that “Walden Two is not only 
minimally consuming, it is minimally polluting” (“Walden (One)” 2).  
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 Skinner addresses some of the same issues over scientific control and 
rationality versus freedom and emotion that Zamyatin raises in We, but believes 
that human passions can be redirected through conditioning, rather than turning 
out the mindless robots of Zamyatin’s “fantasiectomy”. Skinner wrote Walden 
Two to show that behaviourism could safely diffuse human passions and 
emotions without harming the individual’s ability to live, love and create art, 
though he did struggle with the fact that it also turned people into obedient and 
uncritical citizens. In an article entitled “What’s Wrong with Walden Two” (2009), 
Pedro Alexis Tabensky argues that the main problem with Walden Two is not 
lack of individual control over the conditions of life in the community but too 
much control. While Skinner’s drive to eliminate danger from his community is 
understandable in the immediate aftermath of World War Two, it is not just the 
extent of control that is the problem, but the illusion that all of life can be 
controlled. Walden Two noticeably contains no sick and dying people. Skinner 
has designed a world still based on the belief that with enough knowledge, 
science can dominate all the forces of nature.   
Two factors distinguish Skinner’s utopia from earlier scientific utopias. 
Firstly, the emphasis on continuous experimentation; although Charlotte 
Haldane makes heroes of the pioneering self-experimenting leaders of her 
society, it is on an individualistic basis in the cause of transcending humanity, 
whereas Skinner’s experimentation covers every facet of daily life. Science is 
not didactic, but provisional. Secondly, like Bellamy, Skinner’s belief in the 
benefits of co-operation and small-scale communities leads to a more 
environmentally-friendly version of the scientific utopia. He is resolutely anti-
racist in his approach, and has no interest in setting up a world state or 
enforcing political control. Although human culture takes priority over nature in 
Walden Two, working with the natural world is seen as important for the benefits 
that humans can gain, and in Frazier’s fascination with “trade treaties with 
nature” there is the beginning of an understanding of what might be gained from 
including the natural world in the ideal utopian community rather than trying to 
eliminate it. Finally, although eugenics remain a factor in the life of Walden Two, 
environmental conditions are recognised as being of major importance, and 
there is a confident inclusiveness in the idea that, whatever their background, 
humans can be trained to live well together. 
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 In the next section I explore the ecological credentials of Aldous 
Huxley’s Island (1962) and argue that Huxley’s view of nature is as 
anthropocentric as Skinner’s. However, while Huxley, like Skinner, proposes to 
perfect human nature through a mixture of eugenics and other forms of 
conditioning, he also acknowledges an individual responsibility in this process, 
an element that is absent from Skinner’s operant conditioning. This change 
reflects the shift in the conception of eugenics after the Second World War from 
state-enforced programmes for improving population to individual genetic 
interventions, where, as sociologist Nikolas Rose argues, “The norm of 
individual health replaced that of the quality of the population” (12).   
 
6.3 Aldous Huxley’s Island and the Path to Ecological Enlightenment 
 
Aldous Huxley’s Island is often seen as the utopian counterpart to Brave 
New World, or as Huxley himself put it “a kind of reverse Brave New World, 
about a society in which real efforts are made to realize human potentialities” 
(qtd. in Beauchamp 59). There is also a tendency to see Island as representing 
the peak of Huxley’s wisdom, his conversion from cynical satirist to wise 
humanist. June Deery, writing on Huxley and mysticism in 1996, proposes that 
although most people associate Huxley with the dystopian Brave New World, 
“the eutopian Island is one of his most important works, as I believe a new 
generation is about to discover” (7). Its position as Huxley’s last novel also 
confers on it a status of defining work, crucial to the understanding of Huxley’s 
later work. Charles Holmes suggests “It comprises his answers to all the 
questions raised in his earlier works, with greater consistency and unity than 
ever before” (197-98). Island also benefits from its reputation as a green utopia 
containing an early criticism of the environmental destruction caused by 
capitalist industry. De Geus includes it in his survey of ecological utopias as an 
attempt at “an ecologically stable society in which nature and environmental 
conservation are given priority” (153), while Werner Christie Mathisen discusses 
it as “an important green literary ecotopia” alongside Le Guin’s The 
Dispossessed and Callenbach’s Ecotopia.131 There is no doubt that Huxley saw 
                                                          
131 Tom Moylan, writing a new chapter on Island for the 2014 reprint of his classic text Demand 
the Impossible: Science Fiction and the Utopian Imagination, also sees it as a precursor to the 
environmentally conscious critical utopias of the 1970s, only held back by its lack of self-critique 
220 
 
it as an important work too. The manuscript for Island was one of the only things 
he rescued when his Californian home caught fire in 1961, and his 
disappointment at it not being better understood or appreciated is documented 
by his second wife Laura Archera Huxley.132 However, despite the dichotomy 
set up between the dystopian Brave New World and the utopian Island, there 
appears to be more continuity between the ideas that occupied Huxley in Brave 
New World and those he develops in Island than is generally supposed. For 
example, despite the thirty years between the two books, the events of the 
Second World War, and Huxley’s move to the USA, he was still concerned with 
declining IQs, excess population growth and the negative influence of popular 
culture, and he still regarded eugenics as crucial for the development of the 
human species. This section of the chapter will consider whether these 
concerns which appear more characteristic of the 1930s than the 1960s are 
simply old ideas refreshed with a dash of fashionable experimentation into 
mind-expanding drugs and ecological politics, or whether there are significant 
changes in Huxley’s world view which impelled him to move away from the 
dystopianism of Brave New World and the post-war devil-worshipping society of 
Ape and Essence (1948) to express his ideas in the utopian mode.  
Huxley began work on Island in 1956, although according to George 
Woodcock, “all his work during the decade from 1952 to 1962, even where it is 
not a deliberate preparation for Island, in fact leads towards that novel” (223). In 
1958 Huxley wrote to his frequent correspondent Dr. Humphry Osmond that he 
was working on a “phantasy about a society in which serious efforts are made 
to realize human potentialities” (“Letter 793” 850) , though he had doubts 
whether he yet had a “satisfactory fable” which would appeal to readers 
reluctant to tackle “material which isn’t straight story telling”. Noticeably, the one 
word Huxley does not use to describe his otherwise difficult to classify story, at 
this point, is utopia.133 For Huxley, one of the key features of the story is that 
                                                          
and political engagement, and its “resigned stance that better serves an anti-utopian rather than 
a utopian imaginary” (221). 
132 Contemporary reactions to Island were mixed. Most found the ideas interesting but the story 
rather dull, and were clearly nostalgic for the earlier version of Huxley, valuing his “energizing 
disgust” (Kermode qtd. in Watt 454) and his “high-spirited and debonair satirical poise” (Furbank 
qtd. in Watt 449). For a range of reviews see Watt, Aldous Huxley: The Critical Heritage, 446-
58.  
133 By 1959, Huxley does refer to Island as a “Utopian Novel” in a letter to his son Matthew, but 
hopes that it will be better than previous utopias: “For most Utopian book have been 
exceedingly didactic and expository. I am trying to lighten up the exposition by putting it into 
dialogue form, which I make as lively as possible” (“Letter 819”). 
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this society could really exist, even if only at a certain time, and in a certain 
place. As he writes to Osmond: “The locale of the story is a hypothetical island 
between Ceylon and Sumatra – independent in spite of colonialism, where the 
process of turning an old Shiva-ite-cum-Mahayana-Buddhist society into 
something combining the best features of East and West was inaugurated in the 
eighteen-forties”(“Letter 793” 850). This setting offers Huxley the opportunity to 
imagine a society based both on Western science and Eastern religious 
practices, in a location sufficiently isolated to demonstrate its potential over a 
number of generations. Huxley’s concern that the society he describes should 
be believable is underlined by the quotation from Aristotle he uses as an 
epigraph to Island: “In framing an ideal we may assume what we wish, but 
should avoid impossibilities” (6).   
The plot of Island is quickly summarised. Journalist Will Farnaby is 
washed ashore on the mysterious island of Pala with a mission to act as a 
representative for his editor’s oil interests. He is taken around the island, to 
learn the details of its systems of education, technology, healthcare and family 
life, but more importantly goes on a personal journey from sceptic to convert to 
the Palanese way of life. Will’s damaged emotional past is healed by the 
recently-widowed Susila, who encourages him to move from a cynically 
destructive attitude to life, to a realisation that guilt and fear of death can be 
overcome by living a positive, accepting life in the present moment. Will also 
rejects the false spiritualism and consumerist values represented by the Rani 
and her son, Murugan, the heir to the Palanese throne, who are the main 
targets of Huxley’s satire. Will’s visit culminates in him taking the “moshka-
medicine”, the psychedelic drug which underpins the spiritual life of the island, 
just as the invasion by neighbouring dictator Colonel Dipa begins to take place.   
One of the more striking dichotomies in Island is that while the 
inhabitants of Pala deliberately refuse to act against the looming threat of 
military invasion, they expend time and energy on perfecting all other aspects of 
their life, including planning for their genetic future. Will Farnaby visits a typical 
Palanese family and discovers that the couple’s baby is genetically related to 
the mother, but not the father. Technology for Artificial Insemination by donor 
(AID) has reached the stage where parents can go to the sperm bank and 
choose a talented individual as father, whether to enhance the genetic diversity 
of their family or to avoid inherited diseases. Ethical objections to this process 
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have been overcome in an original way by treating AID as a scientific 
manifestation of karma. Those who have lived a good life will be reincarnated 
through their genes, a process which is aided by good genealogical records and 
a central bank of “[s]uperior stocks of every variety of physique and 
temperament” (188). Watt argues that “The notion of an artificial stock of babies 
perhaps at first recalls, disturbingly, the bottled babies of Brave New World. But 
the crucial difference, for Huxley, is that in the earlier novel the State completely 
and ruthlessly controlled production, whereas in Island the decision to try AI and 
the choice of the stock rests entirely with the parents” (154). While freedom 
from state control and personal responsibility for genetic choices demonstrates 
a significant change, it could be argued that peer pressure represents another, 
more subtle form of coercion in a society where, as Farnaby learns, “most 
married couples feel that it’s more moral to take a shot at having a child of 
superior quality than to run the risks of slavishly reproducing whatever quirks 
and defects may happen to run in the husband’s family” (188). AID also 
suggests a low tolerance for the normal variations that arise in the population, 
and a preference for some degree of genetic perfection. Lambert 
Schmithausen, an expert in Buddhism, agrees with Watt that AID is acceptable 
when it is “dependent on the free decision of individual couples” as well as 
feeling that its eugenic aims are justifiable providing they are for “improving the 
race” (167). This cautious approval highlights another problem with Huxley’s 
use of artificial insemination in Island, which is that whereas Brave New World 
offers a satirical critique of such eugenic measures, Island seeks to persuade 
the reader of their importance. Clare Hanson points out the similarity of the 
Palanese programme to Hermann J. Muller’s proposals for freezing and storing 
sperm from superior donors to offer ‘germinal choice’, a suggestion which 
Huxley’s brother Julian was also enthusiastic about (Hanson 77, 128). Although 
Muller was primarily concerned about the accumulation of individual genetic 
defects in the human population, his programme also addressed the traditional 
eugenic concern with differential reproduction which in his view favoured the 
“clumsier, slacker, less provident” over the “better endowed” (Muller 252, 254). 
Muller’s main aim was to initiate a new form of eugenics to deal with the 
increasingly complex challenges of preserving democracy, which he believed 
required “higher, more widespread intelligence and co-operative propensities” 
(261).  
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Huxley expressed similar concerns about differential reproduction in “The 
Double Crisis” (1950), arguing that “Within any nation whose birth-rate is 
declining, there is a tendency for the decline to be most rapid among the most 
accomplished and gifted members of the population, least rapid among those 
whose hereditary and educational endowment is the lowest” (232). Indeed, one 
of the main aims of the Palanese eugenics programme is raising average IQs, 
and avoiding the dysgenic effects of improved healthcare, summarised as: 
“Better medicine – more congenital deficiencies preserved and passed on” 
(188).134 However, it is unclear why it is so important to have a high IQ in the 
kind of society that Huxley describes on Pala. If, as Farnaby is told, the purpose 
of education on Pala is “For actualization, for being turned into full-blown human 
beings” (202), then raising IQs seems largely irrelevant. Huxley even introduces 
a character to demonstrate the lack of relevance of intelligence to this goal. The 
librarian, Leela Rao, asserts: 
Pala’s the place for stupid people. The greatest happiness of the greatest 
number - and we stupid ones are the greatest number. People like Dr 
Robert and Vijay and my darling Ranga – we recognise their superiority, 
we know very well that their kind of intelligence is enormously important. 
But we also know that our kind of intelligence is just as important. (185)  
Huxley’s recognition of a different form of intelligence, however, as this quote 
suggests, is somewhat half-hearted. The superiority of the type of intelligence 
measured by IQ tests is still taken for granted, and the benefit to society of 
really intelligent people is never questioned. Huxley also supports the kind of 
specialist education that produces nuclear physicists or philosophers, arguing: 
“No specialization, no civilization” (209). But, Huxley makes clear specialisation 
needs to be combined with a rounded education in order to avoid the “academic 
monsters” of the European education system. Certainly Huxley sent his own 
son Matthew to the experimental co-educational Dartington Hall School, which, 
as David Parsons argues, may have been a source of inspiration for the more 
holistic educational system on Pala.135 
                                                          
134 Julian Huxley made a similar point in the 1962 Galton Lecture (Hanson 77) 
135 Dartington Hall School, founded by Dorothy and Leonard Elmhirst, was inspired by the 
principles of Rabindranath Tagore who “wished to devise an educational system combining 
traditional Hindu religious philosophy and ideals of living with the rudiments of Western scientific 
knowledge and practical work experience” (Parsons 11), in other words a similar synthesis to 
the one that Huxley explores on Pala. For further information on Dartington Hall and its 
connections to the Huxley family see also Michael Young The Elmhirsts of Dartington (1982). It 
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 When Huxley wrote about “Education for Freedom” in Brave New World 
Revisited (1959), his concerns centred on the ease with which propagandists 
could manipulate people, and the lack of understanding of genetics. He 
criticised behaviourism in general for its focus on environmental factors, and 
Skinner’s work in particular for dismissing in less than a page the “genetic 
factors determining human behaviour” (139). Huxley argues that government 
and business still want the standardised human product of Brave New World, 
and will attempt to achieve this “through all the mind-manipulating techniques at 
their disposal” (145). Education for freedom, in Huxley’s view, needs to correctly 
recognise the diversity and genetic uniqueness of individuals, but more 
importantly, train people in “propaganda analysis to preserve them from an 
uncritical belief in sheer nonsense” (148). Huxley also argues that freedom, love 
and intelligence are necessary for the preservation of society, claiming that 
without intelligence “love is impotent and freedom unattainable” (149). In other 
words, intelligence is the sine qua non for the other social attributes that Huxley 
finds important.  
 However, by the time Huxley wrote Island he had developed some ideas 
for alternative methods to combat irrational propaganda, which rely on neither 
freedom nor intelligence, and seem more closely related to the behaviourism he 
rejects in Brave New World Revisited. For example, in Island, babies are 
conditioned to love people or animals by being caressed while being fed, a 
process which is described as “pure Pavlov”, but which, Huxley argues, can be 
used just as effectively for “friendliness and trust and compassion” as for 
“selling cigarettes and vodka and patriotism” (Island 190).136 Once at school, 
children are taught breathing games to train them to redirect anger (206-7), as 
well as “Destiny Control”, to bridge “the gap between theory and practice” in 
resolutions and actual behaviour (96). The visualisation techniques of Destiny 
Control are supposedly powerful enough to give “completely painless childbirth” 
to the trained practitioner (98). Children are also tested for their susceptibility to 
propaganda, or a predisposition to misuse power. In Island these last are 
                                                          
is also interesting to note that Aldous Huxley’s own mother, Julia Arnold (niece of Matthew 
Arnold), founded a girl’s school, Prior’s Field School, while Huxley himself was a co-founder of 
Happy Valley School in California. Huxley also addresses the issue of specialist versus trans-
disciplinary education in “Integrate Education” in The Human Situation (1959). 
136 In The Human Situation Huxley credits Margaret Mead as the source of the idea for positive 
conditioning from her description of the Arapesh tribe in New Guinea (244). 
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categorised into what Huxley refers to as “two distinct and dissimilar species – 
the Muscle People and Peter Pans” (150-1), exemplified by Joseph Stalin and 
Adolf Hitler. Once identified, the Peter Pan types are cured by “early diagnosis 
and three pink capsules a day” (152), while the Muscle People are trained to be 
“aware and sensitive” and to sublimate their energy into strenuous activity 
(154). Huxley’s argument is that biochemistry is a major determinant of 
delinquent and bullying behaviour, and that abuse of power is not so much a 
social problem as a physiological one with “its roots in anatomy and 
biochemistry and temperament” (155).137 On Pala, therefore, crime is either 
prevented through medicine and education, or when it does occur, is treated by 
therapy.   
 The other key element of social conditioning is meditation and the use of 
“moksha-medicine”, made from psychedelic mushrooms. Literary critic Dominic 
Baker-Smith is not alone in noting the similarity between moshka and soma, 
suggesting that “soma, the compensatory drug that keeps Mond’s citizens 
acquiescent, reappear[s] under the guise of moksha” (110). Huxley, though, 
saw moksha very differently from soma, not as “chemically induced euphoria” 
(Revisited 144), but as the gateway to transcendental knowledge, and 
therefore, I argue, as the means of creating a moral foundation for the whole 
society of Pala.138 Moksha certainly plays an important part in the cultural and 
educational system of the island. Children have their first experience of the drug 
at graduation, when they are sent off to climb a mountain, and then given “four 
hundred milligrams of revelation” to round off the day. Adults take the drug at 
regular intervals thereafter, not in the manner of Brave New World, where the 
so-called “soma holiday” provided an all-purpose escape from the challenges of 
life, but a couple of times a year to aid spiritual development. Huxley is careful 
to frame moksha in a totally different way from hedonistic soma, for example by 
calling it moksha-medicine and specifying that its use be backed up by the hard 
work of daily meditation. Huxley clearly struggled with the idea that a whole 
                                                          
137 Although this physiological determinism might appear to signal a move away from 
hereditarian accounts of human behaviour, for Huxley physiology remained linked to genetic 
heritage, hence his insistence on different types of treatment for different types of behaviour, 
rather than Skinner’s more universal, all-purpose conditioning.  
138 Woodcock sees a clear difference between drug use in the two books: “in Brave New World 
it provides a conditioning technique and its effect is therefore negative and life-constricting, but 
in Island (written in 1962 after Huxley had experimented with LSD) it is used in a positive Utopia 
as part of a technique of mental liberation” (177). 
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social order could be based on chemically-induced revelations. In a letter to Dr 
Osmond in May 1959, he observes: “There must be something rather 
disturbing, to people brought up in the traditional Christian fold, in the spectacle 
of an overwhelming conviction of sin being completely dissipated in a few days 
by a course of pills” (“Letter 813” 868). That Huxley himself found it disturbing, if 
for different reasons, can be observed by his fear that the abolition of Christian 
guilt through chemical means would lead to complacency and philistinism. Part 
of Huxley’s concern was not religious but cultural, since the value of education, 
literature and intelligence would be called into question if, as is stated in Island, 
using moksha means that “quite ordinary people are perfectly capable of having 
visionary or even fully liberating experiences” (172). The corollary being, as 
Huxley reluctantly had to admit, that “the men and women who make and enjoy 
high culture are no better off than the lowbrows” (172). Huxley’s other concern 
was that drug experiences tend to lead to enhanced perceptions at the expense 
of social responsibility. As he observes in The Doors of Perception (1954): 
“Mescalin ... gives access to contemplation – but to a contemplation that is 
incompatible with action and even with the will to action, the very thought of 
action” (26). The solution to this problem, Huxley argued, “can be found only by 
those who are prepared to implement the right kind of Weltanschauung by the 
means of the right kind of behaviour and the right kind of constant and 
unstrained alertness” (26). By returning behaviour and world view to centre 
stage, Huxley revalidates the relevance of education and mental attitude to the 
creation of a socially-responsible society.  
In Pala, an appropriate state of mental alertness is achieved through the 
practice of tantric yoga. Huxley draws on the Eastern part of the heritage of his 
imaginary society to present a different type of behaviourism based on what he 
called the “transcendental pragmatism” of “oriental systems of philosophy” 
(“Letter 776” 827). In a letter to counter-cultural guru Timothy Leary in 1962, 
Huxley wrote:  
Tantra teaches a yoga of sex, a yoga of eating (even eating forbidden 
foods and drinking forbidden drinks). The sacramentalizing of common 
life, so that every event may become a means whereby enlightenment 
can be realized is achieved, essentially, through constant awareness. 
This is the ultimate yoga – being aware, conscious even of the 
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unconscious – on every level from the physiological to the spiritual. 
(“Letter 888” 929) 
This concept, which is very similar to the precepts of the currently popular 
mindfulness movement, is all-pervasive in Pala: “Be fully aware of what you’re 
doing, and work becomes the yoga of work, play becomes the yoga of play, 
everyday living becomes the yoga of everyday living” (149).139 This message of 
mental alertness is reinforced by a flock of mynah birds which fly around the 
island, reminding everyone to pay attention to the here and now, using the three 
catch-phrases they have been taught: “Attention”, “Here and now, boys” and 
“Karuna” (meaning compassion). This omnipresent reinforcement of desirable 
behaviour is accepted by the population as a useful aid to their personal 
attempts to practice good everyday living.   
The other important role for tantric yoga on Pala is population control. 
Maithuna, the yoga of love, as practised on Pala, is a method of birth control, 
described as being similar to the “Male Continence” of the Oneida Community. 
For those not able or willing to practice maithuna, there are free contraceptives 
provided by the government, but it is clear that for Huxley maithuna is the 
preferred method, because then sexual relations are not simply about sensual 
gratification but about enlightenment. In The Devils of Loudon (1952) Huxley 
talks about a sexual behaviour which “takes those who indulge in it to a lower 
level of subhumanity” (315). This kind of sexual activity is represented in Island 
by the sexual history of Will Farnaby, characterised by an addictive affair which 
led to the death of his wife in a car accident, and his own self-abasement 
through a sense of “alienations from love, from intelligence, from common 
decency, from all consciousness but that of an excruciating frenzy” (Island 79). 
In The Devils of Loudon, Huxley contrasts “the downward self-transcendence” 
of this kind of sexuality with the “upward self-transcendence” of Tantric yoga. 
Birth control through a kind of sacred, mindful sex is clearly superior in Huxley’s 
hierarchy of values to the sex without consequences of contraception. On Pala, 
maithuna also facilitates Artificial Insemination, allowing couples to choose this 
method of procreation without impairing the social bonds of the monogamous 
relationships portrayed in Island. The deleterious effects of family life which 
                                                          
139 Jon Kabat-Zinn, who created the 8-week Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MSBR) 
programme, studied under Buddhist teachers. Like Huxley he was interested in the scientific 
benefits of meditation, and tried to place mindfulness on a scientific basis, turning it into a form 
of cognitive behavioural therapy. For further information see Williams and Kabat-Zinn. 
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continue to haunt Huxley’s characters are mitigated by a system of “Mutual 
Adoption Clubs”, social groupings that allow for a larger, self-chosen family: “An 
inclusive, unpredestined and voluntary family” (90). 
Despite these positive descriptions of family life, it cannot be denied that 
the supposedly enlightened cultural values of the population of Pala are in fact 
underpinned by psychedelic drugs, meditation, behavioural and chemical 
conditioning and the animal equivalent of hypnopedia, or as Baker puts it “a 
local space where utopian parrots police the population squawking moral 
imperatives” (257). Hanson argues that “In Huxley’s utopia ... the use of 
biochemical and psychological techniques to shape the body politic is 
wholeheartedly endorsed” (128). However, this conclusion over-simplifies what 
to Huxley is a far more complex and liberating process. As with Skinner’s 
operant conditioning, Huxley’s Buddhist meditation techniques and holistic 
educational practices provide not just specific behaviourial routines, but an 
adaptable state of mind for ensuring social behaviour which fosters mutual 
respect and concern for the wider community as well as an anti-consumerist 
ethos. For Huxley, daily meditation, in conjunction with judicious use of 
psychedelic drugs, promotes self-knowledge “to the point where one won’t be 
compelled by one’s unconscious to do all the ugly, absurd, self-stultifying things 
that one so often finds oneself doing” (Island 184). It is an alternative 
intelligence to immunise the inhabitants of Pala from the challenges facing the 
modern world, where freedom and happiness are no longer easy to maintain 
due to what Huxley describes in the novel as “Mass production, mass slaughter, 
mass communication and above all, plain mass – more and more people in 
bigger and bigger slums or suburbs” (58).  
The problem of more people, or population growth, was an issue that 
Huxley returned to repeatedly. Will Farnaby expresses the visceral side of 
Huxley’s dislike of overpopulation when he observes the crowds in Fleet Street 
as so many maggots: “Thousands upon thousands of people, all on the move, 
and each of them unique, each of them the centre of the universe. Then the sun 
came out from behind a cloud. Everything was extraordinarily bright and clear; 
and suddenly, with an almost audible click, they were all maggots” (99). Like 
Julian West in Looking Backward who saw the people of nineteenth century 
Boston as living sepulchres, or John the Savage who is nauseated by the 
identikit twins of Brave New World, Farnaby’s alienation is triggered by a sense 
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of undifferentiated humanity. For Huxley people en masse were either the 
hypnotised victims of demagogues, or as Farnaby suggests “little pale worms 
with black heads that one sees on rotten meat” (99), that is to say, parasites. 
Huxley also saw overpopulation as inextricably linked to environmental 
problems. In Ape and Essence (1948) Huxley forecasts overcrowding leading 
to: “Everywhere erosion, everywhere the leaching out of minerals. And the 
deserts spreading, the forests dwindling.” In “The Double Crisis” (1950) he 
argues that soil erosion from over-farming caused by rising populations is a 
greater threat to humanity than nuclear war, “atomic war may destroy one 
particular civilization ... soil erosion, if unchecked, can put an end to the 
possibility of any civilization whatsoever” (227). In The Human Situation (1959) 
Huxley returns to the question with even more urgency: “Finally, the unlimited 
increase in human numbers practically guarantees that our planetary resources 
will be destroyed and that within a hundred or two hundred years an immensely 
hypertrophied human species will have become a kind of cancer on this planet 
and will ruin the quasi-organism on which it lives” (62-63).  
Huxley’s arguments linking overpopulation and environmental 
degradation, pre-figuring Ehrlich’s Population Bomb, contributed to the 
reputation of Island as an early ecotopia. In fact, Heinz Tschachler suggests 
that Island was “perhaps the first ecological utopia ever” (qtd. in Rohmann 177). 
Huxley was certainly one of the first to overtly incorporate ecological concepts 
into his analysis of the problematic relationship between humans and the 
natural environment, claiming in Island that ecology “has unveiled the basic 
facts that living organisms exist in exquisitely balanced communities and that 
this balance can be very easily upset” (40). For Huxley, ecology represented a 
new way of interacting with nature that was closer to the Oriental, and 
especially Taoist, concepts of nature, which privileged relationships over 
classification (42-43). In Island, ecology is both science and governing principle 
for scientific intervention. Children are taught ecology, at the same time as 
arithmetic, so that they understand from an early age that “all living is 
relationship” (211). They are also taught environmental ethics, which in Huxley’s 
words amount to: “Treat Nature well, and Nature will treat you well. Hurt or 
destroy Nature, and Nature will soon destroy you” (212). Huxley also makes an 
explicit link between ecology and Buddhism: “We shall be permitted to live on 
this planet only for as long as we treat all Nature with compassion and 
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intelligence. Elementary ecology leads straight to elementary Buddhism” (212). 
Huxley’s interest in Buddhism and Eastern philosophy was undoubtedly part of 
the appeal of his writing for advocates of deep ecology.140 Ecologist Bill Devall 
identifies the importance for the development of deep ecology of “the influx of 
Eastern spiritual traditions into the West”, starting with the writings of Alan Watts 
and Daisetz Suzuki in the 1950s, and the influence on eco-philosophers such 
as Gary Snyder in the 1970s (128-29). Eastern philosophy was seen as 
important to deep ecology as it offered an alternative to Western Judeo-
Christian dominant paradigm of nature as a resource to be exploited by 
humans.  
Deep ecology also provides an important perspective for considering the 
relationship between technology, science and the environment in Island. The 
Palanese try to keep their use of technology to a minimum, using hydro-
electricity, communal freezers, and small-scale technology for agricultural co-
operatives and craft businesses. Low levels of industrialisation are facilitated by 
population control, and redirecting aspirations towards health and well-being 
instead of consumerism, defence spending and making money (211). There are 
no commercial banks, “no captains of industry or omnipotent financiers” (146) 
and no exploitation of oil reserves. However, the environmental credentials of 
New Rothamsted, Pala’s agricultural station, are more dubious. New 
Rothamsted is named after the Rothamsted Experimental Station in 
Hertfordshire, where in the 1920s the eugenicist Ronald A. Fisher developed 
statistical methods to “help plan and evaluate plant and animal breeding 
experiments” (Kevles 181). Rothamsted was also known for its development of 
insecticides, and its long-running experiments into the effects of fertilisers on 
crop yield. Huxley’s version: “Rothamsted-in-the-Tropics” also carries out 
experimental agriculture, delivering “new strains of rice and maize and millet 
and bread-fruit”, “better breeds of cattle and chicken”, not to mention “the first 
superphosphate factory East of Berlin” (83). Crop modification, fertilizers and 
animal breeding are all seen as justifiable measures to ensure the well-being of 
the population, regardless of their impact on the natural environment of Pala. 
Even though Huxley inveighs against humans as “Conquerors of Nature” (Ape 
and Essence 93) and criticises the destructive ideology of progress, the 
                                                          
140 George Sessions includes Huxley in an inspirational pantheon of forerunners to deep 
ecology alongside Thoreau, Muir, D. H. Lawrence and Robinson Jeffers (ix). 
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scientific experimentation of Rothamsted, is legitimised for Huxley by being for 
the benefit of humanity, not for capitalist profit. Huxley was also slow to 
recognise the potentially damaging impact of pesticides, arguing in 1959 that 
insecticides were one of the most powerful weapons of public health (Human 
52). In this respect he was out of step with Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) 
which offered a damning indictment of the impact of pesticides on birds and 
other wildlife. 
Huxley’s islanders also express no ecological concerns over building 
roads and using old cars to link villages, or in developing a vigorous forestry 
industry to provide alternative outlets for the destructive energies of “muscle 
men”. There is an implicit assumption that taming or civilising nature is 
important. Like many utopias, Island demonstrates a preference for human 
landscapes over the natural:  
Nature here was no longer merely natural; the landscape had been 
composed, had been reduced to its geometrical essences and rendered, 
by what in a painter would have been a miracle of virtuosity, in terms of 
these sinuous lines, these streaks of pure bright colour. (25) 
Schmithausen argues that the early Huxley tended to prefer “cultivated, 
humanized landscape to wild Nature”, but in his later works he was more 
concerned about “the protection of Nature (be it wild or cultivated) against its 
radical destruction by modern industrial civilization” (152, 163-64). However, 
when Huxley comes to write about the jungle in Pala it is still seen as 
suffocating: “The air was stiflingly damp and there was the hot, acrid smell of 
luxuriant green growth and of that other kind of life which is decay” (Island 153). 
By contrast, the man-made clearing in the jungle is suffused with light, and 
represented in terms of a pastoral idyll, or a scene from a Disney movie:  
Tall and broad-shouldered, half a dozen almost naked woodcutters were 
engaged in lopping the branches from a newly felled tree. In the 
sunshine hundreds of blue and amethyst butterflies chased one another, 
fluttering and soaring in an endless random dance. ... Near by a small 
tame deer, fine-limbed and elegantly dappled, was quietly grazing. (153) 
In Island, the wilderness is predominantly represented as a challenge, to be 
tamed like the jungle, or used as a means of spiritual growth. Climbing 
mountains teaches the children of Pala “to realise the omnipresence of death, 
the essential precariousness of existence” and allows the potential bullies of 
232 
 
Huxley’s physical stereotyping to work off aggression (159-60). Animals too are 
mainly seen as tools for human growth. The mynah birds are trained to deliver 
homilies, and a hawk flying above the forest is a reminder of empty space and 
“the Buddha Nature in all our perpetual perishing” (162).   
It could be argued that Huxley mostly valued nature as a gateway to 
revelation rather than in its own right. In the Doors of Perception, Huxley 
includes “occasional glimpses, in nature, of Wordsworth’s ‘something far more 
deeply interfused’” (26) among his sources of contemplative inspiration. This 
view of nature as sacred or sublime is shared by the deep ecology movement, 
through the works of Thoreau, John Muir, Santayana, Aldo Leopold and many 
others.141 On seeing an orchid, Muir, wrote “I never before saw a plant so full of 
life; so perfectly spiritual. It seemed pure enough for the throne of the Creator. I 
felt as if I were in the presence of a superior being” (qtd. in B. Taylor 30). Huxley 
similarly experienced, with the aid of mescalin, “a bunch of flowers shining with 
their own inner light and all but quivering under the pressure of the significance 
with which they were charged” (7). Muir though is looking at the living flower, 
while Huxley intuits “living light” and “breathing” from cut flowers that are 
already decaying. Muir also saw the American wilderness as sacred, and his 
missionary strategy was “to get people into the wild to listen to Earth’s sacred 
voices” (31). Huxley, on the other hand valued wilderness mostly for the 
absence of people, writing in 1956: “A short generation ago you might have 
wandered and died within only a hundred miles of Los Angeles. Today the 
mounting tide of humanity has oozed through the intervening canyons and 
spilled out into the wide Mojave. Solitude is receding at the rate of four and a 
half kilometres per annum” (Adonis 77). In Brave New World, Huxley dealt with 
the problem of people spoiling wilderness by conditioning the majority of people 
to hate nature. Edward Abbey too sought spiritual truth in the desert, but failed 
to find any transcendental encounters: “I’ve looked and I’ve looked, tried fasting, 
drugs, meditation, religious experience, even self-mortification, but never seem 
to get any closer to basic reality than the lizard on a rock, a hawk in the sky, a 
dead pig in the sunshine” (“Preface” xii). Still, like Huxley, Abbey wanted to 
preserve the wilderness from the impact of people and industry, believing that 
                                                          
141 Environmental academic Bron Taylor in his outline of the religious beliefs of activists, such as 
John Muir, Gary Snyder and Edward Abbey emphasises their spirituality and sense of the 
sacred in nature (29). 
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“A civilization which destroys what little remains of the wild, the spare, the 
original, is cutting itself off from its origins and betraying the principle of 
civilization itself” (Desert 169).  
Despite his sincere interest in improving the relationship between 
humans and nature, Huxley remained at heart convinced that humans were 
custodians of nature, rather than equal partners. In a series of lectures in 1959, 
he suggests that humans have a right to control nature if they go about it in the 
right way:  
…it is only on condition that we act with love and knowledge that we can 
dominate nature. We must remember that man is a paradoxical creature: 
he is one with nature, but he is a completely unique animal inasmuch as 
he can become conscious of his position and inasmuch as he can 
influence nature in an enormous and sometimes terrifying way. (Human 
42) 
Huxley’s ecological concerns tie in with an awareness of the power humans 
have over nature. He is interested in rebalancing this power, and the novel 
Island is an attempt at imagining this more harmonious relationship, beginning 
on the basis of the individual and their presence, here and now, in the material 
world, manifested as ecology. Huxley’s personal ambivalence about the natural 
environment makes little difference to the ecological message of Island but his 
focus on nature as an amenity and inspiration for the human characters, 
suggests that, for him, even within an ecological context, utopianism is still 
essentially a human activity which privileges the human species over any other 
occupants of the planet. 
Utopianism seems to be the appropriate mode in which to regard 
Huxley’s later works, despite his continuing resistance to the concept of utopia. 
It would be reductive to consider Island as simply a re-treading of Brave New 
World. Many of the themes are the same, but the tone is different. It is an 
optimistic world of tantric yoga, spiritual development, ecological care and 
loving relationships. Pala does not survive as a political entity, but by depicting 
a society planning for its future through artificial insemination, improved 
populations and the enhanced family life of mutual adoption clubs, Huxley tricks 
us into seeing it as persisting into the future, capable of offering an example to 
the rest of the world of a non-consumerist society, living in equilibrium with 
nature through non-invasive technology and population control. Huxley destroys 
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Pala to demonstrate his realism, but also to move the concept of utopia from 
one specific island to the whole of the world. As he says in a letter, although 
Island remains a dream: “if we weren’t all so busy trying to do something else, 
we could, I believe, make this world a place fit for fully human beings to live in” 
(italics in original) (“Letter 944” 911). Part of Huxley’s optimism stemmed from 
his discovery of an alternative to repressive conditioning for achieving social 
improvement. Woodcock argues that in Huxley’s final years “he believed that he 
had discovered the way, through mystical discipline and the intelligent use of 
drugs, to give every man an equal chance of an enlightened existence, and so a 
Utopia based on a balance of the physical and spiritual, the temporal and 
eternal, seemed possible to him...” (173). Yet, Huxley still hankered after the 
idea of improved humans, intelligent enough not to pollute the planet or 
contribute to overpopulation. He retained faith in eugenics, albeit a voluntary 
version backed by peer pressure and artificial insemination. Regrettably, 
Huxley’s environmental credentials and the individualistic focus of his measures 
combine to give an air of acceptability to eugenics in this form, leading admirers 
to overlook this problematic element of the ecological utopia of Pala. In the next 
section, I consider whether Callenbach’s Ecotopia invites the same acceptance 
of eugenics, and how the changing cultural environment of the 1970s reframes 
eugenics as a pseudo-scientific anomaly with no connection to the exclusionist 
thinking of population control or racial segregation.    
 
6.4 Back to Nature: Callenbach’s Ecotopia 
 
The 1970s is often seen as a decade of utopian revival, spurred by the 
experimentalism of the counter-culture, the emergence of environmental activist 
movements and the rise of Second Wave feminism. As I argue, Skinner 
repositioned Walden Two as an ecological utopia for its reprint in 1976, while 
Island anticipated many of the ecological and spiritual concepts of deep 
ecology. Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia (1975) suggests by its very name its 
position as the apotheosis of the concept of the ecological utopia. However, the 
utopian fiction of the 1970s was not solely about environmental politics, as it 
was also the decade of the feminist critical utopia, notable for such works as 
Ursula K. Le Guin’s The Dispossessed (1974), Joanna Russ’s The Female Man 
(1975) and Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time (1976). Moylan argues 
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that the revival of utopian fiction in the 1970s “was actually a transformation 
which involved the destruction of utopian writing as well as its preservation” 
(41). In this section, I consider whether Ecotopia fits into this paradigm of self-
consciously critical utopias, or whether, as Moylan himself argues, Ecotopia 
represents “a lateral development” (xxi). I also assess to what extent Ecotopia’s 
policy of population control fits into the post-war-repositioning of eugenics, how 
the matriarchal elements of the Ecotopian political system relate to earlier 
feminist utopias, and the role of a nostalgia for Native American values in 
supporting the environmental ethos of Ecotopia.   
Ernest Callenbach was working as an editor and film critic when he wrote 
Ecotopia. By his own account, the book took him three years to write and was 
rejected by numerous publishers before being self-published and becoming an 
underground classic (‘Author’s’ 169). It was written in the context of “an exciting 
new burst of ecological research and technological innovation”, early in what he 
describes as the transition of environmentalism to ecologism (169-70). The 
book grew out of an article Callenbach was writing on the scandal of sewage 
not being recycled, inspiring him to invent a society which took the principles of 
sustainability as seriously as the economic bottom-line (Callenbach, “Life”). 
Ecotopia, like Walden Two and Island, is set in a real and identifiable part of the 
world, a section of the Pacific North West from Washington State down to 
Northern California. Ecotopia, like Pala, is a closed society, following its 
secession from the USA, and the protagonist is also a journalist, Will Weston, 
who arrives on an assignment to describe life in Ecotopia for his American 
readership. The structure of the book is built around Weston’s articles, 
interleaved with his personal diary which provides the account of his conversion 
to the Ecotopian way of life. Will Weston, like the Will of Island, has a dubious 
sexual history and owes much of his conversion to a restorative relationship 
with one of the local women.142 The device of the newspaper articles though 
allows the dialogue between the utopian society and a future version of 
capitalist America to take place in these mini-essays rather than in 
conversation. This structure provides a useful gap between the state policies of 
Ecotopia and its inhabitants, making them seem far less didactic and more 
                                                          
142 Heinz Tschachler points out that William Weston’s name resembles both William Morris’s 
William Guest and Edward Bellamy’s Julian West (305). On the other hand, Michael 
S.Cummings sees the name as a “both an etymological and psychological amalgam” of Julian 
West and Will Farnaby (69). 
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diverse than the usual citizens of utopia. Will’s initial resistance and gradual 
change is tracked in both his diaries and his articles, with the articles continuing 
to represent and satirise the capitalist, technocratic American viewpoint long 
after Will’s culture shock has changed to admiration. This device neatly 
maintains the dialogue between the two alternatives without needing to invent 
excessively stubborn characters such as Frazier and Castle in Walden Two. 
However, the drawback to this approach is that the book reads more like a 
series of essays than a novel, or as German critic Heinz Tschachler suggests a 
political pamphlet or an example of “journalism engagé”, leading to the 
“narrowing of the narrative distance between the implied author and the real 
author” (313). On the other hand, this bite-sized structure that recognises the 
hybrid nature of utopian fiction may well have contributed to its popularity as the 
ideas are readily accessible, and the narrative offers an easy emotional journey 
for the main character, as well as working well with Callenbach’s strengths as a 
journalist and editor. It was certainly more successful than its sequel, Ecotopia 
Emerging (1981), written in the form of a conventional novel.  
 In the first of Callenbach’s essays for Ecotopia he outlines the underlying 
concept of the Ecotopian state of phasing out harmful industrial processes and 
recycling “more than 99% of ... wastes” to reach a stable state (20). The 
Ecotopians have adopted something similar to the “Polluter Pays Principle” of 
current environmental regulation to incorporate any costs of clean-up into the 
calculation for manufacturing processes, arguing that “If … we had continued 
your practice of ‘free’ disposal of wastes in watercourses, sooner or later 
somebody else would have had to calculate (and bear) the costs of the resulting 
dead rivers and lakes” (18). The Ecotopians have also completely transformed 
their industrial base to work with biodegradable materials and cut out polluting 
industries to achieve this stable state. Callenbach commented in a 2006 talk 
that he used the term “stable state” in Ecotopia because “sustainability” was not 
used in the current sense until the 1980s (Life). Stable state also suggests 
“steady state”, a key term in economics, and a term which is used 
interchangeably with “stable state” elsewhere in the book. Herman Daly, writing 
in 1977, saw steady-state economics as an economic system that moved away 
from the growth paradigm of classic economic theory and replaced “the basic 
premise of ‘more is better’ with the much sounder axiom that ‘enough is best’” 
(96). His thesis was that technology could not solve the economic problem and 
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that it was important to recognise the impossibility of maintaining “an ever-
growing standard of per capita consumption for an ever-growing world 
population” (98). Daly placed population control at the heart of his steady-state 
economics, arguing that the second law of thermodynamics made it impossible 
to effectively recycle the waste generated by growing populations. His argument 
echoes that of Garrett Hardin’s in “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968). 
Hardin argued that the freedom to breed could no longer be seen as a right, but 
had to be regulated like other forms of land and property in order to preserve 
the common good. Regulation was necessary as appeals for voluntary restraint 
would only be effective amongst the conscientious, resulting in “elimination of 
conscience from the race” (1246). Instead, Hardin called for restrictions on 
breeding, arguing that the benefits would outweigh the reduction in freedom: 
“Individuals locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring on 
universal ruin; once they see the necessity of mutual coercion they become free 
to pursue other goals” (1248).  
 In Ecotopia, population reduction is a formal goal, adopted following 
secession in order to “lessen pressure on resources and other species and to 
improve the comfort and amenity of life” (61), though not without opposition 
from economists and defence advocates, fearful of “national extinction”. The 
Ecotopian programme involved educating women in birth control and legalizing 
abortion, followed by radical changes to living arrangements to a more 
decentralised model that put responsibility for population levels back on local 
communities. Although there is no suggestion of a policy of one birth per death 
as in Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time, there is clearly a much 
closer connection between local services and population levels, enabling 
“people to deliberately think about how they now wished to arrange their 
collective lives, and what this meant for population levels and distribution” (62). 
Callenbach paints a positive picture of gentle population decline, limited only by 
fears of attack by the numerically superior Americans. There are also a few 
radical thinkers who “believe that a proper population size would be the number 
of Indians who inhabited the territory before the Spaniards and Americans 
came” (63), a response motivated more by nostalgia for the American Indian 
way of life, than population concerns. This lack of unanimity and urgency over 
the population question, however, suggests that in Callenbach’s vision of a 
stable state economy, population reduction was not the pressing concern that it 
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is for either Hardin or Daly. One of the reasons for this relative lack of pressure 
is that Ecotopia operates in an economy of abundance rather than scarcity due 
to its highly fertile agricultural lands. Another factor is that the state continues to 
embrace technology to improve its environmental footfall. Daly argues for 
restricting technology in a steady-state economy to “the socially benign 
directions of small scale, decentralization, increased durability of products and 
increased long-run efficiency in the use of scarce resources...” (98). Although 
Ecotopia subscribes to these principles, there is also investment in larger-scale 
technology projects such as the biodegradable plastics industry, sewage 
recycling, energy-efficient transport and large-scale renewable energy projects.  
Callenbach acknowledges Murray Bookchin’s Post-Scarcity Anarchism 
(1971) as one of the influences on the development of Ecotopia (“Life”). 
Bookchin argued for the liberatory potential of modern technology to free people 
from work and material needs and allow industry to be structured on a more 
human scale around communities and regions. Bookchin also saw the potential 
for the new technology to “reawaken man’s sense of dependence on the 
environment” (136), for example, through small-scale agriculture: “Relieved of 
toil by agricultural machines, communitarians will approach food cultivation with 
the same playful and creative attitude that men so often bring to gardening” 
(140). A similar approach is evident in Ecotopia. Ecotopians “do not feel 
‘separate’ from their technology,” but see it as springing, “like the human being, 
from the womb of nature, organically” (47). Worker collectives run most of 
industry, and work is limited to twenty hours a week, with permeable barriers 
between work and play. Every citizen is guaranteed the basic necessities of life, 
so there is no true poverty. Bookchin saw the reaction against consumerism in 
the youth culture of the 1960s as a sign of the promise of a post-scarcity 
generation: “The rising generation, that has been largely spared the scarcity 
psychosis of its parents, anticipates the development that lies ahead. In the 
outlook and praxis of young people, which range from tribalism to a sweeping 
affirmation of sensuousness, one finds those cultural prefigurations that point to 
a future utopia” (29). Callenbach has also adopted the characteristics of a post-
scarcity society as described by Bookchin, incorporating spontaneity, 
sensuality, emotional openness, personal connectedness, tribal families and 
generosity into his vision for Ecotopia.  
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With population control only a minor problem in Callenbach’s post-
scarcity scenario, there is little evidence of concern about the quality and 
intelligence of the population that is so prevalent in Island. Eugenics is rejected 
as an extremist technology involving “the aiding of natural selection by 
deliberate breeding, or farther-out possibilities such as cloning, whereby actual 
genetic duplicates of superior individuals might be produced, or even 
modification of gene structures to produce a race of supermen” (65-66). 
Instead, the Ecotopians are described as being willing to live with the biological 
constitutions they now possess. However, these constitutions, as in most 
utopias, are visibly superior to those of their real-world counterparts. Ecotopians 
are described as being remarkably healthy, there are no “fat and broken-down 
people, and even oldsters seem surprisingly fit and hearty” (34). Ecotopians 
attribute their health to their active physical outdoors life, but there is more than 
a suggestion of female sexual selection at work. Women “exercise absolute 
control over their own bodies” allowing them to “openly exert a power which in 
other societies is covert or nonexistent: the right to select the fathers of their 
children” (64). This rule is so universal that Will is told, “sternly”, that “No 
Ecotopian woman ever bears a child by a man she has not freely chosen” (64). 
As with Edward Bellamy and Charlotte Perkins Gilman, female selection of 
partners is important, and, it is implied, sufficient, for guaranteeing the quality of 
the next generation. Sexual favours are linked to the ritual War Games carried 
out at regular intervals where teams of men consciously adopt a primitive 
tribalism, adorn themselves with war paint and fight with spears until someone 
is injured or occasionally dies. The War Games have been set up by the largely 
female-dominated Survivalist Party to channel “the physical competitiveness 
that seemed to be inherent in man’s biological programming” and allow them to 
test courage, strength and comradeship (74). By contrast, women’s 
competitiveness is reserved for political contests, management and “rivalry over 
men to father their children” (75). Literary critic Naomi Jacobs questions the 
rationale for this gender divide, which she sees as inconsistent with the stated 
egalitarianism of Ecotopia, and as largely a result of Callenbach’s inability to 
imagine women fighting (323). However, an alternative explanation would be to 
look at the War Games in the context of the nostalgia for Native American 
customs which suffuses the text. Ecotopians “envy the Indians their lost natural 
place in the American wilderness” (29), live as “tribal animals”, hunt with bows 
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and arrows and let their children grow up “like happy savages”, learning basic 
survival skills ahead of the more conventional education of civilised society. 
They also feel a spiritual connection with nature. Will’s lover, Marissa 
Brightcloud, adopts a Native American name, and has a deep love for forests, 
which she sees as making her free (50), while Ecotopians in general “regard 
trees as being alive in almost a human sense” (58). Forestry is run not just to 
maintain stable-state conditions but to return forestry land to a perceived natural 
condition; hence any areas too difficult to work are assigned wilderness status. 
These attitudes to forestry fit with Tschachler’s argument that the function of the 
Ecotopian forestry service is “to mystically reconcile humanity to the creation”, 
an aspect of Ecotopia which he regards as a manifestation of “the schizophrenic 
attitude of Americans towards historical progress” (307).  
Alongside this reversion to a Native American inspired primitivism, 
Callenbach is working with another myth, that of the matriarchal society.143 
Women are in charge of the ruling party and they infuse their values into 
society. Ecotopia adopts elements of a common myth of ecological feminism, 
here summarised by ecofeminist Val Plumwood: 
The story of a land where women live at peace with themselves and with 
the natural world is a recurrent theme of feminist utopias. This is a land 
where there is no hierarchy, among humans or between humans and 
animals, where people care for one another and for nature, where the 
earth and the forest retain their mystery, power and wholeness, where 
the power of technology and of military and economic forces does not 
rule the earth, or at least that part of it controlled by women. (7) 
Within this myth of pre-industrial matriarchy, war games are masculine only 
because they represent aggression which is essentialised as patriarchal and 
masculine. Competitiveness, aggression and dominance are in this way 
contained and controlled by the women who reward the victors (Marissa gets 
carried off by a strong warrior) and heal the losers (Will has his own personal 
nurse after being injured in the games). A similar scenario of masculine games 
occurs in Katherine Burdekin’s matriarchal The End of this Day’s Business 
(1989) where infantilised men fight to impress the women. Callenbach’s version 
is less consistently matriarchal as the women also compete to win the best 
                                                          
143 In his 2006 talk Callenbach happily acknowledges that Ecotopians could be accused of being 
matriarchal (“Life”). 
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men, though it is unclear what form this competition takes.144 The overall result 
though is a society which, while not wishing to engage with eugenics in any 
medical or governmental sense, is very concerned about how it maintains 
survival characteristics such as strength and courage within the population. 
Intelligence, creativity and ingenuity, which are elsewhere celebrated as 
important characteristics of Ecotopian society, do not fit so well into this 
privileging of primitive “natural” characteristics, though Marissa claims to be 
attracted to Will by his intelligence and kindness, so these may be reflected as 
elements of the female selection process. Also the ability to entertain with song, 
dance and stories is valued as part of the fabric of Ecotopia’s pseudo-tribal life.  
 The matriarchal element of Ecotopia is supported by Callenbach’s focus 
on women as either attractively fertile or mothers. Will’s assessment of 
Ecotopian women is that they “still seem to me feminine, with a relaxed air of 
their biological attractiveness, even fertility” (33), and he is tortured by the 
sounds and sights of uninhibited love-making going on around him. As well as 
being sexually confident and in absolute control of their fertility, women also 
take a dominant role in the early-years training of their children. Even though 
“men participate extensively in the care and upbringing of the very young,” 
mothers have the final say in their nurturing (64). The widespread use of 
abortion as a contraceptive method might seem problematic for this picture of 
fertile and nurturing mothers, but Callenbach clearly views sexual freedom and 
female control over when and with whom they have children as priorities.145 
Also, anthropological evidence suggests that abortion was one of the most 
frequently used methods of fertility control in the majority of human societies 
(Cochrane 119). On a political level, Vera Allwen, the President is also 
represented as a mother figure for the whole country, or, as Will sees her, a 
domineering grandmother (149). The majority-female Survivalist party is 
modelled on what are held to be female values: “The basic cooperation- and 
biology-oriented policies of the party ... are usually considered to be derived 
mainly from female attitudes and interests” (83). These values are contrasted 
favourably with the “outdated and destructive male attitudes towards 
individualism, productivity, and related issues” of the Progressive Party who are 
                                                          
144 This is one of the many examples that Jacob points out of the confusion between 
Callenbach’s stated feminist ideals and the wish-fulfilment elements of the text. 
145 See Regina Cochrane, Social Ecology and Reproductive Freedom (1998) for a discussion of 
abortion and ecofeminism.  
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the chief opposition party. Female-centred government chiefly involves 
devolving power to ecologically-based regions or local communities, and a 
move away from nation states. There are also female-centred meetings, without 
agendas privileging attention to emotions and consensus decision-making. 
Ecotopians also see a special relationship between women and nature, and are 
trained to “treat the earth as a mother” (29).  
Although qualities traditionally associated with women such as co-
operation, emotional openness and nurturing are highly valued in Ecotopia, 
Callenbach also promotes an alternative ecological identity for men via a 
version of masculinity based on hunting, ritual battle and outdoor survival skills. 
The combination of these two strands of supposedly natural gender roles allows 
Callenbach to use primitive societies as the foundation for the values for 
Ecotopia, while still representing it as a modern society with equal rights for 
women and a positive relationship with modern technology. This cultural hybrid 
is important to Callenbach in a similar way as the mix of Western science and 
Eastern philosophy was for Huxley. Anthropologist Roy F. Ellen points out that 
by referring back to its Native American Indian heritage Ecotopia aligns itself 
with a potent myth that “primitive societies, shorn of the artifice of civilization, 
are in harmony with their environment through the wisdom of their folkways and 
that it is only the foolishness and wickedness of modern society that has 
rejected this” (8). Callenbach suggests that if the citizens of Ecotopia go back to 
this earlier way of life, which Ellen connects to the version of Native American 
spiritualism made famous by John G. Neihardt’s classic book Black Elk Speaks 
(1932), and live in harmony with the land in the same way as American Indians 
did, then they will automatically live an environmentally sound life in tune with 
nature.146 
 These cultural values are important because, as political scientist Werner 
Christie Mathisen points out, “There is a strong general trend away from the 
exercise of formal political authority towards the use of culture as an instrument 
of social change and regulation” (66). The strength of this cultural 
transformation can be seen in the attitudes of the citizens, who are remarkably 
                                                          
146 Deep ecologists too saw Native Americans as a potential source of knowledge about living 
with the natural environment, though not in the sense of “a revival of the Romantic view of 
Native Americans as ‘noble savages’ but rather an attempt to evaluate traditional religions, 
philosophies, and social organizations of Native Americans in objective, comparative and 
analytic, and critical ways” (Devall 129). 
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unanimous in their support for the changes necessitated by stable-state 
economics. Ecotopians have accepted a limited choice of food and consumer 
goods to simplify their industrial processes and reduce the impact of 
distribution. Many processed and packaged foods are banned for health 
reasons and others are put on local “Bad Practice lists”, leading to consumer 
boycotts. Sweatshop products from Asia are kept out by high tariffs, and many 
Ecotopians wear home-made clothes, “which has by now become considered a 
virtue” (93). Standardisation of products is the norm, in terms of packaging, 
sizes and even colours: “Bath towels, for instance, can be bought in only one 
color, white” (40). Unlike Walden Two and Island, where various forms of 
conditioning are used to ensure appropriate behaviours, Ecotopia relies largely 
on peer pressure and a strong culture of what Mathisen describes as “eco-
political correctness” (71) to keep its citizens on track. Mathisen points out that 
this reliance on cultural rather than political measures leads to “a tendency 
towards political and cultural conformism” and the risk of a “totalitarian green 
culture” (69). Tschachler expresses similar concerns, suggesting that Ecotopia 
is “founded on an intolerance reminiscent of the Puritan theocracies of New 
England” (309) with happiness “enforced by what can only be called a mild form 
of mind control” (309). Tschachler also argues that Ecotopia is based on 
“despotic reason” where community interests have priority over those of the 
individual, introducing a reactionary element to the otherwise anarchic, 
organicist concept of life that Callenbach is hoping to portray. Nevertheless, 
Callenbach is aware of the potential restrictiveness of the stable-state concept 
as guiding principle. Bert, one of the journalists, argues that “in practice there’s 
no stable point.... we only agree on the root essentials, everything else is in 
dispute” (31). Ecotopian society is like a meadow where there is a lot of change 
going on at the micro-level, while sustaining itself on “a steady-state basis” 
overall (31). Tschachler argues, though, that this diversity is only counter-
cultural window-dressing on a conformist society, an “eco-totalitarianism” which 
poses “a serious problem of authoritarianism” (310). However, by representing 
strong alternative cultural values through the love of wilderness, War Games 
and other survivalist activities, Callenbach manages to sidestep the impression 
of conformity, I argue. The banned lists of environmentally-unfriendly goods, the 
acceptance of reduced consumer choice and the DIY attitude to clothing, 
housing and other elements of life are simply outward signs of the new 
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environmental consciousness which manifests itself not as conformity but in the 
individual patterns that get dyed onto the plain white towels and the feral 
activities of the Ecotopians. Even though return to a more primitive way of living 
is represented as an extreme position in the Ecotopian polity, its appeal is 
evident throughout the text, and suggests an ideal that goes beyond the eking 
out of scarce resources and the “holier than thou” attitude of the environmental 
thought-police.147 However, it does also leave Callenbach tied to a White 
American view of Native American culture. For example, Luther Standing Bear, 
an Oglala Sioux, debunks some of the myths that Callenbach uses: “Only to the 
white man was nature a ‘wilderness’ and only to him was the land ‘infested’ with 
‘wild’ animals and ‘savage’ people. To us it was tame” (qtd. in Devall 130). 
 Also, by basing Ecotopian values on those of Native Americans, 
Callenbach compromises some important elements of an ecological community. 
Ecotopians hunt and kill, eat meat and wear fur, without there being any 
opposition to these activities or campaigns against animal cruelty. The 
Ecotopians accept gender stereotyping in the upbringing of children and in 
certain cultural institutions. They also support an isolationist nativism. Janet 
Fiskio, an environmental academic, compares the formation of an ideal society 
through exclusion in Ecotopia and Herland. In Herland, Gilman ensures an 
Aryan eugenic purity through isolation and the closed borders of Herland. In 
Ecotopia, the ghettoisation of ethnic minorities ensures a similar purity. Black 
Ecotopians have their own separatist community, referred to as Soul City. Soul 
City is characterised stereotypically as a producer of music, musicians, novels, 
movies and poetry, as well as experts in criminology, thanks to the large black 
prison population at secession, and culturally interested in African politics and 
language. The dream of reversion to Native American tradition is apparently 
only appropriate for white European settlers (Will guesses that Marissa is of 
Italian descent) while African Americans create their own culture which remains 
separate from mainstream Ecotopia. Fiskio also demonstrates that Ecotopia’s 
bioregional model, and the defense of Ecotopia described in Ecotopia 
Emerging, draws a circle around “those who live in the geographical zone, 
justifying a politics of exclusion on environmental ground” (22). In Ecotopia 
                                                          
147 Callenbach also wrote a short story “Chocco” anthologised in Kim Stanley Robinson’s Future 
Primitive collection (1994) which depicts the indigenous population of North America defeating 
the invading European colonists. 
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Emerging the mountain passes are defended by Ecotopians to prevent 
invasion. In both texts, nuclear devices are hidden in major population centres 
in the US as a military deterrent, confirming the lengths that Ecotopians would 
go to protect their own ecologically-balanced paradise, even to the extent of 
destruction of the neighbouring ecosystem. There are no propaganda missions 
to establish revolution elsewhere and nothing like Castle’s subversive dream of 
Walden-style communities proliferating throughout the United States. The 
Ecotopian have instead, as Fiskio argues, withdrawn to their lifeboat and will not 
allow the rest of the world on board.148 
Callenbach’s representation of Ecotopia as a successfully-achieved 
ecological society largely prevents the book from operating as a critical utopia. 
The dialogue between the capitalism of the United States and the eco-
friendliness of Ecotopia is heavily slanted in favour of Ecotopia. Although Will’s 
viewpoint occasionally raises questions about the desirability of certain 
Ecotopian habits, for example their extreme emotionality, the co-option of his 
voice into the satire against US excess makes it hard for his observations to 
count as criticism rather than culture shock. The only place where his 
questioning seems to escape satire is when he regrets the similarity between 
Ecotopian separatism and South African apartheid, writing “this admission that 
the races cannot live in harmony is surely one of the most disheartening 
developments in all of Ecotopia” (101). Ecotopia, for all its environmental 
credentials, does not have the self-awareness of the critical utopias of the 
1970s identified by Moylan. These utopias show far more textual resistance to 
the utopian situation either through maintaining utopia as a fragmented or 
hypothetical state, as in Russ’s Female Man and Piercy’s Woman on the Edge 
of Time, or through characters who cannot conform to the utopian communities 
they live in, as for example in Le Guin’s The Dispossessed, which is sub-titled 
“an ambiguous utopia”, or in Samuel R. Delany’s equally ambiguous 
heterotopia, Triton (1976). Michael Cummings regards the difference between 
Ecotopia and the traditional utopia in a different light, since for him its role is not 
to be critical of the ideas it presents, but to offer a practical handbook for would-
be imitators. Cummings argues that Callenbach is “atypical of Utopian novelists’ 
                                                          
148 The lifeboat metaphor comes from another of Garrett Hardin’s articles “Living on a lifeboat” 
(1974) which uses the metaphor of a lifeboat to argue against sharing resources needed for 
survival with those less well off. 
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almost universal indifference to the problem of how their utopias could actually 
be made to happen”, pointing out that neither Bellamy nor Huxley make any 
serious or believable attempt to show how their utopian world could be brought 
into being. Callenbach on the other hand used Ecotopia Emerging as a “serious 
fictional attempt to outline a realistic transition to utopia” (69). Even though, 
Cummings concludes that the transition processes described by Callenbach 
were too naively simplistic to work, he sees them as a useful starting-point for 
future would-be utopianists to consider. Ecotopia is remarkable for its optimism, 
reminiscent of the late-nineteenth century heyday of utopianism. Ecotopia 
illustrates the strength of utopianism within the environmental activist 
movement, and the openness of this movement to practical utopian 
experiments on a small or large scale. Lynne F. Williams argues that ecotopian 
utopias “reflect a nostalgia for simpler times and the beauty of the natural world 
rather than the classical Utopian concern for the perfectibility of human society”, 
but Callenbach’s Ecotopia contains both nostalgia and the desire to develop a 
perfect sustainable society, in touch with nature, but able to lightly harness the 
environment to provide modern amenities through a range of technological 
innovations. The Ecotopians, like most citizens of utopia, are represented as 
being more perfect than average in that they are invariably mentally, sexually 
and physically healthy. This state, achieved through a process of female sexual 
selection, abortion of unwanted (and possibly imperfect) children and racial 
segregation, demonstrates the enduring concern with perfecting the human 
element of society, even in ecotopia.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Far from disappearing immediately after the Second World War, 
eugenics remained an important component of post-War society. The 
regrouping of the eugenics movement after the Second World War led to 
eugenic arguments reappearing in areas such as the population debate, where 
fears of accelerating birth rates were used to justify sterilisation programmes in 
the developing world (Hansen and King 201). In utopian fiction, eugenics 
became mainly light-touch positive eugenics, focussing on raising the quality of 
the population, either through genetic technology or the selection of appropriate 
partners, while using birth control and peer pressure to keep populations stable. 
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The severing of the link between biological parenthood and family life was seen 
as a key element in enabling eugenics to take on a less disruptive role in social 
relationships. In Walden Two, children are raised communally to make genetic 
parenthood less important. In Island, artificial insemination offers a means of 
increasing the genetic quality of the population without affecting people’s 
freedom to choose the partners they prefer. In Ecotopia, large tribal families 
mean that children may be conceived by the best potential fathers without 
affecting who raises the child. The move away from the idea of a monolithic 
world state to smaller ecological communities represents a reaction against the 
totalising ideologies of the Second World War, and a return to biological science 
for inspiration for improved ways of living for human communities. Walden Two 
with its focus on behaviourism is still a scientific utopia in miniature, but with 
added influence from Thoreau and early understanding of the importance of 
working with the natural environment to achieve “trade-treaties with nature”. 
Huxley’s interest in the science of ecology, and Eastern mysticism, and his 
disillusion with the results of technocratic Western scientific progress allowed 
him to rework Brave New World as an ecological utopia and attempt to 
reconcile his pessimism over the direction of twentieth-century society with a 
recipe for mass social conditioning that drew on Buddhism and psychedelic 
enlightenment to provide stability without repressive social control. Callenbach’s 
Ecotopia combines steady-state environmental economics with ecofeminism 
and a return to Native American values to provide a fully-developed picture of 
what an ecological society might look like. While all three of these utopias have 
provided inspiration for the environmental movement, and been acclaimed for 
their ecological principles, they also all privilege the human over the natural 
world and represent in one form or another, the continuation of the domination 
of nature by human social groups. They all show a strong concern with the 
survival of human-beings as a species, manifested in isolationism or measures 
to improve the intelligence or behaviour of the population. In the last analysis, 
and despite the environmental commitment of the individual authors, greater 
respect for the natural environment is largely a tactic to improve the quality of 
life for the human inhabitants of utopia. Utopian fiction remains in this new, 
more pastoral mode, still about the betterment of humans as individuals and 
species, and the improvement of their ability to live well together in social 
groupings, rather than the integration of human and non-humans on an equal 
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footing. Moreover, the tendency of ecotopian fiction to explore the future of 
humans as a biological species underlines the links between post-war eugenics 
and environmentalism. These works indicate how the frames of reference and 
assumptions that informed the eugenic agenda of earlier utopian fiction have 
been incorporated into new arguments for reproductive limits as the focus has 
shifted not only to improved humans, but to the future health of the planet.  
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7. Conclusion 
This study of eugenics in utopian fiction shows the diverse ways in which 
eugenics has impacted on utopian fiction, the ubiquity of eugenics of some 
description in these works, and its persistence into the mid-twentieth century 
and beyond. Although writers of utopian fiction were not averse to echoing the 
rhetoric of eugenics, or accepting elements of its dogma such as class 
prejudice, racism and nationalism, my research shows that eugenics also 
formed part of wider discussions on concerns as diverse as democracy, social 
justice and gender equality. After Darwin, evolution offered hope of achieving 
utopia, but also fear of dehumanisation. Eugenics became one of the ways of 
dealing with questions of morality, teleology and survival of the fittest thrown up 
by the simplified version of evolution which entered into the public 
consciousness. Late-nineteenth-century writers of utopian fiction saw a positive 
future for eugenics as a means of promoting rational marriage, addressing 
issues of health and disease, and directing evolution into positive channels. 
Science and biology were referenced to back up their imaginings, but were 
rarely central to their ideas on eugenics, which tended to be symbolic, or else 
imbued with a Lamarckian concept of striving and purpose. Only Francis 
Galton, in his utopian college of Kantsaywhere, relied entirely on the workings 
of eugenics to improve the world. For most writers, eugenics took its place 
alongside social forces such as education, hygiene, fair wages and high 
standards of morality in the quest for an improved world. In particular, late-
nineteenth-century writers promoted the importance of female choice of 
husband in improving the health and quality of the citizens of utopia. Samuel 
Butler, when he wrote Erewhon in 1872, did not imagine a specific role for 
women in improving the species, but he did believe that the beautiful and 
healthy should marry each other. However, later in the century, Edward 
Bellamy, Elizabeth Corbett and Charlotte Perkins Gilman all saw the socially 
sanctioned imbalance of power between the genders as a significant 
evolutionary misstep, and recommended that women be given more say in 
whom they married. Utopian fiction provided an arena away from the vested 
interests of governmental bodies and the restrictive social conventions of late-
nineteenth-century society to articulate the concept that women could improve 
society through their moral and rational choice of husband, their determined 
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rejection of a diseased heritage, their family-centred values and the adoption of 
sensible scientific and hygienic measures to improve public health. Bellamy 
avoided the tendency of equating the poor with the eugenically unfit by putting 
the blame for poverty on capitalism and arguing that under a regime of brotherly 
love and equality everyone would thrive. Butler on the other hand played with 
the idea that illness was a crime, and anticipated a connection between morality 
and health that would be influential throughout the history of the eugenics 
movement. Wells agreed that whole classes of people would fall by the wayside 
as victims of evolution and the increasing sophistication of society, but his 
utopian and dystopian fiction offers a more complex picture of vitality in the 
working class and decadence in the upper echelons of society. Gilman too, 
despite elements of racism in her personal life, was opposed to nationalistic 
rivalry and recommended an America of hospitable welcome in the near-future 
utopia of Moving the Mountain (1911).  
If early eugenic utopian fiction is largely uncritical of eugenics, and intent on 
domesticating evolution, and turning it into a force for moral development, early 
twentieth-century dystopian fiction begins to uncover the flaws in the eugenic 
proposals for human self-improvement; in particular, the curtailment of freedom 
in favour of social tractability. The eugenically moulded citizen is not so much 
the committed worker of Bellamy’s future Boston or Gilman’s Moving the 
Mountain as an industrial component, doped or drilled by the state in a 
necessary act of submission to the needs of stability. In these dystopias, 
reproduction is no longer a right, and children are a resource or a state 
commodity. Only Charlotte Haldane deals with the eugenic dream of breeding 
the advanced human, but offers a chilling picture of the fate of those who do not 
fit in with the progressive agenda of the new society. However, despite the 
personal sacrifices involved, Haldane does not question the value of the project. 
Even Katherine Burdekin, who criticises the nationalism and militarism of Nazi 
Germany in Swastika Night (1937), still hopes to see scientific changes abolish 
power imbalances between men and women. The ecotopian fiction of the post-
war era is if anything less critical of eugenics than earlier works, suggesting that 
improving the human race is seen as important not just for social progress but 
for the health of the planet as a whole.    
 This study of utopian and dystopian fiction over the course of a century 
reveals two main areas of concern that it was hoped that eugenics would 
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address. The first and most persistent of these was the issue of procreation, 
and involved the desire to separate sex and reproduction so that children could 
be planned in a rational way. The second was about physical wellbeing, 
intelligence and the idea of conscious or self-directed evolution. In the following 
sections I consider these two areas, beginning with the issue of reproduction 
and its resurgence in the feminist utopian fiction of the 1970s, followed by an 
overview of ideas for overcoming the physical limitations of the human species. 
I conclude by examining more recent manifestations of eugenics in utopian 
fiction and society, and consider where the relationship between eugenics and 
modern versions of utopian fiction is heading.  
 
7.1 Sexual Reproduction and the 1970s Feminist Utopia 
 
Dissatisfaction with existing methods and mores of sexual reproduction is 
a surprisingly important theme in utopian fiction. Maybe because the marriage 
plot is so peripheral to utopian fiction compared to the mechanics of world-
building, it is possible to deny the relevance of personal preference and 
consider changes to the established institutions of marriage, family and 
reproduction which would not be feasible in other forms of fiction. The focus in 
utopian fiction is on social changes, not individual destiny, and although the 
utopian visitor might be tempted to choose a utopian mate, this is usually a 
rhetorical device to emphasise the excellence of utopia, rather than a key 
component of the narrative. Instead, what counts are the larger changes to 
society, the management of the physical realities of human life in the service of 
the state or the common good. In amongst these changes, the management of 
sex and reproduction are the subjects of radical proposals, especially in feminist 
utopian fiction. Where New Woman fiction promoted rational reproduction as 
part of the marriage plot, feminist utopian fiction takes this idea a step further by 
rationalising sex out of the reproductive process altogether. Writers such as 
Mary E. Bradley Lane and Charlotte Perkins Gilman abolished men’s role in 
reproduction, turning erotic desire into non-sexual love of a higher kind. In 
Unveiling a Parallel (1893) Jones and Merchant condemned sexual license and 
offered a picture of a people so spiritually evolved that their children are 
conceived in what they describe as “immaculate purity”, the result of a century 
long struggle to eliminate lust and “the purely animal instincts” (58-9). Kathryn 
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Burdekin also saw evolution as a way out of the problem of sexual inequality, 
envisaging in Proud Man (1934) a future where both sexual desire and gender 
had been abolished. For male writers such as Aldous Huxley, the decoupling of 
sex and reproduction is seen in a more dystopian light. In Brave New World 
(1932) babies have become a factory product and sex is meaningless, while in 
Zamyatin’s We (1924) the rationalisation of sex has become part of the 
repressive techniques of the government. However, in Island (1962) Huxley 
reverses the sexual equation and sees artificial insemination as an opportunity 
for people to be sexually intimate without having to worry about the genetic 
consequences. However, Huxley continued to feel uneasy about the idea of sex 
for mere gratification of sensual pleasure and replaced procreation with spiritual 
enlightenment as the purpose of sex. In nineteenth-century America, the 
Oneida Community also saw sex as part of a process of spiritual enlightenment, 
and developed their own techniques for preventing conception, voluntarily 
sacrificing reproductive rights for the eugenic improvement of the next 
generation.  
 Latent within this dream is the desire to evolve humans beyond the 
needs of the body towards a form of moral perfection and self-transcendence. 
As Jones and Merchant write: “God planted the species, a crude and simple 
plant, and turned it over to man to do what he might with it; and in the same way 
he placed man himself here, – to perfect himself if he would” (Unveiling 151). In 
the US this concept can be linked to the philosophy of Perfectionism, often 
ascribed to Emerson, and seen as an ongoing process of improvement and 
self-realisation.149 British writers also show perfectionist tendencies; for 
example, the women of Corbett’s New Amazonia are seeking spiritual 
improvement at the same time as caring for their social environment.  
Clearly for some writers of utopian fiction, a world without sexual activity 
was utopian in itself, and for the rest, the less connection there was between 
the sexual act and the production of children the better.150 Children born from 
non-sexual love would have none of the disadvantages of sexually transmitted 
                                                          
149 For an account of Emersonian moral perfection see Naoko Saito The Gleam of Light: Moral 
Perfectionism and Education in Dewey and Emerson.   
150 Jyotsna A. Gupta suggests that “In fact what is dystopia for men might be eutopia for (some) 
women and vice versa eg the destruction of the family and the use of reproductive engineering 
are viewed as negative features by Huxley, whereas for [Shulamith] Firestone these are positive 
elements” (86) 
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diseases or other degenerate features and would only be produced at need. In 
the end, eugenics offered two hopes, scientific methods to rationalise choice of 
marriage partners, and accelerated evolution towards a state where sexual 
desire was no longer a factor in the human condition. For feminists, eugenics 
offered not just the chance of producing better children, but the chance of 
changing how children were produced. The interest in parthenogenesis 
suggests a hope for a cloning or propagation process that would leave women 
free to be socially active around the demands of motherhood, while Gilman’s 
arguments for changing patterns of childcare, and Burdekin’s interest in 
androgyny, support alternative modes of social organisation based on rejecting 
the idea of women being exclusively responsible for the birth and raising of 
children.  
The continuing interest in alternative versions of reproduction in the late 
twentieth century can be seen in the ongoing importance of these ideas in the 
feminist science fictional utopias of the 1970s and 1980s. This revival of 
feminist utopianism suggests that some of the issues raised in earlier feminist 
utopias still needed to be resolved. Women had gained the vote, could control 
when they had children through contraception and had many of the same 
educational and career opportunities as men. But Second Wave feminism was 
still confronted with issues of discrimination, gender identity, patriarchal 
assumptions, male social dominance, and not least the whole question of 
women’s reproductive role. Feminist Shulamith Firestone writing in 1970 
recommended a revolution in gender roles in which “[t]he reproduction of the 
species by one sex for the benefit of both would be replaced by (at least the 
option) of artificial reproduction: children would be born to both sexes equally, or 
independently of either, however one chooses to look at it all” (19). Monique 
Wittig, author of the lesbian feminist separatist utopia Les Guérillères (1969), 
also contested the biologisation of women’s identity. In a 1981 essay, she 
argued that women collude in their oppression by naturalizing oppressive social 
phenomena such as childbirth: “instead of seeing giving birth as a forced 
production, we see it as a “natural,” “biological” process, forgetting that in our 
societies births are planned (demography), forgetting that we ourselves are 
programmed to produce children, while this is the only social activity ‘short of 
war’ that presents such a great danger of death” (“One” 11). For Wittig, 
lesbianism is a way of escaping the masculine definition of women as 
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reproductive machines. Critic Frances Bartkowski argues that with Wittig 
“Finally lesbian feminism emerged as a strategy to break away from previous 
definitions of sex as allied to reproduction” (33).  
Les Guérillères foregrounds women’s erotic pleasure, but also 
recommends active opposition to masculine oppression in order to reclaim 
female identity. Wittig’s female warriors have no compunction about using 
violence to fight for their freedom, unlike the female protagonists of other 
feminist utopias of the 1970s and 1980s where violence is represented as a 
specifically masculine trait. Anne Maxwell argues that one of the motivations for 
women writing science fictional utopias in the 1970s and 1980s was to address 
issues of the violence of male-dominated political systems. She credits the 
reprint of Gilman’s Herland in 1979 with influencing feminist writers to believe 
that women are inherently less violent than men,  arguing that “Gilman was 
suggesting that it is only the male of the species who harbours the violent 
tendencies that have historically placed civilisations at risk” (“Problem” 111). 
Erin McKenna also sees opposition to violence as a key element of 1970s and 
1980s feminist utopias, defining them as based on the belief “that the 
subordination of women is wrong” and with a “focus on ridding the world of 
violence, especially male violence” (10). Bartkowski also emphasises the 
separatist element of feminist utopias, arguing that although 1970s Western 
feminism grew out of left-wing politics “one of its first moves was to reject the 
masculinist or phallocentric orientation of these movements” (25). These 
elements of separatism and concern over male violence led to a renewed 
interest in the idea of genetic modification of the reproductive role, not only for 
freeing women to take an equal role in society, but to suppress violence in men 
and make them more like women. Ursula Le Guin in The Left Hand of Darkness 
(1969) imagined an androgynous species which only took on gendered 
characteristics during short periods of sexual activity. In this society, resulting 
from a genetic experiment, there is no gender division or discrimination, and no 
large-scale war. Le Guin speculates: “did they [the experimenters] consider war 
to be a purely masculine displacement-activity, a vast Rape, and therefore in 
their experiment eliminate the masculinity that rapes and the feminity that is 
raped?” (77-8). Le Guin’s solution of genetic modification implies an essentialist 
view of gender characteristics, but the development of the novel questions this 
reading, suggesting that in the end, humans are not primarily defined by gender 
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and sexual desire, but by the choices they make and the social forces around 
them. 
 Marge Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time (1976) also starts from a 
premise of violence of men towards women. However, Piercy’s solution is not 
androgyny, but co-operation. Like Skinner and Huxley, she looks to small-scale 
communities, psychological techniques and genetic modification to achieve 
peaceful communal co-existence. In Piercy’s future utopian community the 
power struggle between men and women is resolved by women giving up 
natural childbirth, and both men and women sharing equally in parenting. 
Babies are gestated in a “brooder” from a mix of genetic material from many 
different races, representing a return to the original American idealism of the 
melting pot. There is also an ongoing debate about the use of eugenics. One 
party, the Shapers, want to build on existing genetic intervention to prevent birth 
defects and susceptibility to diseases by breeding for selected traits, while their 
opponents, the Mixers, believe that it is not possible to “know objectively how 
people should become” (226). Piercy’s characters support the Mixers, and the 
dangers of eugenics are further reinforced in a chapter where Connie, the main 
character, is projected into a dystopian future where reproductive control goes 
far beyond small eugenic improvements to the embryos. In this alternative 
future, women are kept on contract by men for sex, or else become mothers 
who are “cored to make babies all the time”, then euthanized after they reach 
forty (290). Meanwhile, the “richies” live on space platforms above the polluted 
earth and are genetically enhanced and medically assisted to live for two 
hundred years. The very poor are simply considered as diseased animals (291). 
This scenario is represented as the logical end-result of experiments in 
biochemical control of the medically disempowered population of the asylum to 
which Connie has been committed. For Piercy, this escalation of the chemical 
conditioning of parts of the population, under a similar rationale to that used by 
Huxley in Island, for social and individual well-being, is shown as dangerous 
enough to require violent resistance. However, by introducing violence, Piercy 
also problematises her argument, leaving open the question of whether 
Connie’s violence confirms the original diagnosis of her as a risk to the 
community. Nevertheless it also points out the consequences of medicalising 
those who are powerless, and the ethical unacceptability of experimenting on 
the mentally vulnerable.  
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 In Suzy McKee Charnas’s Walk to the End of the Road (1974) and 
Motherlines (1978), separatist societies come about as a result of “The 
Wasting”, an ecological catastrophe brought on by pollution and war. In Walk, 
women are treated as animals, and used to serve men, not just sexually, but as 
a slave population for all labouring jobs. Like Burdekin, Charnas shows the link 
between cultures of aggressive masculinity and the dehumanisation of women, 
enhanced by the adoption of agricultural-style breeding practices which devalue 
children by referring to them as ‘kits’ and ‘cubs’. Men too are dehumanised. In a 
dark replica of Huxley’s graduation ritual on Pala, boys are given drugs, and 
those who prove too susceptible to their effects are condemned to become 
human “hounds”, controlled by their handlers through their drugs addiction. The 
destructive masculine way of life is contrasted with two all-female communities 
in Motherlines. The “free fems”, escaped slaves, recreate many of the 
hierarchies and patterns of control of the masculine society from which they 
have escaped. On the other hand, the Riding Women, independent survivors of 
the ecological catastrophe have built up a society where they live in harmony 
with nature, hunting and gathering and moving with the seasons. However, their 
way of life is dependent on genetic engineering, the technology that enables 
them to breed without men. They are products of a laboratory experiment in 
cloning and have genetically altered their horses to provide the serum needed 
to stimulate reproduction, through a carefully managed mating process. The 
children are not horse/women hybrids, as the complete genetic information for 
their reproduction is contained in the egg. Instead, the women produce genetic 
replicas of themselves which form the Motherlines of the title. Diversity comes 
from societal arrangements which split the women into tribes and co-mothering 
groups. Charnas provides for an element of natural selection through the 
“childpack” in which the children live till adolescence, growing up like wild 
animals on the margins of the tribe. This process allows only the fit to survive, 
thus ensuring the health of the future propagators of the Motherline. Even so, 
some Motherlines have been lost, and the women although socially viable are in 
need of new genetic material to improve their diversity.  
Despite the artificial origin of their reproductive strategies, the women live 
a very environmental lifestyle and welcome the role of the horses in their 
reproductive cycle as a reminder of their place in nature. In this way, Charnas 
suggests that genetic technology does not have to be anti-nature. In her 
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representation of two complex but far from perfect all-female societies she also 
resists the gender essentialism of other feminist utopian fiction, such as Sally 
Miller Gearhart’s The Wanderground (1979). In The Wanderground the earth 
itself is said to have revolted against male violence, forestalling male potency 
outside the City, and allowing women to develop new powers such as flying and 
the ability to communicate with animals through their close relationship with 
nature. Male violence is represented as intrinsic to male sexuality: “It is not in 
his nature not to rape. It is not in my nature to be raped. We do not co-exist” 
(26). Reproduction is carried out without men, not through biotechnology, but in 
an extension of the women’s new natural powers, a process of egg-merging 
and implantation, taking place deep within the earth. Mario Klarer comments 
that “This blood and earth romanticism is a leitmotif in a number of ecofeminist 
publications. Women extract their power out of nature, which resembles a living 
organism made of flesh and blood” (327).  
The feminist utopias of the 1970s provide an example of the debate 
between social constructivist views of gender as represented by Firestone and 
Wittig and the essentialist views of some ecofeminists such as Gearhart. In 
denying that reproduction is the “natural” role of women, and replacing childbirth 
with technology, feminist utopias can be seen as accepting masculine-centred 
values of scientific domination of nature, while the claim of a privileged position 
for women in relation to nature implies acceptance of the essentialist rhetoric of 
women as biologically and culturally different from men. Australian feminist 
Elizabeth Grosz sums up the dilemma for feminism of both positions: either it 
avoids “essentialist and universalist categories (in which case its rationale as a 
political struggle centered around women is problematized); or it accepts the 
limitations patriarchy imposes on its conceptual schemas and models and 
abandons the attempt to provide autonomous, self-defined terms in which to 
describe women and femininity” (55). However, Donna J. Haraway’s concept of 
the cyborg offers an alternative strategy for linking technology and nature. In “A 
Cyborg Manifesto”, written in the 1980s and later forming part of her influential 
book Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (1991), 
Haraway appropriates the idea of the cyborg, part-animal and part-machine, as 
a feminist icon. She sees the cyborg as “a creature in a post-gender world” 
where “[c]yborg replication is uncoupled from organic reproduction” (150). 
Haraway plays with the image of the cyborg to escape from dualism but also to 
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affirm an iconoclastic belief in feminist science and technology. Cyborg imagery 
also helps avoid metaphors of rebirth based on ideas of reproduction. Instead 
the cyborg evokes concepts of regrowth and regeneration in order to arrive at 
what Haraway describes as “the utopian dream of the hope for a monstrous 
world without gender” (181). Haraway illustrates this concept with examples of 
monstrous hybrids in the work of feminist science fiction, including Joanna 
Russ, Octavia Butler and Vonda McIntyre, but she could just as easily included 
the hermaphrodite protagonist of Burdekin’s Proud Man, or Charnas’s biotech-
enhanced horse-bred Riding Women. Even though the idea of parthenogenesis 
developed by earlier utopian feminists invoked a different set of imagery to that 
of the cyborg, featuring as it did virginal superwomen, supremely competent 
whether as mothers, rulers or scientists, these fictional constructs offer a similar 
disruption to the idea of women as being solely defined by their fertility or their 
relationship to men. The difference being was that the hybrid in question was 
not that of animals and machine, but that of women and their spiritual self, 
striving towards the asexual perfection of fairy folk or goddesses.  
 
7.2  More than Human: Perfect bodies and Perfect minds 
 
Even though the rejection of sexual reproduction by feminist writers of 
utopian fiction suggests a desire to transcend the concerns of the body, perfect 
bodies and physical well-being remain an important theme in utopian fiction. 
The ableist prejudices of eugenics are very visible in utopia, where one of the 
markers of a good society is that everyone is healthy and beautiful. As noted 
above, Samuel Butler in Erewhon promoted a religion of good health and 
suggested that to be diseased was to be criminal. In Elizabeth Corbett’s New 
Amazonia, the health of society is equated with its high moral standards. In 
Jones and Merchant’s utopian society of Caskia “Perfect health and longevity 
are among the rewards of right living practiced from generation to generation” 
(117). Disease is also largely absent in utopian fiction, either cured by science, 
or, as Gilman asserts in Moving the Mountain (1911), eradicated through 
improved hygiene, knowledge and cures. Ernst Bloch attributes this absence of 
disease in utopia to the ancient Greek idea of health as natural balance, and 
disease as disruption to this balance (463-4). This idea of good health being 
natural is certainly true of Gilman’s utopia where her chief concern is over 
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sexually transmitted diseases such as syphilis and gonorrhoea. A tough regime 
of medical-record-keeping ensures that men cannot marry without a clean bill of 
health, and doctors are obliged to report any incidents of STDs. Moreover, with 
disease eradicated, the full force of the medical establishment of Moving the 
Mountain is directed towards curing those previously seen as either insane or 
criminal. By focusing on sexually transmitted disease and curing criminals, 
Gilman is reinforcing the moral dimension of illness at the expense of its 
medical reality and suggesting that ill health can be cured through improving 
standards of morality, and that criminality is just another form of illness.  
On the other hand, Bellamy’s future Boston in Looking Backward (1888) 
is unusual in having an identifiable body of sick people, who are not quietly 
shuffled out of existence. For Bellamy, it is important that the sick have the 
same rights and responsibilities as the able-bodied: “A solution which leaves an 
unaccounted-for residuum is no solution at all; and our solution of the problem 
of human society would have been none at all had it left the lame, the sick, and 
the blind outside with the beasts, to fare as they might” (135). However, there is 
no attempt made at curing sick people because so long as the society as a 
whole is healthy, then it does not matter that individuals within it are less able. 
Eugenics contributed to the utopian belief that all forms of ill-health could be 
bred out of the population through restricting the unhealthy from breeding. In 
utopian fiction, no-one attempts to cure bodies, only spirit, morals and criminal 
tendencies. The conclusion is that the eugenically enhanced humans of the 
future will be perfect in body, mind and morality. Corbett’s rejuvenation process 
is only allowed because the New Amazonians live in what she describes as “the 
most perfect, the most prosperous and the most moral community in existence” 
(47).   
If physical health was a symbol of moral health, there remained a more 
practical element to the utopian concern with breeding better people, that of 
ensuring that humans were intelligent enough to survive into the future. Wells 
feared that humans would be out-evolved by other species, and believed that 
evolution would eliminate whole races or classes of people who were not up to 
scratch in the task of surviving in the modern world. Aldous Huxley feared that 
without intelligence the world would fall prey to dictators and mindless 
consumerism, and that human stupidity would lead to nuclear war, pollution, 
overpopulation and other threats to the human ecosystem. Huxley nonetheless 
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recognised that a society run by highly intelligent people, such as the Alphas of 
Brave New World would be very unstable. Instead, in Brave New World, stability 
is ensured though engineering the mix of intelligence required for different roles, 
and using drugs and conditioning to take the place of citizenship. In Island, a 
more holistic approach to education is taken, with meditation offering a different 
type of intelligence, one that provides resistance to dictatorship for people of all 
levels of intelligence. In Skinner’s Walden Two, social conditioning plays a 
similar role in helping people to live together effectively and eliminate anti-social 
competitive instincts. 
 Right from the beginning, Galton framed eugenics as a matter of 
intelligence, concentrating initially on the question of genius and how to provide 
more intelligent leaders to deal with the increasing problems of governing the 
late-nineteenth-century world. While Wells rejected the idea of the great leader 
and the dictatorship of the Nietzschean Overman represented by Ostrog in 
When the Sleeper Wakes (1899), he still recommended an elite group of 
intelligent technocrats to lead society, such as his Samurai of A Modern Utopia 
(1905). For feminist writers, it was taken as given that women would avoid the 
stupidity of men, though not so much through intelligence as common sense, 
high moral ideals and hard work; while Bellamy saw the death of capitalism and 
the pooling of labour for the common good as providing a social intelligence that 
would ensure the continuing improvement of society. Gilman too was less 
concerned with the intelligence of individuals and more interested in what she 
called social evolution, the ability of society as a whole to learn and progress. 
For her, collective intelligence would be boosted not just through eugenics, but 
education, though as her concerns over immigration grew, so did her interest in 
the quality of the population. 
Intelligence was also seen as crucial to scientific progress and the 
control of nature in the interest of human development. This belief in scientific 
progress and the necessity of humans having the means of controlling the 
natural environment runs through much of the utopian fiction in this study, from 
Corbett’s scientifically managed society of New Amazonia to Callenbach’s 
ecologically ingenious Ecotopia. Butler may have feared what scientific 
progress would bring, in the shape of a world run by machines, but also 
recognised that human progress came from adaptation of mechanical aids, 
which had taken humans from the level of mere survival to civilisations that 
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support culture and science. The application of human intelligence to evolution 
is important because it shows how deeply embedded the idea of human 
domination of the natural world actually was. Evolution is seen as a positive 
force by Bellamy and Gilman, even though temporarily perverted by capitalism 
and patriarchy. Evolution is right because it is natural, but it is also a legitimate 
tool for humans to use to achieve their domination over nature. Charlotte 
Haldane’s Man’s World (1926) is based on a scientific culture which values 
intelligence and sees no limits to the marriage of science and evolution to 
ensure human progress. The ideological conviction that humans belong at the 
top of the natural hierarchy remains strong in utopian fiction and fuels the idea 
of destiny, that it is right for people to keep developing to retain their position of 
power against other natural competitors.  
This urge to improve on the biologically-constrained human animal has 
continued to be expressed in the twenty-first century through movements such 
as transhumanism and posthumanism. Both movements consider the potential 
to genetically engineer humans beyond the current physical and intellectual 
limitations of human existence, and implement what transhumanist Zoltan 
Istvan describes in the fictional Transhumanist Wager (2013) as an attempt to 
achieve immortality. According to Robert Ranisch and Stefan Lorenz Sorgner in 
Post- and Transhumanism: An Introduction (2014), transhumanism involves 
“the radical transformation of human’s biological capacities and social 
conditions by means of technologies”, whereas posthumanism is the 
replacement of humans, whether as “a new biological species, a cybernetic 
organism, or even a digital, disembodied entity” (8). Transhumanism is 
sometimes seen as an abbreviation of transitional human (8), but the term as 
coined by Julian Huxley in 1957 relates more to transcendence than transition. 
Julian Huxley wrote: “The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself. ... 
We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve: man 
remaining man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and 
for his human nature” (17). Transhumanists are not a homogenous group, but 
they do take their guiding principles from “The Transhumanist Declaration”, 
available on the Humanity + website, which offers an endorsement of using 
science and technology to realise human potential through the development of 
techniques to assist mental energy, life extension therapies, reproductive choice 
and cryonics. The UK Transhumanist Association’s website is more forthright in 
262 
 
its declaration that “It is the proper business of human beings to seek to 
improve themselves.” While eugenics per se does not feature in their proposals, 
they do include references to genetic developments in stem cell therapy and 
cloning. The dream of directing evolution lives on in the Transhumanist wish “to 
see an end to the tyranny of nature over humankind” and “the development of 
technologies that will enable us to transform our bodies and brains so that they 
are more powerful, more flexible, and longer-lasting that our current ones, which 
are the product of blind evolution and can be immensely improved upon with the 
right knowledge and some good design.”  
Transhumanists are also interested in the whole area of artificial 
intelligence (AI) and the idea of the technological singularity. The Singularity, as 
popularised by Ray Kurzweil in The Singularity is Near: When Humans 
Transcend Biology (2005), is the point at which machine intelligence will outstrip 
the totality of human intelligence. Kurzweil’s ideas involve a grandiose 
conception of the future:  
The Singularity will allow us to transcend these limitations of our 
biological bodies and brains. We will gain power over our fates. Our 
mortality will be in our own hands… We will fully understand human 
thinking and will vastly extend and expand its reach. By the end of this 
century, the non-biological portion of our intelligence will be trillions of 
trillions of times more powerful than unaided human intelligence. (9) 
 Kurzweil sees The Singularity as helping to correct “the profound limitations of 
biological evolution” (21). He contrast the biological evolution of humans which 
“takes tens of thousands of years to make noticeable, albeit still small, 
differences” with “[c]urrent progress” which “is on a scale that is a thousand to a 
million times faster than biological evolution” (94). But whatever else changes, 
human exceptionalism lives on in the post-Singularity world: “Whether our 
civilization infuses the rest of the universe with its creativity and intelligence 
quickly or slowly depends on its immutability. In any event the “dumb” matter 
and mechanisms of the universe will be transformed into exquisitely sublime 
forms of intelligence, which will constitute the sixth epoch in the evolution of 
patterns of information” (21).   
Whereas the interest of transhumanists in scientific progress aligns them 
with Enlightenment humanism, posthumanists tend to challenge the humanistic 
ideology of Western civilisation. Posthumanist philosopher Francesca Ferrando 
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describes posthumanism as having a “post-anthropocentric and post dualistic” 
approach (27) with its roots in early postmodernism, and embraced by both 
feminist theorists and cultural studies (29). Feminists such as Donna Haraway 
and N. Katherine Hayles are interested in how posthumanism can escape 
privileging the category of human above other forms of being. Hayles regards 
posthumanism as rejecting the importance of human embodiment, other than as 
a means of connecting to intelligent machines: “In the posthuman, there are not 
essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and 
computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot 
teleology and human goals”(3). Although Hayles is concerned about the 
posthumanist erasure of embodiment in relation to the liberal humanist 
tendency to ignore the body in favour of the rational mind, she believes that the 
posthuman partnership between humans and intelligent machines offers the 
possibility of replacing “the liberal humanist subject’s manifest destiny to 
dominate and control nature” (288). Posthumanism has become popular in 
cultural studies, where it offers a way of decentering the human and challenges 
humanism itself and the Enlightenment scientific values that underpin it. Kim 
Toffoletti argues that posthuman images appeal because they are “contradictory 
and unstable”, rather than “because they transcend the body or offer a better 
version of human existence” (4). Cultural critics Judith Halberstam and Ira 
Livingston ask “Are posthuman bodies postgender?” (8), returning to the 
questions raised by Haraway and the concept of the cyborg. 
  The writers of nineteenth- and twentieth-century utopian fiction discussed 
in this thesis mainly subscribes to the same scientific rationalist tradition of 
human improvement as transhumanism. Feminist utopias of the late-nineteenth 
and early-twentieth century broaden the definition of human from primarily 
meaning men to claim a place for women in this category, often at the expense 
of animals and nature. Ecotopias allow a role for nature, but still at a subsidiary 
to level to humans. Posthumanism is largely regarded in a negative light in 
these works, as a threat to what makes human beings human. Samuel Butler’s 
image of the posthuman sees humans superseded by machines, while 
Zamyatin’s fantasiectomy dehumanises people in a far from playful manner. A 
more positive view of the aspirant post-human is provided by Jones and 
Merchant whose Caskians are well on the way to achieving post-human status 
through spiritual transcendence. But even they are described as lacking in 
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imagination and emotional intensity. Burdekin’s androgynous hero of Proud 
Man is a posthuman from our future, who considers the humans of Burdekin’s 
time as subhuman. To be fully human in his/ her view is to have a unified mind, 
“permanently welded into one piece” which leaves no room for dreaming since 
they have “neither fears, nor unfulfilled wishes, nor conflict” (14). For writers of 
utopian fiction, the posthuman is a state beyond desire, which can only be 
reached by sacrificing part of what makes us human, even if the human is still 
imperfect. Popular representations of the post-human show that this 
ambivalence over the posthuman continues. The film The Lobster (Yorgos 
Lanthimos 2015), in which humans are forcibly turned into animals if they are 
not part of a couple, uses monstrous and boundary-breaking transformations to 
interrogate ideas about relationships, while the alien protagonist of Michel 
Faber’s Under the Skin (2000), played by Scarlett Johansson in the 2013 film 
adaptation, offers full-on body horror, epitomising the sense of attraction and 
fear around the figure of the posthuman. The many recent film and TV 
representations of androids and artificial intelligence, such as Alex Garland’s Ex 
Machina (2015), Humans (Channel 4 2015-2016) and Westworld (HBO 2016) 
shows the continuing fascination and concern over our potential posthuman 
successors. The dilemma that the posthuman addresses is one that both Freud 
and Heidegger touch on, which is that the technology that has enabled humans 
to take control of nature now threatens to take control of humans themselves. 
Toffoletti argues that Heidegger’s essay on the “The question concerning 
technology” (1955) “taps into the fear that humans will become powerless 
because they are no longer able to fully control either technology or nature.... A 
point of crisis ensues for the subject as the humans increasingly rely on 
technology to control the unpredictable forces of nature, yet concurrently, the 
‘other-than-human’ machine poses a threat to our very existence” ( 11-12). The 
trajectory of utopian fiction from the late-nineteenth century onwards suggests 
that the ambivalence over the wish to improve humans, and the desire to 
remain fully human is never adequately resolved. Utopian humans are better 
than their present day counterparts, and while they strive towards a future state 
of posthuman or transhuman perfection, they never fully resolve the problems of 
what this future state of being more than human state will involve. 
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7.3  Some Final Thoughts 
 
Refracted through the prism of utopia, eugenics becomes not so much 
about breeding better people as resolving the problems of embodiment. People 
are stupid and get ill. Reproduction is messy. Sexual desire is irrational. Utopian 
eugenics reaches forward to a transhuman alterity which will deal with these 
problems, replacing religious versions of spiritual development with scientific 
ideas of evolution, resulting in a bizarre mix of the biological and the 
transcendent. Patrick Parrinder in his recent book Utopian Literature and 
Science from the Scientific Revolution to Brave New World and Beyond (2015) 
argues that one of the distinguishing features of the modern utopia is lack of 
interest in “spiritual or other-worldly goals” (5). However, late-nineteenth century 
feminist utopias continue to remain far from modern in this respect, as does the 
post-war utopianism of Huxley, Skinner and Callenbach. The purpose of the 
ideal state for Huxley is to support spiritual growth, a distinction which he makes 
through the contrast between the soul-destroying satisfaction of physical needs 
in Brave New World and the anti-consumerist, life-affirming meditative practices 
of Island. Skinner’s Walden Two similarly rejects materialism and consumerism 
for more wholesome pursuits of knowledge, and artistic and physical 
excellence. The eugenic concerns of these texts represent an ambition for 
utopia to encompass more than simple hedonism, with the pursuit of individual 
happiness playing a subsidiary role to the concept of self-sacrifice for the 
improved future of civilisation and the human species. As Jones and Merchant 
put it: “To labor incessantly, to strain the muscles, fret the mind, and weary the 
soul, and to shorten the life, all for the sake of supplying the wants of the body, 
and nothing more, is, I think inconceivable hardship” (120).   
The original starting point of this study was the idea that perfect people 
are needed for a perfect society, but my research has shown that the 
utopianism of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries was not primarily 
about perfection but about perfecting, the process of improving society. Even 
the best societies described are still on their way to becoming better. In Herland 
(1915) each generation aspires to be better than the one before. Eugenics with 
its promise of accelerated evolution and swift but merciful genetic oblivion for 
the least perfect unsurprisingly plays a big role in this process. But the purpose 
of breeding better people is not competitive nationalism but a philosophical 
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quest for self-transcendence. The ever-evolving body represents a striving 
towards increased intelligence and morality which it is hoped will lead to greater 
perfection. My research demonstrates that it was more the idea of improving 
humans than the specifics of eugenics that captured the imagination of writers 
of utopian fiction. They show little interest in the political ramifications of 
eugenics, and their imaginary societies assume a consensual approach to the 
goals that will require eugenic discipline. Directing evolution was seen as more 
important than debating the ethics of specific approaches. Instead, the value of 
these works of utopian fiction resides in their representation of what to the 
writers are self-evident certainties. These treatises, often uncontaminated by 
realism, reveal the underlying conversations that fuelled and inspired the 
political enactment of eugenics. My study demonstrates that even works which 
at first do not appear to have much connection to eugenics engage with the 
wider issues of marriage, procreation, parenting and fashioning of the improved 
citizen, and suggest that utopian fiction provides a valuable resource for further 
study of the penetration of eugenic ideas into the psyche and mindset of late-
nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century society.  
 Fictional representations of eugenics have not disappeared. The 
increasing science-fictionalisation of utopia has allowed eugenics to thrive in the 
late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries, providing it with new names and 
allowing the dream of reinventing and improving humanity to take new forms. 
The popularity of the Young Adult dystopia has re-introduced eugenics as a 
topic, for example in the genetic experimentation behind the stratified society of 
Veronica Roth’s Divergent trilogy. Genetic divergence and development of a 
new race of humans is also a key element in the continuing popularity of Marvel 
Comics’s various X-Men titles and the X-Men movies. Recent TV series such as 
Utopia (2013-14) and Orphan Black (2013-17) pick up on eugenic themes in the 
form of bioterrorists determined to reduce the world’s population, or genetic 
engineering of clones to promote “Neolution”, a new form of evolution. These 
current fictional representations of the biological future of humankind often 
indicate a sense of despair about the world that the next generations will inherit, 
seen as overpopulated and on the brink of ecological breakdown. The 
underlying theme seems to be that eugenics may not be good, but the 
alternatives are worse. The narratology of climate change which focuses on the 
idea of forces beyond our control has also adds a renewed sense of urgency to 
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the idea of improving people and making ourselves smart enough to control 
these forces. These recent works continue to ask similar questions to those 
posed by the utopian fiction of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century: 
questions about whether we can have a better society without better people, or 
why we need a better society and what the consequences of not striving to 
imagine better ways of organising society can be. For us, as for the Victorians, 
standing still is not an option, when the material world is changing fast, in our 
case through climate change, industrialisation of the Third World, globalisation, 
social media and virtual reality. It seems that we, as a society, are once more 
afraid of being out-evolved, not by another species, but by our own children and 
our own machines. Maybe Samuel Butler was more prescient than most in his 
predictions in “The Book of the Machines”, even if it was only a convenient 
analogy for evolution.    
 Returning to earlier works of utopian fiction to read the interaction with 
eugenics offers a useful perspective on current transhumanist utopianism and 
debates over humanism, posthumanism, gender difference and environmental 
rights. Reading these earlier works shows how similar the concerns over the 
future of the human species remain, and how much more slowly the human 
imagination changes than the social environment and advancing technologies 
that feed it. Better understanding of the kind of utopian ideas that motivated 
eugenics can offer perspective on the relationship between fictional 
representations and societal acceptance of ideas. In a recent anthology of 
transhumanist predictions, The End of the Beginning (2015), Viktoras Veitas of 
the Global Brain Institute points out that  “Due to the reflexivity of 
sociotechnological systems, merely thinking and imagining the future means 
influencing it” (“Dialogue 1.1”). Popular culture now has a vast machinery for 
imagining the future, numerous media channels and mass audiences. In theory 
there should be no limits on what the popular, crowd-sourced imagination of the 
modern world can achieve. Yet, improved technology and greater levels of 
planning are not sufficient in themselves to deal with developments which 
challenge the trajectory of modern progress palpable in the form of Islamic 
extremism, the rise of right-wing populism, anti-abortion rhetoric and denial of 
the science behind climate change and evolution itself. It is important to 
understand what we can learn from utopianism, to be able to read its forms not 
just in the classical works of utopian fiction, but in the utopianism and 
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dystopianism of the emerging modern world to look at where the dream of 
scientific self-improvement can take us, and where it can lead us massively 
astray. Pulitzer prize-winning scientist Siddhartha Mukherjee argues in a recent 
TED talk that the metaphor of killing microbes to cure disease has locked 
Western medicine into an ineffective paradigm of targeting disease instead of 
re-growing cells. The metaphor in eugenics of preventing those who were 
defective from breeding led to mass sterilisations. Metaphors matter and 
utopian fiction in its past and present incarnations is an important source of 
metaphors. Historical studies of the scientific dreams of utopian fiction, such as 
this work on eugenics in utopian fiction, can help us understand whether we are 
using the appropriate metaphors and which metaphors might require re-
examining, or changing, to understand and fashion the kind of world we wish to 
live in.  
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